UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GPGC LIMITED,

Petitioner, v. Civil Action No. 24-169 (JEB) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case arises out of a 2018 contractual dispute between Petitioner GPGC Limited and

Respondent The Republic of Ghana. As a prior Opinion details the full background of this suit,

see ECF No. 17 (Mem. Op.) at 4, the Court need only briefly recount the facts relevant to the

present Motion. During an energy crisis in 2015, Ghana entered into an agreement with GPGC

for the transportation, installation, and maintenance of two gas-turbine power plants in the

country. When that contract went south, the parties arbitrated the dispute in front of a three-

person arbitration tribunal in the United Kingdom, which resulted in a final award concluding

unanimously that Ghana had wrongfully repudiated the agreement. In 2024, Petitioner filed this

action to enforce the award minus some token payments Ghana had made. When the country

failed to appear, GPGC sought default judgment, which the Court granted on August 6, 2024,

and awarded $111,493,828.92 to Petitioner. Id. at 14. Now all that remains is Petitioner’s

Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses, which the Court will grant for the most part. See ECF

No. 19 (Motion for Fees).

1 I. Legal Standard

The governing law in the United States for international arbitration is found in the

Federal Arbitration Act, see

, and the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention). See

.

Neither the FAA nor the New York Convention, however, expressly or impliedly

addresses whether courts may award attorney fees. See Swiss Inst. of Bioinformatics v. Glob.

Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data,

(D.D.C. 2014) (pointing this out).

In U.S. courts “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’

fee from the loser.” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,

(1975). There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, it “may be overcome by, inter alia,

an ‘enforceable contract’ allocating such fees.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas &

Elec. Co.,

(2007) (quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing

Co.,

(1967)). Second, “it is well settled that the Court retains inherent power

to assess attorneys’ fees ‘when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for

oppressive reasons.’” Concesionaria Dominicana de Autopistas y Carreteras, S.A. v. Dominican

State,

(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

, 45–

46 (1991)).

If a party is entitled to fees, the court must then determine that the amount is fair and

reasonable. “The usual method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees is to multiply the hours

reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly fee, producing the ‘lodestar’

amount.” Bd. of Trs. of Hotel & Rest. Emps. Local 25 v. JPR, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir.

1998). “The party seeking fees has the . . . burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees

requested” for “both the number of hours and the hourly rate.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t

2 of Homeland Sec.,

(D.D.C. 2016). Supporting documentation “must

be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of

certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended.” Role Models Am., Inc. v.

Brownlee,

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

II. Analysis

The Court first considers Petitioner’s entitlement to fees; it then examines the amount

sought.

A. Entitlement to Fees

The first issue is straightforward, as the two parties here have a contract that allows for

the prevailing party to receive attorney fees. See Mot. for Fees at 1–2. Specifically, the

agreement states that “[i]n the event of any legal proceedings between the Parties with regard to

this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the non-prevailing party,

and the non-prevailing party shall pay upon demand, all reasonable fees and expenses of counsel

for the prevailing party.” ECF No. 1-11 (Emergency Purchase Agreement), ¶ 28(g). This suit is

exactly that — a legal proceeding between the parties concerning the agreement — and therefore

falls within this provision. Given the default judgment this Court entered, GPGC is the

prevailing party. It is thus entitled to fees.

Even if the parties’ contract did not so provide, the Court would find that it is within its

authority to grant fees. It is well supported that a court can award fees if it determines that a

party has acted in bad faith. Swiss Inst. of Bioinformatics,

; Concesionaria

Dominicana,

. More specifically, courts have determined that unjustifiably

refusing to abide by an arbitral award or not participating in confirmation proceedings constitutes

such bad faith and warrants the granting of fees. Swiss Inst. of Bioinformatics,

3 98; Concesionaria Dominicana,

(granting attorney fees based on party’s

inaction in confirmation proceedings of international arbitral award); Leon Trading SA v. M.Y.

Shipping Private Ltd.,

, at *4 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (granting petitioner’s request for

attorney fees in arbitration case where “[r]espondents failed to submit opposition papers to the

Petition”). Here, Respondent has not participated in the litigation at any point after being served.

Although Ghana has made some payments, the Court found it to be totally unresponsive and

willfully defaulting in these proceedings.

at 4–5. This is thus an additional basis for the

award of fees.

B. Reasonableness of Fees

The Court must also determine the appropriate amount of fees. Petitioner seeks

$147,219.50 for 145 hours of attorney and legal-assistant time, as well as $505 in reimbursable

expenses. See Mot. for Fees at 5. To determine what constitutes “reasonable attorney fees,” the

Court first multiplies the hours reasonably spent on the case by a reasonable hourly fee. See

Covington v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). To

substantiate its hours, Petitioner provides the law firm MoloLamken’s billing history and

invoices with itemized time entries for GPGC. See Mot. for Fees, Exhs. D–E. The Court finds

this documentation sufficient to establish that the hours worked are reasonable and fair.

For its rates, Petitioner provides the Laffey Matrix, a schedule of hourly fees based on the

number of years an attorney has practiced, which is commonly employed by courts in this

district. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(D.D.C. 2015). GPGC also provides the biographies for Robert Kry and Sara

Tofighbakhsh, the primary partner and associate on the case. See Mot. for Fees, Exhs. A–B.

Petitioner acknowledges, however, that its requested hourly rates do not comply with the Laffey

4 Matrix. See Mot. for Fees at 6. It argues that because this case involved complicated matters,

the increase in rates is justified. Specifically, it contends that the departure is reasonable because

of the high-quality representation and the complex subject matter — i.e., sovereign-enforcement

litigation.

at 6–7. There are many complicated federal cases, however, and the Court does not

find this to be a compelling argument for a deviation from the Laffey Matrix. See Ashraf-Hassan

v. Embassy of France in the U.S.,

(D.D.C. 2016) (using Laffey Matrix in

complicated employment case). As a result, the chart below provides an updated hourly rate

based on the Laffey Matrix and uses that to determine the appropriate fee. Information for the

employees of MomoLamken that was not provided by Petitioner was found on its website. See

ECF 19-1 (Robert Kry Decl.), ¶ 4.

Name TitleYears of Laffey Hours Billed Fees Experience Matrix Rate Robert Kry Partner 22 $1,120 89.5 $100,240 Lucas Walker Partner 15 $930 1.4 $1,302 Lauren Dayton Partner 8 $823 4.1 $3,374.3 Sara Tofighbakhsh Associate 3 $463 29.9 $13,843.7 Jackson Myers Associate 4 $570 1.1 $627 Legal Assistants N/A N/A $253 19 $4,807 Reimbursable $550 Fees TOTAL $124,744

In sum, Petitioner sought a total of $146,714.50 in fees and costs, and it will receive

$124,744.

5 III. Conclusion

The Court will accordingly grant in part and deny in part Petitioner’s Motion for Fees. A

separate Order so stating will issue this day.

James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: September 23, 2024

6