UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALVIN B. TRUESDALE, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 23-92 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 13, 17 : UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH : SERVICE., et al., : : Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Alvin B. Truesdale, proceeding pro se, brings the instant action against the

United States Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the

Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and various other components of

those federal agencies (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants arise

under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),

, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a. Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint or, alternatively, for summary

judgment. Plaintiff has cross-moved for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below,

the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denies Plaintiff’s cross-motion.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that, on February 4, 2022, he sent a FOIA request to DOJ. See Compl. at

2–3, ECF No. 1. By June, Plaintiff had not received any reply or acknowledgment, so he sent a

letter requesting an update on the “status” of that request. See id. at 3. When Plaintiff was met

with radio silence, he sent two additional letters—one in October and another in November— asking for information pertaining to his initial FOIA request. See id. Again, however, Plaintiff

received no reply and thus, on January 11, 2023, he filed a lawsuit seeking to “compel[] the

Defendants to disclose” the records Plaintiff had sought to uncover under FOIA. See id. at 6–8.

According to Defendants, they did not learn of Plaintiff’s FOIA request until he filed suit.

In fact, Defendants attest that they have “no record of receiving a FOIA request from Plaintiff” at

any point in 2022. See Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts ¶ 11, ECF No. 13. Defendants make

this attestation after confirming that, upon receipt of Plaintiff’s complaint, “[e]ach agency and its

components searched their respective FOIA Units and did not locate any FOIA request from

Plaintiff in February 2022.” See id. ¶¶ 5, 11.

That being so, Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, or, alternatively,

for summary judgment. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or Alternatively for

Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 13. Generally speaking, they argue that, because they never

received Plaintiff’s FOIA request, they were not obligated to search for records responsive to

that request and, relatedly, that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See id.

at 3–5. Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion, see Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or for

Summ. J. in the Alternative (“Pl.’s Resp.”), ECF No. 16, and has filed a cross-motion for

summary judgment, see Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 17. The parties’ motions are ripe for

review. See Defs.’ Combined Reply and Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF

No. 20.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Where, as here, a defendant argues that a FOIA plaintiff has failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies, courts typically analyze the defendant’s arguments through the lens of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Hidalgo v. F.B.I.,

(D.C.

2 Cir. 2003) (vacating the district court’s summary judgment order and remanding the case with

instructions to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) on exhaustion grounds); Jean–Pierre v.

Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

, 100 n.4 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Although FOIA cases

‘typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment,’ where an agency

argues that the requester has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, courts analyze the

matter under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.” (citations omitted)). A different

framework applies, however, if the defendant’s motion references materials outside the

pleadings. In such cases, a court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment, not as one

for dismissal based on failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d);

Colbert v. Potter,

(D.C. Cir. 2006); Yates v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Rosenberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigr. & Customs Enf’t,

, 36–43 (D.D.C. 2013).

Here, Defendants’ motion refers to—and relies upon—materials outside the pleadings.

See Defs.’ Mot. at 2. Specifically, Defendants rely on multiple declarations sworn to by

employees of the federal agencies implicated in this suit. See Decl. of Kara Christenson

(“Christenson Decl.”), ECF No. 13-1; Decl. of Alesia Y. Williams (“Williams Decl.”), ECF No.

13-2; Decl. of Joseph E. Gerstell (“Gerstell Decl.”), ECF No. 13-3; Decl. of Roger Andoh

(“Andoh Decl.”), ECF No. 13-4; Decl. of Carmen Smith Carter (“Carter Decl.”), ECF No. 13-5.

And in responding to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff also introduces matters outside of the

pleadings, such as his own sworn declarations and copies of his FOIA request. See Pl.’s Resp. at

1; Decl. of Alvin B. Truesdale (“Truesdale Decl.”), ECF No. 16-3. The Court will therefore

evaluate Defendants’ motion under the summary judgment standard.

3 A court may grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the

litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986). A dispute is “genuine” if

there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. Scott v.

Harris,

(2007).

The principal purpose of summary judgment is to streamline litigation by disposing of

factually unsupported claims or defenses. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

, 323–24

(1986). The movant bears the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1);

Celotex,

. In response, the non-movant must point to specific facts in the record

that reveal a genuine issue that is suitable for trial. See Celotex,

. In considering

a motion for summary judgment, a court must avoid “making credibility determinations,”

Czekalski v. Peters,

(D.C. Cir. 2007), and analyze all underlying facts and

inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Anderson,

.

Nevertheless, conclusory assertions offered without any evidentiary support do not

establish a genuine issue for trial. See Greene v. Dalton,

, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). “If

the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be

granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citation omitted). “In addition, the non-

moving party cannot rely upon inadmissible evidence to survive summary judgment; rather, the

non-moving party must rely on evidence that would arguably be admissible at trial.” Manuel v.

Potter,

(D.D.C. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

4 IV. ANALYSIS

FOIA requires an agency to “determine within 20 days . . . after the receipt” of a properly

submitted request “whether to comply with [the] request” and to notify the requester accordingly.

(a)(6)(A)(i)) (emphasis added). It is thus the “receipt of a FOIA request [that]

triggers an agency’s obligation to respond.” Eddington v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,

, 837

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (emphasis added). Put differently, “[a] federal agency has no obligation to

respond to a FOIA request it has not received.” Kanaya v. Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearm &

Explosives,

(D.D.C. 2018). It therefore follows that “if an agency never

received a plaintiff’s FOIA request in accordance with its published rules, the agency is entitled

to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(D.D.C. 2014).

When, as here, an agency moves for summary judgment on the ground that it has not

received a plaintiff’s FOIA request, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a genuine

dispute as to the agency’s receipt of the request. See

The agency typically establishes its

non-receipt of a request through a sworn declaration. Such a declaration is—if relatively

detailed and non-conclusory—afforded a presumption of good faith. Eddington, 35 F.4th at 837;

see also SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC,

(D.C. Cir. 1991). That presumption

cannot be rebutted with “purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of [the

request].” Eddington, 35 F.4th at 837 (citation omitted).

In this case, each agency has provided a declaration attesting that they never received

Plaintiff’s FOIA request. The agency’s declarants describe in detail the role that he or she plays

in the respective agency, his or her familiarity with the procedures surrounding FOIA requests,

and states that the agency has no record of Plaintiff’s request. See Christenson Decl. ¶¶ 1, 8–9;

5 Williams Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4, 6; Gerstell Decl. ¶¶ 2–7; Andoh Decl. ¶¶ 2–7; Carter Decl. ¶¶ 1–3, 6–14.

Moreover, Mr. Gerstell attests that DOJ’s Mail Referral Unit—the only place Plaintiff claims to

have sent his request—searched for both electronic and hardcopy FOIA requests but found no

record of Plaintiff’s FOIA request or his follow-up letters. See Gerstell Decl. at ¶ 7. In light of

the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that the agencies’ declarations are entitled to the presumption

of good faith. See Eddington, 35 F.4th at 837–38.

Plaintiff attempts to overcome the force of Defendants’ sworn declarations by providing a

copy of his FOIA request, copies of the follow-up letters he sent when he did not receive a

response, and his own sworn declarations. See, e.g., Truesdale Decl.; Pl.’s Exs. 1–3, ECF No.

16-4. But while this evidence supports Plaintiff’s genuinely held belief that he properly sent the

FOIA request, it does not create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Defendants received the

request. See Eddington, 35 F.4th at 839. In other words, Plaintiff’s evidence, without more,

does not create a genuine dispute of material fact as to any of the agencies’ actual receipt of a

FOIA request. See, e.g., Day v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 19-cv-3467,

,

at *3 (D.D.C. July 31, 2020) (“On summary judgment Plaintiff must produce some evidence to

show that the IRS actually received a proper FOIA request.”); Reynolds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

No. 16-cv-1428,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2017) (granting summary judgment

for agency where “Plaintiff [did] not offer proof via, e.g., a certified-mail receipt or any other

form of mailing that his [FOIA requests] reached their intended target”). That being so,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 1 See, e.g., Geddis v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.

23-cv-191,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2024) (“Because Plaintiff has failed to

1 Because the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court denies Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment as moot.

6 create a dispute of material fact that [the federal agencies] received his FOIA/Privacy Act request

prior to filing this civil action, summary judgment is entered on [defendant’s] behalf.”); Kanaya,

(holding that “where, as here, an agency’s declaration demonstrates that the

prerequisites for triggering the agency’s duties to search and produce responsive records have

not been satisfied, and the agency’s declaration stands unrebutted by competent evidence, the

agency is entitled to summary judgment” (cleaned up)).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint or in the

Alternative for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17) is DENIED. An order consistent with this Memorandum

Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: July 30, 2024 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

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