UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CENTER FOR MEDICAL PROGRESS,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 21-642 (BAH) v. Judge Beryl A. Howell U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is the second go-round in summary judgment briefing in this lawsuit, as plaintiff

Center for Medical Progress, a nonprofit investigative journalism organization, continues its

effort to obtain, through a record request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),

, a grant application submitted by the University of Pittsburgh to serve as a

GenitoUrinary Development Molecular Anatomy Project (“GUDMAP”) Tissue Hub and Tissue

Gathering site for the National Institutes of Health’s (“NIH”) subcomponent, the National

Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (“NIDDK”). See Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No.

1; see also Ctr. for Med. Progress v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (“Ctr. for Medical

Progress I”), No. 21-cv-642 (BAH),

(D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2022) (granting, in part,

and denying, in part, parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment). Still contested is the

withholding by defendant U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, under FOIA

Exemption 6,

(b)(6), of the names of two NIH employees involved with the grant,

which plaintiff alleges provides controversial funding for the collection and distribution of fetal

stem cell tissue, see Decl. of Meredith Di Liberto, Pl.’s Counsel, ¶¶ 14–15, Exs. 9–10, ECF Nos.

18-1, 18-10, 18-11. The parties have thus renewed their cross-motions for summary judgment, 1 with supplemental evidentiary support for their respective positions. See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot.

Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 35; Def.’s Opp’n Supp. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. & Cross-

Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 44. For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s

pending motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s pending cross-motion for

summary judgment is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background and procedural history relevant to the pending motions have been

described at length in this Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion resolving the parties’ initial

cross-motions for summary judgment, see Ctr. for Med. Progress I,

, at *1–3,

and thus are incorporated by reference here. Briefly, this dispute began with plaintiff’s FOIA

request, submitted on April 28, 2020, requesting access to the grant application of the University

of Pittsburgh submitted to NIH to serve as the GUDMAP Tissue Hub and Tissue Gathering site.

See

. As production was ongoing, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment

regarding whether defendant’s reliance on FOIA Exemptions 4 and 6 were properly invoked.

See

at *2–3.

Summary judgment was subsequently granted to defendant as to its withholding of six

categories of records under Exemption 4 and six categories of records under Exemption 6, see

, but summary judgment was denied to both parties, without prejudice, as to two aspects of

the withheld records: (1) various categories of information withheld under Exemption 4 “due to

insufficient information to determine whether the parties dispute that such categories contain

confidential commercial information”; and (2) “the category of withheld information under

Exemption 6 detailed as ‘names of NIH staff involved in administering the grant’ . . . due to

insufficient information to determine whether the asserted privacy interests outweigh the public

2 interest in this information[,]”

. The parties were then directed to meet and confer

regarding the records remaining at issue and propose further proceedings to resolve any lingering

disputes as to the remaining records. See

Upon conferral, the parties proposed a schedule for

subsequent dispositive motions to resolve the remaining disputes, which request was granted.

See Min. Order (Sept. 17, 2022). Approximately two weeks later, plaintiff moved to alter or

amend the September 3, 2022 judgment, see Pl.’s Mot. Alter Amend J., ECF No. 30, challenging

factual assertions about employee harassment and abortion numbers included in defendant’s

Third Declaration of Gorka Garcia-Malene (“Third NIH Decl.”), ECF No. 23-2, referenced in

the Memorandum Opinion. See Ctr. for Med. Progress I,

, at *9, *13. That

motion was denied for the reasons explained in Center for Medical Progress v. U.S. Department

of Health & Human Services, No. 21-cv-642 (BAH),

(D.D.C. Nov. 16,

2022) (“Ctr. for Med. Progress II”).

Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on November 14, 2022, seeking to force the

release of the remaining responsive records falling into three categories of information withheld

under FOIA Exemption 4 as well as the release of three remaining redacted names of NIH

employees withheld under FOIA Exemption 6. See Pl.’s Mem. Defendant cross-moved for

summary judgment, reasserting the validity of its Exemption 4 and 6 withholdings. See Def.’s

Opp’n. 1 As this briefing progressed, defendant chose to release two categories of previously

withheld information under Exemption 4, see Def.’s Opp’n at 21; Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Def.’s

Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Reply Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 9 n.13, ECF No. 47,

1 Defendant filed its cross-motion and opposition twice on the docket, the only difference being that the latter-filed version includes a Proposed Order and defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. Compare ECF No. 43 (including solely defendant’s 21-page Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Combined (1) Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment), with ECF No. 44 (including the identical 21-page Memorandum of Law as well as the two- page Proposed Order and the two-page Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts). As such, the more complete filing, ECF No. 44, is considered the operative filing for the purposes of this opinion.

3 as well as “lifted challenged redactions” also withheld under Exemption 4, rendering moot

plaintiff’s challenges under this exemption, see Def.’s Reply Supp. Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J.

(“Def.’s Reply”) at 2; accord

at 14–15; see also Sixth Decl. of Gorka Garcia-Malene, FOIA

Officer, NIH, HHS (“Sixth NIH Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 55-2;

Ex. 1 (disclosing requested

redactions), ECF No. 55-3. Meanwhile, plaintiff withdrew another challenge because

defendant’s “explanation” of a certain term in the FOIA request revealed that release of one

category of materials protected by FOIA Exemption 6 “will not add anything pertinent to the

public interest aspect of the records.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4 n.3.

In summary, what remains is plaintiff’s challenge to the Exemption 6 withholdings of

two categories of information: (1) the name of the “NIH Program Official”; and (2) the name of

the “NIH Grants Management Specialist.” The parties’ motions are now ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party is entitled to summary judgment

only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment in the movant’s favor is proper as

a matter of law.” Soundboard Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir.

2018) (quoting Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,

(D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In FOIA cases, “courts must grant summary

judgment for an agency if its affidavit: (1) describes the justifications for nondisclosure with

‘reasonably specific detail’; and (2) is not substantially called into question by contrary record

evidence or evidence of agency bad faith.” Schaerr v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Wolf v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 2007)). Most FOIA cases

“can be resolved on summary judgment.” Brayton v. Off. of U.S. Trade Representative,

(D.C. Cir. 2011).

4 “The fundamental principle animating FOIA is public access to government

documents.” Waterman v. IRS,

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Valencia-Lucena v.

U.S. Coast Guard,

(D.C. Cir. 1999)); accord DiBacco v. U.S.

Army (“DiBacco I”),

(D.C. Cir. 2015). Agencies are therefore statutorily

mandated to “make . . . records promptly available to any person” who submits a request that

“reasonably describes such records” and “is made in accordance with [the agency’s] published

rules.”

(a)(3)(A). “Congress, however, did not ‘pursue transparency at all

costs[;]’ [r]ather, it recognized that ‘legitimate governmental and private interests could be

harmed by release of certain types of information.’” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington

v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. (“CREW II”),

, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (first quoting Hall &

Assocs. v. EPA,

(D.C. Cir. 2020), then quoting AquAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of

Reclamation,

(D.C. Cir. 2017)). To balance those competing interests, “FOIA

exempts nine categories of documents from ‘the government’s otherwise broad duty of

disclosure.’” Waterman,

(quoting AquAlliance,

). “[T]hese

limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant

objective of the Act.” Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose,

(1976).

FOIA authorizes federal courts “to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records

and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.”

(a)(4)(B). When an agency invokes an exemption to disclosure, district courts must

“determine de novo whether non-disclosure was permissible.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t

of Homeland Sec.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015); see also U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Landano,

(1993) (“The Government bears the burden of establishing that the exemption

applies.”); DiBacco v. U.S. Dep’t of Army (“DiBacco II”),

(D.C. Cir. 2019)

5 (“‘An agency withholding responsive documents from a FOIA release bears the burden of

proving the applicability of claimed exemptions,’ typically through affidavit or declaration.”

(quoting DiBacco I,

)). The statute “places the burden ‘on the agency to sustain

its action,’ and the agency therefore bears the burden of proving that it has not ‘improperly’

withheld the requested records.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of

Just. (“CREW I”),

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (first quoting

(a)(4)(B),

then quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Tax Analysts,

, 142 n.3 (1989)). This burden

does not shift even when the requester files a cross-motion for summary judgment because the

agency ultimately “bears the burden to establish the applicability of a claimed exemption to any

records or portions of records it seeks to withhold,” Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n v. Exec. Off. for

Immigr. Rev.,

(D.C. Cir. 2016), while “[t]he burden upon the requester is

merely ‘to establish the absence of material factual issues before a summary disposition of the

case could permissibly occur,’” Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,

, 904–05 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Campbell,

(D.C. Cir. 1978)).

The agency may sustain “this burden ‘by submitting a Vaughn index, along with

affidavits from agency employees that describe the justifications for nondisclosure with

reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the

claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by

evidence of agency bad faith.’” Waterman,

(quoting Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n v.

Exec. Off. Immigr. Rev.,

(D.C. Cir. 2016)); see also Poitras v. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec.,

(D.D.C. 2018) (“An agency may carry its burden of

showing an exemption was properly invoked by submitting sufficiently detailed affidavits or

6 declarations, a Vaughn index of the withheld documents, or both, to demonstrate that the

government has analyzed carefully any material withheld and provided sufficient information as

to the applicability of an exemption to enable the adversary system to operate.”). “‘Ultimately,

an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or

‘plausible.’” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (per

curiam) (quoting ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contests the invocation of FOIA Exemption 6 to redact the names of two NIH

employees with the titles “Program Official” and “Grants Management Specialist,” respectively.

See Pl.’s Mem. at 8–9, 10–12. As discussed below, Exemption 6 properly applies to protect

from disclosure the names of the individuals who hold those job titles.

A. Withheld NIH Employees’ Names Qualify for Exemption 6 Nondisclosure

Exemption 6 protects “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

(b)(6). As a threshold matter, to qualify for this exemption, the withheld information must be

“personnel and medical files” or “similar files.”

“The terms [sic] ‘similar files’ is construed

broadly and ‘is intended to cover detailed Government records on an individual which can be

identified as applying to that individual.’” Gov’t Accountability Project v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

, 105–06 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co.,

(1982)). “[C]ourts look ‘not to the nature of the files,’ but rather to ‘the nature of

the information’ at issue.” Skybridge Spectrum Found. v. FCC,

(D.D.C.

2012) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA,

(D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also Jud.

Watch, Inc. v. FDA,

, 152–53 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“similar files” encompasses “not

just files, but also bits of personal information, such as names and addresses, the release of which 7 would ‘create[] a palpable threat to privacy.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Carter v. U.S.

Dep’t of Com.,

(D.C. Cir. 1987))).

Correctly, nowhere does plaintiff dispute that the two NIH employee names requested

qualify as “similar file[s].” Cf. Pl.’s Mem. at 10 (stating only that “Exemption 6 exempts from

disclosure information from ‘personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’

(b)(6).”). Indeed, the names, job titles, location of tissue procurement sites, and other

identifying information of University of Pittsburgh employees, names and identifying

information of third parties supporting the grant, and names and identifying information of

clients who wrote letters in support of the grant are “bits of personal information,” Jud. Watch,

, that “appl[y] to . . . particular individual[s],” Wash. Post Co., 690 F.2d at 260.

Thus, Exemption 6 may be triggered. See Jud. Watch, 449 F.3d at 152–53 (finding that the

names and addresses of persons and businesses associated with a drug that induced abortion

constituted “similar files”).

Upon meeting this threshold determination, the next inquiry is whether disclosure

“‘would compromise a substantial, as opposed to de minimis, privacy interest,’ because ‘[i]f no

significant privacy interest is implicated . . . FOIA demands disclosure.’” Multi Ag Media LLC

v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (alteration and omission in

original) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner,

(D.C. Cir.

1989)). The standard “means less than it might seem,” as a substantial privacy interest is

“anything greater than a de minimis privacy interest.”

at 1229–30. If a substantial privacy

interest is found in the information, courts employ a balancing test to determine whether release

of such information constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, Wash. Post

8 Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,

(D.C. Cir. 1982); Rose,

, by weighing “the privacy interest that would be compromised by disclosure against any

public interest in the requested information,” Multi Ag Media LLC,

. “[A]

privacy interest may be substantial,” yet nonetheless “be insufficient to overcome the public

interest in disclosure.”

. “Exemption 6’s requirement that disclosure be ‘clearly

unwarranted’ instructs us to ‘tilt the balance (of disclosure interests against privacy interests) in

favor of disclosure.’” Morley v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Wash. Post

Co.,

).

Accordingly, the appropriateness of applying Exemption 6 to withhold the names of the

two NIH employees turns on whether the requested information implicates a substantial privacy

interest and, if so, whether release of the information would be “clearly unwarranted” in view of

the public interest, if any, in the requested documents. This analysis applies to each of the two

NIH employees, whose information is being withheld, and is addressed next.

B. “NIH Program Official”

Plaintiff argues that Exemption 6 does not apply to the name of the “NIH Program

Official” for two reasons, namely: (1) the name is already publicly available either on the NIH

website, see Pl.’s Mem. at 8–9, or on the website www.grantome.com, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 4–5,

and (2) defendant has “completely failed to provide any evidence that fetal tissue researchers at

Pittsburgh were ever harassed” and thus made an insufficient showing of risks to the “Program

Official,” see

at 5–6. Both arguments are addressed in turn.

First, plaintiff claims that NIH already has made the withheld name publicly available,

along with the names of other individuals associated with fetal tissue research more generally.

As support, plaintiff says the withheld name is listed on NIH’s own RePORTER website

associated with the relevant grant application as “Anna Burkart Sadusky,” who is listed as 9 “Program Officer,” see Pl.’s Mem. at 8, and also offers up another name “Deborah K.

Hoshizaki,” listed as the “Program Official” on the publicly available website

www.grantome.com to justify lifting the redactions, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 4–5. Plaintiff requests in

camera review for confirmation. See Pl.’s Mem. at 8–9. Defendant counters that the name of

the “Program Official” has not been publicly released. See Fifth Decl. of Gorka Garcia-Malene,

FOIA Officer, NIH, HHS (“Fifth NIH Decl.”) ¶ 7, ECF No. 44-1; Sixth NIH Decl. ¶ 7; see also

Def.’s Opp’n at 2–4 (stating that Sadusky is not the redacted name plaintiff requests); Def.’s

Reply at 9 (“Plaintiff has no way of confirming the accuracy of the listing on Grantome.com

[naming “Deborah K. Hoshizaki” as the “Program Official”] . . . . For that reason, the

Government will neither confirm nor deny whether the listed name is correctly attributed to the

listed role.”). Moreover, defendant contends that any inconsistencies, missteps, or concessions

made in the redaction process have already been deemed by this Court not to amount to bad

faith, see

at 3–4 (quoting Ctr. for Med. Progress I,

, at *17–18), and, in any

event, the fact that other individuals associated with fetal tissue procurement and research are

publicly identified does not support the release of additional names solely on that basis, see

Def.’s Reply at 7–11. 2 Defendant is correct.

As previously explained, the fact that the names of some individuals tied to the grant

program are public does not justify disclosing more names simply on that basis. See Ctr. for

Med. Progress I,

, at *14 (describing Judicial Watch: “where the D.C. Circuit

2 Despite this prior rejection of plaintiff’s urging to make a finding of bad faith, plaintiff persists in seeking such a finding. Again, any inconsistencies throughout the records in the naming of the “Program Official” are not evidence of bad faith. See Ctr. for Med. Progress I,

, at *17 (citing Mobley v. CIA,

(D.D.C. 2013)). Despite the varying uses of “Program Official” and “Program Officer,” defendant throughout this litigation has been forthcoming about the need to protect certain information, and has made corrections to the Vaughn index as well as subsequent disclosures upon uncovering new information. See also Ctr. for Med. Progress I,

, at *17 (describing those same efforts). That conduct supports defendant’s good faith efforts to comply with FOIA’s requirements.

10 held that once an agency established the potential for violence and harassment for persons or

businesses associated with the product at issue, such ‘privacy interest extends to all such

employees, and the [agency] need not justify the withholding of [names] on an individual-by-

individual basis under FOIA Exemption 6’”) (citing Jud. Watch, Inc. v. FDA,

(D.C. Cir. 2006)).

Furthermore, any named individuals on the public website www.grantome.com

supposedly linked to the grant program do not support disclosure. As the D.C. Circuit outlined

in Cottone v. Reno, “materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA lose their

protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record.”

(D.C. Cir. 1999). Known as the “public domain doctrine,” requested information is deemed

“officially acknowledged” and thus publicly disclosed if the information is (1) “as specific as the

information previously released[,]” (2) “match[es] the information previously disclosed[,]” and

(3) “already ha[s] been made public through an official and documented disclosure[.]”

Montgomery v. IRS,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Fitzgibbon v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 1990)).

Information cited by plaintiff on www.grantome.com does not fulfill that test because the

website is privately managed and operated—claiming to be run by “data scientists based in

Cleveland, OH USA who are scientifically trained with Ph.D. degrees in quantitative

disciplines”—and claiming to compile grant data available from NIH. See About, Grantome (last

visited July 24, 2023), https://www.grantome.com/about [https://perma.cc/6E3Z-F2HN].

Nowhere on the website does the company purport to be an arm of the government, and plaintiff

does not allege such. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4–5; see also Sixth NIH Decl. ¶ 7 (“The grantome.com

website is not, in any way, associated with NIH and NIH bears no responsibility for (nor does it

11 have any control over) what appears there.”). On that ground alone, plaintiff fails to show that

the public domain doctrine applies and thus discussion of the two additional requirements for

official disclosure is unnecessary.

Second, plaintiff claims a complete lack of factual support for defendant’s contention that

NIH employees affiliated with this grant project are subject to risks of harassment, bolstering this

contention by pointing out that NIH already publicizes the names of individuals connected to the

grant. See

at 5–6. This Court already held that defendant provided sufficient evidence to

support that releasing the names of individuals tied to the grant program and fetal tissue research,

such as the “Program Official,” would subject those individuals to the real risk of threats,

harassment, and violence. See Ctr. for Med. Progress I,

, at *13 (citing First

Decl. of Gorka Garcia-Malene, FOIA Officer, NIH, HHS (“First NIH Decl.”) ¶ 31, ECF No. 17-

3; Second Decl. of Gorka Garcia-Malene, FOIA Officer, NIH, HHS (“Second NIH Decl.”) ¶ 12,

ECF No. 21-1; Revised Vaughn Index at 59–60, ECF No. 25-1). Such interests are far more than

de minimis. Plaintiff again challenged the sufficiency of defendant’s evidence of harassment in

its Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, which was similarly rejected, see Ctr. for Med.

Progress II,

, at *2. Plaintiff now seizes a third opportunity to decry a

supposed dearth of evidence of harassment—such an effort to force the Court to revisit its prior

findings based on arguments already rejected twice is both unsuccessful and unacceptable.

Given the lack of official public disclosure of the name of the “Program Official” and the

great privacy interest in protecting that individual’s identity, FOIA Exemption 6 is properly

invoked here and thus defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to the

withholding of that name.

12 C. “NIH Grants Management Specialist”

Plaintiff then challenges defendant’s invocation of Exemption 6 to withhold the identity

of the “NIH Grants Management Specialist” arguing that the public interest in ensuring that NIH

and the grant recipient are complying with federal and state laws pertaining to fetal tissue

outweigh that individual’s privacy interest. See Pl.’s Mem. at 10–11. According to plaintiff, the

“NIH Grants Management Specialist” is “in a very important position” with the tasks, among

other things, of “evaluating grant applications for administrative content and compliance with

statutes, regulations, and guidelines,” such that knowing the identity of this person would address

the public concern with statutory compliance. See

; Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–9. Defendant

counters that the “NIH Grants Management Specialist” is “a staff-level civil servant” without

programmatic responsibilities and “is not involved in the substance of the grant.” Def.’s Opp’n

at 10 (citing Fifth NIH Decl. ¶¶ 5–6). Defendant also flags plaintiff’s lack of evidence, beyond

hearsay reported in news articles, that NIH or the grant recipient are violating any statute in any

way, and that such conclusory allegations do not outweigh the individual’s substantial interest in

privacy to avoid the risk of harassment or threats. See

at 10–13. Finally, defendant asserts

that any interest of the public in exposing “what their government is up to” would not be solved

by the release of the name of a single individual and thus does not eclipse the privacy interest.

at 11 (quoting Rose,

). Again, defendant is correct.

Plaintiff is free to request information regarding potential government wrongdoing, but

revealing the exact identity of the “NIH Grants Management Specialist” in no way furthers that

aim. See Rose,

(“[T]he basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act [is] to

open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” (internal citation omitted)). Aside from

stating that the “NIH Grant Management Specialist” has an important job, see Pl.’s Mem. at 11;

Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–7, plaintiff’s papers stop short of accusing this person of any individual 13 misconduct. Thus, in attempting to unravel a supposed web of government noncompliance, the

relevant material involves the actions of individuals, not their names. Cf. Rose, 425 U.S. at 380–

81 (ruling that the names of U.S. Air Force Academy cadets accused of wrongdoing were

irrelevant to the inquiry into whether the Air Force abided by its Honor Code and thus the names

were not subject to disclosure under FOIA Exemption 6); U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reporters Comm.

for Freedom of Press,

, 774–75 (1989) (“[A]lthough there is undoubtedly some

public interest in anyone’s criminal history, especially if the history is in some way related to the

subject’s dealing with a public official or agency, the FOIA’s central purpose is to ensure that the

Government’s activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny[.]”). The extremely

limited public interest in the identity of the “NIH Grant Management Specialist” is far

outweighed by the private interest in protecting this individual from harassment and potential

violence that could result from disclosing their name. As previously discussed, plaintiff

provided sufficient facts to illustrate that threat. See supra Section III.B (citing First NIH Decl. ¶

31; Second NIH Decl. ¶ 12; Revised Vaughn Index at 59–60). Moreover, plaintiff’s second

attempt to assert that prior NIH disclosure of names of individuals connected to fetal tissue

research justifies disclosure of more names that have thus far been protected similarly falls flat.

See supra id. (citing See Ctr. for Med. Progress I,

, at *14; Jud. Watch, Inc.,

).

As such, the private interest in protecting the identity of the “NIH Grants Management

Specialist” outweighs the public interest and thus FOIA Exemption 6 properly withholds that

information from disclosure. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

14 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the government’s invocation of FOIA Exemption 6 to withhold

the identities of the “NIH Program Official” and the “NIH Grants Management Specialist” is

proper. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment demanding release of that information is

therefore denied and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.

An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.

Date: August 7, 2023

___________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL United States District Judge

15