UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ENERGY POLICY ADVOCATES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:19-cv-03307 (TNM) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Energy Policy Advocates sues the State Department under FOIA for documents

related to the agency’s handling of the 2016 Paris Climate Agreement. State produced hundreds

of records, but only three remain at issue. These are an action memo seeking authority to join

the Agreement, an attached background document, and a set of draft talking points State sent to

the National Security Council about entering the Agreement. State redacted information in all

three documents under Exemption 5’s deliberative process and attorney client privileges.

Plaintiff challenges these privilege claims on multiple grounds. The Court will grant State

summary judgment because it adequately demonstrates both privileges and satisfies its

segregability burden.

I.

The State Department oversees international agreements and treaties. The Secretary of

State dictates the United States’ entry into some of those agreements. See Pl.’s Stmt. of Genuine

Issues of Mat’l Fact (Pl.’s SMF) ¶ 5, ECF No. 50-4. And State’s policy requires written

authorization from the Secretary before the United States enters any “significant international

1 agreements[.]” See U.S. State Dep’t, 11 Foreign Affairs Manual (“FAM”) 724.1 (2006). 1 To get

authorization, State employees follow the “Circular 175” process, named for the document that

initially established it. 11 FAM 721; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 9. A key part of the process involves

subordinates sending “action memos” with background information to the Secretary. 11 FAM

724.3; Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 2, 3. The Secretary then approves or disapproves of the memo’s

recommendations by signing the memo itself. See, e.g., Ex. 1, ECF 50-2.

Plaintiff—a nonprofit dedicated to government transparency—filed a FOIA request

seeking records about the Circular 175 process for the Paris Climate Agreement. See, e.g.,

Compl. ¶¶ 12, 18. State produced over 300 documents in response. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ.

J. (MSJ) at 3, ECF No. 47. Three remain at issue: (1) the action memo seeking written

authorization to enter the Paris Climate Agreement, (2) a background document attached to it,

and (3) a set of draft talking points entitled “Points on U.S. Domestic Approval Procedures for

Becoming a Party to the Paris Agreement.” See generally Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ.

J. (Pl.’s Opp’n), ECF No. 50-1; see also Decl. of Christopher Horner, Exs. 1–3, ECF No. 50-2.

State moves for summary judgment. It argues that it properly redacted information in

these three documents under Exemption 5’s deliberative process and attorney-client privileges.

See generally MSJ. And it contends that it produced all reasonably segregable material. See id.

Plaintiff disagrees on both fronts. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. 2 State’s motion is ripe. This Court

has jurisdiction under

(a)(4)(B) and

.

II.

Courts resolve the “vast majority” of FOIA cases at summary judgment. AARC v. CIA,

1 Available at https://fam.state.gov (last accessed June 13, 2023). 2 Plaintiff does not challenge the adequacy of State’s search. See Pl.’s SMF ¶ 11. 2

(D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 781 Fed. App’x 11 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a party must show that “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986).

FOIA requires “disclosure of documents held by a federal agency unless the documents

fall within one of nine enumerated exemptions[.]” U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club,

Inc.,

, 785 (2021). To obtain summary judgment, the agency bears the burden to

show that any claimed exemptions apply. See ACLU v. DOD,

(D.C. Cir.

2011). Courts construe FOIA exemptions narrowly, see Milner v. Dep’t of Navy,

,

565 (2011), and consider their applicability de novo, see King v. DOJ,

(D.C.

Cir. 1987).

To meet its burden, an agency may rely on declarations describing the applicability of a

FOIA exemption to information that the agency has withheld. See Shapiro v. DOJ,

(D.C. Cir. 2018). Such declarations receive “a presumption of good faith.” SafeCard

Servs., Inc. v. SEC,

(D.C. Cir. 1991). The Court may grant summary

judgment based solely on the agency’s declarations if neither record evidence nor evidence of the

agency’s bad faith contradicts them. See Aguiar v. DEA,

, 734–35 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

III.

The only remaining disputes are whether State properly redacted material under

Exemption 5 and met its segregability burden. Exemption 5 protects records from disclosure

“that would not be available by law to a party other than . . . in litigation with the agency.”

(b)(5). In other words, it shields records “normally privileged in the civil discovery

context.” NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

(1975). State invokes the

3 deliberative process privilege for all of its Exemption 5 withholdings and the attorney-client

privilege for a subset. See Decl. of Susan C. Weetman (Weetman Decl.) ¶¶ 27–46, ECF No. 47-

1; Ex. 1, ECF No. 47-2 (Vaughn Index); Second Decl. of Susan C. Weetman (2d Weetman

Decl.) ¶¶ 5–6, ECF No. 51-3; Ex. 5, ECF No. 51-2 (Suppl. Vaughn Index). 3 The Court takes

each privilege in turn.

A.

The deliberative process privilege “shields documents that reflect an agency’s

preliminary thinking about a problem, as opposed to its final decision about it.” Sierra Club, 141

S. Ct. at 785. It “is rooted in the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly

among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news.” Id.

(cleaned up). The privilege thus ensures that subordinates “will feel free to provide the decision-

maker with their uninhibited opinions and recommendations” without fear of public ridicule.

Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy,

(D.C. Cir. 1980). More, it

“guards against confusing the issues and misleading the public by dissemination of documents

suggesting reasons and rationales for a course of action” that the agency ultimately rejected.

To qualify for the deliberative process privilege, a document must be both pre-decisional

and deliberative. A document is pre-decisional if the agency generated it before its final decision

on a matter. See Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. at 786. A document is deliberative if the agency

prepared it to “help the agency formulate its position.” Id. Along with these two requirements,

State must clear another hurdle. To withhold exempt records, it must provide a focused, context-

specific explanation about why disclosure would cause foreseeable harm to an interest protected

3 State filed a supplemental Vaughn index further detailing which parts of each document are covered by the attorney-client privilege. See 2d Weetman Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. 5 (Suppl. Vaughn Index). 4 by FOIA. See

(a)(8)(A)(i)(I); see also Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v.

FBI,

(D.C. Cir. 2021). Though agencies could previously articulate a mere link

between the withheld information and some foreseeable harm, this is no longer enough. See

Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. CBP,

, 109 (D.D.C. 2021)

(describing this shift).

State must now provide a “focused and concrete demonstration of why disclosure of the

particular type of material” will cause foreseeable harm “in the specific context of the agency

action at issue.” See Reps. Comm. v. FBI,

. In other words, the agency cannot

merely state that disclosure “could . . . adversely impair internal deliberations” or chill inter-

agency speech; it must argue that disclosure would have that effect in context.

at 369–70; see

also Machado Amadis v. DOS,

, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (upholding an assertion of the

deliberative process privilege where an agency “specifically focused on the information at issue”

in the responsive records and “concluded that disclosure of that information ‘would’ chill future

internal discussions”). But even without enough explanation from the agency, the “context and

purpose” of withheld information can support a finding of foreseeable harm. Reps. Comm. v.

FBI,

.

1.

State has established that the redacted content in the three documents is both pre-

decisional and deliberative.

First consider the action memo and its attachment. Subordinate State Department

employees sent the memo to the Secretary requesting his sign-off to accept the Paris Climate

Agreement. See MSJ at 10; Weetman Decl. ¶ 31. State released “purely factual” portions, and

information that “encompass[es] the final decision reached.” MSJ at 10; Weetman Decl. ¶ 33.

5 But it withheld parts in each document that subordinates drafted “for the Secretary to consider in

making his decision” to sign the memo. MSJ at 10; Weetman Decl. ¶ 34. These withheld

portions distill the thoughts of State employees about the merits or drawbacks of the suggested

action. See MSJ at 10; Weetman Decl. ¶ 34. And they involve subordinates’ “selection and

analysis of facts” for the decision-maker. Vaughn Index at 4. One handwritten part specifically

says it awaits a “final decision.” Id. at 3. And another describes “with specificity, a potential

course of action . . . that was ultimately decided against.” Id.

State has shown that the information in these two documents predated the Secretary’s

decision to sign the memo and that it informed his decision. See Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. at 786.

That the documents flowed from subordinates to the Secretary who makes the final call bolsters

the conclusion that they are pre-decisional and deliberative. Accord Greenspan v. Bd. of Govs.

of Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 21-cv-1968,

, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2022); Abtew

v. DHS,

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

Next consider the draft talking points. An attorney at State without final decision-making

authority prepared these for the National Security Council. See MSJ at 11; Weetman Decl. ¶¶

37, 34, 39. At this point, the United States had not yet entered the Paris Climate Agreement. See

Weetman Decl. ¶ 39. The talking points provide “initial guidance” about describing to a foreign

counterpart the “domestic legal process for the United States to enter into an international

agreement.” MSJ at 11; Weetman Decl. ¶ 37. And they highlight the “potential framing of key

issues,” plus “rejoinders to hypothetical arguments that other interlocutors may make.” MSJ at

11; Weetman Decl. ¶ 38. This document is pre-decisional because it predates the meeting for

which it was prepared. See, e.g., Advancement Project v. DHS,

, 138

(D.D.C. 2021). And it is deliberative because it helped the National Security Council members

6 prepare for any final statements they may have made at the meeting. See, e.g., Greenspan,

, at *13 (finding documents prepared to help decision-makers prepare for meetings

pre-decisional and deliberative).

Plaintiff asserts—without support—that the talking points are “primarily factual in

nature” or merely “messaging about existing policy” and thus should be released. Pl.’s Opp’n at

12, 25–26. But State’s evidence belies that conclusion. See, e.g., Vaughn Index at 5 (points are

“legal advice regarding the background and possible domestic legal processes” for entering the

agreement); Weetman Decl. ¶ 38 (talking points “included suggestions on how to frame certain

issues”). More, “factual material culled and presented to decision-makers through exercises of

discretion” may be protected by the deliberative process privilege. Greenspan,

, at *11; see also Reply in Support of Def.’s MSJ (Reply) at 10, ECF No. 51

(collecting authorities). State has adequately justified its withholdings of the talking points. 4

2.

Next up is foreseeable harm. State explains that disclosure of advice that subordinates

provided to the Secretary would chill internal deliberations about future agreements if

subordinates knew that the public, including foreign adversaries, could access that information.

See Weetman Decl. ¶ 35. Such a chilling effect would degrade the quality of advice the

Secretary receives when considering whether to enter future agreements. See

More,

disclosure of advice in the memo and its attachment could cause public confusion because

portions reflect a course ultimately not adopted. See Vaughn Index at 3; Weetman Decl. ¶ 36.

As State explains, the “danger of public confusion is particularly high” in this context because

4 And as explained in Part III.C, State is entitled to a presumption that it complied with its independent obligation to release all reasonably segregable materials. Accord Reply at 12.

7 the redactions “could be improperly interpreted as positions of the U.S. Government” by

domestic or foreign observers. Weetman Decl. ¶ 36.

Similarly, State explains that redactions in the draft talking points “do not reflect final

Department policy.”

. So their disclosure would “chill the flow of internal

recommendations, candid assessments, and other necessary exchanges,” hampering information

flow.

. State notes that the harm would be “especially pronounced here given the highly

sensitive nature of” what legal form the Paris Agreement should take. Vaughn Index at 6. More,

release of a subordinate lawyer’s opinions and ideas “would cause public confusion” about

whether information they contain was a final decision.

As State explains, the final decision-

makers in the National Security Council who received the draft talking points could have used or

jettisoned them. See Weetman Decl. ¶ 39. Disclosing the contents of the talking points could

thus confuse the public about what was actually said in a private meeting with foreign

counterparts. See id.; see also Vaughn Index at 6.

State meets its foreseeable harm burden for all three redacted documents. It explains why

release of each would impair internal deliberations surrounding future action memos or talking

points. Accord Reps. Comm. v. FBI, 3 F.4th at 369–70. More, the D.C. Circuit has “long

recognized that the risk of public confusion has a special force with respect to disclosures of

agency positions or reasoning concerning proposed policies.” Reps. Comm. v. CBP, 567 F.

Supp. 3d at 122 (cleaned up). So too here. All of the redacted documents discuss subordinates’

thoughts and analysis on proposed policies for decision-makers to review. See, e.g., Vaughn

Index at 2–6. Releasing such inchoate material could certainly mislead and foreseeably harm the

agency’s processes. Accord Greenspan,

, at *17.

Plaintiff raises several counterarguments, but none persuade. First, Plaintiff protests that

8 because the Secretary signed the memo, it must be released in full. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4–5, 23–

24. This is so because a document that is pre-decisional when prepared “can lose that status if it

is adopted, formally or informally, as the agency position[.]” Arthur Andersen & Co. v. IRS,

(D.C. Cir. 1982).

But as State explains, the Secretary’s signature reflects only approval of the memo’s

request to join the agreement—an official thumbs up. See MSJ at 10. Consider the redacted

memo itself. See Ex. 1, ECF No. 50-2. It begins with two top-line recommendations: that the

Secretary sign (1) the 2016 Paris Climate Agreement and (2) the “Instrument of Acceptance.”

Lines asking the Secretary to either “approve” or “disapprove” these recommendations using his

signature fall just below.

The Secretary initialed both “approve” lines. See

All of that

information has been released.

But State’s redactions are different because they encompass advice from subordinates

teeing up the ultimate decision. See, e.g., Weetman Decl. ¶ 34. While the Secretary agrees with

the conclusion of the memo, his signature does not necessarily endorse his subordinates’

preliminary advice—some of which he actually rejected. See Vaughn Index at 3; cf. Spears v.

DOJ,

(D.D.C. 2015) (upholding withholding of action memo from

subordinates to Assistant Attorney General seeking sign-off on wiretaps under the deliberative

process privilege). So the Secretary did not “adopt[], formally or informally,” the redacted

recommendations of his staff. Arthur Andersen & Co.,

.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the memo’s contents must be released under the related

“working law” doctrine. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 23–24. But the memo does not meet the high bar of

“working law,” defined as a “conclusive or authoritative statement of [agency] policy, usually a

higher authority instructing a subordinate on how the agency’s general policy applies to a

9 particular case, or a document that determined policy or applied established policy.” Elec.

Frontier Found. v. DOJ,

(D.C. Cir. 2014). Plaintiff has it backwards. The memo

is information supplied by a subordinate to the Secretary seeking his final approval. See, e.g.,

Weetman Decl. ¶ 34.

Tax Analysts v. IRS, which Plaintiff cites, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 24, is not to the contrary.

There, the Circuit held that IRS advice memoranda were working law and must be released. See

(D.C. Cir. 1997). But the agency’s chief counsel issued those memos in

response to subordinates’ questions to promote nationwide uniformity on tax law. See

And

subordinates routinely used and relied on them. See

Those memos differ from State’s action

memo here, which subordinates sent to the Secretary for final sign-off and is not a formal

statement of agency policy. See, e.g., Weetman Decl. ¶¶ 33, 35–36; Vaughn Index at 2.

Third, Plaintiff calls State’s foreseeable harm explanations “boilerplate” and “cookie-

cutter.” See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7, 9. For the reasons already explained, the Court disagrees. State

follows the Circuit’s instruction in Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. FBI to

provide a focused, context-specific discussion of potential harms. See 3 F.4th at 369–72.

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that disclosing the action memo will “aid” State because its

employees will be “encouraged” to know the Secretary adopted their suggestions. Pl.’s Opp’n at

5, 7–8. In other words, Plaintiff believes that the “increased pride and improved morale from

disclosure” would counter any chill on internal discussion. Id. at 8. Accord Sears,

. But the Court is hard-pressed to understand how hypothetical projections about employee

morale defeat State’s assertions of foreseeable harm. More, as State explains, at least one of the

redactions in the action memo was not accepted by the Secretary. See Vaughn at 3. Thus,

10 Plaintiff’s objection is factually flawed and entirely conjectural.

Fifth, Plaintiff claims that different agencies have released other action memos publicly,

so releasing this one would not cause harm. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6 (discussing the Energy

Department’s release of a State legal memorandum about an international agreement with the

Czech Republic). Maybe so, but that has little bearing on whether State fails to show foreseeable

harm for Paris Agreement memo. It does not follow that because other agencies have voluntarily

released similar memos, State should be compelled to release the action memo here. All Plaintiff

offers is speculation that State employees “might well have” disseminated the memo already.

Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. That is not enough.

In sum, State’s deliberative process privilege withholdings are proper.

B.

Recall that State invoked attorney-client privilege for a subset of its redactions. The

attorney-client privilege encourages clients “to be as open and honest as possible with attorneys.”

Coastal States,

. In the governmental context, “the client may be the agency and

the attorney may be an agency lawyer.” Tax Analysts,

. And the privilege

“extends to all situations in which an attorney’s counsel is sought on a legal matter.” Coastal

States,

. Confidentiality is a “fundamental prerequisite” of this privilege, and

must exist both when information is communicated and after.

.

1.

State properly justified its attorney-client privilege withholdings. It withheld parts of the

action memo and background document under this privilege, plus all of the draft talking points.

See Suppl. Vaughn Index.

First, the action memo and attachment. State noted they contain “legal analysis and

11 advice” from State’s attorneys to inter-agency clients about the Paris Agreement and acceptance

of it. Vaughn Index at 3. The background document contains more of the same. See id. at 5.

And they “include facts divulged to one or more attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal

advice.” Weetman Decl. ¶ 45. Releasing this information would reveal the legal questions the

agency clients had, plus information provided to attorneys so they could provide answers. See

Vaughn Index at 3, 5. State also attests that all redacted legal advice “was kept confidential

within the executive branch.” Id. Those assertions, plus the presumption of good faith the Court

affords agency declarations, more than establishes the privilege. Accord Reps. Comm. v. CBP,

567 F. Supp. 3d at 117–18.

Second, the talking points. State explains that the National Security Council asked an

attorney-advisor for State to prepare them. See 2d Weetman Decl. ¶ 12. That attorney then sent

talking points providing legal advice about the background and domestic legal process through

which the United States may join the Paris Agreement. See Vaughn Index at 6. State again

reassures that all redacted legal advice “was kept confidential within the executive branch.” Id.

at 6. These assertions also establish the privilege; the draft talking points involve legal matters

for which one agency “has sought professional advice” from State’s attorneys. Mead Data

Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force,

(D.C. Cir. 1977).

Plaintiff counters that State fails to establish confidentiality for a few reasons. See Pl.’s

Opp’n at 14–22. First, Plaintiff claims that another document attached to the action memo (a

legal memorandum) was publicly released in unredacted form. See id. at 15. But as State points

out, that another document allegedly accompanying the action memo was leaked does not

eviscerate its assertions that the action memo and background document are privileged. See

Reply at 13. These are distinct documents and State justified its privilege assertions for the ones

12 at issue.

If Plaintiff intends to extend its argument about the leaked document to State’s

deliberative process privilege withholdings, it fails for the same reasons. More, Judge Mehta

recently held that this legal memo merits deliberative process protection even though a putative

version of it leaked. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. DOS,

, 184 (D.D.C.

2020). The Court agrees with his reasoning. A leaked document that the agency steadfastly

refuses to authenticate does not explode privilege because it does not qualify as an official

agency acknowledgment. See

at 184–85. And in any event, Plaintiff does not challenge

State’s withholding of the legal memo. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. So even if the leak somehow

waived that memo’s privilege, neither the action memo nor the background attachment have

suffered the same fate.

Second, Plaintiff protests that State’s Vaughn index does not list the name of each

document’s author or its recipients. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 16. And Plaintiff cites out-of-circuit

district court cases that required these details and more. See

at 16–18, 20–22 (arguing that

privilege logs and attorney bar numbers are also necessary). Because State did not include these

descriptions, Plaintiff claims it waived privilege. See

Not so.

Plaintiff overlooks that State’s Vaughn index includes the attorney’s name who sent the

talking points to the National Security Council. See Vaughn at 6. And it clarifies that the

Council requested those talking points from the attorney. See Suppl. Vaughn Index ¶ 12. More,

the action memo State produced lists the drafters of the document (all subordinates) and those

cleared to receive it. See Ex. 1, ECF 50-2; Weetman Decl. ¶ 34. State repeats the agencies for

whom the recipients work in its Vaughn index. See Vaughn Index at 1–2. And its declarant

underscores that all documents remain confidential between State’s attorneys and other agency

13 clients. See, e.g., Weetman Decl. ¶¶ 43, 46. That is enough. See, e.g., Reps. Comm. v. CBP, 567

F. Supp. 3d at 117–18 (upholding attorney-client privilege withholdings when agency noted

which offices they originated from and attested that they were responses to agency requests for

legal advice). 5

In sum, State appropriately justified it attorney-client privilege withholdings.

2.

State also meets its foreseeable harm burden. To date, the D.C. Circuit has applied this

requirement only to the deliberative process privilege, but the text is not so limited. See Reps.

Comm. v. FBI, 3 F.4th at 369–70;

(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). Still, as this Court has

explained, an agency’s foreseeable harm burden “may be more easily met when invoking other

privileges . . . for which the risk of harm through disclosure is more self-evident and the potential

for agency overuse is attenuated.” Reps. Comm. v. CBP, 567 F. Supp. 3d at 120.

The attorney-client privilege falls within this category. See id. Releasing attorney-client

communications “would undoubtably undermine our legal culture” because agencies “would lose

an important tool in their decisionmaking process—employees’ ability to confidentially consult

agency lawyers.” Id. The law therefore “already acknowledges and guards against the risk of

harm that would come from disclosing attorney-client communications.” Id.

State has articulated a persuasive description of that risk. The record shows that

disclosure of the redactions would impair the relationship of trust between an agency and its

attorneys. See, e.g., Weetman Decl. ¶ 46; Vaughn Index at 3, 5–6. And it would “undermine the

5 Importantly, there is no evidence that State shared these documents with non-Governmental personnel. Cf. Georgia v. DOJ, No. 21-cv-3138,

, at *4–6 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2023) (finding DOJ failed to meet FOIA’s threshold intra-agency requirement when it shared documents with private parties who did not act as consultants). 14 ability and willingness of executive branch officials to seek legal advice before making decisions

about issues with significant legal ramifications.”

; see also

at 5–6. More, as State’s

declarant explains, receiving legal advice as part of an action memo is “essential to appropriately

entering into an international agreement.” Weetman Decl. ¶ 46. Thus, State satisfies its

foreseeable harm burden for the attorney-client privilege redactions. Accord Machado Amadis v.

DOJ,

(D.D.C. 2019) (finding agency’s concern about potential chilling

effect of disclosure of attorney work product sufficient to show foreseeable harm), aff’d sub nom.

Machado Amadis v. DOS,

(D.C. Cir. 2020).

C.

Finally, State must “demonstrate that all reasonably segregable material has been

released.” Johnson v. EOUSA,

, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To meet this burden, it can

rely on both its declarations and Vaughn Index. See id. State is also “entitled to a presumption

that [it] complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material.” Sussman v.

U.S. Marshals Serv.,

(D.C. Cir. 2007). To overcome the presumption,

Plaintiff must present a “quantum of evidence.”

State declares that it conducted “line-by-line review” of each document before

determining that no more information could be segregated and released. See Weetman Decl. ¶ 5;

Vaughn Index; Suppl. Vaughn Index. These sworn statements are presumed accurate. Accord

Reps. Comm. v. CBP, 567 F. Supp. 3d at 131.

Plaintiff briefly argues that State improperly withheld factual information. See Pl.’s

Opp’n at 10–11. It claims that State’s segregability representations are contradictory and

conclusory. See id. The Court disagrees. And in any event, Plaintiff provides no evidence,

much less a “quantum,” that overcomes the presumption that the agency released all reasonably

15 segregable information. See Sussman,

. The Court thus finds that State has met

its burden. 6

IV.

For these reasons, the Court will grant State’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A

separate order will issue today.

2023.06.27 14:00:53 -04'00' Dated: June 27, 2023 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

6 Plaintiff suggests that the Court should conduct in camera review of documents to see whether State reasonably segregated factual information. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. Such review is a “discretionary tool” in this circuit, see, e.g., Juarez v. DOJ,

, 59–60 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve State’s motion. 16