UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JAMES JOHNSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00558 (UNA) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) GOVERNMENT, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on review of plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2, and pro se complaint, ECF No. 1. The court will grant the

IFP application, and for the reasons discussed below, it will dismiss the complaint without

prejudice for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff, a resident of the District of Columbia, sues the District of Columbia, its Mayor,

its “Police Training Department,” and Officer “J. Trumble” of the “D.C. Parking Enforcement

Agency.” Plaintiff states that he is an elderly disabled resident of an apartment complex on

Maryland Avenue. He alleges that Parking Enforcement officers, including Officer Trumble, have

ignored his handicapped placard, and unfairly issued him traffic citations for having illegally

parked his vehicle in a Metro bus lane. He also seems to allege that this bus lane, and others, are

improperly drawn, extending longer than the maximum “90 feet” allowed by zoning, but he does

not point to any specific authority to support this contention. He alleges that these Parking

Enforcement officers are improperly trained and are interfering with the authority of the D.C.

Police Department and D.C. Metro Transit Police. He appears to contend that the Parking

Enforcement Agency is intentionally targeting local residents who are Black, elderly, and/or disabled, in violation of their rights. In support, he cites only to amendments to the Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Interstate Compact Agreement, D.C. Code § 9–1109.11,

and to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”), PL 94-579, codified by

43 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. He demands both equitable relief and damages.

The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth

generally at

and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available

when a “federal question” is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000. “For jurisdiction to exist under

, there must be

complete diversity between the parties, which is to say that the plaintiff may not be a citizen of the

same state as any defendant.” Bush v. Butler,

(D.D.C. 2007) (citing Owen

Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,

(1978)). A party seeking relief in the

district court must at least plead facts that bring the suit within the court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a).

Here, there is no diversity of citizenship, because all parties are located in the District of

Columbia. See Bush v. Butler,

(D.D.C. 2007) (citing Owen Equip. &

Erection Co. v. Kroger,

, 373–74 (1978) (“For jurisdiction to exist under

, there must be complete diversity between the parties, which is to say that the plaintiff may

not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”)).

Furthermore, the complaint fails to state any federal question. See

.

Plaintiff cites to the Interstate Compact Agreement and the FLPMA, but it is unclear what

applicability, if any, these authorities have to plaintiff’s intended claims and the relief sought, or

how they would provide him with a private right of action. Although plaintiff does not invoke

, the court recognizes that a private

cause of action may exist against an individual or a municipality that, under color of state or

District of Columbia law, deprives another individual of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York,

(1978); Warren

v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). The statute, however, “is not itself a

source of substantive rights; rather, it is a method of vindicating federal rights conferred

elsewhere.” Melton v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2015) (citing Albright

v. Oliver,

, 269–70 (1994) and Baker v. McCollan,

, 144 n.3 (1979)).

Plaintiff’s allegations fall well short of the bar to establish a Monell claim because they,

inter alia, fail to implicate any constitutional or federal statutory right. Plaintiff passingly

references alleged constitutional violations but does not specify which, if any, of his constitutional

rights were violated, nor does not provide any additional context to make out a colorable claim.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“bare assertions” of “constitutional discrimination

claim” are “not entitled to be assumed true”). Moreover, as here, a plaintiff cannot merely invoke

race, age, or disability, “in the course of a claim’s narrative and automatically be entitled to pursue

relief.” Bray v. RHT, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 1990). As such, without more, these claims

should be contested in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

Put differently, “[e]vents may not have unfolded as [p]laintiff wished, but his

dissatisfaction . . . [does] not form a basis” for a constitutional violation, Melton,

. And a federal question must “affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly[,]” Johnson v.

Robinson,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Bilal v. Kaplan,

(8th Cir.

1990) (per curiam)). Consequently, this case will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion for

injunctive relief/declaratory judgment, ECF No. 3, raising the same allegations as those raised in

the complaint, is denied for the same above-stated reasons. A separate order accompanies this

memorandum opinion.

Date: April 12, 2023

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge