UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHAUN RUSHING, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00231 (UNA) ) 425 2ND STREET SHELTER, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff has filed a pro se complaint, ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons explained below, the court will grant

plaintiff’s IFP application and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff, a resident of the District of Columbia, sues the “425 2nd Street Shelter,” which is

also located in the District. He alleges only that, during his time at the Shelter, he was treated

disrespectfully and, at some point, told that he could not return to the premises. He contends that

unspecified individuals “clearly expressed discrimination,” but provides no additional detail. He

demands “one hundred million dollars each.”

The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth

generally at

and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available

only when a “federal question” is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount

in controversy exceeds $75,000. A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts

that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such

facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). First, plaintiff and defendant are both located in the District of Columbia, so there can be

no diversity jurisdiction. See Bush v. Butler,

(D.D.C. 2007) (citing Owen

Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,

(1978)) (“For jurisdiction to exist under

, there must be complete diversity between the parties, which is to say that the

plaintiff may not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”).

Second, plaintiff has failed to state a federal question. A federal question must

“affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly[,]” Johnson v. Robinson,

(D.C. Cir.

2009) (citing Bilal v. Kaplan,

(8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). Although plaintiff

passingly refers to “discrimination,” he does not specify the legal authority under which he rights

were purportedly violated nor does not provide any context to make out a colorable claim. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“bare assertions” of a “discrimination claim” are “not

entitled to be assumed true”). Indeed, the court has no information as to who discriminated against

plaintiff, how they discriminated against him, when these alleged events occurred, and how or

what damages resulted therefrom.

For all of these reasons, this court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this

matter, and the complaint, ECF No. 1, and the case, are dismissed without prejudice. A separate

order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Date: April 5, 2023

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge