UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALEJANDRO TOLEDO,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-627 (BAH) v. Judge Beryl A. Howell U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Alejandro Toledo, who served as President of Peru from 2001 to 2006, has for

the past several years been fighting his requested extradition to that country to face charges of

collusion and money laundering. Despite his ongoing proceedings in the Ninth Circuit and the

Northern District of California also challenging his extradition, plaintiff has turned to this Court

to enjoin the United States Department of State from acting upon its final determination to

extradite him to the Peruvian authorities, on the ground that the determination ran afoul of his

constitutional due process rights. See Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 1; Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Relief (“Pl.’s

Mot.”) at 1–2, ECF No. 5. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of

his due process claim, however and accordingly, this alternative route to the same end he is

simultaneously pursuing in federal court on the opposite coast of this country, fails and

plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order is denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Although this suit does not concern the merits of the underlying criminal prosecution in

Peru, the allegations against plaintiff will be briefly outlined as relevant background for

plaintiff’s extradition proceedings. Then, because plaintiff’s challenge is to the process he has

1 been afforded prior to the State Department’s extradition determination, a detailed overview of

the United States’ extradition process in general and the events to date in plaintiff’s proceedings

is provided as context in assessing the instant complaint about insufficient process.

A. Underlying Criminal Charges

Plaintiff’s legal troubles began in 2016 or 2017, when Peruvian authorities began

investigating allegations that plaintiff had participated in a massive money laundering scheme in

connection with the construction of a large highway project during his presidential term. Compl.

¶ 32 (alleging the investigation began in early 2017); id., Ex. B, WilmerHale White Paper to

Secretary of State and Letters of Support (Oct. 28, 2022) (“White Paper”) at 2, 17, ECF No. 1-3

(dating the beginning of the investigation to 2016). The investigation culminated in influence

peddling, collusion, and money laundering charges filed in mid-2018, accusing plaintiff of

soliciting and laundering millions of dollars in bribes from the Brazilian construction

conglomerate Odebrecht S.A. Id. ¶ 33; Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Relief (“Def.’s Opp’n”),

Ex. 1, Excerpts from Record of Peruvian Extradition Proceedings (“Peruvian Extradition

Record”)) at 10–17, 162–66, ECF No. 9-1. 1

Shortly after the investigation began, plaintiff relocated to the United States, where he is

a lawful permanent resident. See Peruvian Extradition Record at 45–47. While plaintiff has not

faced criminal charges in the United States related to his alleged role in the bribery scheme, the

United States has successfully pursued two civil forfeiture proceedings based on the same

underlying facts, resulting in the recovery and return to Peru of approximately $686,000 that

plaintiff and other members of his family had used to purchase real estate as part of a scheme

“designed to hide Toledo’s ownership of the funds and their connection to Odebrecht.” See

1 Peru subsequently dropped the influence peddling charge. See In re Extradition of Toledo Manrique, No. 19-mj-71055 (TSH),

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2021).

2 Department of Justice, Press Release No. 22-933 (Aug. 31, 2022), https://perma.cc/6FAE-34EX;

Def.’s Opp’n at 12 n.2. The United States did prosecute the construction company Odebrecht,

which pled guilty in 2016 to a charge stemming from its own role in the bribery scheme; as part

of its plea agreement, Odebrecht stipulated to the fact that the scheme operated in Peru during

plaintiff’s presidency. See Department of Justice, Press Release No. 16-1515 (Dec. 21, 2016),

https://perma.cc/E3KW-694L; Odebrecht Plea Agreement (Dec. 21, 2016), Att. B, Statement of

Facts ¶¶ 20, 43, 65–66, https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/919916/download.

Plaintiff maintains his innocence, arguing that the prosecution is politically motivated and

that the prosecution’s lead witness, who has died since the beginning of the investigation and so

cannot be cross-examined, is untrustworthy. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 34–35; Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot.

Prelim. Relief (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 16–18, ECF No. 6. He has remained in California with his wife

through the pendency of his extradition proceedings. See White Paper at 12; Pl.’s Mem. at 16.

B. Extradition Proceedings Generally

As already noted, the instant suit is not Toledo’s first attempt to stop his extradition to

Peru. To situate the instant motion amid his other, long-running extradition proceedings, a brief

overview of the U.S.’s extradition process is in order.

Extradition proceeds in two phases, taking place in the judicial and executive branches.

When a foreign government requests the extradition of an individual from the United States, the

first step is for the Department of State and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to determine

whether the request satisfies the requirements of the applicable treaty between the United States

and the foreign government. See Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 2, Declaration of Oliver M. Lewis ¶ 2 (Mar.

20, 2023) (“Lewis Decl.”), ECF No. 9-2. If those treaty requirements are found to be met, the

DOJ commences proceedings, under

, before a judicial officer in federal court.

3

¶¶ 2–3 The judge is then responsible for holding a hearing or hearings to determine whether

there is sufficient evidence to sustain the charges against the fugitive for which extradition is

sought. See

; Lewis Decl. ¶ 3. These hearings are adversarial and allow the

putative fugitive, through counsel, to present argument and evidence to prove that the requesting

country’s charges cannot be sustained. See id.;

. Upon determining that the

fugitive is subject to extradition on any charge, the judge sends a certification of that finding to

the Secretary of State. See id.; Lewis Decl. ¶ 3. That certification is not directly appealable, but

the fugitive can still challenge the determination by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

which is then ruled upon and appealed in the usual course. Id. ¶ 4;

. The

habeas challenges may include whether the judge had jurisdiction, whether the charged offense is

covered by the terms of the treaty, and whether the evidence presented establishes probable

cause that the fugitive committed the charged offense. See Fernandez v. Phillips,

(1925); Vo v. Benov,

(9th Cir. 2006).

If the judicial proceedings conclude with a certification of extraditability and the habeas

petition, if filed, is denied absent a stay pending appeal, the Secretary of State then has the

ultimate authority to decide whether the fugitive should be surrendered to the requesting country.

See

; Lewis Decl. ¶ 4. The State Department’s decision rests on the entire

record before the extradition court, including any issues raised in collateral habeas proceedings,

but also incorporates political, humanitarian, or other concerns that were not, and often could not

have been, before the court. Id. ¶ 4; see also Al-Anazi v. Bush,

, 194–95

(D.D.C. 2005) (noting the limited nature of a court’s inquiry in extradition proceedings as

compared to the Secretary of the State’s). “This bifurcated procedure reflects the fact that

extradition proceedings contain legal issues peculiarly suited for judicial resolution, such as

4 questions of the standard of proof, competence of evidence, and treaty construction, yet

simultaneously implicate questions of foreign policy, which are better answered by the executive

branch.” United States v. Kin-Hong,

(1st Cir. 1997).

The executive branch phase proceeds according to a number of internal policies and

regulations designed to ensure the ultimate extradition determination is consistent with United

States and international law. For example, the Secretary’s decision must be consistent with the

United States’ obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Torture Convention”), which means that part of the

Secretary’s extradition determination must include the conclusion that it is not more likely than

not that the particular fugitive will be tortured if returned to the requesting country. See Lewis

Decl. ¶¶ 4–5 & n.2; 22 C.F.R. Part 95 (outlining the procedures to be followed in considering the

question of torture in reaching an extradition decision). The State Department follows similar

procedures to evaluate other humanitarian concerns raised by a fugitive, even when those

allegations may not amount to a claim cognizable under the Torture Convention. Lewis Decl.

¶ 5. Multiple offices, bureaus, and country desks within the State Department are brought in to

analyze particular claims or information relevant to a case where they have regional or

substantive expertise, and other government agencies are consulted when needed.

¶¶ 6–7.

The U.S. Embassy in the requesting country, for instance, may provide information on the

current political situation in that country, its judicial system, and the local conditions of

detention. Id. ¶ 7.

The fugitive, through counsel or otherwise, may participate in the executive branch phase

by submitting materials to the State Department, including any written arguments and

documentation or evidence relevant to the extradition determination. Id. ¶ 8. Any other

5 interested parties may also submit materials. Id. The State Department considers all materials

submitted, and may seek further information on the issues raised from the fugitive or others,

before reaching its decision. Id.

At the conclusion of both these phases, the Secretary of State reaches its final decision to

either surrender the fugitive to the requesting country, deny surrender of the fugitive, or

condition the fugitive’s surrender on certain assurances from the requesting state to protect

against mistreatment in its criminal justice system. Id. ¶ 9. The ultimate decision to extradite an

individual pursuant to a treaty stems from the Executive’s Article II power to conduct foreign

policy. See Sidali v. I.N.S.,

(3d Cir. 1997) (“Because the power to extradite

derives from the President’s power to conduct foreign affairs, extradition is an executive, not a

judicial function.” (citing U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2)). As such, unlike in the judicial phase of

the extradition proceedings, as plaintiff concedes, the final “decision is committed to the

discretion of the Secretary of State and not otherwise reviewable.” Pl.’s Mem. at 8.

C. Toledo’s Extradition Process

Plaintiff brings the instant suit late in the extradition process described supra. His

proceedings began in early 2018, when the government of Peru—following adversarial legal

proceedings in that country—requested plaintiff’s extradition from the U.S. on collusion and

money laundering charges stemming from the bribery scheme. See Peruvian Extradition

Record” at 165–66; Compl. ¶ 15.

1. 2019–2021: Extraditability Certification Proceedings In the Northern District of California

The judicial branch phase of plaintiff’s extradition proceedings then commenced in mid-

2019 before a magistrate judge in the Northern District of California. See In re Extradition of

Toledo Manrique, No. 19-mj-71055 (TSH) (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2019), ECF No. 2. Plaintiff was

6 arrested and initially ordered detained for the pendency of the proceedings, but after oral

argument was then released on bond following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. See id.,

, 422–24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020). Over the following several months, the

magistrate judge held two hearings, at which he considered the extradition record from Peru and

which plaintiff, through counsel, attempted to rebut with his own evidence. See

No. 19-mj-

71055 (TSH),

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2020);

Minute Entry (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4,

2020), ECF No. 148;

, at *1–2, 4–9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2021)

(summarizing the previous years’ worth of proceedings and disputed evidence). These

proceedings culminated in the magistrate judge’s certification of plaintiff’s extraditability, based

upon findings that: (1) he had the authority and jurisdiction to conduct the extradition

proceedings, (2) the extradition treaty between Peru and the United States was in full force and

effect and covered the charged conduct, and (3) that, while “[t]he case against Toledo is not

airtight,” there was sufficient evidence to support “probable cause to believe that Toledo

committed collusion and money laundering.” Id. at *2, 19.

The next day, the DOJ sent a letter to Toledo, through counsel, explaining the next steps

of the extradition proceedings. See Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 3, DOJ Letter to Counsel for Toledo (Sept.

29, 2021), ECF No. 9-3. The letter explained that the executive branch phase of the proceedings

would commence, provided instructions for Toledo’s participation in that phase by submitting

materials to the State Department, and summarized his options for challenging the judicial

extradition certification through habeas proceedings. Id. at 1–2.

2. 2021–2022: Habeas Proceedings in Northern District of California

Plaintiff duly pursued his judicial challenges, filing a habeas corpus petition one month

later challenging the magistrate judge’s certification decision on the grounds that the Peru-U.S.

extradition treaty did not apply to him under the circumstances and that the magistrate judge had 7 erred in several of his evidentiary rulings and in his ultimate probable cause finding. See Pet.,

Manrique v. O’Keefe, No. 21-cv-8395 (LB) (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2021), ECF No. 1; id.,

, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2022). Another magistrate judge in the Northern District of

California denied that petition, id. at *14, and shortly thereafter denied plaintiff’s request for a

stay of extradition pending his habeas appeal, id.,

, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 13,

2022). Plaintiff then sought a stay from the Ninth Circuit for the pendency of his habeas appeal,

which was also denied. See Order, Manrique v. Kolc, No. 22-15705 (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 2022),

ECF No. 22.

3. 2022–2023: State Department Consideration of Extradition

In the absence of a stay, the State Department began work on its portion of the extradition

proceedings. Plaintiff, through counsel, participated in this phase by corresponding with State

Department representatives by email regarding the status of both the judicial and executive

branch proceedings; submitting a white paper detailing evidence and arguments to support his

request for a denial of extradition; submitting letters of support from interested third parties; and

repeatedly supplementing the arguments in the white paper with additional submissions via

email. See White Paper; Compl., Ex. C, Email Correspondence Through October 28, 2022, ECF

No. 1-4;

Ex. D, Email Correspondence Through December 7, 2022, ECF No. 1-5;

Ex. E,

Email Correspondence Through December 29, 2022, ECF No.1-6. The State Department

confirmed receipt and review of all the substantive submissions as part of its deliberative

process, which also included its review of the records in both the extradition and habeas cases

and other information regarding Peru. See

Exs. C–E.

On February 21, 2023, the State Department notified plaintiff that the Deputy Secretary

of State, acting under authority delegated by the Secretary, see Lewis Decl. ¶ 3 n.1, had reached

its final decision to surrender him to the Peruvian authorities. Compl., Ex. A, Department of 8 State Letter to Counsel for Toledo (Feb. 21, 2023) (“Dep’t of State Extradition Decision”), ECF

1-2. Plaintiff, through counsel, urged the State Department to reconsider in another emailed

submission reiterating the arguments made in his white paper and previous emails.

Ex. F,

Email Correspondence Through February 28, 2023 at 4–7, ECF No. 1-7. The State Department

again confirmed receipt, offered assurances that it had “carefully considered” the arguments

presented as part of its internal processes, but did “not see a basis to reconsider the February 21

decision” to extradite plaintiff, which decision it “confirmed . . . complies with the United States’

domestic and international legal obligations.”

at 3–4.

4. 2023: Extradition Stay Proceedings in Northern District of California and Pending Appeal Before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

In response, plaintiff once again moved to stay his extradition in the Northern District of

California before a magistrate judge, who once again denied the request, while granting a

temporary stay to allow him to pursue a renewed motion to stay before the Ninth Circuit. See

Order, Manrique v. O’Keefe, No. 21-cv-8395 (N.D. Cal. Feb 23, 2023), ECF No. 36. Plaintiff

filed the latter motion days later. See Mot., Manrique v. Kolc, No. 22-15705 (9th Cir. Feb. 27,

2023), ECF No. 41. The magistrate judge’s temporary stay of plaintiff’s extradition remains in

effect until the Ninth Circuit decides the pending motion. See Compl. ¶ 19; Email

Correspondence Through February 28, 2023 at 4.

The Ninth Circuit heard argument on plaintiff’s habeas challenges and the renewed

motion to stay on March 6, 2023. See Minute Entry, Manrique v. Kolc, No. 22-15705 (9th Cir.

March 6, 2023), ECF No. 44.

5. 2023: Pending Remand to Custody Proceedings in the Northern District of California

Meanwhile, following its determination to surrender plaintiff to the Peruvian authorities,

the State Department filed a motion in the Northern District of California, before the first

9 magistrate judge who issued the certification, seeking that plaintiff be remanded to custody. See

Mot., In re Extradition of Toledo Manrique, No. 19-mj-71055 (TSH) (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2023),

ECF No. 211. That motion for remand was argued on March 9, 2023 and remains under

advisement. See

Minute Entry (N.D. Cal. March 9, 2023), ECF No. 218.

6. March 2023: Instant Complaint

With the two motions in the Ninth Circuit still pending and the bail proceedings in the

Northern District of California ongoing, plaintiff turned his sights to the opposite coast, initiating

the instant suit the day after his argument before the Ninth Circuit. See Compl. at 23. Per

plaintiff, this civil suit is nominally different from his previous challenges, because it challenges

the executive branch phase of the extradition process under the Due Process Clause of the U.S.

Constitution, as opposed to the findings in the judicial branch phase (i.e., the applicability of the

Peru-U.S. treaty, probable cause that plaintiff committed the charged offenses, and plaintiff’s

entitlement to habeas corpus relief). See Compl. ¶ 20; Pl.’s Mem. at 25. Here, his single claim is

that, despite the State Department’s acknowledged “broad discretion in making extradition

decisions,” its ultimate extradition decision was nonetheless made in violation of the Due

Process Clause because it did not “disclose the unclassified bases for its decision” or “afford Dr.

Toledo and his counsel an opportunity to rebut those bases in a full and fair exchange of views.”

Compl. ¶¶ 55, 59. Among other requested relief, he seeks an order enjoining enforcement of the

State Department’s extradition decision, requiring further process, and declaring that he cannot

be remanded to custody. Id. at 22 (“Requested Relief”). Thus, despite the distinct legal basis for

the instant action, plaintiff’s desired outcome is the same as in his pending Ninth Circuit and

Northern District of California proceedings: to block his extradition by the State Department.

Less than a week after filing the new suit, plaintiff moved “for a temporary restraining

order and/or preliminary injunction” enjoining the State Department from taking him into 10 custody or surrendering him for extradition. See Pl.’s Mot. at 1. The parties’ proposed briefing

schedule was adopted, see Minute Order (March 16, 2023), and the motion became ripe for

resolution on March 23, 2023. See Pl.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Prelim. Relief (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF

No. 10 (filed just before midnight on March 22, 2023). Perhaps in recognition of the fact that

multiple previous hearings have been held in interrelated issues over the past several years in the

extradition proceedings in the Northern District of California and before the Ninth Circuit,

neither party requested a hearing, see Pl.’s Mot. at 1; Def.’s Joint Proposed Briefing Sched. at 1,

ECF No. 8, and accordingly the motion will be decided on the papers. See D.D.C. LCvR 65.1(d)

(“On request of the moving party together with a statement of the facts which make expedition

essential, a hearing on an application for preliminary injunction shall be set by the Court . . .

unless the Court earlier decides the motion on the papers[.]”).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In evaluating a motion for both a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive

relief, generally the same standard is applied. See Sampson v. Murray,

(1974)

(confirming that “a temporary restraining order continued beyond the time permissible under

Rule 65 must be treated as a preliminary injunction, and must conform to the standards

applicable to preliminary injunctions”); Nat’l Mediation Bd. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l,

(D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (noting that “[a]n order extending a temporary

restraining order beyond the 20 days allowed by Civil Rule 65(b) is tantamount to the grant of a

preliminary injunction”).

A temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary . . .

remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden

of persuasion” on each of four factors. Mazurek v. Armstrong,

(1997) (per

11 curiam) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 11A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at 129–30 (2d ed. 1995)). To obtain relief, the moving party

must establish that (1) “he is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) “he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities tips in his

favor”; and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

(2008); see also Benisek v. Lamone,

, 1943–44 (2018) (per curiam);

League of Women Voters of the U.S. v. Newby,

(D.C. Cir. 2016); Pursuing Am.’s

Greatness v. FEC,

(D.C. Cir. 2016). The first factor is “[a] foundational

requirement for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief.” Guedes v. Bur. of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms and Explosives,

(D.C. Cir. 2019); see also Aamer v. Obama,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (highlighting the first factor as the “most important factor”); Munaf

v. Geren,

(2008) (“[A] party seeking a preliminary injunction must

demonstrate, among other things, ‘a likelihood of success on the merits.’” (quoting Gonzales v.

O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal,

(2006))). 2

III. DISCUSSION

The parties dispute plaintiff’s establishment of all four preliminary relief factors, but

focus their arguments primarily on the first: whether plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of

his due process challenge. See Pl.’s Mem. at 23–36; Def.’s Opp’n at 15–25; Pl.’s Reply at 8–16.

Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions and the record of the underlying extradition

proceedings, the Court concludes the Due Process Clause does not mandate further procedure

2 The D.C. Circuit has previously followed a “sliding scale” approach to evaluating preliminary injunctions, but that approach is likely inconsistent with Winter, see Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area. Transit Auth.,

(D.C. Cir. 2018) (observing that Winter may be “properly read to suggest a ‘sliding scale’ approach to weighing the four factors be abandoned”); Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,

, 1295– 96 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (noting that “this Circuit's traditional sliding-scale approach to preliminary injunctions may be difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in” Winter and Munaf), and therefore will not be employed here, see Singh v. Carter,

, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2016).

12 than plaintiff in fact received. As such, plaintiff does not establish a likelihood of success on the

merits of this litigation, and is therefore not entitled to preliminary relief, obviating the need to

address the remaining factors. See Guedes,

.

Plaintiff’s core argument is that his extradition proceedings fell short of constitutional

due process because in the executive branch phase, the State Department did not, as part of its

review of his case, “disclose the unclassified information regarding its decision and afford

[plaintiff] an opportunity to be heard, including an opportunity to rebut the factual premises and

other bases for the decision.” See Pl.’s Mem. at 24. In support, he cites a series of cases that

have held that executive branch determinations in other contexts must include at least these

elements to comport with due process. See

at 23–25 (citing Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign

Inv. in U.S.,

(D.C. Cir. 2014); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,

(2004);

People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran (“PMOI”) v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

(D.C. Cir.

2010); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State (“NCRI”),

(D.C. Cir. 2001); Chai v. Dep’t of State,

(D.C. Cir. 2006)).

The government goes to great lengths to distinguish these cases, arguing for a host of

reasons that the different contexts of these non-extradition decisions warranted the application of

different due process requirements than are implicated here. See Def.’s Opp’n 20–25. For

instance, as the government explains, Hamdi concerned “a U.S. citizen’s detention under the law

of war, a much weightier context warranting . . . additional process” than that of the extradition

of a fugitive, id. at 20, while NCPR, Chai, and PMOI concerned a specific statute applicable to

the designation of foreign terrorist organizations that strictly limited the designated

organizations’ participation in the judicial review of the administrative decision, which has no

analog in the extradition context, id. at 21. Finally, the government argues that Ralls, which

13 concerned the President’s statutory authority to suspend or prohibit foreign investment in the

United States, “expressly confined its due process holding to Presidential actions pursuant to

statute, rather than Presidential actions pursuant to Article II authority” like extradition

determinations, and that the substantive standards imposed by the foreign divestment statute

implicate specific record development concerns not present in extradition, which is subject to the

Secretary of State’s broad discretion. Id. at 22–24.

These are all valid distinctions, but the cited cases are inapposite for an even more

fundamental reason. Plaintiff’s cases all concern standalone administrative determinations that

in and of themselves have the potential to deprive the interested party of life, liberty, or property,

and therefore that require the meaningful participation of that party to comport with the Due

Process Clause. Plaintiff makes much of the fact that the Secretary of State’s extradition

decision is final and non-reviewable to depict this decision, too, as a discrete administrative

determination that would require an opportunity for a hearing and other process. See Pl.’s Mem.

at 23–26. This blinkered perspective on the Secretary’s extradition decision is strained and

unpersuasive. In reality, the Secretary of State’s final determination does not stand in a vacuum,

but comes after—and is reliant upon—a substantial amount of other process also focused on the

determination of the fugitive’s extraditability, in which the fugitive has already been a key

participant.

For plaintiff, the Secretary’s determination represents merely the final step in what has

been a multi-year-long opportunity for him, with the assistance of counsel, to present evidence

and develop the record through adversarial proceedings, to participate in multiple hearings

before several judges, to attack collaterally the resulting judicial determinations in habeas, and to

supplement the record with unlimited written submissions to the Department of State. Plaintiff

14 has thus been given ample process prior to the Secretary’s decision to surrender him to the

Peruvian authorities, and that final decision was made in reliance on the record generated

through all that came before. See Dep’t of State Extradition Decision (confirming that its

decision came “[f]ollowing a review of all pertinent information, including all the materials

[plaintiff’s counsel] submitted directly to the Department of State on behalf of Mr. Toledo, as

well as the materials and filing submitted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of

California and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on behalf of Mr. Toledo,

information regarding the current situation in Peru, and other relevant information”). When the

Secretary’s final determination is viewed in the context of plaintiff’s multiple years of

extradition proceedings, what becomes patently clear is that plaintiff received the equivalent, if

not far more, of the process he argues he was entitled to under his cited caselaw.

The Due Process Clause does not mandate that plaintiff be given yet more process at this

final stage of the proceedings. The amount of process “due” in a given situation turns on the

balancing of (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of

an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if

any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest,

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or

substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge,

(1976). While plaintiff’s private liberty interest is indisputably implicated by his extradition

proceedings, the risk of an erroneous deprivation absent an additional hearing conducted by the

State Department and the furnishing of any unclassified documents relied upon is minimal, as is

the potential probable value of that additional procedure, given plaintiff’s active role (including

in multiple hearings) in developing the record in his judicial proceedings and challenging the key

15 determinations there, not to mention his ability to supplement the record in whatever way he

wished before the State Department. Further, requiring the State Department to provide the

additional opportunities for participation plaintiff requests would unnecessarily overtax

Department resources without meaningfully expanding the scope of information considered and

risks chilling the Department’s ability to freely obtain information and assurances from relevant

foreign governments, which might be less willing to speak frankly if the information disclosed

was not kept confidential. See Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 7, 11–14.

Unsurprisingly, then, other courts to have considered the totality of the United States’

extradition process have easily concluded that this combination of the judicial and executive

branch proceedings comports with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, in light of the

substantial process afforded in the judicial phase and the executive’s broad discretion to decide

matters of foreign policy. See, e.g., Venckiene v. United States,

, 863–64 (7th Cir.

2019) (explaining that because “[a]n extradition case does not reach the Secretary of State”

before the “ample procedural protections” of the judicial branch phase have been followed, there

was no basis to require additional procedure “in the executive portion of the extradition

process”); Lopez-Smith v. Hood,

(9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a due process-

based argument for an additional hearing, as “[e]xtradition is a matter of foreign policy entirely

within the discretion of the executive branch, except to the extent that the statute interposes a

judicial function”); Escobedo v. United States,

, 1104–05 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting

a due process argument because the “[e]xecutive discretion” in an extradition case arises only

after substantial process in the judicial phase, which “safeguard[s] the fugitive’s due process

rights”); Peroff v. Hylton,

, 1102–03 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); Juarez-Saldana v.

United States,

, 961–62 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (same). Plaintiff cannot avoid

16 the same conclusion here by demanding that a single step in a lengthy process be analyzed in

isolation, misleadingly characterizing the Secretary’s final decision as involving a “near-

complete lack of any process.” Pl.’s Mem. at 28. Plaintiff received the process due under the

Fifth Amendment in his extradition proceedings.

***

While the merits of plaintiff’s claim have been disposed of, a final point bears belaboring,

for the foregoing cases also highlight a peculiarly inappropriate aspect of plaintiff’s requested

relief in this case. Strikingly, the due process holdings in these cases all arose in the course of

the fugitives’ habeas challenges to their judicial extradition determinations. Here, by contrast,

plaintiff has chosen to bring his Fifth Amendment claim in a fresh lawsuit, before a different

judge sitting on a different court, rather than in his ongoing habeas proceedings.

Plaintiff could have raised this same due process argument before the Northern District of

California and the Ninth Circuit, as all the fugitives before the other courts to have faced this

argument were able to do in their habeas proceedings. Indeed, perhaps he did—the Ninth Circuit

heard argument in plaintiff’s case mere weeks ago, and that panel may well have something to

say about due process in its eventual decision.

More likely, though, plaintiff has opted for this unprecedented procedural gambit to avoid

clearly unfavorable precedent extant in the Ninth Circuit. See Lopez-Smith,

.

Perhaps plaintiff hopes that by obtaining preliminary relief here, he would set this Court against

those in the Ninth Circuit and the Northern District of California, which are already considering

the government’s ability to detain and extradite him. This kind of forum shopping is anathema

to our judicial system. The five judges involved in plaintiff’s long-running West coast

proceedings (two magistrate judges and a panel of appellate judges) have the benefit of years of

17 familiarity with plaintiff’s case and a substantial record before them, developed through multiple

rounds of adversarial briefing, hearings, and argument, on which they are able to base their

findings of probable cause and other relevant conclusions. Plaintiff is now attempting an end-

run around their final decisions on his case by receiving fresh consideration from a judge on the

opposite coast, to whom he has furnished a highly selective and misleading presentation of the

factual background, see Def.’s Opp’n at 27 n.9 (detailing how “several of Toledo’s statements

appear to overstate the facts”), and requiring an expedited decision on an emergency motion for

preliminary relief. The irony is striking that plaintiff would engage in such abuse of the judicial

process in order to complain that he has not, in fact, received enough process. This Court will

not call a halt to the elaborate procedures already in motion regarding plaintiff’s extradition.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on

the merits of his due process claim. Consequently, the Court need not “proceed to review the

other three preliminary [relief] factors,” as plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing

entitlement to the extraordinary remedy sought. Guedes,

(quoting Arkansas

Dairy Coop. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

(D.C. Cir. 2009)). His motion for a

preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order is therefore DENIED. An order

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.

Date: March 28, 2023

__________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL U.S. District Court Judge

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