UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LOUISE TRAUMA CENTER LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 20-cv-2348 (DLF)

CHAD WOLF, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is plaintiff Louise Trauma Center’s motion for attorney’s fees, Dkt. 55.

For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The Louise Trauma Center (the “Center”) alleges it is a “nonprofit organization dedicated

to raising awareness about immigrant women who have suffered from gender-based violence.”

Compl. at ¶ 4, Dkt. 1. Between September 2019 and April 2020, the Center made nine Freedom

of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests: one to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and

eight to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). The requested records

pertained to the training of immigration-related federal employees, mostly asylum officers. E.g.,

id. at ¶ 49 (requesting records concerning “field training for staff at Newark Asylum Office” and

“all records that are used to train and re-train asylum officers at Newark Asylum Office”). On

August 25, 2020, the Center filed this action. Id. at 1. Over the course of the next several years,

the parties negotiated and resolved all the Center’s requests; in the end, ICE and USCIS released

20,206 pages’ worth of responsive records. See Mot. for Att’y Fees at 1, Dkt. 55. The Center now

moves for attorney’s fees. Id. II. LEGAL STANDARDS

To receive attorney's fees under FOIA, a plaintiff must be (1) eligible for and (2) entitled

to them. See

(a)(4)(E)(i). A plaintiff is eligible if it “substantially prevailed” in the

litigation,

, meaning it “obtained relief through either― (I) a judicial order, or an enforceable

written agreement or consent decree; or (II) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the

agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial,”

§ 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). Second, the plaintiff

must be entitled to attorney’s fees. McKinley v. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency,

(D.C. Cir. 2014). “Four non-exclusive factors typically govern the entitlement inquiry: (1) the

public benefit derived from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the nature of

the plaintiff's interest in the records; and (4) the reasonableness of the agency’s withholding of the

requested documents.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the Court may

award only “reasonable” attorney’s fees.

(a)(4)(E)(i). The plaintiff bears the burden

of demonstrating that its requested fees are reasonable. Jud. Watch v. DOJ,

(D.D.C. 2012)

III. ANALYSIS

A. Eligibility

The Center is eligible for attorney’s fees if it “substantially prevailed” in the litigation,

meaning either that the Court ruled in its favor or that the “institution and prosecution of the

litigation caused the agency to release the documents obtained.” Grand Canyon Tr. v. Bernhardt,

, 96–97 (2020) (alterations omitted); see

(a)(4)(E)(i). The latter

occurred here. In their September 2020 answer, USCIS and ICE admitted that no determination

had been made on any of the Center’s requests. E.g., Answer, at ¶ 9, Dkt. 11. Four weeks later,

the agencies reported that several parts of their search were complete and that the rest was

2 underway, with the first records to be released in less than a month. See Joint Status Report of

Oct. 23, 2020, Dkt. 12. Ultimately, all responsive records were released.

The commencement of this litigation is the most natural explanation for the sudden

movement on the Center’s FOIA request. To be sure, “the mere filing of the complaint and the

subsequent release of the documents is insufficient to establish causation.” ACLU v. DHS,

(D.D.C. 2011). But the D.C. Circuit has not ruled out that “a sudden

acceleration of production” may prove causation. Grand Canyon Tr., 947 F.3d at 97–98 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Here, the agencies do not offer a plausible alternative explanation for

the immediate action on the Center’s FOIA request, other than that a backlog of FOIA requests

postponed their pre-filing response. See Opp’n to Mot. at 4–5, Dkt. 61. But despite the backlog,

the agencies turned to the Center’s requests as soon as this litigation commenced. The Court thus

concludes that the Center “substantially prevailed” and is eligible for attorney’s fees.

B. Entitlement

The Court considers four factors to determine whether the Louise Trauma Center is entitled

to attorney’s fees: “(1) the public benefit derived from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the

plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiff's interest in the records; and (4) the reasonableness of the

agency’s withholding of the requested documents.” McKinley,

(internal quotations

marks omitted). The parties agree that the first factor favors the Louise Trauma Center. See Opp’n

at 5.

On balance, the second and third factors favor the plaintiff. These factors, which are

closely related and often considered together, help the Court gauge whether the plaintiff has

“sufficient private incentive to seek disclosure without attorney’s fees.” Davy v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the factors “weigh

3 against an award to a plaintiff who seeks disclosure for a commercial benefit or out of other

personal motives and instead favor non-profit organizations which aim to ferret out and make

public worthwhile, previously unknown government information.” Urban Air Initiative, Inc. v.

EPA,

, 316 (D.D.C. 2020) (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks

omitted).

The Center holds itself out as a “nonprofit organization” that works on the public-interest

project of analyzing and fighting “gender-based violence.” Compl. at ¶ 4. The government raises

a question as to the Center’s status as a non-profit organization, noting that is has not registered as

such with the IRS. Opp’n at 6. There is no evidence, however, that the Center is a well-resourced

private company or is primarily seeking disclosure to obtain a commercial benefit. Moreover,

there is no tension between the Center’s status as an LLC and its claim that it is a “nonprofit

organization”—under the D.C. Code, an LLC “may have any lawful purpose, regardless of

whether for profit.” DC Code § 29–801.04(b). Thus, the Center passes the test’s second and third

factors.

The government also posits, as it has done in earlier cases, see, e.g., Louise Trauma Ctr.

v. DHS, No. 21-cv-2371,

, at *4 (D.D.C. July 1, 2024), that the Center is a front

for the collection of attorney’s fees, Opp’n 7–8. The Center has filed an eyebrow-raising number

of FOIA suits like this one. See Opp’n at 8 (collecting cases). Indeed, the list of such cases in the

government’s opposition brief is longer than the explanation of work the Center has provided in

both the complaint and on its website―combined. The Center also has done a poor job of

explaining how it furthers its mission of “raising awareness about immigrant women who have

suffered from gender-based violence such as female genital mutilation (FGM), rape, domestic

violence, and forced marriage” and helping women who seek asylum. Compl. ¶ 4. It appears that

4 the Center merely uploads to its website various records that it obtains from FOIA cases and offers

no analysis of the records. Nor does the Center appear to offer any other assistance to immigrant

women, such as housing or other support. When directed by the Court to “explain[] the specific

ways in which the Center furthers its asserted mission,” Min. Order of July 29, 2024, the Center’s

counsel referred the Court to articles he has written that discuss records produced in similar FOIA

suits and to third parties’ discussions of the Center’s successful FOIA requests, see Pl. Response

to Court Order, Dkt. 63 at 2–3. On this meager record, it is hard to discern how immigrant women

benefit from the Center’s work. Even so, the government has fallen short in substantiating its

theory that the Center is a front for the collection of attorney’s fees, and therefore “the Court will

not address it further.” Louise Trauma Ctr.,

, at *4.

Last, the fourth factor favors the government. It considers whether the government has

“been recalcitrant in its opposition to a valid claim or otherwise engaged in obdurate behavior.”

Davy,

. Throughout the parties’ negotiations, each party registered complaints

and made concessions. But the Court sees nothing that rose to the level of obduracy on the part of

the government. Moreover, the Center has dropped any contests to the government’s remaining

withholdings, suggesting that it has ceded that no valid claims remain. See Joint Status Report of

Nov. 20, 2023, Dkt. 56.

Balancing these factors, the Center is entitled to a fee award. It is a “requester[] who

seek[s] documents for public informational purposes”―that is, the type of plaintiff that the FOIA

attorney’s fees award provision exists to reward. Davy,

.

C. Reasonableness of Fees

The Center is eligible and entitled to attorney’s fees―but only “reasonable” attorney’s

fees. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(E)(i). “In determining whether fees are reasonable, courts ordinarily

5 focus on two questions: (1) whether the attorneys charged a reasonable hourly rate and (2) whether

the time attorneys logged on the case was reasonable—i.e., did the attorneys waste or otherwise

unnecessarily spend time on the matter.” In re Donovan,

(D.C. Cir. 1989).

Both issues are contested here.

1. Reasonableness of Rate

The determination of the rate is a straightforward matter. The parties agree that the

Fitzpatrick Matrix supplies the applicable rates. 1 See Opp’n at 15; Reply at 24, Dkt. 62

(abandoning argument for the Laffey Matrix). Only one dispute about the rate remains. The

Center submits that the Court should apply the 2024 rate for hours in all foregoing years, as

compensation for the delay in payment, Reply at 23–24; the government contend historical rates

apply, Opp’n at 10–12. On this issue, the Court has no discretion. “The Supreme Court has made

it plain that absent an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity, attorneys’ fees awarded against the

federal government must be based on historical rates.” Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v.

Hodel,

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). FOIA

contains no such waiver of immunity. Accordingly, the Court will apply the following historical

rates, which reflect the Fitzpatrick Matrix rates for a lawyer with over 35 years of experience: 2020

($731.00/hour); 2021 ($736.00/hour); 2022 ($760.00/hour); 2023 ($807.00/hour). Mot. Ex. D,

Dkt. 55-4.

1 Judge McFadden previously awarded the Center’s counsel fees at “a rate considerably below” the Fitzpatrick Matrix, on the ground that the Fitzpatrick Matrix is typically used for litigation of greater complexity than is presumed of standard FOIA cases. E.g., Louise Trauma Ctr. v. DHS,

, at *5 (D.D.C. May 16, 2023). Because no party has raised the possibility of such a reduction here, the Court will apply the Fitzpatrick Matrix rate.

6 2. Reasonableness of Hours

Although the Center is eligible for attorney’s fees, the Court will decline to award it any

fees because its request is patently unreasonable. A plaintiff bears the “burden of establishing the

reasonableness of its fee request,” and its “supporting documentation must be of sufficient detail

and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours

were actually and reasonably expended.” Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee,

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Center has failed to do

so here. Its fee request is not only grossly excessive, it is plagued with deficiencies and, most

gravely, flouts multiple courts’ reprimands of counsel’s inappropriate billing practices. When a

plaintiff submits an outrageously unreasonable request, a court may decline to award fees as a

means of sanctioning attorney misconduct and deterring similar behavior. See Env’t Def. Fund v.

Reilly,

, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

The deficiencies in the Center’s fee request fall broadly into two categories. The first is

that the time records are vague, inadequately descriptive, or made in error. “Attorneys who

anticipate making a fee application must maintain contemporaneous, complete and standardized

time records which accurately reflect the work done by each attorney.” Citizens for Responsibility

and Ethics in Washington v. FEC,

(D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted). When

attorneys fail to do so, it becomes “impossible for the court to verify the reasonableness of the

billings, either as to the necessity of the particular service or the amount of time expended on a

given legal task.” In re Sealed Case,

(D.C. Cir. 1989). This problem arises in

several ways:

• Several entries are plainly erroneous. Counsel seeks fees that are ten times higher than

what appears justified for certain activities. For instance, counsel billed “2.” hours for

7 reviewing a Joint Status Report on September 23, 2022, even though preceding and

subsequent entries for the same or similar tasks reflect one-tenth of that time. Compare

Mot. Ex. C at 9 (“9/23 2. R&R of ecf 36”) with id. at 9 (“10/21 .2 R&R of ecf 37”).

Similarly, counsel billed “2.” hours for reviewing a 66-page file on February 7, 2023, when

all other similar entries on that day reflect time billed for fractions of an hour. Compare

id. at 10 (“2. review of 66 page file”) with id. at 10 (“.3 review of 83 page file”). The

Court’s conclusion that these entries are erroneous is bolstered by counsel’s apparent

practice of including a zero at the end of a whole-hour entry, see id. at 10 (“1.0 draft MSJ”),

and his inclusion of other similarly incorrect entries, see id. at 10 (“ . Email to TQ”). In

total, the plaintiff’s counsel over-billed for at least 10.8 hours by misplacing the decimal

point in four separate time entries. See id. at 9 (“9/23 2. R&R of ecf 36”); id. (“9/26 3.

Study of JSR”); id. at 10 (“2/7 . . . 2. review of 66 page file”); id. at 14 (“7/11 . . . 5. R&R

of 6 page Declaration of Cindy Munita”).

• The overall number of hours claimed is also unclear. Counsel claims to have expended

236 hours on this case. Mot. at 27. Yet he lists 250.3 hours in his itemization of work.

See Opp’n at 19 (citing Opp’n Ex. E, Dkt. 61-5). The Court cannot know which hours the

Center has chosen not to claim and is left guessing.

• A few entries are so unclear that the Court cannot discern what work was performed. On

November 13, 2020, counsel spent 0.1 hours on “Memo to file,” without explanation. Mot.

Ex. C at 3. This same phrase pops up elsewhere in the itemization, also without

explanation. See, e.g., id. at 4. On May 16, 2021, the Center spent 0.3 hours on “Rev of

file,” with no specification as to which file or its purpose. Id. at 5. On September 17, 2021,

counsel spent 2.1 hours “reading pages,” with no specification as to which pages or how

8 many. Id. at 6. And on June 13, 2023, he spent 0.2 hours on “emails ±,” using a symbol

unfamiliar to the Court. Id. at 13.

• Further, even though the modal entry contains slightly more detail―see, e.g., id. at 3

(billing 0.2 hours on “email to OC about narrowing”); id. at 9 (billing 1.6 hours on “R &R

of records”); id. at 11 (billing 1.7 hours on “reviewing entire file”)―the entries are still

unclear. To quote Judge McFadden, “counsel’s billing records teem with ambiguous

entries.” Louise Trauma Ctr.,

, at *7.

• Oddly, some entries list no time billed, despite descriptions that suggest that work was

performed. For example, on November 14, 2020, counsel spent 0.0 hours on “Westlaw

research on FOIA; recent cases.” Mot. Ex. C at 3; see also

(billing 0.0 hours for

“Westlaw research on fees; recent cases”). If time was, in fact, expended, then the

submission of 0.0 hours casts further doubts on the consistency and accuracy of counsel’s

billing practices.

• Counsel’s handling of the Court’s minute orders is inconsistent. Approximately thirty

times during this litigation, the Court published a one-sentence minute order that read,

“Upon consideration of the parties’ [] Joint Status Report, it is ORDERED that the parties

shall file another joint status report on or before [a date].” Remarkably, on two occasions,

counsel billed 18 minutes for “receipt and review” of such a minute order. See

.

At other times, counsel billed no time for reviewing minute orders. Most often, however,

he billed something in between. He provides no explanation for the wide variation in these

entries.

• Some hours are seemingly unclaimed without explanation. Counsel claims no hours for

the drafting of three jointly filed status reports: Dkts. 21, 26, and 48. This absence is

9 inconsistent with his billing practice for similar joint status reports. See, e.g.,

(billing 0.5 hours for “rev of proposed JSR”). Likewise, even though counsel apprised the

Court in several joint status reports that he was reviewing disclosed records, the itemization

reveals no contemporaneous claimed hours. Compare, e.g., Joint Status Report of July 14,

2021, Dkt. 19, with Mot. Ex. C. at 6 (billing no hours between July 4 and September 14).

These omissions fall short of the standard for accurate and standardized billing.

The second categorical deficiency with the Center’s fee request is that it is grossly out of

line with requests in similar cases, reflecting an extraordinary lack of billing judgment. Attorneys

are entitled to compensation only for “reasonable” expenditures of time, and a court must “exclude

hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Louise Trauma Ctr.,

, at *6. The grossly excessive billing arises in several ways:

• Counsel claims to have spent 236 hours―that is, 29.5 entire workdays―litigating this

FOIA case, in which no motions (except the instant motion) were filed and in which the

agencies resolved the Center’s requests largely by making the requested disclosures. While

the parties plainly spent time negotiating the agencies’ withholdings, their post-pleading

filings consisted of periodic status reports, which varied only slightly with each iteration.

Simply put, this straightforward case should not have taken counsel so much time.

• Similarly, counsel represents that approximately one-third of his claimed hours, or 85

hours, were spent on records review. But, as other courts have explained, records review

is not compensable because a lawyer “would have performed that task even in the absence

of litigation.” Urban Air Initiative, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 324; see Am. Immigr. Council v.

DHS,

(D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he cost of reviewing documents

produced in response to a FOIA request—to see if they are responsive or for other

10 reasons—is simply the price of making such a request. The Court will thus deduct these

charges as well.”); Coffey v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,

(D.D.C.

2018) (holding “time spent reviewing documents released by” the responding agency “is

not compensable”).

• Counsel also claims hours for clerical work, such as “hand-serving US Attorney,”

“checking Post Office website for service of process,” and “double-checking secretary’s

work.” Mot. Ex. C at 2. These clerical tasks do not merit compensation near a thousand

dollars an hour. See Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee,

(“[P]urely clerical

or secretarial tasks should not be billed [even] at a paralegal rate regardless of who

performs them.”).

• Counsel claims 8.3 hours for preparing the complaint even though he lifted text verbatim

from the Center’s complaints in prior actions. See, e.g., Complaint, Dkt. 1, Louise Trauma

Ctr. v. DHS, No. 20-cv-1128 (D.D.C.). The case-specific language, such as the description

of the FOIA requests, was altered, but the rest of the complaint is virtually identical to the

Center’s earlier complaints. To seek more than eight hours for copying, pasting, and

making minor, case-specific alterations to previous complaints is excessive.

• Counsel also claims hours for refreshing his memory on this case. E.g., Mot. Ex. C at 13

(billing 0.1 hours on “reviewing file, to refresh, recollection about recent history of the

case”); id. at 6 (billing 1.8 hours on “rev of entire file; refresh recollection; evaluation of

same; determine what is missing and still to be done”). “The agency should not be billed

for counsel's reading and re-reading of his own pleadings and FOIA requests.” Louise

Trauma Ctr.,

, at *6.

11 • Counsel claims hours for work on individual status reports, although the Court explicitly

instructed the parties to file status reports jointly. Nonetheless, on six occasions, counsel

disobeyed and filed his own report without the agencies. See Dkts. 28, 30, 42, 44, 46, and

49; see also Gov’t Status Report at 1, Dkt. 47 (representing that the Center was responsible

for the filing of separate reports). Time spent on status reports filed in contravention of the

Court’s orders does not merit compensation.

• Moreover, even for joint status reports, the Center claims far too much time. For instance,

counsel claims 5.0 hours for work related to the September 23, 2022 joint status report, see

Mot. Ex. C. at 9,which was an iteration of a previous status report and which, per the

agencies, contained “no substantive input by Plaintiff.” Opp’n at 30 (emphasis added).

Further, the agencies contend that the work on status reports generally fell to them, as they

were providing updates about records review and release, and that counsel for the Center

rarely added new comments.

. Thus, counsel’s claimed 10.6 hours of joint-status-

report work is not justified.

• Finally, the Center claims hours for a default judgment motion that it never filed. It is

certainly possible that work on this motion propelled negotiations forward, see Reply at

20. Still, “the court must not award fees for unnecessary work.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.

v. DHS,

(D.D.C. 2011). The Court cannot know the effect of the

unfiled motion on the parties’ deliberations, but against the backdrop of counsel’s other

billing deficiencies, the Court is, to say the least, skeptical of his claim.

Across the board, the Center has failed to justify the deficiencies of its award request. Its

reply brief is as disorganized as its submission of claimed hours. Rather than address the agencies’

arguments point by point, counsel repeatedly deflects, randomly rebutting just a few with skeletal

12 responses. For example, in response to the agencies’ observation that the Center’s complaint

resembles that of a previous lawsuit and should not have taken eight hours to write, counsel states,

“[C]ounsel should be accurate and precise in a Complaint. He should not rush. Eight hours is in

accord with other cases.” Reply at 22. The statement is evasive and non-responsive. With

responses like this, the Court has little choice but to assume that counsel has no explanation for

his questionable practices.

Furthermore, this is not the first time that the Center’s counsel has been reprimanded for

his improper billing practices. Last year, Judge McFadden reduced the Center’s fees in another

FOIA case by 40%, citing “significant inefficiencies and a lack of billing judgment.” Louise

Trauma Ctr.,

, at *6–7. Just a couple of months ago, Judge Bates imposed a

50% reduction on the Center, citing “improperly and excessively billed time.” Louise Trauma Ctr.,

, at *8. Rather than addressing the same deficiencies that other judges on this

Court have identified, counsel continues to engage in the same pattern of overbilling. Moreover,

his fee requests have increased over time, even as his substantive legal workload has decreased. In

the 2023 case before Judge McFadden, the Center twice moved for summary judgment and

responded to motions for summary judgment. Dkts. 11, 18, 25, 29, Louise Trauma Ctr. v. DHS,

No. 20-cv-1128 (D.D.C.). In the 2024 case before Judge Bates, the Center cross-moved for

summary judgment. Dkt. 29, Louise Trauma Ctr. v. DHS, No. 21-cv-2371 (D.D.C.). In the instant

action, however, the Center filed no motions at all apart from the instant motion. Even so, counsel

requests his highest fees to date by no small margin. In the 2023 case, the Center sought $201,844,

and Judge McFadden awarded $106,098, Louise Trauma Ctr.,

, at *3–8; in the

2024 case, it sought $111,664, and Judge Bates awarded $43,895, Louise Trauma Ctr.,

, at *1; now, it seeks $249,452, its largest award yet.

13 Aside from tweaking a previously-filed complaint and signing a series of largely

government-produced status reports, counsel performed minimal work in this case, far less than

what would support an award of $249,452 in fees. Counsel’s practice of increasing his fee requests

following court-imposed reductions to his earlier requests smacks of the kind of bad-faith

bargaining tactic properly deterred by the denial of a fee award. See Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein

& Assocs., P.C.,

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (Henderson, J., concurring) (“If a party seeks

more than [a reasonable attorney’s fee]—making an excessive demand in the hopes that the award,

although short of the demand, will be artificially high—a district court can impose a sanction to

deter future violations and to protect the integrity of its proceedings. In particular, the court has

discretion to deny an award altogether . . . .”). As the D.C. Circuit has emphasized, “overbilling

the government [is] a serious transgression, damaging to the public fisc and violative of the trust

reposed in each member of the bar.” See Env’t Def. Fund v. Reilly, 1 F.3d at 1260. A court has

discretion to entirely deny a “request for an outrageously unreasonable amount, lest claimants feel

free to make unreasonable demands, knowing that the only unfavorable consequence of such

misconduct would be reduction of their fee to what they should have asked for in the first place.”

Id. at 1258 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Jordan v. DOJ,

(D.C. Cir.

1982) (“[T]he court may, as a means of enforcing the applicable standards, deny a fee motion when

the submission is ‘manifestly inadequate.’”); Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C.,

(Henderson, J., concurring) (collecting cases). The Center’s counsel not only demands

a sum that is plainly excessive for this relatively simple litigation, he also engages in the same

unreasonable and improper billing practices for which he has been admonished repeatedly by this

Court. Because the Center’s counsel continues to submit increasingly exaggerated fee requests,

the Court will exercise its discretion to deny attorney’s fees “as a means of encouraging counsel

14 to maintain adequate records and submit reasonable, carefully calculated and conscientiously

measured claims.” Jordan,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's Motion for Attorney’s Fees is denied. A

separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge September 18, 2024

15