UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LAWRENCE LOGGINS,

Plaintiff, v. Civ. Action No. 21-1129 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER (EGS/MAU) CORPORATION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Mr. Lawrence Loggins (“Mr. Loggins” or “Plaintiff”) brings

this lawsuit against National Railroad Passenger Corporation

(“Amtrak” or “Defendant”), alleging racial discrimination and

hostile work environment claims under

. See

Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 26. 1

Amtrak moved to dismiss Mr. Loggins’ Second Amended

Complaint. See Def. National Railroad Passenger Corporation’s

Mot. Dismiss Pl. Lawrence Loggins’ Second Am. Compl., or

Alternatively, Mot. Transfer Venue, ECF No. 27. The Court

thereafter referred this case to a magistrate judge for full

case management, see Minute Order (June 16, 2022); and the case

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of the filed documents. 1 was later directly assigned to Magistrate Judge Moxila A.

Upadhyaya, see Docket Civ. Action No. 21-1129. On December 1,

2022, Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R. & R.”) recommending that the Court grant

Amtrak’s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for

failure to state a claim or in the alternative that the Court

transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois. See R. & R., ECF No. 32.

Pending before the Court is Mr. Loggins’ Objections to the

R. & R., see Objs. Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings &

Recommendations (“Pl.’s Objs.”), ECF No. 33. Upon careful

consideration of the R. & R.; the objections, opposition, and

reply thereto; the applicable law; and the entire record herein,

the Court hereby the Court hereby ADOPTS IN PART Magistrate

Judge Upadhyaya’s R. & R., see ECF No. 32; and GRANTS Amtrak’s

Motion to Transfer Venue, see ECF No. 27.

II. Background

A. Factual

Mr. Loggins is a Black man who lives in Chicago and

formerly worked as a conductor for Amtrak. See Second Am.

Compl., ECF No. 26 at 1 & ¶ 10. During his employment, he

admitted that he had sold cash fare tickets and failed to turn

in the proceeds of those sales.

. Amtrak removed him

from service.

Following an audit of his account, Amtrak

2 found that he had failed to transmit $4,331.25 for a two-year

period but permitted him to return to his position if he made

restitution and accepted discipline.

. Mr. Loggins

agreed to these terms and also waived the investigation.

.

Amtrak continued to audit Mr. Loggins despite his

understanding that the waiver included “all outstanding

deficiencies in his account.”

. The audit revealed

additional cash fares that he had failed to transmit.

.

Amtrak investigated and dismissed him from service.

.

Mr. Loggins appealed his dismissal to the Public Law Board.

. The Public Law Board directed Amtrak to rehire him but

required him to make restitution for the remaining deficiency in

his account.

. Mr. Loggins does not allege whether he

failed to turn in other funds or whether he paid any additional

restitution to Amtrak. See generally

.

In the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Loggins alleges that

“White employees engaged in similar misconduct but were not

similarly disciplined.”

. He points to one example for

comparison: Mr. Lonnie Lavoie (“Mr. Lavoie”), a White man who

worked as a conductor and revenue instructor in Chicago.

According to Mr. Loggins, Mr. Lavoie failed to turn in $1,652.00

of proceeds from cash fare sales but did not disclose this

information to Amtrak.

. Mr. Loggins also alleges

3 that Amtrak dismissed Mr. Lavoie but later rehired him and

expunged his charges without requiring that he repay the

company.

.

Mr. Loggins’ remaining allegations are conclusory and

devoid of factual content, so the Court will not recount them

here. See

.

B. Procedural

On April 13, 2022, Amtrak moved to dismiss Mr. Loggins’

Second Amended Complaint or, alternatively, to transfer the case

to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois. See Def. National Railroad Passenger Corporation’s

Mot. Dismiss Pl. Lawrence Loggins’ Second Am. Compl., or

Alternatively, Mot. Transfer Venue, ECF No. 27 at 1. Mr. Loggins

filed a brief in opposition on April 27, 2022, see Pl.’s Mem. P.

& A. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pl. Loggins’ Second Am. Compl.,

or Alternatively, Mot. Transfer Venue, ECF No. 28; and Amtrak

filed its reply brief on May 4, 2022, see Def.’s Reply Supp.

Mot. Dismiss Second Am. Compl., or Alternatively, Mot. Transfer

Venue, ECF No. 29. On December 1, 2022, Magistrate Judge

Upadhyaya issued her R. & R. recommending that the Court grant

Amtrak’s Motion to Dismiss or transfer the case to the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See R. &

R., ECF No. 32 at 9.

4 On December 16, 2022, Mr. Loggins submitted Objections to

the R. & R. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33. Amtrak filed an

opposition brief on January 26, 2023. See Def. National Railroad

Passenger Corporation’s Opp’n Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s R.

& R. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 35. Mr. Loggins replied on

January 27, 2023. See Pls.’ Rep[l]y Def. National Railroad

Passenger Corporation’s Opp’n Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s

Proposed Findings & Recommendations (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 37.

The objections are now ripe and ready for adjudication.

III. Legal Standard

A. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R. & R.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party

may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has

entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)-(2).

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended

disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also

(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate judge.”). A district court “must

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition

that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

“If, however, the party makes only conclusory or general

objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the

Court reviews the [R. & R.] only for clear error.” Houlahan v.

5 Brown,

(D.D.C. 2013) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the clearly erroneous

standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled to great

deference” and “is clearly erroneous only if on the entire

evidence the court is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of Columbia,

No. CV 16-1920 (CKK),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12,

2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v.

Mukasey,

(D.D.C. 2009)).

Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the

proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made

and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections

which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the

magistrate judge are not ‘properly objected to’ and are

therefore not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA,

(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Morgan v. Astrue, No.

08-2133,

, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009)). The

Court reviews Mr. Loggins’ objections de novo.

B. Transfer Pursuant to

(a)

(a) authorizes a court to transfer an

action to any other district where it might have been brought

“for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the

interest of justice.” The purpose of § 1404(a) “is to prevent

the waste of time, energy, and money, and to protect litigants,

6 witnesses, and the public from unnecessary inconvenience and

expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack,

(1964).

District courts accordingly have discretion under Section

1404(a) to transfer a case based on an “individualized case-by-

case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Berry v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2014) (citing

Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,

(1988)); see

also Beall v. Edwards Lifesciences LLC,

, 102-

103 (D.D.C. 2018); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey,

(D.D.C. 2006). Section 1404(a) is meant to be a

“judicial housekeeping measure” rather than a “forum-shopping

instrument.” Van Dusen,

.

A defendant bears the “heavy burden of establishing that

[the] [p]laintiff[’s] choice of forum is inappropriate” such

that this Court should transfer this case out of this District

pursuant to

(a). Jalloh v. Underwood,

(D.D.C. 2018) (citing Thayer/Patric of

Educ. Funding L.L.C. v. Pryor Res., Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2002)); Aracely, R. v. Nielsen,

(D.D.C. 2018); see also Garcia v. Acosta,

,

108 (D.D.C. 2019); Accurso v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Case No.

17-CV-02626 (APM),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 15,

2018). To satisfy this burden, a defendant “must show that

considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh

7 in favor of transfer.” Jalloh,

(citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

To justify a transfer, a defendant must make two showings.

Devaughn v. Inphonic, Inc.,

(D.D.C.

2005). First, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff

could have brought suit in the proposed transferee district.

. Pursuant to

(b), a suit may be brought

in a judicial district: (1) where “any defendant resides, if all

defendants are residents of the State in which the district is

located”; (2) where “a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”; or (3) if there is

no judicial district where the case may be brought as provided

by the first two categories, where “any defendant is subject to

the court’s personal jurisdiction.” Second, the defendant must

demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interests

of justice weigh in favor of a transfer. Devaughn,

; Berry,

. “To determine whether

‘considerations of convenience and the interests of justice

weigh in favor of a transfer,’ courts consider several private-

interest factors, including: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of

forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of

the defendant; (2) the defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether

the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties;

(5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access

8 to sources of proof.” Beall,

. Courts also

consider whether certain public-interest factors weigh in favor

of transfer, including “(1) the transferee’s familiarity with

the governing laws, (2) the relative congestion of each court,

and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at

home.”

III. Analysis

Mr. Loggins objects to Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya’s

recommendation that the Court transfer this case to the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. For the

reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the R. & R. as to this

issue.

Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya determined that the convenience

of the parties and the interests of justice weigh in favor of

transfer. See R. & R., ECF No. 32 at 9. To reach this

conclusion, she explained that the following factors support

transfer: (1) Mr. Loggins resides in Chicago; (2) the alleged

misconduct occurred in Chicago; (3) Mr. Lavoie—the proposed

comparator—worked in Chicago; and (4) the Public Appeal Board is

located in Chicago. See id. at 8. She further considered that

the location of Amtrak’s headquarters in the District of

Columbia did not weigh as heavily against transfer. See id. at

8-9.

9 In his Objections to the R. & R., Mr. Loggins argues that

his residence in Chicago is immaterial to the venue analysis

because “[v]enue is his choice” and he chose to bring suit in

the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33 at 10. A

plaintiff’s choice of forum “traditionally receives deference,”

but diminished deference is accorded under several

circumstances, including where, as here, the plaintiff resides

in and the circumstances giving rise to the case occurred in the

transferee forum. Payne v. Giant of Md., L.L.C., No. CIVA

1:05CV00897 (GK),

, at *3–4 (D.D.C. June 28,

2006) (citations omitted). Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya thus

appropriately considered factors other than Mr. Loggins’ choice

of forum in recommending transfer of this case.

However, Mr. Loggins fails to address those circumstances

and contends that several other factors counsel in favor of the

case remaining in the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF

No. 33 at 10. Specifically, he argues that Amtrak often

litigates in the District of Columbia and that this venue is the

location of the company headquarters, lawyers, corporate

officers, personnel records, and human resources and labor

relations functions. See

Amtrak disputes most of these

points. See Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 35 at 27. It explains that:

its paper personnel records are located in Delaware; the

relevant corporate officer works in Colorado; one of its

10 attorneys is based in Georgia; another attorney is barred in

Illinois and admitted to practice in the transferee forum; and

its attorneys regularly litigate matters in other federal

district courts.

Given all these circumstances, the Court

agrees with Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya that only the location of

Amtrak’s headquarters weighs in favor of this case remaining in

the District of Columbia. See R. & R., ECF No. 32 at 8. Further,

the Court declines to find that this factor is significant, as

courts in this District regularly transfer cases against Amtrak

to other more appropriate districts despite the location of

Amtrak’s headquarters. See, e.g., Brown v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp. (“Amtrak”), No. 18-CV-02216 (APM),

, at *1

(D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2018) (transferring case out of the District of

Columbia where the plaintiff resided in the transferee forum and

all the events occurred there); Wedge v. Potter, No. CIVA 06-

0422 (EGS),

, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2006)

(transferring case out of the District of Columbia where all of

events in the complaint, the relevant witnesses, and the

documents were located in the transferee forum).

Mr. Loggins also argues that a new factor weighs against

transfer: “a change of venue will only disadvantage [his]

counsel, whose costs and efforts to prosecute the case will be

multiplied by a transfer to Chicago, and additional counsel will

have to be retained because [his counsel] is not a member of the

11 bar of the state of Illinois.” Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33 at 10. As

Amtrak points out in its opposition briefing, see Def.’s Opp’n,

ECF No. 35 at 27; Mr. Loggins cites no caselaw to support

consideration of this factor. Because the Court is not aware of

any authority suggesting that the convenience of a party’s

attorney is a public or private interest factor to consider, cf.

Beall,

(discussing convenience of the

parties but not convenience of their attorneys); the Court will

not consider this issue in reviewing Magistrate Judge

Upadhyaya’s findings and recommendation.

Finally, Mr. Loggins disputes that other factors weigh in

favor of transfer. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 33 at 10. He argues

that Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya “has no idea” where Mr. Lavoie

currently works and that “the location of the Public Appeal

Board is irrelevant” to this case.

He has misread the R. &

R. and the caselaw. Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya correctly found

that the relevant events in this case—including Mr. Lavoie’s

alleged misconduct and the decision by the Public Appeal Board—

occurred in Chicago. See R. & R., ECF No. 32 at 8. The caselaw

makes clear that the location of events relevant to the

complaint is a factor that the Court should consider in deciding

a motion to transfer. See Brown,

, at *1.

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the R. & R. as to this issue

and TRANSFERS this case to the U.S. District Court for the

12 Northern District of Illinois. 2

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the Court ADOPTS IN PART

Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya’s R. & R., see ECF No. 32; and GRANTS

Amtrak’s Motion to Transfer Venue, see ECF No. 27. An

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge May 3, 2023

2 The Court declines to decide Amtrak’s Motion to Dismiss, see ECF No. 27 and leaves the remaining issues to the transferee forum. Cf. Brown,

, at *1-2. 13