UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LOUISE TRAUMA CENTER LLC, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 20-3517 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 43 : U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, : : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

I. INTRODUCTION

Louise Trauma Center LLC (the “Center”) sued to compel the United States Department

of Justice (the “Department” or “DOJ”) to produce records that the Department did not initially

produce after the Center filed a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),

. After the Court denied the Center’s motion for summary judgment and granted in

part and denied in part the Department’s cross-motion for summary judgment, the Center filed

the present Motion for Attorney’s Fees seeking: $98,647.00 in fees for the underlying litigation,

$35,508.00 in fees for hours spent preparing the fees motion (“fees-on-fees”), and $402.00 in

costs. See Pl.’s Mot. Att’y’s Fees, ECF No. 43 (“Pl.’s Fee Mot.”); Pl.’s Reply Sup. Mot. Att’y’s

Fees, ECF No. 47 (“Pl.’s Fee Reply”). The Government has filed a brief in opposition to

Plaintiff’s fee motion, see Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Att’y’s Fees, ECF No. 46 (“Def.’s Fee

Opp’n”) and Plaintiff has filed a reply in support of its motion, see Pl.’s Fee Reply. For the

reasons set forth below, this Court grants in part and denies in part the Center’s motion for

attorney’s fees. II. BACKGROUND

The Court presumes familiarity with the factual and procedural background described in

Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. Dep’t of Just. (“Louise Trauma I”), No. 20-3517,

(D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2022), Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. (“Louise Trauma II”), No.

20-cv-3517,

(D.D.C. March 28, 2023), and Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just. (“Louise Trauma III”), No. 20-cv-3517,

(D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2023)

but briefly reviews the facts that are relevant to the Center’s motion for attorney’s fees. The

Center submitted a series of FOIA requests to the Department of Justice in 2019 and 2020 that

formed the basis of this suit. See Compl. ¶¶ 8, 15, 20, 25, 34, 42, ECF No. 1. After the Center

filed this suit in December 2020, the Department processed all six of the Center’s FOIA requests,

produced some documents and withheld others, and the parties conferred regarding outstanding

disagreements over the scope of the Department’s withholdings. See Joint Status Reports, ECF

Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 15.

Unable to resolve their remaining disagreements, the parties filed cross-motions for

summary judgment. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 4, ECF No. 14; Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J.

ECF No. 17. In its summary judgment briefing, the Center stated that it was dismissing its First,

Third, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 1. Therefore, summary

judgment focused on the documents that Plaintiff sought in the Second and Fourth causes of

action in its complaint. See

Ultimately, the Court granted in part and denied in part summary

judgment for the Department and denied summary judgment for the Center. See generally

Louise Trauma I,

, at *12; Louise Trauma III,

, at *7.

Specifically, the Court ordered DOJ to produce some of the records that the Center sought in the

Second cause of action of its complaint, but the Court held that the Department could withhold

2 records sought in the Fourth cause of action in the Center’s complaint. See Louise Trauma I,

, at *12; Louise Trauma III,

, at *7. Following the Court’s

decision on summary judgment, the Center filed the present motion for attorney’s fees. See

generally Pl.’s Fee Mot.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

FOIA permits courts to assess “against the United States reasonable attorney fees and

other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case . . . in which the complainant has

substantially prevailed.”

(a)(4)(E)(i). To recover fees and costs, a plaintiff “must

show that it is eligible for fees and that it is entitled to them.” WP Co. LLC v. DHS, No. 20-cv-

1487,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2023) (citing Jud. Watch, Inc. v. DOC,

, 368–69 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). If a plaintiff shows both eligibility and entitlement, the Court

assesses whether the requested fee amount is reasonable. See id. at *4. It is the plaintiff’s

burden to show that its request fees are justified. See id.

A party is “eligible” to receive attorney’s fees if it has “substantially prevailed.” Jud.

Watch, Inc., 470 F.3d at 368–69. To “substantially prevail,” a party must obtain court-ordered

relief on the merits of its FOIA claim,

(a)(4)(E)(ii)(I), or cause the agency to make

a “voluntary or unilateral change in . . . position . . . if the complainant’s claim is not

insubstantial,”

§ 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II). When determining whether a party is “entitled” to fees,

the Court considers “(1) the public benefit derived from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to

the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in the records; and (4) the reasonableness of

the agency’s withholding of the requested documents.” McKinley v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).

3 As noted above, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that its fee request is reasonable. “The

most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate” to produce what is

called the “lodestar” amount. Hensley v. Eckerhart,

(1983). With respect to

the number of hours expended, the Court must exclude hours that are “excessive, redundant, or

otherwise unnecessary.” Craig v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2016)

(citation omitted). Along the same lines, if a plaintiff “achieved only partial or limited success,”

the Court may conclude that “the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a

whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount,” and it may accordingly

reduce the award. See Hensley,

.

IV. ANALYSIS

The Center submits that its attorney spent 152.8 hours litigating this case but voluntarily

reduces its hours by 20% to account for its limited success. See Pl.’s Fee Mot. at 20, 22. For the

remaining 122 hours, the Center’s attorney argues that he is entitled to the hourly rates set by the

Fitzpatrick Matrix, for a fee total of $98,647.00.1 Id. at 1. The Center also seeks $35,508.00 for

fees-on-fees, and $402 in costs. See Pl.’s Fee Reply at 14. In response, the Department argues

that (1) the Center is not entitled to fees because it has not substantially prevailed; (2) the Center

is not eligible for fees for the claims on which it did not prevail; and (3) the Center’s requested

fees are unreasonable. See generally Def.’s Fee Opp’n. The Department contends that these

considerations warrant a significant reduction or an outright denial of the Center’s attorney’s fees

1 The Fitzpatrick Matrix is a chart published by DOJ that lists fee rates for attorneys according to their years of experience for use in complex civil cases in District of Columbia federal courts handled by the Civil Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. See THE FITZPATRICK MATRIX, U.S. Atty’s Office for the Dist. of Columbia, Civil Division (2024), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/media/1353286/dl?inline.

4 award. Id. at 1. As detailed below, the Court finds that the Center is entitled to and eligible for

attorney’s fees. However, the Center’s proposed fees are unreasonably high, and the Court

reduces the fee award to a sum that is reasonable and reflective of the level of the Center’s

success and time spent on successful litigation.

A. Eligibility for Fees

The Court begins by assessing the Center’s eligibility for attorney’s fees. A party can

“establish eligibility for fees by showing that it obtained relief either through (1) “a judicial

order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent decree,”

(a)(4)(E)(ii)(I), or

(2) by causing a “voluntary or unilateral change in the position by the agency, if the

complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.”

§ 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II). The Center argues that it has

substantially prevailed both because it caused the Department to change its policy and because it

obtained a judicial order requiring the Department to produce certain documents. The Court

addresses each of these arguments, starting with the Center’s claim that it instigated the

Department to change its position.

1. Change in Position

The Center argues that it substantially prevailed with respect to its First, Third, Fourth,

Fifth, and Sixth causes of action because it caused the Department to change in position with

respect to those causes of action. See Pl.’s Fee Mot. at 14. Under the “catalyst theory” that the

Center relies on, a plaintiff “substantially prevails” when it “substantially cause[s] the

government to release the requested documents before final judgment.” Harrington v. U.S.

Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-cv-2671,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 9,

2022). “[T]he key question under the ‘catalyst theory’ is whether the ‘institution and prosecution

of the litigation cause[d] the agency to release the documents obtained during the pendency of

5 the litigation[.]’”

(citation omitted). “That is, a FOIA plaintiff must prove that prosecution of

the action could reasonably be regarded as necessary to obtain the information and that a causal

nexus exists between the action and the agency’s surrender of that information.”

(quotation

marks and citation omitted). But “something more than post hoc, ergo propter hoc must be

shown.”

(citation omitted). “If, rather than the threat of an adverse court order, an

unavoidable delay accompanied by due diligence in the administrative process was the actual

reason for the agency’s failure to respond to a request, then it cannot be said that the complainant

substantially prevailed in its suit.”

(cleaned up).

Additionally, a plaintiff may show that it prevailed by demonstrating that an agency sped

up its FOIA processing because of the plaintiff’s suit. But while it is true that “sudden

acceleration . . . might, in a given case, lead a court to conclude that . . . the filing of the lawsuit

was the real reason for that acceleration,” it is also true that “if the government’s assertion for

any delay is the slowness of the FOIA process despite its due diligence, disclosure after the

lawsuit is filed, even if long delayed, will not in itself justify the award of fees.”

(cleaned up). “To determine if extrinsic factors, rather than the plaintiff’s lawsuit, caused the

agency’s release of documents,” courts consider “(1) whether the agency made a good faith

effort to search out material and pass on whether it should be disclosed; (2) whether the scope of

request caused delay in disclosure; and (3) whether the agency was burdened with other duties

that delayed its response.”

(citation omitted).

Here, the parties came to an agreement early in this litigation which resolved their

controversy with respect to the documents requested in the Center’s First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth

causes of action. See Joint Status Reports, ECF Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 15. And with respect to the

documents relating to the Center’s Fourth cause of action, the Court granted summary judgment

6 for the Department. See Louise Trauma I,

, at *12. The Center argues that its

initiation of this suit against the Department caused the Department to turn over documents

requested in the First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action, or else explain why it lacked those

records. See Pl.’s Fee Reply at 8–9. The Center also argues that—even though the Court

awarded summary judgment to the Department with respect to the documents in the Fourth cause

of action—the Center’s suit nonetheless spurred the Department to comply more fully with

respect to the requested documents and speed up its processing. See

In response, the Department argues that the Center has not substantially prevailed with

respect to its First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action. See Fee Opp’n at 7, 9. The

Department argues essentially that the Center’s litigation did not cause it to change positions.

See

. In support of its contention, DOJ submitted an affidavit averring that the agency

started processing the Center’s requests before the Center filed suit. See Decl. of Kenneth

Hendricks ¶ 5; Def.’s Fee Opp’n, ECF No. 46-1 (stating that DOJ responded to parts of the

Center’s first request “just one day after the request was submitted . . . almost 7 months prior to

the filing of the complaint”). The affidavit also explains that DOJ promptly acted on the

Center’s later-filed requests when it received them.

, 9–10. The affidavit, which must be

“accorded a presumption of good faith” by this Court, SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. S.E.C.,

(D.C. Cir. 1991), provides additional details about the specific steps that DOJ took in

response to the Center’s requests received prior to, as well as after, the Center filed its complaint,

see Hendricks Decl. ¶¶ 5–10. The affidavit also explains that the Center filed “duplicate

requests” with different units of DOJ, that the records it was required to process were extensive,

and that DOJ received some of the Center’s requests only after the Center filed suit. See

¶¶ 5–6. The affidavit further clarifies that the Department issued multiple responses informing

7 the Center of the status of its requests at various points in its processing. Id. ¶ 6, 10. In short, the

affidavit provides evidence that the Department had already begun processing the Center’s

requests when the Center filed suit, that the center was doing so in good faith, and that the scope

of the Center’s requests was substantial.

The Court concludes that the Center has not proved its eligibility for attorney’s fees with

respect to the documents it sought in its First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action.

As explained above, the catalyst theory turns on whether a plaintiff’s lawsuit “substantially

caused” the agency to release documents. Although an agency’s sudden acceleration in

processing a FOIA request “may” lead to the conclusion that the Center caused a change in

position by the agency, id., the Center has failed to meet its burden to prove that the Department

sped up its process or “that it is more probable than not that the government would not have

performed the desired act absent the lawsuit.” See Grand Canyon Tr. v. Bernhardt,

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Indeed, it is not clear that the Department ever sped up its

processing of the Center’s request or otherwise changed its policy. Accordingly, the Center

cannot rely on a change in the Department’s policy to prove it substantially prevailed and that it

is eligible for attorney’s fees.

2. Judicial Order

The Center also argues that it substantially prevailed because it obtained an order from

the Court requiring the Department to produce some of the documents that the Center requested

in the Second cause of action in its complaint. See Pl.’s Fee Mot. at 13–14; Pl.’s Fee Reply at 9.

The Department “does not dispute that Plaintiff received some records concerning its Second

claim due to the lawsuit.” See Def.’s Fee Opp’n at 9. The Department contends, however, that

just because the Center obtained a “relatively small number of additional records following

8 litigation,” it does not mean that the Center has proven that it “substantially prevailed.” See id. at

10. Rather, the Department asserts that because the Center obtained so little relief, the Court

should deny the Center’s fee petition in its totality. Id.

The Court concludes that the Center’s limited success with respect to the documents it

sought in its Second cause of action is sufficient to show that the Center has substantially

prevailed in the litigation through a court order. See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S.

Dep’t. of Justice,

(D.D.C. 2011) (explaining that a plaintiff sufficiently

shows that he has substantially prevailed if the “plaintiff has ‘succeed[ed] on any significant

issue in litigation, achieving some of the benefits the parties sought in bringing the suit’”

(quoting Edmonds v. FBI,

, 1326–27 (D.C. Cir. 2005))). Although the Court

ordered only a small number of documents to be produced, “FOIA cases routinely result in the

disclosure of a relatively small proportion of the documents originally requested.” See Jud.

Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice,

(D.D.C. 2011). Even if the

Center received only a “relatively small” number of documents following the Court’s order,

Def.’s Fee Opp’n at 10, the Center has “obtain[ed] court-ordered relief on the merits of its FOIA

claim.” See Jud. Watch, Inc., 470 F.3d at 368–69. The Court thus concludes that the Center has

substantially prevailed in the litigation and is eligible for attorney’s fees.

B. Entitlement to Fees

The Center argues that it is also entitled to fees. See Pl.’s Fee Mot. at 14–19. With

respect to its argument on entitlement, however, the Center appears to focus only on the

documents it sought in the second cause of action in its complaint—on which it prevailed at

summary judgment. See id. at 15 (“Plaintiff requested documents concerning appellate training

of agency lawyers”); Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1 (explaining in Count Two that the Center

9 “requested ‘all records concerning Office of Immigration Litigation training materials for

lawyers in the appellate section’”). The Center urges the Court not to apply the four-factor test

required by the Circuit for assessing entitlement to attorney’s fees. See id. at 14–15. And the

Center argues that even if the Court applies the four-factor test required by Circuit precedent, it

is still entitled to fees. See id. at 15. The Department responds that the Center is not entitled to

fees with respect to the Center’s First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action. See

Def.’s Fee Opp’n at 11.

The Court is bound to apply the Circuit’s precedent, which requires the use of a four-

factor test, to determine whether the Center is entitled to fees. See Kwoka v. Internal Revenue

Serv.,

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (explaining that the Circuit “has devised a four-

factor test to guide district courts in determining whether a plaintiff is ‘entitled’ to fees”); Davy

v. C.I.A.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that the Circuit “has directed the

district court to consider” the four-factor test). That test “looks to (1) the public benefit derived

from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiff’s interest

in the records; and (4) the reasonableness of the agency’s withholding of the requested

documents.” Kwoka,

(citation omitted). “No one factor is dispositive,” except

that “the court will not assess fees when the agency has demonstrated that it had a lawful right to

withhold disclosure.” Davy,

.

Here, the Center abandoned its First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action when it filed

its motion for summary judgment. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 4. Because the Center reached an

agreement with the Department and forwent any additional claim with respect to those causes of

action, the Department has not unlawfully “withheld” any documents sought by those causes of

action. See Gov’t Accountability Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 17-cv-2518, 2020

, at *2 (D.D.C. June 2, 2020) (explaining that “whether the ‘withholding had a

reasonable basis in law’ . . . explicitly presupposes a ‘withholding’”). Additionally, the Court

held in favor of the Department with respect to the Center’s Fourth cause of action. See Louise

Trauma I,

, at *11. Because the Center focuses only on documents relating to

its Second cause of action and because it either abandoned or lost with respect to its other claims,

the Court concludes that the Department “has demonstrated that it had a lawful right to withhold

disclosure” with respect to the documents in the Center’s causes of action other than its Second

cause of action. See Davy,

(“If the Government’s position is correct as a matter

of law, that will be dispositive.” (citation omitted)).

With respect to the Center’s Second cause of action, the Department “does not dispute”

that the Center “may be entitled to some fees for documents released in response to this Court’s

Orders.” Def.’s Fee Opp’n at 12. Because the Department concedes that the Center is entitled to

fees with respect to the records that the Center obtained by Court order, the Court need not

discuss entitlement with respect to fees sought for the work to obtain those documents. Jay v.

D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2014). Accordingly, the Court turns to whether the

Center’s fee request is reasonable.

C. Reasonableness of Fees

Although the Center is eligible and entitled to receive attorney’s fees, before the Court

can award the Center fees, the Center must establish that its request is based on (1) a reasonable

hourly rate for its attorney’s services and (2) the number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation. See Hensley,

. “Importantly, the plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating that both the hourly rate and the number of hours expended on particular tasks are

reasonable.” Jay,

.

11 1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

To establish a reasonable hourly rate, a plaintiff must “produce satisfactory evidence—in

addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those

prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,

experience and reputation.” Eley v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2015)

(quoting Blum v. Stenson,

, 895 n.11 (1984)). Fee matrices “provide a useful

starting point” for determining whether an attorney’s rate is in line with those prevailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and experience.

Covington v. D.C.,

, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

The Center claims that the Fitzpatrick Matrix rate for an attorney who has been practicing

law for over thirty-five years should be used here.2 See Pl.’s Fee Mot. at 25; Pl.’s Fee Mot., Ex.

D. “The Fitzpatrick Matrix itself, just like the LSI Laffey Matrix before it, is meant to capture

the market rates for complex federal litigation in the District.” J.T. v. District of Columbia,

, 29–30 (D.D.C. 2023). Although “there is no presumption that FOIA cases

qualify as complex federal litigation,” Webster v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 02-cv-603,

, at *11 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2021), the Department concedes that the “[Fitzpatrick] matrix

is the one applicable in circumstances like those here,” Def.’s Fee Opp’n at 18 (“If this Court

determines that Plaintiff . . . is eligible for and entitled to certain reasonable fees, the parties

agree that those fees should be paid at Fitzpatrick Matrix rates.”). Accordingly, the Court will

apply the rates set by the Fitzpatrick Matrix.

2 The Center’s attorney seeks a blanket rate of $807 per hour for all his services from 2020-2023. See Pl.’s Fee Mot. at 25. The Center is entitled to $807 per hour only for the services he performed in 2023. As shown in the chart below, the Court applies the appropriate Fitzpatrick Matrix rate applicable to each year that the Center’s attorney provided services.

12 2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Having determined the Center’s attorney’s hourly rate, the Court turns to the

reasonableness of the Center’s request for fees covering 122 hours of its attorney’s time pursuing

the underlying FOIA litigation, totaling $98,647.00. See Pl.’s Fee Mot. at 1. The Department

argues that the Court should deny the Center’s requested fees because (1) the fee amount is

unreasonable considering the limited success of the Center’s claims and (2) the Center’s attorney

showed “a lack of billing judgment” by recording nondescriptive time entries. Def.’s Fee Opp’n

at 14–16. Addressing each argument in turn, the Court concludes that the Center can recover

fees, but that a significant downward adjustment in the amount of fees is warranted.

a. Reduction in Fees for Unsuccessful Claims

The Department argues that the Center’s fees should be reduced to exclude entries for

claims on which the Center did not prevail. See Def.’s Fee Opp’n at 14. The Court has

discretion to adjust a fee award to exclude time an attorney worked on unsuccessful claims. See

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434–36 (explaining that when a plaintiff prevails on only some of their

claims, “a fee award based on the [total] claimed hours” would be “excessive”); Merrick v.

District of Columbia,

, 506–07 (D.D.C. 2018) (same); Craig,

(“When reducing fees for limited degree of success, the Court may reduce fees in a

number of ways, such as by eliminating specific hours or reducing the award as a whole.”).

When determining the amount by which to reduce a fee award for a partially successful plaintiff,

a court must analyze the relationships between the plaintiff’s successful and unsuccessful claims.

See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434–35. “The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that

should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.”

at 436–37.

13 The Department makes two arguments for why the Center’s fee award should be denied

for lack of success. First, the Department argues that the Center was not successful on its First,

Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action and any fee award for those claims would be

unreasonable. See Def.’s Fee Opp’n at 14. Second, the Department argues that even with

respect to the Center’s Second cause of action—pursuant to which it received some documents

after summary judgment briefing—the Center’s arguments were so deficient that awarding the

Center fees for that cause of action would be unreasonable.

at 14–15 (“Plaintiff’s legal

arguments in its motions for summary judgment addressing the Second Cause of Action were so

inadequate that this Court was required to expend its own time and resources to parse Plaintiff’s

filings to discern what, if anything, Plaintiff possibly could be arguing as the basis for its claim

of an improper withholding.”).

Taking the Department’s second argument first, the Court does not consider the Center’s

legal arguments so devoid of substance as to warrant an outright denial of its fee award.

Although the Court will not compensate “duplicative, unorganized, or otherwise unproductive

effort,” Envt’l Def. Fund, Inc. v. Reilly,

, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Jordan v.

U.S. Dep’t. of Justice,

(D.C. Cir. 1982)), the Center’s efforts were productive

enough for the Court to rule in part against the Department, see Louise Trauma I,

, at *12 (denying in part DOJ’s cross-motion for summary judgment). The Court notes,

however, that the Center was successful with respect to only some of the documents sought in

the Center’s Second cause of action. See Louise Trauma III,

, at *7.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that hours spent on, and identifiable to, the Center’s success in

obtaining some of the documents it sought in its Second cause of action are reasonable. That

said, the Court agrees with the Department that awarding the Center fees for its efforts on

14 unsuccessful claims would be unreasonable. See Def.’s Fee Opp’n at 14. Thus, the Court

deducts hours attributable to unsuccessful claims from the Center’s fee award. See Craig,

.

As explained in greater detail below, the Center’s attorney’s fee hours log lacks detail

and is difficult to parse. See generally Pl.’s Fee Mot., Ex. C. The fee hours log attached to the

Center’s motion is a long document that appears to have been created in a word processing

application. See

It is ordered by date, with time entries listed below each date, and

descriptions associated with the time entries. See

To put it mildly, the descriptions

associated with the various time entries provide little to no detail. Despite the lack of clarity, the

Court can identify several entries attributable to unsuccessful claims and motions. For instance,

the Center’s attorney logged 2.6 hours “Improving and Editing,” and 1.5 hours “Re-evaluati[ng]”

its First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes.3 Id. at 1, 3–4. The Center also spent at least 8.2

hours working on its unsuccessful motion for summary judgment.4 Id. at 4–5; see also Louise

Trauma I,

, at *12 (denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment).

Collectively, the Center worked on unsuccessful claims and motions for at least 12.3 hours, and

the Court deducts these hours from its fee award. That said, given the lack of detail in the fee

hours log, it appears likely that additional hours were spent on unsuccessful claims even if the

3 The Court reaches these numbers by adding “.9 #1”; “.4 #3”; “.7 #4”; “.3 #5”; “.3 #6,” equaling 2.6 hours, and adding “.3 1st cause of action”; “.4 3rd cause of action” (sic); “.6 5th cause of action”; “.2 6th cause of action,” equaling 1.5 hours. See Pl.’s Fee Mot., Ex. C at 1, 3– 4. 4 The Court reaches this number by adding “1.4 Drafting MSJ: DLC Declaration #14”; “1.0 preparing outline of Motion for SJ”; “1.9 preparing Intro and Tables and Exhibits”; “1.2 Writing argument I of SJ (appellate materials)”; “.5 Writing Part II (bad search)”; “1.1 re-writing Motion & proof reading”; “1.1 rewriting arguments,” equaling 8.2 hours. See Fee Mot. Ex., C at 4–5.

15 Court cannot identify additional misspent hours. That brings the Court to the Department’s next

argument.

b. Reduction in Fees for Lack of Billing Judgment

The Department argues that the Center’s fee award should be further reduced because its

attorney exercised poor billing practices and produced deficient billing records. See Def.’s Fee

Opp’n at 15. To support a reasonable fee request, a plaintiff’s “supporting documentation must

be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable a court to determine with a high degree of

certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended.” Role Models Am., Inc. v.

Brownlee,

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). Satisfactory documentation consists

of “contemporaneous time records of hours worked . . . plus a detailed description of the subject

matter of the work with supporting documents, if any.” Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of France in

the U. S.,

(D.D.C. 2016) (quoting In re Donovan,

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). “Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district

court may reduce the award accordingly.” Hensley,

. A fixed, percentage

reduction may be warranted when a large number of billing entries suffer from one or more

deficiencies. See Role Models Am.,

. The Department argues that a substantial

number of the Center’s attorney’s time entries are so lacking in necessary descriptive detail that

fees for those time entries should be precluded. See Def.’s Fee Opp’n at 15. The Court agrees

and accordingly reduces the Center’s fee award by 40%.

To start, the Center’s attorney’s fee hours log simply does not describe the attorney’s

tasks with enough detail to assess the reasonableness of the hours worked. Its descriptions are

brief and provide only surface-level explanations of the work done for any given entry. See

generally Pl.’s Fee Mot., Ex. C. The following are a limited sample of deficient billing entries:

16 “R&R of Answer ECF 9”; “study of complaints”; “R&R of order”; “Writing Part II (bad

search)”; “writing Reply”; “re-writing lumping together”; “R&R and response to emails”; “re-

reading #28”; and “Study of order.”

at 1–9. The Center’s attorney’s barebones descriptions

do not provide the Court enough information to determine with a “high degree of certainty” that

the reported hours are reasonable. Role Models Am.,

. Rather, to the contrary,

the deficient entries leave the Court with a high degree of uncertainty respecting the

reasonableness of the hours expended.

Furthermore, numerous entries appear to be “review of secretarial work” for which the

Center’s counsel is not entitled to fees. See Lans v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 97-cv-2526,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2005) (excluding from fees time entries spent on “purely

administrative” tasks); cf. Role Models Am.,

(“[P]urely clerical or secretarial

tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate regardless of who performs them.” (quoting

Missouri v. Jenkins,

, 288 n.10)).

When faced with inadequate timekeeping records, courts in this district have discounted

lump percentages from attorney’s fees awards. See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v.

U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 230–31 (D.D.C. 2011) (reducing plaintiffs’ award by

37.5% for failing to maintain sufficiently detailed contemporaneous records); Boehner v.

McDermott,

, 324–26 (D.D.C. 2008) (reducing plaintiff’s award by 25% to

account for insufficiently documented fees-on-fees). The lack of detail in the Center’s billing

records here is particularly egregious in comparison to other fee cases in this district. For

instance, neither Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington nor Boehner had

timekeeping deficiencies as pervasive as the timekeeping deficiencies in the Center’s attorney’s

17 fee hours log, nor did the plaintiffs in those cases claim as many hours that were logged with

deficient entries.

In comparable cases involving the Center’s work on unsuccessful motions, with non-

contemporaneous timekeeping, and nondescript records, judges in this district reduced the

Center’s attorney’s fees awards by 40% and 50%. See Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. United States

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 20-cv-01128,

, at *6 (D.D.C. May 16, 2023)

(reducing the Center’s fee award by 40%); Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., No. 21-cv-2371,

, at *9 (D.D.C. July 1, 2024) (reducing the Center’s fee

award by 50% in part because “many of counsel’s time entries were not sufficiently detailed to

allow the Court to determine with a ‘high degree of certainty’ that the hours in th[e] case were

reasonably and actually expended”); see also Nat’l Sec. Couns. v. Cent. Intel. Agency,

(D.D.C. 2016) (reducing a plaintiff’s fee award by “40%” in part because the

plaintiff’s fee “chart was prepared post hoc, lack[ed] sufficient detail, and include[d] duplicative

work”). The Court concludes that reducing the lodestar award amount by 40% is appropriate

here. Accordingly, the Center is entitled to $49,465.61 in fees on its successful claims.

c. “Fees-on-Fees”

Finally, the Court assesses the reasonableness of the Center’s fees-on-fees request. It “is

settled in this circuit” that “[h]ours reasonably devoted to a request for fees are compensable.”

Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar–B–Que Rest.,

, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

“However, ‘fees on fees’ must be reasonable, and not excessive.” Gatore v. DHS,

(D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted). “Courts, therefore, ‘have an obligation to scrutinize

the hours spent preparing the fee petitions to [e]nsure that the total is reasonable and that it does

not represent a windfall for the attorneys.’” Boehner,

(citation omitted).

18 The Center’s attorney seeks $35,508.00 for forty-four hours spent preparing the fee

motion. See Pl.’s Fee Reply at 14. Although the Department does not specifically oppose the

hours spent on the motion, the Court finds that the Center’s fees-on-fees request is unreasonable.

See Boehner,

. This is so because the Center’s fee hours log for its fees-

on-fees request is lacking in sufficient detail in the same way as its fee hours log for the

underlying litigation. See Pl.’s Fee Reply, Ex. C. While that alone justifies reducing the

Center’s fees-on-fees award, the Court observes that the Center’s fees-on-fees request is also

equivalent to 36% of the claimed total cost of this litigation—which is disproportionate and

excessive. Judges in this district have concluded that fees-on-fees equaling even “30% of the

claimed total litigation costs” would be excessive. See Urban Air Initiative, Inc. v. Env’t Prot.

Agency,

, 327 (D.D.C. 2020). Awarding the Center its fees-on-fees request

here “would be an ‘unsupportable windfall.’” Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC.,

, at

*6 (D.D.C. May 16, 2023) (citation omitted). The Court will thus award $10,000.00 in fees-on-

fees. Cf. Urban Air Initiative, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 326 (awarding $10,000 of requested fees-on-

fees where the initial request was $35,574.10).

3. Costs

The Department does not oppose the Center’s request for $402.00 in costs. See generally

Def.’s Fee Opp’n. Accordingly, the Court will grant the Center $402.00 in costs.

* * *

19 The following chart summarizes the Court’s adjustments to the Center’s request for

attorney’s fees and costs:

Time The The Court’s Court’s Fitzpatrick Total Period Center’s Center’s adjustment adjustment Matrix Hours adjustment for for Lack of Rate (less 20%) unsuccessful Billing work (less Judgement 12.3 total (less 40%) hours) 2020 10.8 8.64 6.04 3.62 $731 $2,646.22

2021 77.5 62 52.3 31.38 $736 $23,095.68

2022 55.9 44.72 -- 26.83 $760 $20,390.80

2023 8.6 6.88 -- 4.13 $807 $3,332.91

Fees-on- -- -- -- -- -- $10,000.00 fees Costs -- -- -- -- -- $402.00

Total -- -- -- -- -- $59,867.61

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Center’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is

separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: September 18, 2024 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

20