UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WASHINGTON WINDSOR, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-01050 (UNA) ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ) VETERANS AFFAIRS, ) ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is currently before the court on consideration of plaintiff’s application for leave

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2, and pro se complaint, ECF No. 1. Upon review,

the court grant the application to proceed IFP and will dismiss the complaint without prejudice.

Plaintiff has filed suit against the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. The

complaint is not a model of clarity. From what can be understood, he attempts to bring this case,

in large part, under the Veterans' Benefits Act,

et seq. More specifically, he

challenges the Department’s denial of “Chapter 31 benefits,” which relate to veteran readiness and

employment, and he seeks “retroactive benefits” and damages caused by the alleged fallout of that

denial. But challenges to decisions “affecting the provision of veterans’ benefits” are generally

within the exclusive province of the Court of Veterans Appeals and the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Price v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (per

curiam); accord Hunt v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (per

curiam) (citing

(a)); Thomas v. Principi,

(D.C. Cir. 2005).

“Benefit means any payment, service, commodity, function, or status, entitlement to which is

determined under laws administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs pertaining to veterans and their dependents and survivors.”

(e). Consequently, this court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over these claims. See Price,

(citing

(a)); see

(“[C]ourts have consistently held that a federal district court may not entertain

constitutional or statutory claims whose resolution would require the court to intrude upon the

VA’s exclusive jurisdiction.”) (citing cases); see also Thomas,

(“Because

adjudicating . . . allegations [of] failure to render appropriate medical services and denial of . . .

necessary medical care treatment would require the district court to determine first whether the

VA acted properly in providing . . . benefits, [such] claims are barred by section 511.”) (internal

quotation marks and omitted).

Plaintiff also references the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),

. He

alleges that, after he challenged his denial of benefits, the Department retaliated against him by

intentionally withholding other necessary medical benefits and by providing him with inadequate

medical care on more than one occasion. Again, he seeks retroactive benefits and damages. First,

the “United States of America is the only proper defendant in a suit under the FTCA.” Chandler

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

, 6 n.3 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Coulibaly v. Kerry,

(D.D.C. 2016) (“[A] plaintiff may not bring tort claims against federal

officials in their official capacities or against federal agencies; the proper defendant is the United

States itself[.]”);

(a). Here, plaintiff has failed to sue the United States.

Second, “the FTCA also cannot circumvent section 511. The D.C. Circuit has held that

section 511 precludes district court review not only of benefits determinations but also of tort

claims related to a benefits determination that would require the district court to review the VA's

determination about what the litigant was entitled to receive.” Fermin v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2017) (citing Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Ass'n, Inc. v. McDonald,

(D.C. Cir. 2016); Thomas,

(finding that plaintiff’s

tort claim about “the adequacy of medical services provided to the plaintiff,” was barred by section

511)), aff’d, No. 17–5193,

(D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2017) (per curiam). Plaintiff’s

FTCA claims, at least as currently pleaded, are intrinsically linked to the Department’s denial of

benefits. He contends that all the alleged wrongdoing arises from that denial and his subsequent

challenges to that determination. Therefore, “the court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to

section 1346(b)(1).”

Third, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v.

Tisch,

(D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009); Ciralsky v.

CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive

fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate

defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano,

(D.D.C. 1977).

Here, plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 8(a) in pleading his FTCA claim. The FTCA

allows a damages claim “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the

scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private

person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or

omission occurred.”

(b)(1). Plaintiff vaguely references “Veterans Affairs’ staff”

but fails to identify any of the actual government employees who allegedly determined to interfere with his benefits and medical care or otherwise retaliated against him, nor does he explain how or

when these unnamed government employees committed these acts.

To that end, plaintiff does not clearly identify where any of these tortious acts allegedly

occurred. From a review of the attached exhibits, it appears that plaintiff takes issue, at least in

part, with medical care that he was to receive, but was ultimately denied, in Maryland. Federal

Tort Claims Act claims against the United States “may be prosecuted only in the judicial district

where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred.”

(b). In this court, “[u]nder the prevailing interpretation of section 1402(b), venue is proper in

the District of Columbia if sufficient activities giving rise to plaintiff's cause of action took place

here.” Franz v. United States,

(D.D.C. 1984). These FTCA venue

requirements have been interpreted in accordance with those of section 1391(b), “and the relevant

terms of the two statutes are similar.”

“Where section 1402(b) refers to the district ‘[where]

the act or omission occurred,’ section 1391(b) refers to ‘the judicial district . . . in which the claim

arose.’ ”

Here, plaintiff is a citizen of Virginia, and there is no indication that any tortious activities

occurred in the District of Columbia. Notably, the location of the federal government or an

agency's headquarters office does not necessitate venue in this District, see Bartel v. Federal

Aviation Admin.,

(D.D.C. 1985), and the court is required to examine venue

carefully to guard against the danger that a plaintiff might attempt to improperly bring suit here by

mere virtue of naming the federal government as a defendant, see Cameron v. Thornburgh,

(D.C. Cir. 1993). For all of these reasons, the action is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: May 1, 2023 Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge