UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KEVIN L. JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Civ. Action No. 20-2421 (ZMF/EGS)

HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Kevin Jackson (“Mr. Jackson” or “Plaintiff”)

initiated this suit against his former employer, Honeywell

International, Inc. (“Honeywell” or “Defendant”), after his

termination from the company in 2020. See R. & R., ECF No. 36 at

1. 1 Mr. Jackson alleges that Honeywell terminated him due to his

race, in violation of

, the D.C. Human Rights

Act (“DCHRA”), and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act

(“MFEPA”).

He also claims that Honeywell is liable for

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) due to the

termination and its circumstances.

Honeywell moved for

summary judgment on all of Mr. Jackson’s claims and Magistrate

Judge Faruqui issued a Report and Recommendation, which

recommended granting Honeywell’s motion. See

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the page number of the filed document. Pending before the Court are Honeywell’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, see Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s SJM”), ECF No.

24; and Mr. Jackson’s objections to Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s

Report and Recommendation, see Objs. to the Magistrate Judge’s

Proposed Findings and Recommendations (“Pl.’s Objs.”), ECF No.

37. Upon careful consideration of the Report and Recommendation,

the objections and opposition thereto, the underlying motion and

its opposition, the applicable law, and the entire record

herein, the Court hereby ADPOTS the Report and Recommendation,

see ECF No. 36; and GRANTS Honeywell’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, see ECF No. 24, for all of Mr. Jackson’s claims.

2 I. Background

A. Factual 2

Honeywell hired Kevin Jackson as the Business Development

Director for its Aerospace Americas Aftermarket (“AAM”) business

unit in January 2017. Reply to Pl.’s Answer to Def.’s Statement

of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“SOMF”), ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 1. Mr.

Jackson was placed on the Air Force team within AAM and directly

reported to Ms. Elisabeth Boucek (“Ms. Boucek”).

. Mr.

Jackson was the only Business Development Director on the Air

Force team and had greater expectations than his colleagues.

. Mr. John Bell (“Mr. Bell”) was the only other person

supervised by Ms. Boucek with business development

responsibilities, but he was not on the same director level as

Mr. Jackson.

.

As of Spring 2018, Ms. Boucek reported to the Vice

2 The factual background is taken from Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts. See Reply to Pl.’s Answer to Def.’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“SOMF”), ECF No. 33-1. Although Mr. Jackson often expressed his disagreement, he failed to properly dispute any of Defendant’s facts. For example, Mr. Jackson often argued that he could “neither admit nor deny the allegations” from Defendant’s stated fact because “defendant failed to produce any evidence, other than the self-serving testimony of [two of its employees] to substantiate [the] allegations.” See, e.g.,

. Since the parties had ample time for discovery, Mr. Jackson’s failure to uncover any evidence that supports his position is not sufficient to properly deny Defendant’s supported factual statements. Furthermore, Mr. Jackson’s disbelief of Defendant’s employees’ sworn statements is also not enough to properly controvert Defendant’s facts. And finally, Mr. Jackson has failed to

3 President of AAM, Mr. Steve Williams (“Mr. Williams”).

.

Mr. Williams was intimately involved with AAM’s business

development in his role and interacted with members of the

business development team at least weekly to discuss their

leads.

. He also received weekly reports from each

member of the AAM business development team and met with them

frequently to discuss those reports and business prospects.

.

The COVID-19 pandemic caused a loss of revenue, a reduction

in profits, a shortage in supplies, and challenges in meeting

delivery expectations for Honeywell.

. The Aerospace

Leadership Team implemented furloughs and reduced executive

compensation to help cut costs; Mr. Jackson was one of the

furloughed employees.

. When those measures

failed to alleviate the problem, Honeywell decided to implement

a reduction in force (“RIF”).

. Each business unit had a

set target for the RIF.

.

comport with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) in claiming that any facts were unavailable to him for purposes of this motion. Similarly, Mr. Jackson simply denies several factual allegations without any additional information—and crucially, without any citations to the record supporting his position. See, e.g., SOMF, ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 47; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (requiring parties to “support the assertion” of a genuine factual dispute with “citing to particular parts of materials in the record”). Since Mr. Jackson has failed to properly deny any of Defendant’s facts, the Court considers Defendant’s facts undisputed for purposes of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

4 For AAM, Mr. Williams was tasked with making

recommendations for the RIF.

. His supervisors required

him to consider “what customers the role supported, the market

that the role operated in, and the role’s available pipeline” in

making recommendations to eliminate or consolidate roles as part

of the RIF.

. Mr. Williams was also required to attend

training related to the RIF and he was assigned to work with a

Human Resources Manager, Mr. Ethan Garrett (“Mr. Garrett”), to

apply the RIF criteria and policy.

.

In March 2020, Mr. Williams provided recommendations for

twelve individuals for the RIF, eleven of whom were white.

. Mr. Williams considered “the individual’s current

performance, past performance, ability to develop new business,

sales pipeline, and ability to take on additional work” in

making his recommendations.

. Mr. Williams and Mr.

Garrett “discussed the recommendations on several occasions,

including applying the reduction-in-force criteria correctly and

determining when an elimination versus a consolidation would

apply.”

. Mr. Jackson’s position was recommended for

elimination because of the business challenges in the Aerospace

Aftermarket Defense team, which could be supported by the

elimination of the Business Development Director position

because it had the weakest sales pipeline and its elimination

allowed for a smaller team to focus on more imminent business

5 opportunities.

.

Honeywell adopted Mr. Williams’s recommendation and

eliminated Mr. Jackson’s position of Business Development

Director through the RIF.

. Mr. Garrett concurred that

selecting Mr. Jackson for the RIF was “appropriate and

consistent with policy” and in May 2020 Mr. Jackson was informed

that his position was eliminated through the RIF due to the

pandemic.

.

B. Procedural

On August 29, 2020, Mr. Jackson filed suit against

Honeywell for racial discrimination in terminating his position

as part of the RIF. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 7. He alleged

violations of

, the DCHRA, the MFEPA, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

. The parties engaged in discovery throughout 2021 and

notified the Court in early 2022 that they were unable to come

to a settlement agreement. See Def. Honeywell’s Status Report,

ECF No. 21 at 1 (stating that “[t]o date, the parties have

completed discovery” and were “unable to resolve the case during

the December 17, 2021 settlement conference, and since then,

have not resolved the matter”); Pl.’s Status Report, ECF No. 22

(stating that Plaintiff had “no objections to any of the

statements . . . made in Defendant Honeywell’s Status Report”).

In April 2022, Honeywell filed its Motion for Summary

6 Judgment on all of Mr. Jackson’s claims. See Def.’s SJM, ECF No.

24. After the motion became ripe, this Court referred it to

Magistrate Judge Faruqui for an initial Report and

Recommendation. See Minute Order (Apr. 19, 2023). Magistrate

Judge Faruqui submitted his Report and Recommendation, which

recommended granting summary judgment to Honeywell, in November

2023. See R. & R., ECF No. 36 at 1. Mr. Jackson timely objected

to the Report and Recommendation. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 37.

The following month Honeywell submitted its response, see Def.’s

Resp. to Pl.’s 72(b) Objs. to the Magistrate’s R. & R. (“Def.’s

Resp.”), ECF No. 38; and Mr. Jackson submitted his reply, see

Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Objs. to the Magistrate Judge’s

Proposed Findings and Recommendations, ECF No. 39. Honeywell’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and Mr. Jackson’s objections to the

Report and Recommendation are now ripe and ready for

adjudication.

II. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary

judgment motions must be granted if “there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986). The moving party

bears the initial burden “of informing the district court of the

7 basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

(1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). This burden “may be

discharged by ‘showing’ . . . that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex,

.

In evaluating a summary judgment motion, “[t]he evidence of

the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in his favor.” Liberty Lobby,

.

Summary judgment turns on “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or

whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law.”

. “[I]f the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”

then the district court cannot grant summary judgment.

.

For purposes of summary judgment, “[o]nly disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.”

The Court’s role at the summary judgment stage

“is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of

8 the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.”

.

B. Objections to Report and Recommendation

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party

may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has

entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A

district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended

disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also

(b)(1). A district court “must determine de novo any part

of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly

objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). “If, however,

the party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply

reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the Report

and Recommendation only for clear error.” Houlahan v. Brown,

(D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “Under the clearly erroneous standard, the ‘magistrate

judge's decision is entitled to great deference’” and “is

clearly erroneous only ‘if on the entire evidence the court is

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed.’” Buie v. District of Columbia, No. 16-1920,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2019) (quoting Graham

v. Mukasey,

(D.D.C. 2009)).

Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the

proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made

9 and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections

which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the

magistrate judge are not properly objected to and are therefore

not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. U.S. E.P.A.,

(D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

C. Section 1981 Racial Discrimination Claims

Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the

“making, performance, modification, and termination of

contracts, and the enjoyments of all benefits, privileges,

terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.”

(a)-(b). “To evaluate a section 1981 claim, courts

use the three-step McDonnell Douglas framework for establishing

racial discrimination under Title VII.” Brown v. Sessoms,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Under this “method of proof,” (1) “the employee must

establish a prima facie case”; (2) if they succeed, “the burden

then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions”; and (3) “[i]f the

employer meets its burden of production, the burden then shifts

back to the employee, who must prove that, despite the proffered

reason, [they have] been the victim of intentional

discrimination.” Figueroa v. Pompeo,

(D.C.

10 Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, when

considering a motion for summary judgment, instead of focusing

on a plaintiff’s prima facie case, the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has clarified that

“where an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and

an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for the decision,” “the district court must resolve one central

question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-

discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the

employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the

basis of race . . . ?” Brady v. Off. of the Sergeant at Arms,

(D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Figueroa,

(describing the Brady question as “a shortcut for the

District Court to tackle the critical question of

discrimination” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

III. Analysis

Mr. Jackson objects to the Report and Recommendation’s

conclusion that Honeywell should be granted summary judgment on

all claims and argues that “the Magistrate Judge ignored

relevant case law, improperly decided issues of credibility and

intent against Mr. Jackson, and improperly drew inferences from

the facts in favor of defendant.” Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 37 at 2.

Mr. Jackson identifies six issues in particular which he argues

11 have “genuine issues of material fact” such that summary

judgment would be inappropriate. See id. at 10. Defendant

counters that Mr. Jackson “fails to identify . . . record

evidence” supporting his claims of genuine issues of material

fact and also “fails to explain why he did not controvert

Defendant’s [Statement of Material Facts] in his opposition.”

Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 38 at 5. Defendant also argues that Mr.

Jackson’s objections “simply reiterate[]” his original arguments

and thus are only entitled to clear error review in addition to

being meritless. See id. at 6 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The Court agrees with Defendant that Mr. Jackson’s

objections are without merit and the evidence in the record

supports the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion of granting

summary judgment to Defendant. Although the Court does not

conclude that the standard of review is dispositive on this

motion, the Court will nevertheless begin with Defendant’s

argument on that issue before addressing Mr. Jackson’s

objections.

A. Standard of Review

Defendant argues that Mr. Jackson’s objections “simply

reiterate[] [his] original arguments” from his briefing in

opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

therefore this Court should review the Report and Recommendation

12 “only for clear error.” Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 38 at 6 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Mr. Jackson fails to respond to this

argument in his reply brief and therefore, for that reason

alone, this Court may consider it conceded. See Am. Waterways

Operators v. Regan,

, 138 (D.D.C. 2022) (“‘If

a party fails to counter an argument that the opposing party

makes in a motion, the court may treat that argument as

conceded.’” (quoting Day v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Regul.

Affs.,

(D.D.C. 2002))).

However, Defendant is also correct that “conclusory or

general objections” or “simply reiterat[ing] . . . original

arguments” are not proper objections to a Report and

Recommendation and thus are only reviewed for clear error. See

Houlahan,

. And the Court agrees that Mr.

Jackson’s objections are clear examples of simply repeating

previously made arguments.

For example, Mr. Jackson’s first objection to the Report

and Recommendation is that Magistrate Judge Faruqui erred in

concluding that there was not a genuine issue of material fact

regarding whether “defendant’s stated reason for terminating Mr.

Jackson was false.” Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 37 at 10. As Defendant

points out, this is the same argument that Mr. Jackson made in

his briefing opposing Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

See Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.

13 (“Pl.’s Opp’n to SJM”), ECF No. 29-2 at 16-17 (stating that

“there remain genuine issues of material fact in dispute

sufficient to require the denial of defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment” regarding whether “defendant’s stated

rationale for the RIF is legitimate or pretextual”). In fact,

Mr. Jackson’s briefing on this point in his opposition to the

Motion for Summary Judgment is nearly identical to his objection

in this round of briefing. Compare Pl.’s Objs, ECF No. 37 at 18,

with Pl.’s Opp’n to SJM, ECF No. 29-2 at 16-17. Defendant

identifies—and supplements with examples from Mr. Jackson’s

briefing—that this same pattern is true for every one of Mr.

Jackson’s objections to the Report and Recommendation. See

Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 38 at 6 n.6. The Court agrees and thus

concludes that Mr. Jackson’s objections should only be reviewed

for clear error. 3

B. Plaintiff’s Objections

Mr. Jackson asserts that Honeywell should not be granted

summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist

in the record pertaining to: (1) whether “defendant’s stated

reason for terminating Mr. Jackson was false”; (2) whether

“[Mr.] Williams’s comparison of [Mr. Jackson’s] performance with

3 Although the Court holds that the Report and Recommendation is subject to clear error review, for the reasons below, the Court also determines that it would reach the same conclusions under de novo review.

14 [Mr.] Bell’s performance contained errors too obvious to be

unintentional and concealed discriminatory motives”; (3) whether

“Mr. Williams preferred Mr. Bell because he was White”; (4)

whether “defendant failed to follow its established RIF

procedures and policy when it terminated Mr. Jackson and

redistributed his work”; (5) whether “labeling Mr. Jackson’s

discharge a position elimination rather than a consolidation

violated defendant’s RIF policies”; and (6) whether “Mr.

Jackson’s performance and sales pipeline were superior to Mr.

Bell[’s].” Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 37 at 10; see also id. at 17-18

(listing four similar “critical issues” with “material facts in

dispute”). The Court agrees with Defendant that all of

“Plaintiff’s objections and alleged genuine disputes of material

facts lack merit.” See Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 38 at 6.

1. RIF

The Court will begin with Mr. Jackson’s objections related

to Honeywell’s stated reason for terminating him—the RIF. Mr.

Jackson’s first objection on this issue appears to be that the

reason given for the RIF itself was false. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF

No. 37 at 18. He argues that “defendant failed to produce any

evidence during discovery to substantiate” the contention that

Honeywell “implemented the RIF in 2020 because of the negative

economic impact on its business caused by the Covid-19

pandemic.” Id. He claims that his business unit did not suffer

15 “the same negative economic impact” as other parts of

Honeywell’s business. Id. He then faults Honeywell for not

producing “evidence of the Covid-19 pandemic’s impact on [his

business unit], such as sales histories, financial and earnings

reports, reports concerning financial projections for the

future, and the like.” Id. Mr. Jackson’s overall argument

appears to be that a RIF in his division was unnecessary, which,

even if true, is immaterial to his legal claims. As the D.C.

Circuit has emphasized, “courts are not super-personnel

department[s] that reexamine[] an entity’s business

decision[s].” Stewart v. Ashcroft,

(D.C. Cir.

2003). The court’s only job is to determine if discrimination

infected an otherwise innocuous business decision.

Furthermore, Mr. Jackson’s claim that he believed an RIF

was not necessary for his division is not suggestive of pretext

in this context. Honeywell, through the deposition of Mr.

Williams, provided ample evidence that its business was in

decline, which led to the RIF. Mr. Williams explained that “[a]s

a result of the pandemic, Honeywell experienced a loss of

revenue, a reduction in profits, a shortage in supplies due to

supplier chain issues, and challenges in meeting delivery

expectations” and that Honeywell implemented furloughs and a ten

percent reduction in executive compensation before implementing

the RIF to try and relieve some of the financial pressure. SOMF,

16 ECF No. 33-1 ¶¶ 29, 35. Honeywell is not required to provide

additional proof substantiating its business decision—despite

Mr. Jackson’s suggestions. This is especially true given that

Mr. Jackson’s only “evidence” refuting Honeywell’s assertions is

his own assertion that the pandemic did not impact his division

as drastically as others. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 37 at 18

(citing only Mr. Jackson’s own declaration as evidence); Decl.

of Kevin Jackson (“Jackson Decl.”), ECF No. 29-4 ¶ 4 (“The . . .

Covid-19 pandemic . . . did not have the same negative economic

impact on Honeywell’s Defense Americas business as it did on

Honeywell’s commercial airline business. The Defense Americas

business experienced very little negative economic impact.”).

While it may be true that Honeywell could have cut personnel

only from the divisions most impacted by the pandemic, it is

also true that Honeywell was free to make economic decisions as

it saw fit during a time of financial crisis for the company.

See Stewart,

; Holcomb v. Powell,

(D.C. Cir. 2006). No evidence in the record suggests that

Honeywell’s chosen method of reducing costs was anything other

than a business decision completely within its purview.

Therefore, the Court rejects Mr. Jackson’s claim that Honeywell

“failed to produce any evidence” justifying its RIF and that the

RIF was pretextual.

Mr. Jackson’s next argument about the RIF is that Honeywell

17 failed to follow its “established RIF procedures and policy when

it terminated Mr. Jackson.” Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 37 at 10.

Specifically, Mr. Jackson argues that “labeling [his] discharge

a position elimination rather than a consolidation violated

defendant’s RIF policies.”

He claims that “[t]he facts are

in dispute concerning whether Mr. Jackson’s employment was

terminated as part of a job consolidation or a job elimination.”

Id. at 19.

As an initial matter, the Court agrees that failing to

follow established procedures could be indicative of pretext in

a discrimination case. See Jones v. Ottenberg’s Bakers, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2013) (“Indeed, deviations from

standard procedures may even give rise to an inference of

pretext at the summary-judgment stage.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). However, Mr. Jackson has failed to establish

that Honeywell deviated from its established procedures in his

termination—regardless of whether it was characterized as a

position consolidation or elimination.

Mr. Jackson claims that his termination was a job

consolidation, rather than a job elimination. See Pl.’s Objs.,

ECF No. 37 at 20. For job consolidations, Honeywell’s RIF

procedure requires considering first “relative skills and

abilities . . . to do the remaining and future work,” then “the

existence of documented performance issues,” and finally “length

18 of service” in that order, only looking to the next criteria

when the previous ones “are not objectively determinative when

evaluating the Covered Employees being considered for RIF within

a particular job classification or function.” Id. at 19. In

considering individuals for the RIF, Mr. Williams explained that

he ”considered the individual’s current performance, past

performance, ability to develop new business, sales pipeline,

and ability to take on additional work.” SOMF, ECF No. 33-1

¶ 53. And that he looked at “the individual’s weekly reports,

contact plans, next steps on each opportunity, and the status of

each opportunity.” Id. ¶ 54. The criteria Mr. Williams

considered in recommending employees for the RIF fits the

consolidation procedure of considering first “relative skills

and abilities . . . to do the remaining and future work.” Mr.

Jackson resists this conclusion by arguing that the “performance

data” indicated that “Mr. Jackson had superior skills and

abilities in comparison to Mr. Bell” and thus that “Mr. Bell

should have been selected for termination.” Pl.’s Objs., ECF No.

37 at 20. However, Mr. Jackson’s disagreement with the outcome

of the procedure does not convince the Court that the procedure

itself was disregarded. As the Report and Recommendation noted,

Mr. Williams believed that Mr. Bell performed better and had

superior skills to Mr. Jackson. See R. & R., ECF No. 36 at 6.

Although Mr. Williams ultimately concluded that the comparison

19 was unnecessary since Mr. Jackson’s position should be

eliminated for business reasons beyond Mr. Jackson’s control,

see SOMF, ECF No. 33-1 ¶¶ 58, 60; Mr. Williams still followed

the RIF procedure for a consolidation. Any factual dispute over

whether Mr. Jackson’s RIF was a position elimination or

consolidation is immaterial because the procedure Mr. Williams

took to implement the RIF was consistent with either policy. See

R. & R., ECF No. 36 at 8 (concluding that “Honeywell equally

could have terminated Mr. Jackson via job consolidation” because

his “skills and abilities” were “primary determining factors in

job consolidations” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Therefore, the Court rejects Mr. Jackson’s argument that any

factual contention about his RIF being a position elimination

versus a consolidation would preclude granting Honeywell summary

judgment.

2. Job Performance

Mr. Jackson also objects to the facts related to his job

performance in comparison to Mr. Bell’s performance.

Specifically, Mr. Jackson argues that Mr. Williams’s comparison

of the two “contained errors too obvious to be unintentional and

concealed discriminatory motives” and that his “performance and

sales pipeline were superior to Mr. Bell[’s].” Pl.’s Objs., ECF

No. 37 at 10. For support, Mr. Jackson cites Ms. Boucek’s

deposition that explained how she gave Mr. Williams information

20 about Mr. Bell’s and Mr. Jackson’s sales performances to date

and that the “data showed that Mr. Jackson had closed more deals

and had a larger sales pipeline than Mr. Bell.” Pl.’s Objs., ECF

No. 37 at 12 (citing Pl.’s Ex. E—Deposition of Elisabeth Boucek,

ECF No. 31-1 at 55, 57, 59-66). As noted in the Report and

Recommendation, Mr. Williams in his own deposition stated that

he considered an “individual’s current performance, past

performance, ability to develop new business, sales pipeline,

and ability to take on additional work” before making his

recommendations for the RIF. SOMF, ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 53.

Furthermore, with respect to Mr. Jackson specifically, Mr.

Williams explained that based on his personal assessment of

“weekly reports, . . . meetings, sales calls, [and] trade

shows,” Mr. Bell “was far more active” than Mr. Jackson. Def.’s

Ex. C—Deposition of Steve Williams, ECF No. 24-6 at 31-32. He

also stated that he found Mr. Bell’s “skill set . . . more

valuable than Mr. Jackson’s in developing new business,” and

that Mr. Jackson was lacking in “[i]ndustry contacts” and

“experience” in comparison to Mr. Bell. Id. at 32-33.

As the Report and Recommendation explained, Mr. Williams

had concrete reasons for why he believed Mr. Bell should be

retained over Mr. Jackson. See R. & R., ECF No. 36 at 6. Mr.

Jackson argues that Mr. Williams claims not to have seen the

documents Ms. Boucek sent to him and that “[t]he Magistrate

21 Judge apparently improperly believed that testimony of Mr.

Williams, despite the fact that it was not within his province

to do so.” Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 37 at 12. However, the Report

and Recommendation makes no such indication. It explains Mr.

Williams’s own account of his assessment and correctly states

that it was “Mr. Williams’s right to disagree with Ms. Boucek”

and that to the extent Mr. Williams ignored Ms. Boucek’s

assessment or other relevant data, that is not enough to

establish pretext since “Mr. Williams offered several reasons

for his honest beliefs about Mr. Jackson.” See R. & R., ECF No.

36 at 7; see also Figueroa,

(“an employer at

the second prong [of the McDonnell Douglas framework] must

proffer admissible evidence showing a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory, clear, and reasonably specific explanation

for its actions” and “[w]hen the reason involves subjective

criteria, the evidence must provide fair notice as to how the

employer applied the standards to the employee’s own

circumstances”).

Mr. Jackson’s objections boil down to simple disagreement

with Mr. Williams’s assessment of who was the more valuable

employee. Although Mr. Jackson may be correct that his sales

pipeline was superior and he had closed more sales that year,

Mr. Williams found sales skills, experience, and industry

contacts to be the more valuable attributes. See Vatel v.

22 Alliance of Auto. Mfrs.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011)

(“[I]t is the perception of the decision maker which is

relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). The Court cannot conclude that this

preference indicates “errors too obvious to be unintentional”

and thus suggestive of “discriminatory motives.” See Hairston v.

Vance-Cooks,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Even if a

plaintiff was victimized by poor selection procedures, we may

not second-guess an employer’s personnel decision absent

demonstrably discriminatory motive.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

3. Other Evidence of Discrimination and Other Claims

Mr. Jackson also argues that “[t]he summary judgment record

contains sufficient evidence to establish . . . that Mr.

Williams preferred Mr. Bell because he was White.” Pl.’s Objs.,

ECF No. 37 at 10. However, Mr. Jackson fails to support this

argument with any evidence.

Mr. Jackson argues that “Mr. Williams rejected his

overtures to participate in work-related events and how Mr.

Williams related to him in a standoffish manner,” which

“suggests that Mr. Williams did whatever was necessary to

manipulate the RIF process to ensure that his personal favorite,

Mr. Bell, would survive the RIF, at the expense of Mr. Jackson,

who objectively was a superior performer.” Id. at 20-21. Not

23 only does Mr. Jackson fail to cite any evidence in the record to

substantiate his facts, the facts, even if true, do not suggest

that any favoritism was due to race. Mr. Jackson never alleges,

much less supports with evidence, that Mr. Williams’s alleged

“standoffish” nature and favoritism was connected to either Mr.

Bell’s or Mr. Jackson’s race. Cf. Smith v. Napolitano,

(D.D.C. 2009) (observing that “[c]ourts in this

jurisdiction” have held that “[e]ven if there ha[s] been

favoritism in the selection process” that “does not violate [the

law] when such [selection] is based on the qualifications of the

party and not on some basis prohibited by [law]” in the context

an ”employer’s preselection of a job candidate” for employment).

Similarly, Mr. Jackson argues that Mr. Williams “did not

neutrally apply the RIF criteria to Mr. Bell” and that the

“evidence shows” that Mr. Williams was “motivated by personal

bias in favor of Mr. Bell and against Mr. Jackson.” Id. at 21.

Once again, this statement, devoid of any factual content or

citations to the record, does not convince the Court that any

favoritism or unfairness was motivated by racial bias as opposed

to alleged personal bias. In fact, as the Report and

Recommendation points out, “19 of the 20 individuals that Mr.

Williams recommended to be part of the RIF were white,” which

“cuts against Mr. Jackson’s argument that discrimination was the

real reason for his termination.” R. & R., ECF No. 36 at 8

24 (citing SOMF, ECF No. 33-1 ¶¶ 87-88). Mr. Jackson does not

respond to this fact in his briefing; nor does he provide any

other evidence suggestive of discrimination. Therefore, the

Court rejects Mr. Jackson’s claims about favoritism suggesting

racial bias and agrees with the Report and Recommendation that

Mr. Jackson has failed to establish that Honeywell gave “‘better

treatment [to] similarly situated employees outside the

plaintiff’s protected group.’” R. & R., ECF No. 36 at 8 (quoting

Webster v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy,

, 78 (D.D.C.

2020)).

Finally, Mr. Jackson objects to the Report and

Recommendation’s conclusions that Honeywell is entitled to

summary judgment on his other claims in this case. See Pl.’s

Objs., ECF No. 37 at 1-2. 4 As the Report and Recommendation

correctly noted, each of Mr. Jackson’s other claims are either

premised on the success of or analyzed under the same standard

as his § 1981 claim. See R. & R., ECF No. 36 at 9-10. Thus, the

Court concludes that Honeywell is also entitled to summary

judgment on those claims for the reasons stated above.

Additionally, Mr. Jackson requests a hearing on his

objections, see Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 37 at 21, which the Court

4 Mr. Jackson did not mention his MFEPA claim in his briefing and thus the Court does not understand Mr. Jackson to be challenging the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to grant Honeywell summary judgment on this claim.

25 DENIES because the existing record is sufficient to resolve Mr.

Jackson’s objections.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge

Faruqui’s Report and Recommendation in full, see ECF No. 36; and

GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, see ECF No. 24.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge August 29, 2024

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