UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, : : Plaintiff / Counter-Defendant, : Civil Action No.: 23-915 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 9, 12 : PAUL MAUCHA, : : Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter arises out of a dispute over property between the property owner Bank of

New York Mellon (“BNYM”) and an individual who resided on the property, Paul Maucha. In

April 2023, BNYM sued to eject Maucha from the property. Compl. ECF No. 1. Maucha—who

is proceeding pro se and who was recently convicted of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire

fraud, and engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property, Judgment at 1–2,

United States v. Maucha, No. 21-cr-332 (D.D.C. June 14, 2024), ECF No. 216—responded by

filing a document which the Court construed as both a motion to dismiss the complaint and a

counterclaim against BNYM, see Countercl., ECF No. 8; Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 9.

BNYM now moves to dismiss the counterclaim. Pl.’s Mot. Dismiss Countercl. (“Pl.’s Mot.”),

ECF No. 12. For the reasons described below, BNYM’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim is

granted, and Maucha’s motion to dismiss is denied. II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

BNYM is the owner in fee simple absolute of the “multi-million dollar single-family

home” at 5721 Potomac Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016. Pl.’s Mot. at 1; see also

Compl. ¶ 1. Before his arrest, Maucha lived at the property for over fifteen years and was

“intermittently paying an $1,000/month pittance in rent.” Pl.’s Mot. at 1. According to BNYM,

he was able to do so “because he signed a sham lease with the former owner on the eve of

foreclosure, then spent more than a decade engaged in spurious legal wrangling to stay in the

house for little or no rent to the detriment of” BNYM. Id. Over the years, Maucha also “claimed

housing code violations” and “demanded repairs” but then “threatened to kill anyone that

[BNYM] sent out to inspect the property.” Id. at 1–2.

Maucha no longer resides at the property. See Judgment at 3, United States v. Maucha,

No. 21-cr-332 (D.D.C. June 11, 2024), ECF No. 216 (committing Maucha to a 135-month term

of incarceration). In his stead, however, BNYM alleges that “squatters” now occupy the

property. Pl.’s Mot. at 2. BNYM further alleges that those squatters “more likely than

not . . . filed the Counterclaim on Maucha’s behalf.” Id.

B. Procedural Background

On April 4, 2023, BNYM filed suit in federal court seeking to eject Maucha from 5721

Potomac Avenue. Compl. ¶¶ 21–24. BNYM’s complaint also seeks to recover mense profits

Maucha received as a result of allowing other “unknown persons to occupy the [p]roperty for

years.” Id. ¶¶ 25–28. On November 28, 2023, Maucha filed a counterclaim that accuses BNYM

of fraud, requests dismissal of BNYM’s complaint, and demands $10 million “plus the costs of

all actions and any other relief a Jury may find.” Countercl. at 2–3. Because the Court

2 construed Maucha’s counterclaim as, in part, a motion to dismiss, BNYM filed a brief opposing

dismissal. Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 10. Maucha did not file a reply.

On December 19, 2023, BNYM moved to dismiss Maucha’s counterclaim. Pl.’s Mot. at

1. Maucha’s response was due on January 2, 2024, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1), (d); D.D.C.

LCvR 7(b), but he did not file one. Thus, on June 6, the Court issued an order advising Maucha

of his obligation to respond to BNYM’s motion. Order at 1, ECF No. 13. The Court warned

Maucha that if he “fail[ed] to submit a memorandum responding to [BNYM’s] motion [by July

5], the Court may treat the motion as conceded, grant the motion, and dismiss his counterclaim.”

Id. at 1–2. On July 5, Maucha filed a motion for an extension of time, in which he requested an

additional six months to respond to the motion to dismiss. Def.’s Mot. Extension Time, ECF No.

14. The Court granted in part and denied in part Maucha’s request. Order at 1–2, ECF No. 16.

Relevantly, the Court gave Maucha an additional thirty days in which to file an opposition. Id. at

1. The Court again cautioned Maucha that “if he neither responds nor moves for an extension of

time by [August 12], the Court may treat [BNYM’s] motion to dismiss as conceded and dismiss

Mr. Maucha’s counterclaim.” Id. at 2 (cleaned up). Despite that warning, Maucha has neither

responded to the motion to dismiss nor sought further extension of the deadline.

III. ANALYSIS

Under Local Civil Rule 7(b), if any party fails to file a response to a motion within “14

days of the date of service or at such other time as the Court may direct . . . the Court may treat

the motion as conceded.” D.D.C. LCvR 7(b). This rule “is a docket-management tool that

facilitates efficient and effective resolution of motions by requiring the prompt joining of issues.”

Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). In Fox v. Strickland,

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam), the D.C. Circuit held that a district court must take pains

3 to advise a pro se party of the consequences of the failure to respond to a dispositive motion. See

also Neal v. Kelly,

(D.C. Cir. 1992). “That notice . . . should include an

explanation that the failure to respond . . . may result in the district court granting the motion and

dismissing the case.” Fox,

.

The Circuit has addressed challenges to the compatibility of Local Civil Rule 7(b) with

various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Winston v. Strawn, LLP v. McLean,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Local Rule 7(b) cannot be squared with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56.”); Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir.

2016) (“Applying Local Rule 7(b) to grant an unopposed motion to dismiss under Federal Rule

12(b)(6) risks circumventing the clear preference of the Federal Rules to resolve disputes on their

merits.”). However, Cohen ultimately “reaffirmed that, in the context of a motion to dismiss, it

‘[has] yet to deem a straightforward application of Local Rule 7(b) an abuse of discretion.’”

Voacolo v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg, Ass’n,

(D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Cohen,

); see also Woodhouse v. Ayfi Grp., No. 22-cv-1834,

, at *1

(D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2022).

This case presents such a situation. BNYM filed its motion to dismiss in December

2023. Maucha has thus had over eight months to respond but has declined to do so. See Makell

v. FedChoice Fed. Credit Union, No. 19-cv-2364,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 23,

2019) (granting motion to dismiss as conceded after 74 days passed without response from

plaintiff). Moreover, Maucha has twice been warned that if he failed to respond “the Court may

treat the motion as conceded, grant the motion, and dismiss his counterclaim.” Order at 1, ECF

No. 13; Order at 2, ECF No. 16. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Maucha’s failure to

respond to BNYM’s motion to dismiss presents a straightforward situation in which to apply

4 Local Rule 7(b). It will, therefore, grant BNYM’s motion as conceded, and will dismiss

Maucha’s counterclaim without prejudice. 1

Before concluding, the Court notes an alternative basis on which dismissal of the

counterclaim is proper. Local Rule 5.1(c)(1) requires a party proceeding pro se to file a notice of

a change of address “within 14 days of the change.” D.D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). Failure to obey this

rule provides grounds for dismissing a case for “want of prosecution.” Summers v. Moore, No.

95-cv-2074,

, at *1 (D.D.C. June 27, 1996); see also Matthews v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Bishop v. Gen. Servs. Admin., No. 19-

cv-1396,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2020). Maucha’s address appears to have

changed at least twice since he filed his counterclaim, yet he has never informed the Court of any

changes. The Court has also warned Maucha that if he did not “file a change of address notice

on or before August 12, 2024 . . . the Court may consider dismissing his counterclaim[] for

failure to prosecute.” Order at 2, ECF No. 16. Because Maucha has not complied with the Local

Rules or the Court’s directives, the Court will also dismiss the counterclaim without prejudice

for failure to prosecute. See Summers,

, at *1; see also D.D.C. LCvR 83.23 (“A

dismissal for failure to prosecute may be ordered by the Court . . . upon the Court’s own

motion.”).

1 Maucha’s counterclaim requests nine different forms of relief, one of which is that the Court “[d]ismiss [BNYM’s] case . . . for lack of merit.” Countercl. at 2. Because the Court will dismiss Maucha’s counterclaim, it will also deny Maucha’s motion to dismiss—to the extent it may be construed as such a motion—as moot. In any event, Maucha’s arguments for dismissal of BNYM’s complaint are meritless. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–3.

5 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9)

is DENIED, and Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED

AS CONCEDED. It is hereby:

ORDERED that Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff’s Counterclaim is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send Mr. Maucha a copy of this

Opinion and the accompanying Order (ECF No. 18) at the following three addresses:

Paul Maucha 5721 Potomac Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20016

Paul Maucha Reg. Number: 45013-509 FDC Philadelphia 700 Arch Street Philadelphia, PA 19106

Paul Maucha Reg. Number: 45013-509 FCI Fort Dix Federal Correctional Institution P.O. Box 2000 Joint Base MDL, NJ 08640

An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and

contemporaneously issued.

Dated: August 30, 2024 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

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