UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MAHA VISCONTI,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-3145 (RDM) v.

JOSEPH BURGHARDT, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Maha Visconti, proceeding pro se, brings this action against State Court Judge

Joseph Burghardt, Federal District Court Judge Jesus Bernal, the Superior Courts of Los

Angeles, the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the Clerks of the

Central District Court of California, the United States of America, and the Federal Bureau of

Investigations (“FBI”). Dkt. 1 at 4–5. For the reasons explained below, the Court will

DISMISS the action.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff claims that she was “unlawfully and illegally incarcerated on 8/22/2023

without due process nor any single evidence of any crime, nor violation by Defendant State

Court Judge . . . Burghardt.” Id. at 6. She also claims that Judge Bernal “was not randomly

selected” to preside over her two federal court cases, id. at 11; see also id. at 10; that Judge

Bernal previously criminally conspired with her ex-husband, id. at 12; and that Judge Bernal is

retaliating against her in her cases, id. at 13. She seeks damages, in the amount of $50 million,

pursuant to

, Dkt. 1-1 at 1, and a “permanent injunction against all bench

officers in Los Angeles superior[] and federal court at Central District Court,” Dkt. 1 at 7. On April 26, 2024, Judge Burghardt and the Superior Court of Los Angeles moved to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, judicial immunity,

for failure to state a claim, and on other grounds. See generally Dkts. 46 & 47. The Court, in

turn, issued a Fox/Neal order, directing that Visconti respond to that motion and cautioning her

about the consequences of failing to do so. Dkt. 48. After receiving multiple extensions of

time, Visconti filed a partial opposition on June 21, 2024, Dkt. 68, which she amended on July

17, 2024, Dkt. 82, when she filed further opposition briefs, Dkts. 81, 83–84, to which she

added attachments on July 20, 21 & 22, 2024. Dkts. 87–89, 91–92.

In the meantime, on June 22, 2024, the Court issued a Show Cause Order, Dkt. 71,

directing Visconti to show cause “(1) why the Court has . . . subject-matter jurisdiction in this

case; (2) why the Court has personal jurisdiction over each named defendant; (3) why the

named judicial officers and agents are not immune from suit; and (4) why the case should not

be dismissed pursuant to Dufur [v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2022)]

and [Heck v.] Humphrey, [

, 486–87 (1994)].” Dkt. 71 at 7. As the Court

explained, Visconti bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter

jurisdiction, see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

(1992), and “establishing a

factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction” over each defendant, Crane v. N.Y.

Zoological Soc.,

(D.C. Cir. 1990). Dkt. 71 at 4. The Court directed that

Visconti respond to the Court’s questions when she responded to the pending motion to

dismiss.

Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will hold her pleadings “to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), but “as with any other

2 plaintiff, a pro se plaintiff must meet h[er] burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction,”

Patel v. Ambit Grp., No. 18-cv-2985,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2019). “[A]

district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte prior to service on the defendants pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) when . . . it is evident that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Evans v. Suter, No. 09-5242,

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2010).

A district court may also sua sponte dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) where “it

is patently obvious” that the plaintiff cannot “prevail[] on the facts alleged in h[er] complaint.”

Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Strunk v.

Obama,

(D.D.C. 2011). Finally, although a defendant may waive

personal jurisdiction, where—as here—a defendant seeks to dismiss a complaint for lack of

personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears “the burden of establishing a factual basis for the

exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Crane,

.

Visconti filed a response to the Court’s order to show cause on July 15, 2024, Dkt. 79,

and a supplemental response to Court’s order on July 20, 2024, Dkt. 85. These responses

along with her multiple documents in opposition to Defendant Burghardt and the Superior

Court’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkts. 81–84, 87–89, 91–92, shed further light on her complaint.

The Court considers her pro se complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive

to a motion to dismiss,” even though “[p]ro se complaints must still contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ho v. Garland,

, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 2, 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Visconti explains that her civil action is for “fraud upon the court (Rule 6[0](b)) from

fraudulent documented incarceration because of Amber Gordon on August 21, 2023 without

3 jurisdiction nor authority, nor due process.” Dkt. 79 at 5.1 Amber Gordon appears to have

been a defense attorney who was assigned to represent Visconti in a prior case, see Dkt. 84-1

at 22, and who subsequently became embroiled in Visconti’s other proceedings, see

.

Visconti alleges that she “served (16) sixteen months of jail time because of Amber Gordon,

from also extrinsic fraud on the court, without any conviction nor any jury trial.” Dkt. 79 at

5; see also Dkt. 81 at 22 (describing how she spent “16 months jail time not as an inmate or

prisoner but as a hostage” because of Amber Gordon’s “pathological lies made in open court

of criminal acts that are totally bogus”); Dkt. 91-1 at 10–11 (Order from Judge Burghardt

revoking release on her own recognizance and issuing bench warrant);

(remanding to

custody); Dkt. 91-2 at 2–69 (detention hearing transcript). Visconti “seeks compensatory

damages, including but not limited to loss of income, loss of interest in life, noneconomic

damages, such as emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, punitive damages, and

most importantly declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent more damages and abusive

conduct of fraud upon the court.” Dkt. 79 at 5 (capitalization altered). She describes her

complaint as pleading “abuse of due process, fraudulent incarceration, fraud upon the court

and it’s [sic] cover up, and war on the Constitution of the United States, the 14th, 8th

Amendment, and 6th Amendment violations as well as 5th Amendment rights of Plaintiff.”

Dkt. 82 at 13–14.

Visconti was also convicted in February 2024, in a case relating to Albert Gregory

Pinto, but she is adamant that she is not challenging her conviction and subsequent

incarceration in the Pinto case. Dkt. 79 at 13 (“[T]he conviction of February 14, 2024 in

1 Given the rest of her response, the Court takes the reference to Rule 6(b) to be a typographical error that is supposed to read Rule 60(b). See Dkt. 79 at 37–41.

4 Pinto’s bogus case . . . has nothing to do with claims for relief in this action.”); see also

(describing how the Pinto conviction had not occurred when this complaint was filed and

how the incident “with Amber Gordon and other proceedings of fraudulent incarceration that

took place without any conviction on August 21, 2023 and prior other violations . . . have

NOTHING to do with the conviction of February 15, 2024”); see also

at Dkt. 85 at 20.

Visconti has clarified that she “did not intend to check any box of habeas corpus” on her

original civil cover sheet, Dkt. 79 at 15, she has filed an amended cover sheet, Dkt. 80, and she

repeatedly states that she is not seeking habeas corpus relief or other relief from her conviction

in the Pinto matter. See, e.g., Dkt. 79 at 75; Dkt. 82 at 41.

II. ANALYSIS

The Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. First, Visconti is challenging state court

proceedings that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

“federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review judicial decisions by state . . . courts.”

Richardson v. D.C. Ct. of Appeals,

(D.C. Cir. 1996). In her response to the

Court’s order to show cause and supplement, Visconti repeatedly asserts that she is not asking

for review of her conviction in the Pinto case. See, e.g., Dkt. 79 at 11–13. That may be the

case, but Visconti is challenging what occurred before Judge Burghardt on August 21, 22, 24,

and 25, 2024. See Dkt. 79 at 34; Dkt. 81 at 41–74; Dkt. 47-1 at 4. She fails to offer any basis

to conclude that this Court has jurisdiction to review those state-court proceedings. Visconti

merely argues that Defendants are not sharing “what really and truly took place that day of

August 21, 2023;” that they are not providing “accurate records of what actually transpired that

day inside the courtroom of Defendant Burghardt;” and that they are trying to “hide those facts

about Amber Gordon’s fabrications.” Dkt. 81 at 27–28. Visconti may dispute what occurred

5 at those proceedings, but, regardless of what happened, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review

the proceedings under Rule 60(b) or otherwise. See Dkt. 79 at 27–42.

The same is true of any relief Visconti seeks based on Judge Bernal’s orders in the

United States District Court for the Central District of California. Visconti barely mentions the

federal defendants in her response to the order to show cause and her other filings, and she

offers no reason to conclude that this Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of another

federal district court or take action against another federal judge based on his decisions and

judicial actions. See Klayman v. Kollar-Kotelly, No. 12-5340,

, at *1 (D.C.

Cir. May 20, 2013) (citations omitted).

To the extent that Visconti asserts damages claims against any state or federal agencies

or officials (acting in their official capacities), those claims are also barred by sovereign

immunity. See Dougherty v. United States,

, 232–33 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d

sub nom. Dougherty v. McKee, No. 16-5052,

(D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 2017). The

Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State of California and any state officials sued in

their official capacities for damages, absent the State’s waiver of immunity or an Act of

Congress abrogating that immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,

(1989). Although Visconti brings

claims pursuant to Section 1983, that law does not abrogate state sovereign immunity in suits

against states or state officials named in their official capacities.

. Visconti also fails

to identify any waiver of federal sovereign immunity that would permit her to recover damages

from the federal defendants. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer,

(1994) (“Absent a waiver,

sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”); see also

Smith v. Scalia,

(D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, No. 14-5180,

6 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 2015) (“[T]o the extent that [Plaintiff] has sued the judges in their official

capacity, these defendants are part of the United States government for the purposes of

sovereign immunity[.]”).

Visconti responds that she seeks injunctive relief pursuant to the Ex Parte Young

exception to sovereign immunity. Dkt. 79 at 71. The only “ongoing” injury she alleges,

however, is Amber Gordon “withholding and stealing [her] valuable documents and her own

discovery material,” which are “still missing.” Id.; see also Dkt. 81 at 21; Dkt. 83 at 47.

Visconti does not argue that any of the defendants named in this case are actively withholding

such documents or directly causing this injury. Rather, she alleges that “there has been

encouragement,” “plots by those Supervisors Judges behind it all for years,” and “implicit

authorization.” Dkt. 79 at 72. If this is Visconti’s theory of liability, she has failed to plead a

plausible claim for relief. These cursory and conclusory allegations fail to state a plausible

claim for relief against any individuals, see id.; see also Dkt. 85 at 15, and, among other flaws,

fail to allege a “policy or custom” sufficient to state a Section 1983 claim against the

defendants in their official capacity, see Kentucky v. Graham,

(1985) (citing

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

, 690 n.55 (1978)); Dkt. 85 at 17.

To the extent that Visconti brings suit against Judge Burghardt and the Superior Court

of Los Angeles, Dkt. 79 at 73–74, her claim also fails for lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge

Burghardt resides in California. See Dkt. 79 at 47. Moreover, neither Judge Burghardt nor the

Superior Court of Los Angeles is “essentially at home” in the District of Columbia, Ford

Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,

(2021), and neither appears to

have the type of contacts with the District of Columbia that would satisfy the D.C. long-arm

statute,

, or the constitutional requirements of due process, GTE New

7 Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000).

The problems with Visconti’s complaint do not stop there. Visconti repeatedly

emphasizes that she is not challenging her current confinement and is not bringing a habeas

corpus claim. Dkt. 85 at 20; Dkt. 79 at 75. To distinguish her claims from claims that would

be precluded by Heck v. Humphrey,

, 486–87 (1994), she argues that her “action,

even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment

against [her],” and thus should be allowed to proceed. Dkt. 81 at 34. But that contention is

hard to square with her requests for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Dkt. 79 at 37–41, and for damages

pursuant to Section 1983 resulting from her allegedly fraudulent imprisonment, Dkt. 82 at 32.

She fails to offer any alternative theory of relief that would satisfy Heck v. Humphrey. See

Dkt. 85 at 20–21.

Finally, Visconti’s claims against the judges and clerks are barred by judicial

immunity. “[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice,” rather

“the immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances.” Mireles v. Waco,

(1991). “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions

not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though

judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”

at 11–12 (internal

citations omitted). “‘[W]hether an act by a judge is a “judicial” one relate[s] to the nature of

the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the

expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.’”

at 12 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman,

(1978)). Allegations that the judge

acted in excess of his authority do not suffice to establish that the judge acted in “the

8 complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 13. Here, Visconti’s factual allegations describe

Judge Burghardt performing a judicial function—holding hearings that resulted in revocation

of her release on personal recognizance and her detention without bail—and acting pursuant

to his jurisdiction over the case. Dkt. 82 at 20–29; see also Dkt. 91-1 at 11 (finding by “clear

and convincing evidence a substantial likelihood that defendant’s release would result in great

bodily harm to others, specifically Ms. Gordon” and that “there is no less restrictive condition

than detention that can reasonably protect the interests of the public or victim safety and the

defendant’s appearance in court”); Dkt. 91-2 at 63–69 (issuing findings on the record to

support detention). The only claims against Judge Bernal are also related to, arise out of, or

were taken pursuant to his role as a judge. See Dkt. 1 at 11–12. Accordingly, Visconti’s

claims against Judges Burghardt and Bernal, and the “Clerks of the Central District Court,”

id., must be dismissed on grounds of absolute judicial immunity, Sindram v. Suda,

(D.C. Cir. 1993).

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Visconti has failed to allege

facts, if accepted as true, to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over Judge

Burghardt or the Superior Court of Los Angeles, or to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. The Court will, accordingly, DISMISS the complaint in its entirety, and because

amending the complaint would be futile, the Court will DISMISS the action and will terminate

this case.

A separate order will issue.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge Date: July 23, 2024

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