UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

In re Application of

MIYA WATER PROJECTS NETHERLANDS, B.V., Case No. 1:23-mc-43 (CRC/GMH) Applicant.

To Obtain Discovery for Use in an International Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Under

, a federal district court may compel (1) a person or entity within

its district to respond to discovery requests filed by (2) an applicant that has an interest in a legal

proceeding that (3) has been, or is reasonably contemplated to be, filed in a foreign or international

tribunal. If a court has that authority, then—as directed by the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v.

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,

(2004)—it must decide whether to exercise it, taking

into account not only conventional discovery issues like relevance and burden, but also the nature

of the foreign proceeding and its discovery tools. Here, Miya Water Projects Netherlands B.V.,

(“Miya”) has filed an amended application for the issuance of a subpoena to CG/LA Infrastructure

Inc., (“CG/LA”) related to potential legal proceedings in the Netherlands. ECF No. 13.

After a thorough review of Miya’s application and the record, 1 the Court will GRANT

Miya’s amended application, ECF No. 13, as set forth below. 2

1 The docket entries relevant to this Memorandum Opinion and Order are: (1) Declaration of Noam Komy, ECF No. 3 and attachments; (2) Declaration of Davine Roessingh, ECF No. 4; (3) Declaration of Tara Lee, ECF No. 5; (4) Order to Show Cause,ECF No. 6; (5) Response to Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 10; (6) Declaration of Benedict Bernstein, ECF No. 11; (7) Amended Application, ECF No. 13 and attachments; and (8) Notice of Withdrawal, ECF No. 14. Citations to page numbers herein reflect the pagination assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing system. 2 “Since the Court’s decision on a Section 1782 application is non-dispositive, it may be decided by a magistrate judge by opinion and order, rather than a report and recommendation to the district court.” In re Application of Shervin Pishevar for an Order to take Discovery for use in Foreign Proceedings Pursuant to

, 439 F. Supp. I. BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Dispute

Miya is a Dutch company that provides water and wastewater services around the world,

including services related to water efficiency, commercial management, and water treatment. ECF

No. 13-1 at 9; ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 2–3. In 2018, Puerto Rico’s Aqueducts and Sewer Authority

(“PRASA”) 3 and its Public-Private Partnership Authority (“P3 Authority”) 4 launched a multi-year

project to upgrade Puerto Rico’s water systems with smart water metering technology. ECF No.

13-1 at 6; see also ECF No. 3-1 (Desirability and Convenience Study for project). PRASA and

the P3 Authority issued a Request for Qualifications (“RFQ”) in June 2018, seeking bids for “more

efficient metering systems, remote meter reading technology and re-engineering of its customer

services” (the “Water Metering Project”). ECF No. 13-1 at 12; see also ECF No. 3, ¶ 6; ECF No.

3-2 (RFQ). One bidding consortium, the IBT Group, (“IBT Group”), qualified to move on to the

next stage of the process, the Request for Proposals (“RFP”). ECF No. 13-1 at 12; see also ECF

3d 290, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing In re Hulley Enterprises Ltd.,

, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“This Court agrees with the majority of courts finding that rulings on § 1782 applications are not dispositive.”)), adhered to on reconsideration sub nom. In re Pishevar, No. 19-mc-503,

(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020); see also In re Pons,

, 1141 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (noting that “[t]he great majority of courts to address the issue” have determined that a magistrate judge may dispose of “Section 1782 discovery motions” by order rather than by report and recommendation and collecting cases). That said, the D.C. Circuit has recently held that an appeal of a magistrate judge’s decision on a section 1782 application must first be addressed by a district judge pursuant to

(b)(1) and Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before it can be appealed to the Circuit. See Order, Menashe v. Covington & Burling, No. 21-7091 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 6. 2022) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction because a district judge had not yet ruled on objections to a magistrate judge’s decision pursuant to Rule 72(a)); cf. Charter Oil Co. v. Am. Emp’rs’ Ins. Co.,

, 1171–72 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction over an appeal of a magistrate judge’s order on a non-dispositive dispute where no objections were filed to the order pursuant to Rule 72(a)), cited in Order at 1, Menashe, No. 21-7091. Accordingly, if Miya intends to appeal this Memorandum Opinion and Order, it must first file objections to this order with the assigned District Judge. 3 PRASA is a public corporation and instrumentality of the government of Puerto Rico that “owns and operates Puerto Rico’s public water supply and wastewater systems.” Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, https://perma.cc/ZH9T-8F9U (captured Sept. 8, 2023); see also

. 4 P3 Authority is a public corporation of the government of Puerto Rico that oversees its public-private partnerships. See, e.g., P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 27, §§ 2601(d), 2605.

2 No. 3, ¶ 7; ECF No. 3-3 (letter notifying IBT of qualification). Miya joined the IBT Group in its

bid shortly after it qualified. ECF No. 3, ¶ 8. In July 2019, the two final potential bidders for the

RFP—the IBT Group (with Miya as its leader) and the BLU Water Consortium—each submitted

proposals. ECF No. 13-1 at 12–13; ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 8–9.

In August 2019, PRASA and the P3 Authority designated the IBT Group as the “Preferred

Proponent” to complete the Water Metering Project. ECF No. 1-2 at 6, 12; ECF No. 3-4

(notification letter). This designation “was not an acceptance . . . of any or all of the conditions

contained in [the IBT Group’s] Proposal,” but reflected the P3 Authority’s “strong interest . . . in

working with [the IBT Group] towards a transaction” to perform the project. ECF No. 3-4 at 2.

According to Miya, over the “next two-plus years, Miya worked with PRASA and the P3 Authority

to further refine its blueprints and prepare for the launch of the . . . upgrades” to Puerto Rico’s

water system. ECF No. 13-1 at 7. In the process, the IBT Group spent “millions of dollars and

devot[ed] countless hours to developing proprietary engineering and work plans,” and to

“negotiating and renegotiating the draft P3 Agreement.” ECF No. 13-1 at 7, 13. Miya alleges it

incurred over $2 million in direct expenses. Id. at 13; ECF No. 3, ¶ 12.

According to Miya, while it continued to work toward finalizing the P3 agreement to

complete the Water Metering Project, members of the BLU Water Consortium—the entity that

effectively lost the bid when Miya was designated the Preferred Proponent— “conspire[ed] with

other entities and individuals to sabotage the project.” ECF No. 13-1 at 7. Specifically, Miya

contends that BLU Water Consortium member Sensus and its parent company, Xylem, Inc.

(“Xylem”), as well as consultants from Moonshot Missions (“Moonshot”) and Moonshot’s CEO,

George Hawkins, “hatched a plan to have the Water Metering Project cancelled and then rebid so

3 that members of the BLU Water Consortium could get a second bite at the apple.” Id. at 7–9, 13–

16.

Miya further states that, starting in May 2020, Mr. Hawkins (through Moonshot) served as

an “independent advisor” to the Financial Oversight and Management Board (“the FOMB”) 5 for

Puerto Rico in connection with the Water Metering Project. Id. at 6, 13–14; ECF No. 3-5 (Hawkins

contract). His contract with the FOMB states that he was retained to “assist [the FOMB] in

connection with matters relating to implementation and monitoring for [PRASA’s] current and

future fiscal plans.” ECF No. 3-5 at 10. As part of his contract, Mr. Hawkins certified that he had

no conflicts of interest. Id. at 13–15. Miya alleges, however, that Mr. Hawkins worked for the

FOMB without compensation “in hopes of wrongfully securing a lucrative opportunity for

Xylem.” ECF No. 1-2 at 13. Miya generally alleges that Mr. Hawkins worked to convince the

FOMB to recommend the cancellation of the RFP for the Water Metering Project before the IBT

Group could negotiate the final agreement by providing “false and misleading information about

[the Group’s] proposal.” Id. at 7, 14. Miya does not provide any detail as to what Mr. Hawkins

may have specifically said or advised the FOMB. However, it does proffer emails among Xylem

employees in late 2021 and early 2022 describing how Xylem has been “working with [Puerto

Rico] . . . for a while now to steer [the RFP]” toward Xylem for its benefit. ECF No. 13-2 at 2, 4.

As part of the scheme to cancel the RFP, Miya also alleges that CG/LA CEO Norman

Anderson worked with Xylem, Sensus, and an additional “BLU Water Consortium partner ACEA

S.p.A.” as a consultant. ECF No. 13-1 at 8–9. According to Miya, Mr. Anderson “leveraged his

ties to the Puerto Rican government (including the FOMB) in order to obtain non-public,

5 The FOMB is a board appointed by the President of the United States, which has the authority to “supervise and modify Puerto Rico’s law (and budget) to ‘achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.’” Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, __ U.S. __, __,

(2020) (quoting

(b)).

4 commercially sensitive information” about the project and the IBT Group’s proposal.

.

In support of this assertion, Miya appends an email from July 2020, wherein Mr. Anderson

requested that he and an employee of Xylem “discuss how [they] can get the ACEA/Xylem team

this win” because “[i]t’s been a dirty business, and the way it’s set up—with PRASA trying to

make an award to a single bidder (ACEA had withdrawn)—is simply wrong.” ECF No. 13-2 at 8.

In a later email in August 2020, Mr. Anderson tells the same Xylem employee that he intended to

have a call with his “friend,” the “governor’s liaison with the Fiscal Adjustment Board,” to

“register [their] interest in PRASA,” to “highlight” that “no legal bid was actually conducted (since

only one competitor),” to “get him thinking about what Xylem can do for them,” and to “make

sure that the door is open.”

. Miya alleges that a few days later, Mr. Anderson spoke with

the then-liaison to the FOMB for the Puerto Rican Governor about the IBT Group’s proposal,

claiming that it had submitted an illegal bid. ECF No. 13-1 at 15. At the same time, Miya alleges

that Mr. Anderson advised Xylem to contest the IBT Group’s designation as Preferred Proponent

and to apply “counter-pressure on the Puerto Rican government to ensure that the RFP would not

be awarded to Miya and that an alternative project could be developed.”

Subsequently, 6 the FOMB recommended, based on “advice from their advisors,” that it

would not recommend the approval of the Water Metering Project as structured, citing problems

with both the project’s scope and cost.

(emphasis omitted); ECF No. 3-6 at 12 (Memorandum

from “Partnership Committee” for the Water Metering Project referencing FOMB’s

recommendation that it should not be approved). Miya’s CEO alleges in his declaration that the

6 Miya asserts that the FOMB’s recommendation came in October 2021. ECF No. 13-1 at 15; ECF No. 3, ¶15. The memo from the P3 Authority’s partnership committee states that the recommendation came in October 2020. ECF No. 3-6 at 12. Whatever the date of the FOMB’s recommendation, Miya asserts that it was caused by the actions of Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Anderson, as set forth above.

5 referenced “advisors” to the FOMB were Mr. Hawkins and Moonshot. ECF No. 3, ¶ 15. Based

in part on the FOMB’s recommendation, the P3 Authority canceled the RFP in December 2021,

thereby stripping Miya of its status as the Preferred Proponent. 7 Id.; ECF No. 3-6 at 2–3 (resolution

of the Board of Directors of the P3 Authority), 4–15 (memo appended to Board resolution); ECF

No. 3-7 (letter from P3 Authority to IBT).

One month later, in January 2022, PRASA and the P3 Authority issued a new RFP to

replace Puerto Rico’s water metering system that was materially different from the original RFP.

ECF No. 13-1 at 8. According to Miya, the new RFP omitted the work that made up the “core of

Miya’s proposal” and instead focused on the “core of Sensus’s business.”

Specifically, it

excludes the work of turning the data generated by “smart” meters into increased revenues—work

that Miya does—and instead focuses on the purchase and installation of the meters themselves—

work that Sensus does—which, according to Miya, will “generate wasted data, rendering the

meters ‘smart’ in name only.”

; ECF No. 3, ¶ 16. Miya’s CEO asserts that because the

new RFP focuses on the core of Sensus’ business, Xylem (through Sensus) is now the

“presumptive frontrunner” to win the project. ECF No. 13-1 at 8; ECF No. 3, ¶ 17.

In sum, Miya asserts that a concerted effort was made by Xylem, Sensus, Moonshot, Mr.

Hawkins, and Mr. Anderson to get the original RFP cancelled and to shape the new RFP into one

more suited for Sensus, costing Miya millions and causing it to lose its opportunity to participate

in Puerto Rico’s project to upgrade its water infrastructure.

7 The P3 Authority’s Board of Directors’ resolution terminating the project attached the memorandum from the “Partnership Committee for the Project,” a group appointed by the Board, outlining the Committee’s objections to the project. ECF No. 3-6. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the memorandum makes no reference to the scheme alleged by Miya. Rather, it describes “stalled” negotiations between the FOMB and the IBT Group related to adjustments due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and PRASA’s improved financial condition since the initial RFP making the proposed financing for the project as originally conceived undesirable.

at 9–15.

6 B. Procedural History

1. The Civil Matter

In light of the foregoing, Miya, a Dutch entity, is “contemplating proceedings in the

Netherlands against Moonshot, Mr. Hawkins, Xylem, and potentially others for tort claims arising

under Dutch law over which Dutch courts may exercise jurisdiction.” ECF No. 1-2 at 15. In aid

of that contemplated Dutch litigation, Miya filed its original Section 1782 application on May 2,

2023, seeking a targeted production of documents from CG/LA, an entity headquartered in the

District of Columbia.

. Miya believes that CG/LA holds information relevant to its

contemplated Dutch claims because its “former CEO Norman Anderson acted as consultants to

Xylem during the original RFP and directly advised Xylem in its efforts to cancel the original

RFP.”

.

Consistent with this Court’s practice, the undersigned issued an order directing Miya either

to show cause why this matter should proceed ex parte, or to serve CG/LA with the Section 1782

application. ECF No. 6. In its response, Miya stated that the former CEO and sole principal of

CG/LA, Norman Anderson, passed away in December 2021, and that his daughter, Janina

Anderson took over the company as its managing partner. ECF No. 10 at 2. Miya represented

that it had attempted service on Ms. Anderson on multiple occasions without success.

.

Miya further reported that in September 2022, Ms Anderson filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy

on behalf of the CG/LA.

; see also Ch. 7 Voluntary Pet., In re CG/LA Infrastructure, Inc.,

No. 1:22-bk-172, ECF No. 1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2022). On May 5, 2023, counsel for Miya

emailed the Section 1782 application and related subpoena to CG/LA’s bankruptcy counsel,

Maurice VerStandig, and to counsel for the Bankruptcy Trustee, Joshua Cox. ECF No. 10 at 3.

Thereafter, Miya’s counsel met and conferred with the Bankruptcy Trustee, Marc Albert; his

7 counsel Mr. Cox; and Mr. VerStandig.

Apparently during those conversations, Miya’s counsel

learned that, among the assets included in CG/LA’s bankruptcy estate, was a “physical Hard Drive

containing [CG/LA]’s available digital information,” a copy of which remains in Bankruptcy

Trustee’s possession.

(alteration in original) (quoting the record in the bankruptcy case).

During those conversations, CG/LA’s bankruptcy counsel, Mr. VerStandig, as well as the

Bankruptcy Trustee, Mr. Albert, consented to complying voluntarily with the subpoena by

producing a copy of the contents of the hard drive containing CG/LA’s available digital

information, 8 “provided that the Bankruptcy Court first authorizes [the Trustee] to do so.” ECF

No. 10 at 3; see also ECF No. 11-6 at 2 (proposed order authorizing compliance with the subpoena,

to be signed by Elizabeth L. Gunn, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge). To that end, Miya requested at that

time that the matter be referred to Judge Gunn. ECF No. 10 at 4.

The undersigned held a status conference in this matter on July 13, 2023. Minute Entry

(July 13, 2023). On August 29, 2023, Miya filed an amended application, addressing issues raised

by the Court at the conference. 9 ECF No. 13.

2. The Bankruptcy Matter

In the bankruptcy proceeding before Judge Gunn, in December 2022, the Bankruptcy

Trustee moved for authority to sell a hard drive belonging to the bankruptcy estate—the contents

of which are the subject of the subpoena before this Court. Trustee’s Motion for Authority to Sell

Assets Free and Clear of Any and All Liens and Interests Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.§ 363(b) and (f),

In re CG/LA Infrastructure, Inc., No. 22-bk-172 (Bankr. D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2022), ECF No. 28. The

8 Miya filed its response on June 6, 2023, attaching a different proposed subpoena unaccompanied by an application, seeking a “[c]opy of the contents of the physical hard drive containing CG/LA Infrastructure’s available digital information.” ECF No. 11-5 at 2. 9 On September 1, 2023, Miya filed a notice of withdrawal of its original application. ECF No. 14.

8 Trustee reported that CG/LA previously stored its “various digital business information and

records both locally on the hard drives of several password-protected computers existing at the

office, and through the cloud. Unfortunately, upon the death of [Mr. Anderson] the password

information to access several of the computers . . . was lost,” and any data solely on the physical

hard drives of those computers is no longer available. Id., ¶ 8. Nevertheless, the Trustee

represented that the “majority of [CG/LA’s] important digital information, including . . . financial

information and customer data, was preserved in the cloud or on [an] accessible computer,” and

this data was downloaded and preserved on the hard drive, which is in the Trustee’s possession.

Id. Such data appears to have included “various event names and publications previously created

by [CG/LA], logos and other visual branding, customer lists and marketing information.” In re

CG/LA Infrastructure, Inc., No. 22-bk-172, ECF No. 28-1 at 1. The Trustee sought authorization

from Judge Gunn to sell any interest in the digital files, as well as the hard drive itself, to an

individual named Anand Hemnani, a former employer of CG/LA. In re CG/LA Infrastructure,

Inc., No. 22-bk-172, ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 10, 13, 14, 17. Judge Gunn granted that motion in January

2023. Order, In re CG/LA Infrastructure, Inc., No. 22-bk-172 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2023), ECF

No. 30. In February 2023, the Trustee reported that the hard drive was delivered to the purchaser,

and that the Trustee retained a backup of all data “for the use of the Trustee through the pendency

of the bankruptcy case.” In re CG/LA Infrastructure, Inc., No. 22-bk-172, ECF Nos. 28, 30, 32.

It is the contents of that backup of the hard drive which is the subject of the subpoena that Miya

seeks to execute through its Section 1782 application pending before this Court.

On August 1, 2023, Miya filed a consent motion seeking leave from the Bankruptcy Court

to serve the subpoena on the Trustee as set forth in the amended application before this Court.

Consent Motion to Authorize Service of Subpoena on CG/LA Infrastructure, Inc., In re CG/LA

9 Infrastructure, Inc., No. 22-bk-172 (Bankr. D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2023), ECF No. 44. On September

5, 2023, Judge Gunn granted that motion. Order, In re CG/LA Infrastructure, Inc., No. 22-bk-172

(Bankr. D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2023), ECF No. 47; see also ECF No. 16 (notice of order in bankruptcy

proceeding).

C. The Amended Section 1782 Application

As noted, on August 29, 2023, Miya filed an amended application addressing the issues

raised at the status conference on July 13, 2023.

1. Proposed Foreign Proceeding

With respect to the issue of the nature of the contemplated foreign proceeding, Miya states

that it retained Dutch counsel, Davine Roessingh, in “mid-2022” with the “hope[] of bringing

claims” against Mr. Hawkins, Moonshot, and Xylem in Dutch court. ECF No. 3, ¶ 18.

Specifically, “Miya anticipates commencing a tort claim against Moonshot, George Hawkins,

and/or Xylem, alleging they conspired to provide the FOMB with false and misleading information

. . . so that the RFP would be cancelled and the RFP process restarted, giving Xylem and its Sensus

[water meters] a second chance to win the RFP.” ECF No. 4, ¶ 12. Ms. Roessingh asserts that a

tort claim may be brought under the Dutch Civil Code alleging that Moonshot, Mr. Hawkins, or

Xylem acted tortiously against Miya by “violat[ing] either specific (ethical or statutory) rules” or

by “fail[ing] to observe a duty of care toward Miya, reasonably knowing that they would inflict

losses on Miya.” Id., ¶ 14. Further, under Dutch law, if “it can be established that Moonshot,

George Hawkins, and/or Xylem intentionally caused or contributed to the decision to cancel the

RFP,” then those actors may be held liable for Miya’s losses suffered as a result of the cancellation.

Id., ¶ 15.

10 Ms. Roessingh further asserts that pursuant to the Dutch Code of Civil Proceedings, a

Dutch court has jurisdiction over these claims because the “damaging event has occurred or may

occur in the Netherlands.” Id., ¶ 17. Acknowledging that mere financial loss incurred by a Dutch

entity in a Dutch bank account is insufficient for jurisdiction, she notes that Dutch case law has

established that “initial” financial losses, plus “additional specific circumstances,” can serve as the

basis for jurisdiction, as can cases where the plaintiff suffered loss of profits, if accompanied by

undefined “additional circumstances,” or reputational damage. Id., ¶ 20. Here, Ms. Roessingh

argues, Miya suffered direct financial losses including legal fees and financial commitment fees,

millions of dollars of lost profits arising from the cancelled Water Metering Project, and damage

to its reputation in the Netherlands, a “strong hub for water engineering,” arising from the the loss

of its Preferred Proponent status. Id., ¶¶ 23–28. Accordingly, Ms. Roessingh concludes that Dutch

courts may exercise jurisdiction over the tort claims that Miya is contemplating bringing in the

Netherlands. Id., ¶ 28.

Finally, Ms. Roessingh asserts that Dutch courts have accepted evidence collected through

a Section 1782 application like this one. Id., ¶ 3-–32.

2. Discovery Sought and Proposed Protective Order

In its amended application, Miya proposes execution of a subpoena on CG/LA, via the

Bankruptcy Trustee, requesting the production of a “copy of the contents of the physical hard drive

containing CG/LA . . . available digital information.” ECF No. 13-4 at 2. In an effort to ensure

that it receives only information from the hard drive relevant to its potential tort claims, Miya

proposes the Court enter a protective order directing that the Trustee provide a copy of the contents

of the hard drive to a third-party vendor, Innovative Driven. ECF No. 13-1 at 24; ECF No. 13-3

at 8. That vendor will first evaluate the file structure and metadata of the information from the

11 hard drive to identify files appearing to relate to Norman Anderson or other “loose” files that do

not have another named custodian. ECF No. 13-1 at 24; ECF No. 13-3 at 8. The vendor will do

so in consultation with Miya but without revealing the contents of the files to Miya. Id. Next, the

vendor will run a series of search terms relevant to Miya’s claims and will produce to Miya only

the files that contain those terms. Id.; see also ECF No. 13‐3 at 11–12 (proposed protective order

containing list of search times). To protect any privileged information that may be among the

material produced to it, Miya proposes that it be ordered to destroy any such information it

becomes aware of, or, if it believes that any privilege over such information has been waived, then

it be permitted to seek a determination from the Court that it may retain that information. ECF

No. 13-3 at 8–9.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Section 1782 provides, in relevant part:

The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person . . . . To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(a). A two-stage inquiry informs whether a federal court will grant a motion

under section 1782(a). First, the court must determine whether it can order the requested relief—

that is, whether it has the authority to do so; second, it must decide whether it should order the

requested relief—that is, whether to exercise its discretion to do so, keeping in mind the statute’s

“twin aims of ‘providing efficient assistance to participants in international litigation and

encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar assistance in our courts.’” Intel

12 Corp.,

, 255 (quoting Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,

(9th Cir. 2002)).

As to the first step, “[a] district court has the authority to grant an application when . . . (1)

the person from whom discovery is sought resides or is found within the district; (2) the discovery

is for use in a proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal; and (3) the application is made

by an interested person.” In re Veiga,

(D.D.C. 2010) (citing

(a)). The second step is informed by the following four factors outlined in Intel: (1) whether

the target of the discovery request is a participant in the foreign or international proceeding, (2)

the nature of the foreign tribunal and character of its proceedings, (3) whether the application is an

attempt to “circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies,” and (4) whether the

request is “unduly intrusive or burdensome.”

(quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 264–65). “The

discretionary guidelines in Intel do not command that each factor be weighed equally, nor do they

dictate whether any particular factor should take preceden[ce].” In re Application of Leret,

(D.D.C. 2014). Rather, these factors are merely designed to “guide” a court

adjudicating a section 1782 discovery application. See Intel,

.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ex Parte Consideration

District courts are generally authorized to review a § 1782 application on an ex parte basis,

In re Application of Masters for an Order Pursuant to

to Conduct Discovery for

Use in a Foreign Proceeding,

(D.D.C. 2018) (“[I]t is neither uncommon

nor improper for district courts to grant applications made pursuant to § 1782 ex parte.” (quoting

Gushlak v. Gushlak, 486 Fed. App’x. 215, 217 (2d Cir. 2012))), and as a general matter, ex parte

review is “justified by the fact that the parties [from whom discovery is sought] will be given

13 adequate notice of any discovery taken pursuant to the request and will then have the opportunity

to move to quash the discovery or to participate in it,” In re de Leon, No. 19-mc-0197,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Letter of Request from

Supreme Ct. of Hong Kong,

, 32 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).

In this case, in response to the order requiring Miya to show cause why this application

should be considered on an ex parte basis, ECF No. 6, Miya represented that it attempted without

success to provide notice of this matter to Ms. Anderson on four occasions at her home address,

and twice at another address associated with her. ECF No. 10 at 3; see also ECF Nos. 11-1

(affidavit of nonservice), 11-2 (same), 11-3 (same). It then provided the materials to CG/LA’s

bankruptcy counsel and to the counsel for the Trustee. ECF No. 10 at 3; see ECF No. 11-4 (email

to bankruptcy counsel and trustee). After filing its amended application, Miya once more

attempted to serve Ms. Anderson via certified mail at her home address. ECF No. 15. Because

Ms. Anderson has not responded and appears to be taking steps to avoid involvement in this matter,

the Court will consider this application ex parte.

B. Section 1782’s Statutory Requirements

As noted, a court has the authority to grant a Section 1782 application if, at the time the

application is filed, (1) the person or entity from whom discovery is sought resides or can be found

within the district; (2) the discovery is for use in a proceeding before a foreign or international

tribunal that is pending or reasonably contemplated; and (3) the application is made by an

interested person. See In re Veiga,

. The Court will consider each of those

statutory requirements in turn.

14 1. The person or entity from whom discovery is sought resides or can be found within the district

The first requirement is satisfied. “Courts appear to agree . . . ‘that a corporation is “found”

in a district where it is headquartered or incorporated.’” In re DiGiulian, No. 19-cv-132,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (quoting In re Application of Masters,

). Common principles of personal jurisdiction inform this analysis. See In re Pishevar, No.

21-mc-105,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2023).

Here, CG/LA’s headquarters were located in Washington, D.C. before its bankruptcy. ECF

No. 5-2 (D.C. Consumer and Regulatory Affairs business registration); see also Voluntary Petition

for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy at 1, In re CG/LA Infrastructure, Inc., No. 22-bk-172

(D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2022), ECF No. 1 at 1. In addition, the Trustee of the bankruptcy estate, who

presently possesses the discovery that Miya seeks, is located in Washington, D.C. ECF No. 11-5

at 2. Therefore, the person or entity from whom discovery is sought resides or can be found within

this district.

2. The discovery is for use in a proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal that is pending or reasonably contemplated “[T]o show that a foreign proceeding is in reasonable contemplation, the applicant must

provide “some objective indicium that the action is being contemplated” and will be brought within

a reasonable time.” In re of Lucille Holdings Pte. Ltd., No. 21-mc-99,

, at *13

(D.D.C. May 5, 2022) (quoting In re Certain Funds, Accounts, and/or Inv. Vehicles Managed by

Affiliates of Fortress Inv. Grp. LLC,

(2d Cir. 2015)). In analyzing the issue,

courts must balance “Congress’s desire that broad discovery be available for parties involved in

international litigation” against “the potential that parties may use section 1782 to investigate

whether litigation is possible in the first place,” which “is not an appropriate [basis] for a court to

compel discovery.” In re Certain Funds, No. 14 Civ. 1801,

, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.

15 July 9, 2014), aff’d,

; see also In re Bouka,

, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)

(articulating the “distinction between cases in which an applicant intends to file pending new

information and those in which an applicant needs new information to decide whether to file at

all”), modified on reconsideration on other grounds, __ F. Supp. 3d __,

(S.D.N.Y. 2023).

This Court has identified a non-exhaustive list of considerations to guide the assessment of

whether the foreign proceeding is in reasonable contemplation, including:

(1) the contemplated claims; (2) the preparations made for filing those claims (including audits, investigations, and retention of foreign counsel); (3) the tribunal in which those claims will be brought; (4) the time frame in which those claims will be brought; and (5) the evidence supporting those claims.

Lucille Holdings,

, at *13; compare In re Furstenberg Finance SAS,

(11th Cir. 2017) (finding reliable indications of reasonable contemplation where the

petitioner asserted it would file proceedings in Luxembourg within 45 days of receiving discovery

sought and included specific evidence supporting its claims for fraud under Luxembourg law), and

Bravo Express Corp. v. Total Petrochemicals & Refining U.S.,

(5th Cir.

2015) (finding reliable indications of reasonable contemplation where the petitioner filed a sworn

affidavit from a partner at the law firm representing the petitioner asserting that an action would

be filed “imminently” in a particular foreign court and laid out “in great detail” the facts giving

rise to the prospective action), and In re Bouka, 637 F. Supp. 3d at 85 (finding reliable indications

of reasonable contemplation where the petitioner had retained local counsel, laid out a basis for

liability, and identified the factual basis of his claims), with In re Lucille Holdings,

, at *14 (finding insufficient indicia of reasonable contemplation where petitioner

suggested causes of action but was “investigating and contemplated asserting other potential

16 causes of action” and was “continuing [to investigate] additional claims and the appropriate

jurisdiction and tribunal for asserting them”), and In re Campuzano-Trevino, No. 22-cv-365,

, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2022) (finding that proceedings were not within reasonable

contemplation where potential claim was based on “unspecified media disclosures,” petitioner

gave “no concrete timeline” for the filing of the claim, did not “develop[] a theory of liability,”

and gave no “insight in to what information he expect[ed] to obtain through his discovery, or how

such information will assist the prosecution of his prospective case”).

In this case, Miya asserts that it is “contemplating bringing claims in the Netherlands,”

ECF No. 13-1 at 9, and has provided the Court with some detail as to the “potentially-to-be-filed

proceedings,” ECF No. 4, ¶ 2. It retained Dutch counsel, Ms. Roessingh, in mid-2022. ECF No.

3, ¶ 18; ECF No. 4, ¶ 2. In Ms. Roessingh’s affidavit, she (1) represents that Miya “anticipates

commencing a tort claim against Moonshot, George Hawkins, and/or Xylem” in the Dutch District

Court based on their alleged conspiracy to provide the FOMB with misleading information leading

to the cancellation of the RFP; and (2) describes potential causes of action under Dutch law and

bases for Dutch court jurisdiction over such claims. ECF No. 4, ¶¶ 12–28. In its amended

application, Miya has also provided some factual support for such a claim. That evidence includes:

(1) emails between Mr. Anderson and Xylem staff in the summer of 2020, after Miya had been

designated the Preferred Proponent, wherein Mr. Anderson expressed an intent to make sure the

“door [was] open” for Xylem to win the project by reaching out to his contact in the Puerto Rican

government, ECF No. 13‐1 at 16–17; ECF No. 13‐2 at 8, 11; and (2) emails among Xylem

employees after the original RFP was canceled, where one employee states that he had met with

members of PRASA who had told him that a “new RFP for Puerto Rico” would be issued and that

“we had been working with [Puerto Rico] . . . for a while now to steer this our way,” ECF No. 13‐

17 1 at 16–17, ECF No. 13‐2 at 2, 4–6. This evidence serves as factual support for Miya’s claims, as

well as evidence of Miya’s investigation and preparation for the foreign proceeding.

In sum, Miya has retained Dutch counsel who has explained in a detailed affidavit the

specifics of the tort claim to be brought in the District Court of Amsterdam against Mr. Hawkins,

Moonshot Missions, and Sensus and/or Xylem, and Miya has further provided some factual basis

for its claims, through the evidence received from the additional Section 1782 applications filed in

other judicial districts in preparation for this proceeding. Such a showing leads this Court to find

that the Dutch proceedings are in reasonable contemplation. See Bravo Express,

(finding a foreign proceeding to be within reasonable contemplation where the applicant

proffered a detailed affidavit from counsel regarding the claims, the facts underlying the claims,

the preparation for filing suit, and the foreign court in which they would be filed); In re Bouka,

, at *7 (similar).

3. The application is made by an interested person As to the third requirement, the Supreme Court has defined an “interested person” as a

person or entity that “possess[es] a reasonable interest in obtaining [judicial] assistance.” Intel,

(alterations in original) (quoting Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the

United States Code,

, 1027 (1965)). Courts have found entities that

contemplate initiating foreign litigation qualify as “interested persons.” See, e.g., In re Tovmasyon,

, 356 (D.P.R. 2021) (“Here, Petitioners are ‘interested persons’ for Section

1782 purposes because, as noted earlier, they ‘anticipate initiating a proceeding as claimants in the

High Court of England and Wales in London, England.’” (quoting the record)); accord In re MT

Baltic Soul Produktentankschiff-Ahrtsgesellschaft mgH & Co. KG, No. 15-mc-319,

, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2015). Put another way, “[a]n individual who intends to initiate

proceedings in a foreign tribunal satisfies this third statutory requirement.” In re Pishevar, 2023

, at *3. Because this Court has found that Miya intends to initiate proceedings in the

District Court of Amsterdam, the third requirement is met here.

D. The Court’s Discretion

Even where a Court has the statutory authority to grant a Section 1782 application, it need

not do so in the exercise of its discretion. The Supreme Court has identified four factors that may

be used to guide a district court’s discretion in resolving such an application: (1) whether the target

of the discovery request is a participant in the foreign or international proceeding, (2) the nature

of the foreign tribunal and character of its proceedings, (3) whether the application is an attempt

to “circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies,” and (4) whether the request

is “unduly intrusive or burdensome.” In re Veiga,

(quoting Intel, 542 U.S.

at 264–65). “[T]he Intel factors are non-exhaustive, and a court may exercise its discretion to deny

a petition based on other considerations.” In re Petition of the Republic of Turkey, No. 19-cv-

20107,

, at *2 (D.N.J. July 17, 2020) (citing Kulzer v. Esschem, Inc.,

(3d Cir. 2010)); see also In re Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, No. 19-MC-80272,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2019) (noting that the Intel factors are “non-

exhaustive”); JSC MCC EuroChem v. Chauhan, No. 17-mc-5,

, at *3 (M.D.

Tenn. Aug. 15, 2018) (“In Intel Corp., the Court repeatedly emphasized that these factors are non-

exhaustive and ‘may’ be taken into account as applicable.” (quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 264–65)).

In this case, the Court finds that the four factors counsel in favor of granting the application.

The first factor— whether the target of the discovery request is a participant in the foreign or

international proceeding—does so because CG/LA is not an anticipated defendant in the foreign

proceeding. ECF No. 13-1 at 25; see In re Pishevar,

, at *3 (finding first factor

19 weighed in favor of granting application to serve subpoena on a “nonparticipant in the matter

arising abroad”).

The second factor also weighs in favor of granting Miya’s request. This factor considers

the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings, and the receptivity of the foreign

court to U.S. judicial assistance. In re DiGiulian,

(D.D.C. 2018). Courts in

the United States presume that foreign tribunals will be receptive to evidence obtained here and

find that this factor weighs in favor of granting an application in the absence of “authoritative proof

that [the] foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid of section 1782.” In re

Pishevar,

, at *3 (quoting In re DiGiulian,

). Here, there

is no contention that Dutch courts would reject evidence obtained from this application. Indeed,

Ms. Roessingh asserts that Dutch courts have held that evidence collected through a 1782

application may be used in Dutch proceedings. ECF No. 4, ¶ 32. Other courts have agreed with

this assertion. See In re Upper Brook Cos., No. 22-mc-97,

, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y.

Dec. 23, 2022) (finding that this factor weighed in favor of granting a Section 1782 application

where there was no evidence that Dutch courts would reject such evidence); In re Hulley Enters.,

Ltd.,

(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (concluding that the second Intel factor favored

production of documents based on petitioners’ showing that “Dutch law permits the submission of

evidence collected through section 1782”), aff’d,

(S.D.N.Y. 2019).

The third factor also weighs in favor of granting the application. Nothing in the record

indicates that Miya’s application is seeking discovery here to circumvent the proof-gathering rules

or policies of either this Court or the Dutch courts. See In re Pishevar,

, at *4

(finding that absent evidence of an attempt to circumvent foreign rules, third factor weighed in

20 favor of granting application); accord DiGiulian,

; In re Veiga,

(D.D.C. 2010).

Finally, the fourth factor evaluates whether the scope of the requested discovery is “unduly

intrusive or burdensome.” Intel,

(noting that “unduly intrusive or burdensome

requests may be rejected or trimmed”). Courts have interpreted this inquiry to encompass

consideration of “the relevance of the requested discovery to the foreign proceeding.” In re an

Order Pursuant to

, No. 17-cv-1466,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 18,

2017); see also In re de Leon,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2020) (finding the fourth

factor weighed in favor of granting the application, even where “compliance might be costly and

complex,” because the “requests [were] tailored to issues . . . relevant to the . . . proceedings”).

Courts have also considered concerns of privilege in evaluating the burden that discovery would

impose. See Menashe v. Covington & Burling LLP,

, 44 (D.D.C. 2021). Indeed,

Section 1782(a) cautions that “[a] person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement

or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.”

(a); but see In re Veiga,

(granting a Section 1782 application and

finding that the parties’ blanket arguments about privilege were premature).

In this case, Miya’s proposed subpoena seeks the contents of CG/LA’s hard drive, which

appears to contain event names, publications created by CG/LA, visual branding, customer lists,

and marketing information. Trustee’s Motion for Authority to Sell Assets Free and Clear of Any

and All Liens and Interests Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.§ 363(b) and (f), In re CG/LA Infrastructure,

Inc., No. 22-bk-172 (Bankr. D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2022), ECF No. 28. Much of the information on this

hard drive is likely to be irrelevant to the proof that Miya is seeking to support its claims. To

address this issue, Miya proposes that the Court enter a protective order directing the Bankruptcy

21 Trustee to provide a copy of the contents of the hard drive to a third-party vendor. ECF No. 13-1

at 24; ECF No. 13-3 at 8. The vendor will evaluate the files and related metadata in consultation

with Miya—but without disclosing their contents—to identify files that either relate to Mr.

Anderson or “loose” files that do not appear to have an identified custodian. Id. Among those

files, the vendor will then run a set of search terms focused on Miya’s potential claims regarding

the Water Metering Project and send to Miya only the files that contain these search terms. ECF

No. 13-1 at 24; ECF No. 13-3 at 8, 11–12. All other material will be destroyed by the third-party

vendor. Id. The undersigned is satisfied that the search terms and procedure proposed by Miya

will minimize any burden on CG/LA and the Trustee and will produce discovery that is “relevant

to the issues in dispute in the [foreign] proceeding.” In re DiGiulian,

, at *5.

In addition, the undersigned is satisfied that any concerns regarding privileged material on

the hard drive has been adequately addressed by Miya. As an initial matter, any privilege that may

have existed over material on the hard drive was likely waived when the hard drive was sold to a

third party with no effort made to prevent any such material from being accessed by the buyer.

See CFTC’ v. Weintraub,

(1985) (holding that a bankruptcy trustee can waive

privilege over pre-bankruptcy communications); Cramton v. Grabbagreen Franchising LLC, No.

17‐cv-04663,

, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 9, 2021) (holding that voluntarily turning

over a physical hard drive to a third party waives attorney‐client privilege over the contents of the

hard drive); United States v. Mackey, No. 10‐cr‐310,

, at *3–4 (N.D. Ga. Aug.

8, 2012) (same); Stooksbury v. Ross, No. 09‐cv‐498,

, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Aug.

31, 2012) (finding that selling computers to a third party waived privilege over the contents on the

computers); In re New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc., No. 13‐mdl-2419,

, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2016) (same). Even assuming that some privileged material

22 may remain on the hard drive, the Court finds the protective order proposed by Miya addresses

that concern. See ECF No. 13-3. That order directs that if Miya becomes aware of privileged

information, it shall destroy that information. ECF No. 13-3 at 8–9. Alternatively, if Miya believes

that any privilege over such information has been waived, then the order permits Miya to seek a

determination from the Court that it may retain that information.

The Court finds that that procedure sufficiently addresses any remaining privilege

concerns, particularly where the record before the undersigned does not contain any indication that

privileged communications are either present on the hard drive or will be captured by the proposed

search terms delineating the material that will be produced to Miya. See In re Accent Delight Int’l

Ltd.,

, 252 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that any issues of confidentiality from granting Section 1782 application could

be addressed through a protective order); In re O’Keeffe,

, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2016)

(same).

Accordingly, all four Intel factors weigh in favor of granting Miya’s application.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Amended Application of Miya Water Projects for an Order Permitting

Discovery under

(ECF No. 13) is GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that, in light of Judge Gunn’s September 5, 2023 Order authorizing service of

and compliance with the subpoena in the Bankruptcy Matter, Miya is granted leave to serve the

proposed subpoena duces tecum at ECF No. 13-4, directing CG/LA, through the Bankruptcy

Trustee, to produce the materials requested in the subpoena to Innovative Driven, c/o Joel Harper,

1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1500, Arlington, VA 22209, or at another mutually agreeable location.

23 See Order Authorizing Trustee to Comply with Subpoena, In re CG/LA Infrastructure, Inc., No.

22-bk-172 (Bankr. D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2023), ECF No. 47, . It is further

ORDERED that CG/LA, through the Bankruptcy Trustee, shall produce the requested

discovery within 30 days of the entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, or on some other

date mutually agreeable to the interested parties, and in conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Discovery shall be subject to the terms of the Protective Order entered contemporaneously with

this Memorandum Opinion and Order, as well as to any conditions imposed by Judge Gunn in In

re CG/LA Infrastructure, Inc., No. 22-bk-172. It is further

ORDERED that until further Order by this Court, CG/LA, through the Bankruptcy

Trustee, shall preserve all documents, electronic or otherwise, and any evidence in its possession,

custody, or control that contain information potentially relevant to the subject matter of the foreign

proceeding at issue in the Amended Application.

SO ORDERED. Digitally signed by G. Michael G. Michael Harvey Harvey Date: 2023.09.27 10:49:25 -04'00' Date: September 27, 2023 ___________________________________ G. MICHAEL HARVEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

24