UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LUCAS WALL,

Plaintiff, v. Civ. Action No. 20-2075 RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE (EGS/GMH) INSURANCE CO., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Lucas Wall (“Mr. Wall”), proceeding pro se,

brings this lawsuit against Reliance Standard Life Insurance

Company (“Reliance”) and Dr. Tajuddin Jiva, M.D. (“Dr. Jiva”)

(collectively, “Defendants”), seeking damages following the

termination of his disability benefits. Second Am. Compl., ECF

No. 32; 1 Wall v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. CV 20-2075

(EGS),

, at *12 (D.D.C. June 1, 2021). As

relevant here, Mr. Wall alleges one count of medical malpractice

against Dr. Jiva. See Wall,

, at *12.

On February 1, 2022, the Court referred this case to a

magistrate judge for full case management, see Minute Order

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of the filed documents. 1 (Feb. 1, 2022); and the case was randomly assigned to Magistrate

Judge G. Michael Harvey, see Docket Civ. Action No. 20-2075. Dr.

Jiva thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss

the count against him. See Def., Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Mot. J.

Pleadings Dismiss Count VII of Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 73. On

July 5, 2022, Magistrate Judge Harvey issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R. & R.”) recommending that the Court grant Dr.

Jiva’s motion. See R. & R., ECF No. 83.

Pending before the Court are Mr. Wall’s Objections to the

R. & R., see Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate’s R. & R. on Def. Tajuddin

Jiva’s Mot. J. Pleadings (“Pl.’s Objs.”), ECF No. 84; and Mr.

Wall’s Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1, 2021 Order,

see Pl.’s Mot. Vacate Part of Ct.’s June 1, 2021, Order &

Reinstate Counts II & IV of Second Am. Compl. Against Def.

Tajuddin Jiva (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 85. Upon careful

consideration of the R. & R., the objections, and opposition

thereto; the motion and opposition thereto; the applicable law;

and the entire record herein, the Court hereby ADOPTS Magistrate

Judge Harvey’s R. & R., see ECF No. 83; GRANTS Dr. Jiva’s Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings, see ECF No. 73; and DENIES Mr.

Wall’s Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1, 2021 Order,

see ECF No. 85.

2 II. Background

A. Factual

The background of this litigation was set forth in the

Court’s prior opinion and will not be repeated here. See Wall,

, at *1. In short, Mr. Wall alleges that Reliance

underwrites and administers his long-term disability benefits

through a policy for the employees of the American Association

of State Highway & Transportation Officials, by whom he was

employed from June 2008 until March 2012. See Second Am. Compl.,

ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 1-2. In March 2012, Mr. Wall became “Totally

Disabled” due to Non-24-Hour Sleep/Wake Disorder. Id. ¶ 1. He

received long-term disability benefits until January 29, 2020,

when Reliance notified him that it was terminating his benefits.

Id. ¶ 11.

On April 30, 2020, Mr. Wall appealed Reliance’s termination

decision. Id. ¶ 15. He alleges that Reliance then commissioned a

“peer review” by Dr. Jiva and that he submitted a rebuttal to

Dr. Jiva’s report. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Reliance denied his appeal on

July 29, 2020. Id. ¶ 20. Thereafter, Reliance had Mr. Wall

undergo an Independent Medical Examination, after which the

termination of his benefits was reversed. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.

B. Procedural

On April 5, 2022, Dr. Jiva moved for judgment on the

pleadings. See Def., Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Mot. J. Pleadings

3 Dismiss Count VII of Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 73. Mr. Wall

filed a brief in opposition on April 24, 2022, see Pl.’s Opp’n

Def. Tajuddin Jiva’s Mot. J. Pleadings, ECF No. 75; and Dr. Jiva

filed his reply brief on May 2, 2022, see Def. Tajuddin Jiva,

M.D.’s Reply Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. J. Pleadings Dismiss Count

VII, Pl.’s Medical Malpractice Claim, from Second Am. Compl.,

ECF No. 77. On July 5, 2022, Magistrate Judge Harvey issued his

R. & R. recommending that the Court grant Dr. Jiva’s motion. See

R. & R., ECF No. 83.

On July 19, 2022, Mr. Wall submitted Objections to the R. &

R. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84. Dr. Jiva filed an opposition

brief on August 2, 2022. See Def., Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Resp.

Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s R. & R. (#83) on Def.’s Mot. J.

Pleadings (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 87.

Mr. Wall also filed a Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s

June 1, 2021 Order on July 20, 2022. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85.

Dr. Jiva filed his opposition on August 2, 2022. See Def.,

Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. (#85) Vacate Part of

Ct.’s June 1, 2021 Order (#26) (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 86.

The objections and the motion are now ripe and ready for

adjudication.

4 III. Legal Standard

A. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R. & R.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party

may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has

entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)-(2).

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended

disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also

(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate judge.”). A district court “must

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition

that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

“If, however, the party makes only conclusory or general

objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the

Court reviews the [R. & R.] only for clear error.” Houlahan v.

Brown,

(D.D.C. 2013) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the clearly erroneous

standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled to great

deference” and “is clearly erroneous only if on the entire

evidence the court is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of Columbia,

No. CV 16-1920 (CKK),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12,

2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v.

Mukasey,

(D.D.C. 2009)).

5 Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the

proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made

and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections

which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the

magistrate judge are not ‘properly objected to’ and are

therefore not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA,

(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Morgan v. Astrue, No.

08-2133,

, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009)). The

Court reviews Mr. Wall’s objections de novo.

B. Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

“[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay

trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(c). A motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) is appropriately

granted when, at the close of the pleadings, “no material issue

of fact remains to be solved, and [the movant] is clearly

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Montanans for Multiple

Use v. Barbouletos,

(D.D.C. 2008)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

When evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings

under Rule 12(c), courts employ the same standard that governs a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med.

Colls.,

, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2004). A court must

treat the factual allegations in the complaint as true, “even if

6 doubtful in fact,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007); but it need not accept as true legal conclusions set

forth in a complaint, Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). Accordingly, a court must accept the plaintiff’s well-

pleaded factual allegations to the extent that “they plausibly

give rise to an entitlement to relief,”

; and “may

thus only grant judgment on the pleadings if it appears, even

accepting as true all inferences from the complaint’s factual

allegations, that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts

entitling him to relief,” Lans v. Adduci Mastriani & Schaumberg

LLP,

(D.D.C. 2011) (citing In re United

Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig.,

(D.D.C. 1994)).

C. Motion to Vacate Order

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs Mr. Wall’s

Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1, 2021 Order, ECF No.

85, because the Court has not entered a final judgment. Shapiro

v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. CV 13-555 (RDM),

, at

*2 (D.D.C. May 25, 2016) (applying Rule 54(b) to a motion for

reconsideration “[b]ecause the Court ha[d] not entered final

judgment”). Under Rule 54(b), “the Court [may] revisit any order

that adjudicates ‘fewer than all the claims or rights and

liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . at any time

7 before’ the entry of final judgment.”

(quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 54(b)).

The standard for determining whether or not to grant a Rule

54(b) motion is the “as justice requires” standard. Jud. Watch

v. Dep’t of Army,

(D.D.C. 2006). Under

this flexible standard, the Court considers “whether the court

patently misunderstood the parties, made a decision beyond the

adversarial issues presented, made an error in failing to

consider controlling decisions or data, or whether a controlling

or significant change in the law has occurred.” In Def. of

Animals v. Nat’l Insts. of Health,

(D.D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Montgomery v. Internal Revenue Serv.,

(D.D.C. 2019), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (“[T]here

must be some ‘good reason’ to reconsider an issue already

litigated by the parties and decided by the court, such as new

information, a misunderstanding, or a clear error.”).

The moving party has the burden of demonstrating “‘that

some harm, legal or at least tangible, would flow from a denial

of reconsideration.’” In Def. of Animals,

(quoting Cobell v. Norton,

(D.D.C.

2005)). “[E]ven if justice does not require reconsideration of

an interlocutory ruling, a decision to reconsider is nonetheless

within the court’s discretion.”

(internal quotation marks

8 omitted). However, this discretion is “limited by the law of the

case doctrine and ‘subject to the caveat that where litigants

have once battled for the court’s decision, they should neither

be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it

again.’”

(quoting Singh v. George Wash. Univ.,

(D.D.C. 2005)).

D. Pro Se Litigants

“[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in

all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress,

No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR),

, at *2 (D.D.C. July 5,

2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner,

(1972)). The

pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally

construed.” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (per

curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even

so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates,

(D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch,

(D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply

with federal and local rules. See Jarrell,

;

Roosevelt Land,

, at *2.

9 III. Analysis

A. New York Law Governs Mr. Wall’s Medical Malpractice Claim

Mr. Wall objects to Magistrate Judge Harvey’s conclusion

that New York substantive law should govern this dispute and

argues that District of Columbia substantive law should apply

instead. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 7-10. For the reasons

that follow, the Court concludes that New York law applies to

Mr. Wall’s medical malpractice claim and ADOPTS this portion of

Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R.

To resolve Mr. Wall’s medical malpractice claim against Dr.

Jiva, the Court first must determine whether New York or

District of Columbia law governs the dispute. 2 Magistrate Judge

Harvey resolved the dispute in favor of New York law on two

grounds: (1) New York law applies because the parties implicitly

agree that New York law applies, see R. & R., ECF No. 83 at 6-7;

and (2) New York law applies because New York has a greater

interest in applying its law to this dispute, see id. at 8-12.

Mr. Wall objects to both conclusions, see Pl.’s Objs., ECF No.

84 at 7-10; and the Court addresses each objection in turn.

2 As Magistrate Judge Harvey explained in the R. & R., New York and District of Columbia law are the only options to resolve this choice-of-law question. See R. & R., ECF No. 83 at 6 & n.4. The medical malpractice claim involves Dr. Jiva, who is a resident of New York, and Mr. Wall, who is a resident of the District of Columbia. See Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 at 2. 10 1. The Parties’ Agreement

Mr. Wall first argues that he did not agree—implicitly or

otherwise—that New York law governs this dispute. See id. at 7-

8. He contends that, as a pro se litigant, he did not waive or

forfeit any choice-of-law arguments because he “ha[s] no concept

of ‘choice of law’” and is “therefore entitled to deference in

raising these arguments now.” Id. at 7. For further support, he

points to his briefing on Dr. Jiva’s motion and reasons that his

reference to the law of other jurisdictions—including, for

example, Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts,

Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, and

Virginia—confirms that he did not understand the choice-of-law

question. Id. at 7-8 (citing R. & R., ECF No. 83 at 7). Dr. Jiva

responds that Mr. Wall waived any argument that District of

Columbia law applies here because he did not raise that argument

in his Rule 12(c) opposition briefing. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 87

at 2 (citing Essroc Cement Corp. v. CTI/D.C., Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2010); Am. Civ. Constr., LLC v. Fort Myer

Constr. Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2018)). He

further argues that Mr. Wall’s ignorance of choice-of-law

principles is no excuse. See

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey’s analysis

and conclusion. In deciding a choice-of-law question, a court

may apply the law of the jurisdiction that the parties agree

11 governs the dispute. See Perry Cap. LLC v. Mnuchin,

, 626 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (applying Delaware law where

parties agreed to apply Delaware law); Am. Civ. Constr., LLC,

(applying District of Columbia law to

contract dispute where parties “appear[ed] to implicitly agree”

that District of Columbia law should govern). The parties’

agreement also serves as waiver of any objection to the court’s

application of that law. See Perry Cap. LLC,

n.24. Here, the parties—including Mr. Wall—have agreed that New

York law should govern the medical malpractice claim. Dr. Jiva

argued that New York law should apply in his Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings. See Mem. in Supp. of Def. Tajuddin Jiva,

M.D.’s Mot. J. Pleadings Dismiss Count VII, Pl.’s Medical

Malpractice Claim, from Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 73-1 at 4-6.

Mr. Wall accepted that New York law would govern this claim in

his opposition brief. See Pl.’s Opp’n Def. Tajuddin Jiva’s Mot.

J. Pleadings, ECF No. 75 at 3 (“There are four basic elements of

a compensable medical malpractice claim in New York.”); id. at 4

(“Dr. Jiva ignores that New York law defines medical misconduct

as including ‘Practicing the profession with gross negligence on

a particular occasion’ and ‘Practicing the profession with gross

incompetence.’” (quoting

)); id. at 8

(“There is no distinction in New York between malpractice

insurance available to doctors performing independent medical

12 exams than to those practicing medicine in more traditional

contexts.” (citing Bazakos v. Lewis,

(N.Y.

2009))). Mr. Wall did not suggest that the law of any

jurisdiction other than New York should apply to this claim,

thereby conceding that New York law governs. See Buggs v.

Powell,

(D.D.C. 2003) (“It is

understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an

opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain

arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those

arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”

(citing FDIC v. Bender,

, 67–68 (D.C. Cir. 1997);

Stephenson v. Cox,

(D.D.C. 2002))).

Mr. Wall’s status as a pro se plaintiff does not change the

Court’s conclusion. True, the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff

are “subject to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.’” Gray v. Poole,

(D.C.

Cir. 2002) (quoting Haines,

). Nevertheless, the

Court cannot ignore the fact that Mr. Wall failed to address Dr.

Jiva’s specific argument that New York law applies to the

medical malpractice claim. See Boritz v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2010) (treating argument as conceded

where pro se plaintiff failed to respond to it despite

submitting an opposition brief). Nor can it avoid Mr. Wall’s

specific references to New York law. See supra. The Court is

13 therefore satisfied that Mr. Wall agreed that New York law

governs his medical malpractice claim.

2. Choice-of-Law Analysis

Mr. Wall also objects to Magistrate Judge Harvey’s choice-

of-law analysis. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 8-10. He

concedes, as he must, that Magistrate Judge Harvey relied on the

appropriate legal standard. Id. at 8-9. That is: a federal court

sitting in diversity must “apply the choice-of-law rules of the

jurisdiction in which they sit.” Ideal Elec. Sec. Co. v. Int’l

Fid. Ins. Co.,

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Lee v.

Flintkote Co.,

, 1278–79 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).

District of Columbia law requires that the Court first determine

whether a “true conflict” exists between the laws of the

jurisdictions. See Margolis v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Estate of Doe v. Islamic

Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2011);

Sloan v. Urban Title Servs., Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2010); GEICO v. Fetisoff,

(D.C. Cir.

1992)). Where, as here, there is a true conflict, the Court

applies the District of Columbia’s “‘modified governmental

interests analysis which seeks to identify the jurisdiction with

the most significant relationship to the dispute.’”

(quoting

Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n,

(D.C.

2006)). Under this approach, the Court considers four factors:

14 (1) the place where the injury occurred, (2) the place where the

conduct causing the injury occurred, (3) the domicile or place

of business of the parties, and (4) the place where the parties’

relationship is centered. See Drs. Groover, Christie & Merritt,

P.C. v. Burke,

(D.C. 2007) (citing

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145). “As a rule,

‘the state with the most significant relationship should also be

the state whose policy is advanced by application of [its]

law.’” Id. at 1118 (quoting Hercules & Co. Ltd. v. Shama Rest.

Corp.,

, 41 n.18 (D.C. 1989)).

Mr. Wall objects to four points in the R. & R. See Pl.’s

Objs., ECF No. 84 at 8-10. First, he argues that Magistrate

Judge Harvey incorrectly determined that the first factor—the

place where the injury occurred—weighs in favor of New York. See

id. at 8. He contends that the injury occurred in the District

of Columbia because that is “where [he] reside[s] and was forced

to do without half [his] income after [his] long-term disability

benefits were revoked as a result of Dr. Jiva’s shoddy peer

review.” Id. Dr. Jiva does not specifically address this point

in his opposition briefing. See generally Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No.

87. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey

that this factor does not support either jurisdiction. See R. &

R., ECF No. 83 at 11-12. As the Court explained in its prior

Memorandum Opinion, Mr. Wall’s medical malpractice claim “is not

15 related to the denial of benefits, but rather alleges that Dr.

Jiva’s conduct breached the applicable standard of care.” Wall,

, at *11. This point is essential: Mr. Wall’s

medical malpractice claim survived because it did not conflict

with the provisions or object of ERISA. See

The claim did

not conflict with ERISA because it focused on an injury other

than the denial of benefits. See

As such, the Court is

persuaded that the injury for this claim must have occurred when

Dr. Jiva transmitted his report to Reliance, not when Mr. Wall

was denied his benefits. See

Because Dr. Jiva transmitted

his report from New York to Pennsylvania, New York does not have

a strong claim on this factor. Further, because the transmission

of the report did not involve the District of Columbia, the

District of Columbia does not have a claim on this factor

either. The Court therefore concludes that Magistrate Judge

Harvey correctly determined that the first factor does not

support application of the law of either jurisdiction.

Second, Mr. Wall contends that the second factor—the place

where the conduct causing the injury occurred—favors application

of District of Columbia law. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 9-

10. Specifically, he argues that Dr. Jiva’s conduct “directly

led” to his injuries. Id. at 10. This argument is unpersuasive.

The inquiry is where Dr. Jiva’s conduct occurred. Because Dr.

Jiva acted in New York, this second factor points in favor of

16 New York law. See Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 ¶ 256 (stating

that Defendant Jiva “practices in New York”); Ex. 22, ECF No.

21-22 at 2 (stating that Dr. Jiva’s “[r]eport was written in New

York state”).

Third, Mr. Wall argues that the fourth factor—the place

where the parties’ relationship is centered—should weigh in

favor of District of Columbia law. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84

at 9. He does not explain this objection. See generally id.

Because the Court detects no error in the R. & R., the Court

agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey that the parties’

relationship is centered in New York. See Houlahan,

(“If, however, the party makes only conclusory or

general objections, . . . the Court reviews the [R. & R.] only

for clear error.”).

Fourth, Mr. Wall contends that the District of Columbia has

the stronger interest in having its law applied to this claim.

See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 9. He points to: (1) “the general

public policy interest of ensuring that D.C. residents receive

adequate medical care and are not injured by physicians who are

sworn to help people”; (2) the “special concern” that people

with disabilities “receive[] the disability benefits to which

[they are] entitled”; and (3) the financial harm the

jurisdiction suffers when people with disabilities who are

denied disability benefits become public charges.

Mr. Wall

17 has misconstrued the caselaw here. The Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has explained that

“‘[t]he state where the defendant’s conduct occurs has the

dominant interest in regulating it,’ . . . particularly so

where, as here, it is impossible meaningfully to separate the

injury from the tortious conduct, and where other factors—such

as the residence or place of business of the parties—do not

point in the opposite direction.” Bledsoe v. Crowley,

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Biscoe v. Arlington Cnty.,

, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Restatement (Second) of

Conflict of Laws § 146). Here, Dr. Jiva’s conduct occurred in

New York. Further, the fourth factor also weighs in favor of

application of New York law, and the first and third factors do

not favor application of the law of either jurisdiction. See

supra. Accordingly, New York has the stronger interest in having

its law applied to this medical malpractice claim. See also Drs.

Groover, Christie & Merritt,

(“As a rule, ‘the

state with the most significant relationship should also be the

state whose policy is advanced by application of [its] law.’”

(quoting Hercules,

n.18)).

The Court therefore concludes that New York law governs Mr.

Wall’s medical malpractice claim and ADOPTS this portion of

Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R.

18 B. The Court Will Not Permit Mr. Wall to Pursue His Previously Dismissed Negligence and Bad Faith Claims Against Dr. Jiva

Mr. Wall asks the Court to “reinstate” his negligence and

bad faith claims against Dr. Jiva. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84

at 1-7; Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 1-8. He admits “uncertainty as

to how the Court must achieve th[is] result,” Pl.’s Objs., ECF

No. 84 at 6; and provides two routes: (1) reject Magistrate

Judge Harvey’s recommendation that the Court grant Dr. Jiva’s

motion and instead convert the medical malpractice claim into a

negligence claim, see id. at 1-7; or (2) vacate the Court’s June

1, 2021 Order dismissing Counts II and IV of the Second Amended

Complaint and reinstate those claims against Dr. Jiva, see Pl.’s

Mot., ECF No. 85 at 1-8. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES

Mr. Wall’s motion.

1. Magistrate Judge Harvey Appropriately Considered Only Mr. Wall’s Medical Malpractice Claim Against Dr. Jiva

Mr. Wall first argues that, upon concluding that a

physician-patient relationship did not exist, Magistrate Judge

Harvey should have reinstated his negligence and bad faith

claims against Dr. Jiva instead of granting Dr. Jiva judgment on

the pleadings. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 1-7. He reasons

that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate because the

Second Amended Complaint contains material facts that Dr. Jiva

did not dispute. See id. at 2-3. He further contends that

19 Magistrate Judge Harvey erred by failing to consider whether the

medical malpractice claim could be converted into negligence and

bad faith claims given the caselaw in New York permitting the

latter two claims to proceed without the existence of a

physician-patient relationship. See id. at 3-6.

The Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Harvey

appropriately recommended that Dr. Jiva be granted judgment on

the pleadings. As explained supra, Magistrate Judge Harvey

correctly determined that there was no physician-patient

relationship between Mr. Wall and Dr. Jiva. The facts Mr. Wall

discusses in his Objections to the R. & R. go to the elements of

a medical malpractice claim. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 1-7.

But because “‘[l]iability for medical malpractice may not be

imposed in the absence of a physician-patient relationship,’”

Blau v. Benodin,

(N.Y. App. Div. 2021)

(quoting Thomas v. Hermoso,

(N.Y. App.

Div. 2013)); Dr. Jiva did not need to establish anything else to

succeed in his motion.

The only appropriate action for the Court to take, then, is

to grant Dr. Jiva judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(c). Magistrate Judge Harvey had no occasion to consider

taking any other action, including reinstating claims that this

Court previously dismissed, because Dr. Jiva’s motion was the

only motion before him. See Docket for Civ. Action No. 20-2075.

20 Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Harvey’s

recommendation that the Court grant Dr. Jiva judgment on the

pleadings.

2. The Court Agrees with Its Prior Decision to Dismiss Mr. Wall’s Negligence and Bad Faith Claims Against Dr. Jiva

Mr. Wall has also filed a motion asking the Court to vacate

the part of its June 1, 2021 Order dismissing his negligence and

bad faith claims against Dr. Jiva. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85.

The Court construes the Motion to Vacate as a motion for

reconsideration under Rule 54(b). See Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of

Just.,

, 6 n.8 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that Rule

54(b) supplies the appropriate standard where a party asks the

court to alter or amend an interlocutory judgment). Rule 54(b)

provides that an order or decision which “adjudicates fewer than

all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all

the parties” is subject to revision “at any time before the

entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the

parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). A Rule

54(b) motion for reconsideration should be granted “as justice

requires.” Cobell,

. What “justice

requires” depends on the circumstances.

For example, justice

may require revision of a prior opinion and order when the Court

“has patently misunderstood a party,” has made a decision

outside the scope of the issues presented by the parties, “has

21 made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension,” or where

there has been a significant or controlling change in the law or

facts since the issue was submitted to the Court.

(citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has broad

discretion in ruling on a Rule 54(b) motion for reconsideration.

As a preliminary matter, Dr. Jiva argues that Mr. Wall’s

Motion to Vacate is untimely. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 86 at 3, 5-

6. He contends that “[t]here is significant undue delay [in Mr.

Wall’s] request, as the matter has been pending for almost two

years and Defendant Jiva’s Motion for Judgment has been pending

for approximately four (4) months.”

at 5 (citing Smith v.

Angelone,

(4th Cir. 1997); Molovinsky v.

Monterey Co-Op, Inc.,

(D.C. 1996)). He also

compares this motion to a motion for leave to amend a complaint

after summary judgment has been granted and points to the

caselaw denying such motions to amend where, as here, “the

[p]laintiff has waited many years before seeking amendments or

summary judgment has already been granted.”

(citing Gillard

v. Gruenberg,

(D.D.C. 2018)).

The Court declines to find Mr. Wall’s Motion to Vacate to

be untimely. The Federal Rules do not establish a deadline for

filing a Rule 54(b) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Court

finds no occasion to impose a deadline here. Dr. Jiva’s

22 citations are unpersuasive: Smith involves a federal habeas

petition, Smith,

; and Molovinsky involves

state court rules on amending a complaint, Molovinsky,

(discussing D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 15). This

motion is also unlike a motion for leave to amend a complaint;

Mr. Wall is instead asking the Court to revise its prior

Memorandum Opinion and Order so that he may pursue claims he has

already attempted to add to his complaint. See Second Am.

Compl., ECF 32. The Court therefore will proceed to the merits

of the motion.

Mr. Wall contends that the Court must allow him to pursue

his negligence and bad faith claims because it “is not in the

interest of justice” for him to be left without a remedy against

Dr. Jiva. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 1. As to the negligence

claim, he first argues that “the Court did not offer any

analysis of the claim specifically against Dr. Jiva” and instead

determined that ERISA preempted the negligence claim against

Reliance. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 2 (citing Wall,

, at *9). He reasons that, like his medical malpractice

claim, his negligence claim against Dr. Jiva does not “relate

to” an ERISA plan.

at 5 (citing Padeh v. Zagoria,

(S.D. Fla. 1995)). Mr. Wall has misread the

Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion. There, the Court specifically

considered his negligence claims against Reliance, Dr. Brodner,

23 and Dr. Jiva. Wall,

, at *9. The Court determined

that none of these claims would survive a motion to dismiss

because the claims “ask the Court to review the manner in which

the termination decision was made” and thus seek to “supplement[

] . . . the ERISA civil enforcement remedy.”

(quoting Aetna

Health Inc. v. Davila,

(2004)). The Court

agrees with its previous reasoning that the negligence claim

against Dr. Jiva is preempted. Because a preempted claim would

not survive a motion to dismiss, the Court correctly denied Mr.

Wall’s motion for leave to amend his complaint to add this

claim. See James Madison Ltd. By Hecht v. Ludwig,

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Courts may deny a motion to amend a

complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not

survive a motion to dismiss.” (citing Foman v. Davis,

(1962))).

Mr. Wall further argues that the Court failed to consider:

New York caselaw permitting negligence claims when plaintiffs

cannot pursue medical malpractice claims, the allegations he has

made against Dr. Jiva, and the elements of a negligence claim.

See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 2-6. The Court does not need to

consider any of these arguments. A plaintiff may not maintain a

state-law claim where, as here, it is preempted by ERISA. See

Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

(2016).

24 The Court therefore DENIES Mr. Wall’s motion as to his

negligence claim.

As to the bad faith claim, Mr. Wall accuses the Court of

dismissing the claim without citing any authority or explaining

its reasoning. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 6. He contends that

he “state[d] [his] case for bad faith” in the Second Amended

Complaint and that he incorporated his bad faith claim from his

New York State Department of Health complaint into the Second

Amended Complaint.

at 5-6 (citing Second Am. Compl., ECF No.

32 ¶¶ 119, 176, 177-83). He also argues that the Rule 15(a)(2)

standard requires that the Court allow him to maintain this

claim.

at 8 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)).

Again, Mr. Wall has misread the Court’s prior Memorandum

Opinion. There, the Court explained: “As to his claims for ‘bad

faith’ against . . . Dr. Jiva, Mr. Wall has presented no

authority supporting a common law cause of action for ‘bad

faith’ under District of Columbia law based on the allegations

in the Amended Complaint, and the Court is aware of none.” Wall,

, at *6. Having reviewed the Second Amended

Complaint and incorporated materials again, the Court agrees

with its prior analysis. In the Second Amended Complaint, Mr.

Wall discusses bad faith claims—but only against insurance

companies. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 119-174. He does not

provide any legal authority for his claim against Dr. Jiva, see

25 id. ¶¶ 176-77; and the papers he incorporates do not supply that

authority either, see Ex. 22, ECF No. 21-22 at 24-25. By failing

to cite any legal authority, Mr. Wall failed to provide a theory

of liability and therefore failed to state a claim to relief.

See Young v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. CV 17-02428 (JDB),

, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2018) (dismissal was warranted

where complaint did not include the specific causes of action

under which the plaintiffs were suing). Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Mr. Wall’s Motion to Vacate as to his bad faith claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the Court ADOPTS

Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R., see ECF No. 83; GRANTS Dr.

Jiva’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, see ECF No. 73; and

DENIES Mr. Wall’s Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1,

2021 Order, see ECF No. 85. An appropriate Order accompanies

this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge March 27, 2023

26