Jean-Baptiste v. United States Department of Justice

District Court, District of Columbia

Jean-Baptiste v. United States Department of Justice

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE, ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-1054 (TSC) ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT ) OF JUSTICE, et al., ) ) ) Defendants. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff Harold Jean-Baptiste brings this action against the United States Department

of Justice, the Attorney General of the United States Merrick Garland, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (“FBI”), FBI Director Christopher Wray, and the Civil Process Clerk for the U.S.

Attorney’s Office. He alleges that unidentified FBI agents blocked him from executing unspecified

securities trades on E*TRADE. For the reasons that follow, the court will dismiss this action sua

sponte.

Plaintiff claims that “E*TRADE was instructed by the FBI Special Agent to restrict [his]

account, block all investment trades, block the removal of funds and instruct the plaintiff to provide a

gas utility bill to remove the restriction on the account.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 3 at 8. He further

claims to have had a conversation with an E*TRADE Assistant on April 6, 2023, during which the

employee explained that Plaintiff would not be able to “transfer the funds” until a “restriction” is

“resolved,” but E*TRADE is “working on getting the documents reviewed to remove the restriction.”

Page 1 of 3 Id. at 10. Over the course of the conversation, Plaintiff was repeatedly told that he would be able to

transfer funds once he provided a “Letter of Instruction” explaining “why the bank returned the

funds.” Id. at 11–13. At no point in the call did the E*TRADE representative mention the FBI or

any other government actor.

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the FBI rely on his own unsubstantiated hypotheses about

why he is unable to transfer funds from his E*TRADE account. He has made no factual allegation

regarding any FBI actions or any other government action. Instead, he concludes, without any factual

basis, that the restriction placed on his E*TRADE account is the result of covert action by the FBI.

He claims that “[t]he [FBI’s] strategy is to punish the plaintiff with their illegal actions or egregious

actions to oppress the plaintiff’s life for suing the FBI for attempts to destroy the plaintiff’s life.” Id.

at 17.

He further alleges—again without any factual support—that the FBI to “unfairly target[ed]”

him because of “his race, color, national origin, or malicious intentions.” Id. at 18.

Plaintiff cites to at least twenty or more statutes and the Fourth and Ninth Amendments to the

U.S. Constitution, but he does not explain the relevance of these citations. He seeks $2 million in

punitive damages.

Ultimately, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding a federal government conspiracy to block him

from executing securities trades and transferring funds from his brokerage account in retaliation for

filing suit against the government is “similar to those in a number of cases that district courts have

dismissed for patent insubstantiality.” Tooley v. Napolitano,

586 F.3d 1006, 1010

(D.C. Cir. 2009)

(citing Curran v. Holder,

626 F. Supp. 2d 30

, 33–34 (D.D.C. 2009) (plaintiff alleged a “campaign or

surveillance and harassment” from the FBI)). While pro se complaints must be construed liberally,

Page 2 of 3 see Brown v. District of Columbia,

514 F.3d 1279, 1283

(D.C. Cir. 2008), they are nonetheless

properly dismissed sua sponte when the claims are “patently frivolous,” Reiner v. Roberts, No. 20-

cv-31,

2020 WL 7690275

, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2020).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

subject matter jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994).

When the claim “present[s] no federal question suitable for decision,” the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. Best v. Kelly,

39 F.3d 328, 330

(D.C. Cir. 1994). Here, because Plaintiff’s claims do not

present a federal question, the court invokes Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss the Complaint. See Curran,

626 F. Supp. 2d at 33

(dismissing plaintiff’s complaint because his “claims relating to alleged

government surveillance and harassment are the type of ‘bizarre conspiracy theory’ that warrant

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) (quoting Richards v. Duke Univ.,

480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 232

(D.D.C.

2007))); Bickford v. Gov’t of U.S.,

808 F. Supp. 2d 175

, 181–82 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s

“government torture, surveillance, and harassment” claims under Rule 12(b)(1)).

Accordingly, this court will dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction. An Order of Dismissal

will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: May 31, 2023

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

Page 3 of 3

Reference

Status
Published