UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JULIAN ROLANDO BELETZUY MONZON,

Plaintiff, v. No. 24-cv-162-ZMF MARTIN J. O’MALLEY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Julian Rolando Beletzuy Monzon moves for reversal of Defendant Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) decision denying his application for Disability

Insurance Benefits. See Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 10. Defendant moves for

affirmance. See Def.’s Mot. J. Affirmance & Opp. Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal, ECF No. 12. Having

considered the parties’ submissions and the Administrative Record, 1 and for the reasons set forth

herein, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and GRANT

Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Mr. Monzon is a 59-year-old adult male with a seventh-grade education. See AR 51, 86.

He worked as a cabinet maker until 2020 and was occasionally self-employed between 2020 and

2022. See AR 51–52, 54, 188, 199–200. Mr. Monzon alleged that he was disabled beginning on

1 The Administrative Record consists of 58 exhibits, among other documents such as the Transcript of the Oral Hearing and the ALJ’s Hearing Decision. See ECF No. 6. For ease of reference, citations to the Administrative Record will refer to the “AR” and cite to the consecutive page numbers provided in the lower right-hand corner of each page. 1 April 28, 2020 due to hypertension, arthritis of the right knee, low vision in both eyes, and a lower

back problem. See AR 86.

Between November 17, 2020 and April 14, 2021, Dr. Zain Sultan examined Mr. Monzon

four times for right knee pain. See AR 289–301. Dr. Sultan’s examinations indicated the right knee

was tender to physical touching, had mild joint swelling, and a torn meniscus, but that Mr. Monzon

had “no gait abnormalities.” AR 290, 292–93. On February 10, 2021, Dr. Sultan diagnosed

Mr. Monzon with bilateral primary osteoarthritis of the right knee. See AR 293.

Between August 26, 2021 and May 4, 2023, Colette Knudsen, FNP, examined Mr. Monzon

three times for right knee pain. See AR 281, 284, 347. FNP Knudsen’s examinations revealed “no

swelling or discoloration,” but tenderness to physical touching over the patella. AR 281, 285, 348.

On August 26, 2021, Mr. Monzon had a “mild limp,” AR 285, but on September 10, 2021, he had

a “normal gait.” AR 281. FNP Knudsen noted that Mr. Monzon reported relief from receiving

platelet rich plasma injections twice into his right knee. See AR 348.

In March 2022, Dr. Ines Alamo examined Mr. Monzon’s right knee. See AR 366, 400.

Dr. Alamo’s examinations revealed the presence of bony tenderness and medial collateral ligament

laxity, and that Mr. Monzon generally had “[n]ormal range of motion.” AR 369, 402.

Dr. Robert A. Sershon subsequently examined Mr. Monzon. See AR 319. Dr. Sershon

observed mild swelling, tenderness to physical touching at the joint, and a limping gait due to pain.

See AR 319. Dr. Sershon ordered radiographs of the right knee, which revealed symptoms

“consistent with degenerative arthritis of the affected knee.” AR 320. Dr. Sershon recommended

joint replacement surgery. See AR 320–21. Mr. Monzon initially scheduled the surgery, but later

canceled it due to issues with insurance and home care. See AR 323.

2 On March 21, 2023, Dr. Sershon opined that Mr. Monzon could rarely lift under ten pounds

and would require the option to sit/stand at will. See AR 331. He further asserted that Mr. Monzon

could balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and rotate his head and/or neck “[a]s tolerated” without

providing any further specifics. AR 332. Dr. Sershon also opined that Mr. Monzon would be off-

task fifteen percent of the workday and would not be able to maintain attention and concentration

for more than an hour before requiring a break. See AR 330. Despite these limitations, Dr. Sershon

asserted that Mr. Monzon would likely be absent from work zero days per month. See AR 330.

On May 17, 2023, Lisa E. Knight, DPT, led Mr. Monzon through a physical therapy

session. DPT Knight observed that Mr. Monzon could independently move from sitting to standing

and could do a full squat, despite a limping gait. AR 446–47. DPT Knight further noted that

Mr. Monzon could lift up to twenty-five pounds without pain, and that his strength in his left and

right lower extremities was between four-to-five out of five despite experiencing some pain while

moving. See AR 447, 452. DPT Knight assessed Mr. Monzon’s prognosis as “excellent” with

further physical therapy. AR 449.

B. Statutory Framework

The Social Security Act (the “Act”) provides disability insurance benefits for “disabled”

individuals.

(a)(1). The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

12 months.”

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be severe and must render the individual

unable to perform both “previous work” and “any other kind of substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A); see

.

3 Whether a claimant is disabled is determined through a five-step process. See

(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at each of the first four steps and the

SSA bears the burden at step five. See Butler v. Barnhart,

(D.C. Cir. 2004)

(citing

, 416.920).

At step one, the claimant must demonstrate he is not presently engaged in “substantial

gainful activity.”

(a)(4)(i). If he is, then he is not disabled. See

At step

two, the claimant must show that he has a “severe medically determinable” impairment that

“significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, then he is not disabled.

See id. At step three, the claimant must show that his impairment—or combination of

impairments—“meets or equals” the criteria of an impairment listed in the SSA’s regulations. Id.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, then

he is disabled. See id. If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment,

then between steps three and four the ALJ proceeds to determine the claimant’s residual functional

capacity (“RFC”). See id. § 404.1520(a)(4), (e). An RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do

despite [his] limitations,” and considers a claimant’s “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory,

and other requirements of work.” See id. § 404.1545(a)(1), (a)(4).

At step four, the ALJ must determine whether, considering the RFC, the claimant can still

perform any relevant past work. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). If he can, then he is not disabled

under the Act. See id. If the RFC indicates that the claimant cannot engage in past work, then at

step five, the ALJ looks to the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine

if he can perform “other work” in the national economy. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g). If the

claimant cannot adjust to other work, then he is disabled under the Act. See id.

4 C. Procedural History

On June 14, 2021, Mr. Monzon applied for disability benefits. See AR 165. On October

27, 2021, the SSA denied Mr. Monzon’s claim. See AR 85. On November 3, 2021, Mr. Monzon

applied for reconsideration of his application for disability benefits. See AR 107. On March 28,

2022, the SSA again denied Mr. Monzon’s claim. See AR 90. Mr. Monzon timely requested a

hearing before an ALJ, which the ALJ held on May 16, 2023. See AR 48, 112.

During the May 16, 2023 ALJ hearing, Mr. Monzon testified that while he used knee braces

and experienced pain when walking for more than five to ten minutes, he was able to lift twenty

pounds without a knee brace, and at least thirty to forty pounds with a knee brace. See AR 61, 63,

65. Mr. Monzon further testified that he experienced temporary relief from knee injections, and

that he felt relief from his pain medication with no side effects. See AR 70. Mr. Monzon reported

that he lived alone, did his own cooking, cleaning, and grocery shopping, and could drive or take

public transportation. See AR 68–69.

During that same hearing, the ALJ also spoke to Vocational Expert (“VE”) James Rossi

regarding Mr. Monzon’s past relevant work and transferrable skills. See AR 71–77. VE Rossi

classified Mr. Monzon’s past work as being a “Cabinet Maker” and a “Maintenance Worker,” with

both jobs requiring capacity to perform medium levels of exertion. See AR 71–73. VE Rossi

testified that a person with Mr. Monzon’s limitations could not engage in his past work. See AR

76. VE Rossi testified that Mr. Monzon had skills such as “operating hand, power and

woodworking tools and machines, using measurement, measuring equipment and tools, [and]

assembly of products using drawings and prints,” that would be transferrable to other work. AR

76. VE Rossi testified that an individual limited to light work, able to sit, stand, and walk for six

hours, with only occasional postural changes, and with Mr. Monzon’s transferrable skills would

5 be able to perform the jobs of “Cupboard Builder” and “Hardware Assembler.” AR 77. However,

VE Rossi testified that such jobs would not be available with a sit and stand at-will requirement,

or with a limitation to sedentary work. See AR 77, 82.

On June 12, 2023, the ALJ denied Mr. Monzon’s claim. See AR 26–41. At step one, the

ALJ determined Mr. Monzon had “not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since April 28,

2020, the alleged onset date.” AR 33. At step two, the ALJ determined that from April 28 to

November 16, 2020, Mr. Monzon had “no medically determinable impairments.” AR 33. The ALJ

then determined that from November 17, 2020 to June 12, 2023, Mr. Monzon had “osteoarthritis

and degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees,” which were severe impairments. AR 33.

At step three, the ALJ compared Mr. Monzon’s impairments to listing 1.17, which

considers if a claimant’s history of surgery of a major weight-bearing joint is severe enough to

qualify for disability. See AR 34; 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, 1.17. The ALJ also

compared Mr. Monzon’s impairments to listing 1.18, which considers the severity of the

abnormality of a major joint. See AR 34; 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, 1.18. The ALJ

ultimately determined that Mr. Monzon did not “have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments.” AR 34.

Between steps three and four, the ALJ determined that Mr. Monzon had the RFC to

“perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)” with some limitations. AR 34.

Specifically, the ALJ found that Mr. Monzon could “lift, carry, push and pull 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; stand and walk

for six hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally climb ramps and stairs, climb ropes, ladders,

or scaffolds, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl.” AR 34. In formulating the RFC, the ALJ

considered the objective medical evidence, Mr. Monzon’s own testimony, and the alleged

6 symptoms and the extent to which they were consistent with the other evidence. See AR 34–38.

For example, the ALJ noted that he considered Mr. Monzon’s pain while lifting, his difficulties

with bending, his pain medication and its side effects, and his potential obesity. See AR 38.

The ALJ determined that “while the allegations regarding the nature of [Mr. Monzon’s]

symptoms are found to be supported within the medical evidence in the file, the claimant’s

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” AR 39. The ALJ

also found Dr. Sershon’s opinion that Mr. Monzon would be off-task fifteen percent of the

workday, that he could rarely lift less than ten pounds, that he would need an option to sit and

stand at-will, and more, was “not persuasive” because it was “unsupported by a totality of the

medical evidence.” AR 37. The ALJ reasoned that it was “not consistent with the claimant’s own

testimony that he was able to lift at least 20 pounds, equivalent to . . . light range work.” AR 38.

Additionally, the ALJ reasoned that the opinion was “internally inconsistent” because the “severity

of symptoms” described conflicted with the doctor’s conclusion that “the claimant would not be

absent from work as a result of his medical impairments.” AR 38.

Based on the ALJ’s determination of Mr. Monzon’s RFC and the testimony of VE Rossi,

the ALJ determined at step four that Mr. Monzon “was not able to perform past relevant work.”

AR 39. However, at step five, the ALJ determined that when considering Mr. Monzon’s age,

education, work experience, and RFC, Mr. Monzon had work skills that were “transferable to other

occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.” AR 40.

Specifically, the ALJ noted that Mr. Monzon could transfer his skills to occupations such as

cupboard builder and hardware assembler. See AR 41. The ALJ thus ruled that Mr. Monzon was

not disabled. See AR 41.

7 On December 4, 2023, the SSA Appeals Council denied Mr. Monzon’s request for review.

See AR 1–3. On January 19, 2024, Mr. Monzon filed his complaint. See Compl., ECF No. 1. He

argues that the ALJ erred in: (1) discounting Dr. Sershon’s testimony; and (2) determining the

RFC. See Pl.’s Statement P. & A. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) 7–16, ECF No. 10-1. On January 30, 2024, the

parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge for all purposes. See Order 1, ECF No. 5.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court sits in what is essentially an appellate role when it reviews the SSA’s

disability determination, which must be upheld “if it is supported by substantial evidence and is

not tainted by an error of law.” Smith v. Bowen,

(D.C. Cir. 1987). Substantial

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Butler,

(quoting Richardson v. Perales,

(1971)).

This standard “requires more than a scintilla, but can be satisfied by something less than a

preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC,

, 365–66 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (quoting FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. FERC,

, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).

“Substantial-evidence review is highly deferential to the agency fact-finder.” Rossello ex

rel. Rossello v. Astrue,

(D.C. Cir. 2008). “An ALJ’s credibility

determinations, in particular, ‘are entitled to great deference.’” Harrison Cnty. Coal Co. v. Fed.

Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n,

, 212 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Sec’y of

Labor v. Keystone Coal Mining Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1998)). “The reviewing

court may neither reweigh the evidence presented to it nor replace the [ALJ’s] judgment

‘concerning the credibility of the evidence with its own.’” Goodman v. Colvin,

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Crosson v. Shalala,

(D.D.C. 1995)). However,

this deference requires that the ALJ build a “logical bridge” between the evidence and their

8 conclusions so that the Court may “assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford

a claimant meaningful judicial review.” Lane-Rauth v. Barnhart,

(D.D.C.

2006) (quoting Scott v. Barnhart,

(7th Cir. 2002)).

On review, the “plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the [ALJ’s] decision [was]

not based on substantial evidence or that incorrect legal standards were applied.” Settles v. Colvin,

(D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Muldrow v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-1385,

, at *6 (D.D.C. July 11, 2012)). If the ALJ has applied the correct legal standards and met

the substantial evidence threshold, the reviewing court may grant the SSA’s motion for an

affirmance of the disability determination. See, e.g., Hicks v. Astrue,

(D.D.C.

2010). If a court finds error in an ALJ’s disability determination, it may reverse and remand,

requiring the SSA to conduct further proceedings consistent with the law. See, e.g., Jackson v.

Barnhart, 271 F. Supp. 2d. 30, 38 (D.D.C. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

A. Dr. Sershon’s Medical Opinion

An ALJ must “not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling

weight, to any medical opinion(s).”

.1520c(a). “Instead, the ALJ must decide how

persuasive [he] finds all medical opinions according to five factors: (1) supportability;

(2) consistency; (3) the medical source’s relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and

(5) other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion.” Tiana O. v. Kijakazi, No.

20-cv-2051,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The most important factors in the persuasiveness analysis are (1) supportability—that is,

how well the medical source supported the opinion with objective medical evidence and supporting

9 explanations—and (2) the consistency of the opinion with other evidence in the record.” David W.

v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-3370,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2023) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The ALJ is required to “explain how [they] considered the supportability and

consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions . . . in [a claimant’s] determination.”

.1520c(b)(2). The terms supportability and consistency “need not be used in the

opinion, provided that there is sufficient explanation for a reviewing court to determine that the

ALJ analyzed those factors.” David W.,

, at *11.

Consistency

To discount an opinion because of its inconsistency with the rest of the medical record, an

ALJ need not “provide more detail than citing . . . the contradictory evidence in his report.” Nancy

W. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2505,

, at *9 (D.D.C. July 28, 2023) (quoting McGraw

v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-1011,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2019)). An ALJ has

sufficiently addressed consistency by noting a doctor’s opined limitations are inconsistent with

plaintiff’s testimony. See Stephanie G. v. O’Malley, No. 22-cv-904,

, at *11

(D.D.C. May 20, 2024). Similarly, an ALJ has sufficiently addressed consistency by noting that

a doctor’s opined limitations were internally inconsistent with the doctor’s own findings.

Here, the ALJ properly addressed consistency when he noted that Dr. Sershon’s opinion

was “not consistent with the claimant’s own testimony that he was able to lift at least 20 pounds.”

AR 38. The ALJ also sufficiently addressed consistency when he noted that Dr. Sershon’s opinion

was “internally inconsistent because [Dr. Sershon] describe[d] a severity of symptoms that [were]

not consistent with his conclusion that the claimant would not be absent from work.” AR 38. Thus,

there is “sufficient explanation for [this] reviewing court to determine that the ALJ analyzed”

consistency. David W.,

, at *11.

10 Mr. Monzon argues that his testimony was consistent with Dr. Sershon’s opinion. See Pl.’s

Mem. at 9. However, Dr. Sershon stated that Mr. Monzon could rarely lift less than ten pounds,

see AR 331, while Mr. Monzon testified that he could lift at least twenty pounds without pain. See

AR 65. Mr. Monzon asserts that while “Plaintiff testified that he can lift twenty pounds, [] he also

described swelling and soreness when he walks for more than about ten minutes,” and that such

testimony is consistent with Dr. Sershon’s opinion. Pl.’s Mem. at 9. Even if the record supports

Mr. Monzon’s argument that Dr. Sershon’s report and Mr. Monzon’s testimony are consistent, if

there is substantial evidence to support inconsistencies, this Court “must defer to the ALJ’s

resolution of that evidentiary split.” Melanie A. S. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-185,

,

at *12 (D.D.C. May 12, 2022), report and recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C.

May 27, 2022). Indeed, this Court’s role is neither to “reweigh the evidence” nor to substitute the

ALJ’s judgment concerning the credibility of evidence with its own. Goodman,

. Rather, this Court’s role is cabined to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is grounded

in “substantial evidence and a correct interpretation of the law.”

Mr. Monzon also argues that the ALJ erred in his consistency analysis by comparing

Mr. Monzon’s lifting capabilities to light range work. Pl.’s Mem. at 9. Mr. Monzon bases this

argument in his belief that the ability to lift twenty pounds is not “equivalent to a light range work

restriction.”

First, Mr. Monzon is incorrect: SSA regulations hold that light work “involves

lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time,” as compared to sedentary work, which “involves lifting

no more than 10 pounds at a time.”

(a), (b). Second, “there is no specific

format required for addressing . . . consistency.” David W.,

, at *11.

For the foregoing reasons, it was not error for the ALJ to point to the differing exertional

requirements of light and sedentary work to highlight the inconsistency between Dr. Sershon’s

11 opinion and Mr. Monzon’s testimony. Because the record provides “sufficient explanation . . . to

determine that the ALJ analyzed” consistency, this Court declines to disturb the ALJ’s decision on

this basis.

.

Supportability

As to supportability, an ALJ need only discuss “that [the doctor’s] opinion is not well-

supported by objective medical evidence.” Kory D. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-3571,

, at *7 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2023). The ALJ satisfied this requirement when he noted that

Dr. Sershon’s opinion was “unsupported by . . . the medical evidence.” AR 37. This was not an

overstatement: Dr. Sershon left this portion of the opinion form blank, declining to provide

supporting evidence or explanations. See AR 330–333. There was nothing here for the ALJ to

discuss. Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ sufficiently addressed the factor of supportability when

discussing Dr. Sershon’s opinion. See David W.,

, at *11.

Mr. Monzon also challenges supportability by arguing that the ALJ incorrectly relied on

inconsistencies in Dr. Sershon’s conclusion that Mr. Monzon would not be absent from work

despite his severe limitations. See Pl.’s Mem. at 10. Mr. Monzon does not challenge this

conclusion by Dr. Sershon, but Mr. Monzon still suggests that he is disabled. See

Mr. Monzon

misunderstands the nature of supportability. Whether Dr. Sershon’s opinion is internally consistent

has no bearing upon supportability. Instead, supportability is about an ALJ discussing “how well

the medical source supported the opinion with objective medical evidence.” David W.,

, at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Dr. Sershon’s conclusions—consistent or

not—were unsupported given his decision to leave that part of the opinion form blank. See supra;

Judea L. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-1879,

, at *5, 9 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023) (holding

12 medical opinion unsupported when nurse “submitted no clinical or objective findings in support

of her opinion”). Therefore, the Court declines to disturb the ALJ’s decision on this basis.

Thus, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Sershon’s opinion in assessing Mr. Monzon’s RFC.

B. Mr. Monzon’s RFC

Narrative Discussion

“To provide the requisite logical bridge, [the] narrative discussion . . . must enable the

Court to understand the ALJ’s route to his conclusion to permit meaningful review.” Johnson v.

Kijakazi, No. 18-cv-2749,

, at *2 (D.D.C. July 6, 2022) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “[T]he narrative discussion generally is adequate if the ALJ does not merely list

the evidence but also discusses what the evidence shows about the claimant’s RFC and explains

which evidence he found credible and why.”

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Monzon argues that “the ALJ simply concluded that ‘the findings specified within this

[RFC] assessment are consistent with the appropriate medical findings and the overall evidence in

the file.’” Pl.’s Mem. at 15 (quoting AR 39). This is not the case. The ALJ detailed how his RFC

assessment was based on evidence such as Mr. Monzon’s testimony and the medical evidence in

the record. See AR 38–39; Bullock,

, at *7. Specifically, the ALJ discussed

Mr. Monzon’s pain while lifting objects, his limitations with bending, how his pain medication

helped control his symptoms, and even his “arguable obesity.” AR 38; see AR 34–38. The ALJ

tied this evidence directly to the RFC assessment. See AR 38–39. Furthermore, the ALJ discussed

how his findings of credibility regarding Dr. Sershon’s medical opinion and Mr. Monzon’s

testimony built into the RFC. See AR 37–38. Thus, “the ALJ did more than merely list the

evidence. The ALJ explained which evidence he found credible and why.” Pinkney v. Astrue,

, 17–18 (D.D.C. 2009). By doing so, the ALJ allowed the Court to assess the validity

13 of the ALJ’s findings and afford Mr. Monzon meaningful judicial review. See

. Here, the

ALJ built a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion. See Bullock v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-

1764,

, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2023) (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted); see also AR 37–39. Thus, the ALJ’s RFC assessment was supported by substantial

evidence and provided a sufficient narrative discussion.

Supporting Medical Opinion

Mr. Monzon argues that the failure to have the RFC supported by a medical opinion

necessarily means that the ALJ was lay interpreting raw medical data. See Pl.’s Mem. at 14–15.

Mr. Monzon asserts that such lay interpretation is impermissible. 2 See

Mr. Monzon demands

the establishment of a rule that an ALJ’s RFC lacks substantial evidence without a supporting

medical opinion. See

However, courts “do not expressly require an ALJ always to obtain a

medical opinion when crafting the RFC.” Higgins v. Saul, No. 16-cv-27,

, at *9

(D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2019) (concluding it was not error for the ALJ to assess an RFC despite not

having a medical opinion analyzing new medical evidence received); see Kyler v. Berryhill, No.

16-cv-1271,

, at *6, 10 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2017) (noting that the ALJ

2 Mr. Monzon points to out-of-circuit courts which have held that “an RFC determination lacks substantial evidence when it is not supported by any medical opinion.” See

(first citing O’Connor v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-7019,

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2024); then citing Vernon R. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-825,

, at *2–3 (D. Md. Mar. 22, 2024); then citing Julie B.-Z. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-cv-535,

, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2024); then citing Eric D. B. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-474,

, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2024); then citing Brandon K. v. O’Malley, No. 22-cv-1041,

, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2024); then citing Linda R. v. O’Malley, No. 21-cv-2068,

, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2024); and then citing Kobrock v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 23- cv-256,

, at *8 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2023)). However, other courts have held that “a medical source statement or formal medical opinion is not necessarily required” where “the record contains sufficient evidence from which an ALJ can assess the [claimant’s RFC].” Monroe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Tankisi v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2013)). This Court is free to follow these courts, 14 “discounted” or assigned “little weight” to every medical opinion, but vacating ALJ’s decision on

different basis); Bennett v. Saul, No. 18-cv-1745,

, at *11 (D.D.C. Oct. 27,

2019) (noting that “rejecting” all opinions by not giving them controlling weight does not require

reversal); see also n.2 supra. This is because, the SSI regulations—including on RFC assessments,

(a)(3)—make no requirement of obtaining a medical opinion. See Tankisi,

521 F. App’x at 33–34 (noting that the regulations say that a case record “may contain medical

opinions”). Thus, “the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred simply by failing to obtain a

medical opinion regarding . . . [the] medical evidence.” Higgins,

, at *9. Nor

will the Court adopt Mr. Monzon’s requested rule where there is no textual mandate or controlling

precedent.

Development of the Record

i. State Agency RFC Determination

“[W]hile the ALJ can request additional examinations, it is axiomatic that the claimant

bears the burden of supplying adequate records and evidence to prove their claim of disability.”

Bennett,

, at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he ALJ need not

undertake an additional investigation where there is no obvious gap or defect in the administrative

record, nor to resolve conflicts whose resolution is immaterial to the ALJ’s ultimate

determination.” Richmond-Howard v. Saul, No. 19-cv-2014,

, at *8 (D.D.C.

July 25, 2022) (citing Gurrola v. Astrue,

(D.D.C. 2010)), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Richmond-Howard v. Kijakazi,

(D.D.C.

Aug. 12, 2022).

Mr. Monzon argues that the ALJ should have further developed the record with additional

medical examinations or testimony “because the State Agency offered no RFC determination.”

15 Pl.’s Mem. at 12. Mr. Monzon lacks support for this position given that claimants bear the burden

of providing adequate records and evidence, and ALJ requests for additional examinations are

discretionary. See Bennett,

, at *10; see also Richmond-Howard,

, at *8. Moreover, the state agency did not reach an RFC determination because of

Mr. Monzon’s failure to provide medical evidence. See AR 88, 93. This was despite numerous

attempts by the agency to gather that evidence. See AR 88, 93. “[T]he claimant, not the [agency],

must be faulted for gaps in the record when the claimant fails to comply with . . . numerous

opportunities to supplement the record.” Richmond-Howard,

, at *8 (citing

Levy v. Astrue, No. 07-cv-80157,

, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2008)). Thus, the

ALJ did not err when he declined to further develop the record. See

ii. Mandating Consultative Examinations

The “decision to order a consultative examination is discretionary.” John W. v. Kijakazi,

No. 18-cv-2453,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2022) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The ALJ “should only require a consultative examination if the evidence as a whole,

both medical and nonmedical, is not sufficient to support a decision.”

Therefore, the ALJ only

needs to order a consultive examination if there is an “obvious gap or defect in the administrative

record.” Richmond-Howard,

, at *8 (citing Gurrola,

).

Mr. Monzon argues that the ALJ should have further developed the record with an agency

consultative examination. See Pl.’s Mem. at 12. Mr. Monzon lacks support for this position given

the discretionary nature of consultative examinations. In fact, because the record includes a

plaintiff’s “treatment notes, test results, related prescriptions, and evaluation charts,” the record is

adequate. Johnson v. Colvin,

(D.D.C. 2016) (citing Rothe v. Astrue,

, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2011)); see generally AR 269–477. Moreover, Mr. Monzon has pointed

16 to no obvious gap besides the lack of a supporting medical opinion. See Pl.’s Mem. at 12–13.

However, there is no requirement to have a medical opinion underpinning an RFC. See supra.

Thus, given that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s RFC

determination, the ALJ did not err in declining to obtain a consultative examination. See John W.,

, at *10.

Thus, substantial evidence, including through a sufficient narrative discussion, supported

the ALJ’s RFC assessment, which was based upon a sufficient record not in need of

supplementation.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of

Reversal and will GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance. A separate order will

issue.

Digitally signed by Zia M. Date: August 15, 2024 Zia M. Faruqui Faruqui Date: 2024.08.15 13:57:56 ___________________________________ -04'00'

ZIA M. FARUQUI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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