UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

POONEH R. MOMENI, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 23-cv-3421-RCL

ANTONY BLINKEN, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Pooneh Momeni, a U.S. citizen, filed I-130 visa applications on behalf of her

mother and father, Ms. Mahin Honari and Mr. Mansour Momeni, also plaintiffs in this action and

citizens of Iran. Following their immigrant visa interviews on October 13, 2022, Ms. Honari’s

application was approved, but Mr. Momeni’s application was refused and placed in administrative

processing pursuant to Section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In October

2023, Ms. Honari’s immigrant visa application was canceled due to her failure to take additional

action within one year of being approved. Mr. Momeni’s application remains in administrative

processing.

Plaintiffs brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act,

(b), 701 et

seq, the Mandamus Act,

, the Declaratory Judgment Act,

, and

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to compel action on their immigrant visa

applications. Specifically, alleging that the defendants have unreasonably delayed the processing

of Mr. Momeni’s visa application, Plaintiffs seek an order mandating adjudication of Mr.

Momeni’s application and reinstatement of Ms. Honari’s immigrant visa. Defendants moved to

dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which

1 relief can be granted. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT the defendants’ motion

and dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

Mr. Momeni and Ms. Honari are Iranian nationals and the parents of Pooneh Momeni, a

U.S. citizen. Compl. ¶ 2. In November 2018, Ms. Pooneh Momeni filed an I-390 Petition for an

Alien Relative for each of her parents. Compl. ¶ 4. Following approval by the United States

Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS), in June 2019, Mr. Momeni and Ms. Honari timely

filed their DS-260 visa applications and all required supporting documentation with the National

Visa Center (NVC). Compl. ¶¶ 5–6. The NVC determined Ms. Honari to be “documentarily

qualified” on January 28, 2021, and a year and a half later, reached the same determination

regarding Mr. Momeni. Comp ¶¶ 7–9.

Mr. Momeni and Ms. Honari then appeared for their immigrant visa interviews at the

United States embassy in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on October 13, 2022. Compl. ¶ 10.

Following the interview, Ms. Honari’s visa application was approved, but Mr. Momeni’s

application was “placed in administrative processing” under Section 221(g) of the INA, requiring

supplemental paperwork. Compl. ¶ 11. Mr. Momeni was instructed to complete Form DS-5535,

Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants, which requires applicants to submit detailed

residential, employment, and travel history. Compl. ¶ 11. Mr. Momeni timely submitted the

requested information eight days later. Compl. ¶ 11. Ms. Honari was informed by the embassy

that she could delay receipt of her immigrant visa until Mr. Momeni’s visa was further determined,

2 to which she agreed.1 Compl. ¶ 12. The couple has no immediate family in Iran, and Mr. Momeni,

at 90 years old, could not remain alone in Iran for his own health and well-being. Compl. ¶ 12.

Ms. Pooneh Momeni made several attempts to contact the embassy and various

congressional offices between November 2022 and April 2023 regarding the status of Mr.

Momeni’s application, and she was repeatedly informed that his application remained in

administrative processing and the embassy was unable to predict a time for further resolution.

Compl. ¶¶ 13–16. She emailed the embassy in July 2023 and did not receive a response.

Compl. ¶ 17. As of October 18, 2023, Ms. Honari’s immigrant visa has been canceled under

Section 203(g) of the INA, as she failed to take additional action on her visa within one year of

being approved. Compl. ¶ 19.2

On November 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Secretary of State Antony

Blinken, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, and Attorney General Merrick

Garland to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ immigrant visa applications. Compl. ¶¶ 27–29. Plaintiffs seek

relief under the Administrative Procedure Act,

et seq., the Mandamus Act,

, and the Declaratory Judgment Act,

. Compl. ¶ 22. Plaintiffs also

raise a Fifth Amendment due process challenge. Compl. ¶¶ 38–39. On January 16, 2024,

1 In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs first state that Ms. Honari was “instructed by the U.S. Embassy” to await the adjudication of Mr. Momeni’s visa application before taking action on her own. Pls.’ Opp’n at 2. Later in the opposition, Plaintiffs state that they “repeatedly informed the embassy . . . that Plaintiff Honari was unable to ‘take action’ on her immigrant visa due to . . . [Mr. Momeni’s] advanced age and lack of any support system in Iran.”

; see also

(“Plaintiffs repeatedly informed the embassy of the urgency of the situation, namely . . . Plaintiff Honari’s immigrant visa being set to expire in a year.”). It is unclear to what extent the embassy gave Ms. Honari incorrect advice regarding her own application, resulting in its cancelation. But taking the allegations in the complaint as true, as the Court must at the motion to dismiss stage, this Court is nonetheless unable to provide the requested relief to Ms. Honari, as explained in Section III.D infra. 2 “Courts may take judicial notice of information that is posted on official public websites of government agencies when evaluating a motion to dismiss.” Chowdhury v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-1205 (RCL),

, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2022) (citing Markowicz v. Johnson,

, 161 n.2 (D.D.C. 2016)). The Court will take judicial notice that the Department of State’s Visa Status Check website lists Mr. Momeni’s visa application as “Refused” and Ms. Honari’s visa application as “Refused.” See Visa Status Check, U.S. Dep’t of St., https://ceac.state.gov/CEACStatTracker/Status.aspx [https://perma.cc/NS4H-BST9].

3 defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state

a claim. Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 5. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on February 15, 2024. Pls.’ Opp’n,

ECF No. 9. Defendants filed a reply on March 7, 2024. Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 13. In July 2024,

Defendants filed two notices of supplemental authority. ECF Nos. 14, 15. Defendants’ motion is

now ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss

A defendant in a civil action may move to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A court

considering such a motion must take all the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and

draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000). “[A] court that is assessing a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(1)

may look to documents outside of the complaint in order to evaluate whether or not it has

jurisdiction to entertain a claim,” including to “resolve factual disputes concerning jurisdiction.”

Doe v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,

, 361 (D.D.C. 2020) (Brown,

Jackson, J.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A defendant in a civil action may also move to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

allegations, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal,

(2009). A claim is plausible on its face if it “pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.”

A court evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) “motion presumes that the complaint’s factual

4 allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor.” Alemu v. Dep’t of

For-Hire Vehicles,

(D.D.C. 2018). However, “[a] court need not accept a

plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, nor must a court presume the veracity of legal conclusions that

are couched as factual allegations.”

(citation omitted).

B. Unreasonable Delay

Plaintiffs’ APA claim and mandamus claim rest on the same theory: that Defendants

unreasonably delayed the adjudication of Mr. Momeni’s visa. The APA commands that “within a

reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it” and permits a

reviewing court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”

(b), 706(1). A court evaluating a claim of unreasonable delay must “consider

whether the agency’s failure to respond is ‘so egregious’ as to warrant relief.” Tate v. Pompeo,

, 147 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC

(“TRAC”),

(D.C. Cir. 1984)). The D.C. Circuit has identified six factors for courts

to consider when making this determination:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

TRAC,

(internal quotations and citations omitted). The standard for

unreasonable delay under the Mandamus Act is “identical to the APA standard.” Tate, 513 F.

Supp. 3d at 148 n.7.

5 III. DISCUSSION

Defendants raise six arguments for dismissal: (1) Defendants have no role or authority in

adjudicating Plaintiffs’ visa applications, so no case or controversy exists and Plaintiffs lack

Article III standing;3 (2) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Defendants are

shielded by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability; (3) the Court lacks mandamus jurisdiction

because Defendants do not have a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate visa applications;

(4) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because the alleged delay is not unreasonable under the six-factor

test prescribed in TRAC; (5) the harm to Ms. Honari is not traceable to Defendants because it was

caused by Ms. Honari’s own inaction; and (6) Plaintiffs fail to state a cognizable due process

claim.4

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion based on arguments (4), (5), and (6). Earlier this

year, in a dispute with nearly identical facts, this Court rejected arguments (1) and (2).

Sharifymoghaddam v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1472 (RCL),

, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 5,

2024) (Lamberth, J.). However, this Court also concluded that regarding argument (3), even if the

defendants are subject to a non-discretionary duty, argument (4) prevails; the TRAC test resulted

in a finding that the delay was not unreasonable, and this Court dismissed the complaint.

.

Here, the Court will follow a similar course of action and dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of unreasonable

delay for failure to state a claim. The remaining arguments, (5) and (6), will also result in

dismissal—consular nonreviewability prevents this Court from reinstating of Ms. Honari’s

3 In their opposition, Plaintiffs concede that Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Merrick Garland, Attorney General, were improperly named as defendants. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 3. This Court will therefore proceed to analyze the motion to dismiss regarding only the claim against Secretary of State Antony Blinken. 4 The Court has switched the order of arguments (4) and (5) from how they were listed in the parties’ briefs based on this Court’s organization of the analysis.

6 immigrant visa in these circumstances, and there is no cognizable due process violation at issue.

Therefore, this Court will grant Defendants’ motion.

A. Standing

As this Court did in Sharifymoghaddam, the Court will construe defendants’ argument that

the Secretary of State has “no role” in adjudicating plaintiffs’ visa applications as an Article III

standing challenge, specifically targeting the requirement of redressability.

at

*3 (citing Ark Initiative v. Tidwell,

(D.C. Cir. 2014)). And again here, the

Court will reject that argument. Although “the Secretary of State has no legal authority to control

which visa applications consular officers grant or deny, nothing precludes him from directing them

to decide pending applications ‘within a reasonable time,’ as the APA requires.” Khazaei v.

Blinken, No. 23-cv-1419 (JEB),

, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023); see also Baygan

v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-2840 (JDB),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2024) (“[C]ontrol

over visa determinations is distinguishable from control over the timing of visa determinations.”).

Therefore, Secretary Blinken is properly named as a defendant.

B. Consular Nonreviewability

“Consular nonreviewability shields a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa

from judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise.” Baan Rao Thai Restaurant v.

Pompeo,

, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1159). Courts

in this Circuit, including this one on multiple occasions, have consistently held that when a visa

application is still undergoing administrative processing, the State Department's decision is not

final after initial refusal. See Sharifymoghaddam,

at *4 (Lamberth, J.); Joorabi

v. Pompeo,

, 100 (D.D.C. 2020) (Lamberth, J.); see also Ghadami v. U.S. Dep’t

of Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-397 (ABJ),

, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2020); Al-

7 Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

, 17 (D.D.C. 2022); Vulupala v. Barr,

, 99 (D.D.C. 2020). In other words, “any [p]laintiff with an application in

‘administrative processing’ has not yet received a final decision,” so it would not offend consular

nonreviewability to order accelerated action on a pending application. Nine Iraqi Allies Under

Serious Threat Because of Their Faithful Serv. to the U.S. v. Kerry,

(D.D.C. 2016).

The Court observes that the D.C. Circuit's recent unpublished decision in Karimova v.

Abate, No. 23-cv-5178,

(D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024) (per curiam), calls the

reasoning in those decisions into question. The Karimova panel held that once a consular official

refuses a visa application, even if it is contemporaneously placed in administrative processing, the

visa has been “officially refused” and the decision is considered final.

. Here, as other

Courts in this District have done, the Court will not further analyze the impact of Karimova on the

facts before it, because defendants are entitled to dismissal in any event. See Motevali v. Blinken,

No. CV 23-cv-2133 (RC),

, at *4 (D.D.C. July 30, 2024) (noting the potential

impact of Karimova on consular nonreviewability of visa applications in administrative

processing, but declining to explore the implications and dismissing on the merits of unreasonable

delay); see also Sharifshourabi v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-3382 (RC),

, at *5 (D.D.C.

July 29, 2024) (same).

C. Unreasonable Delay

The Court concludes that defendants are entitled to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because

Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege unreasonable delay of Mr. Momeni’s visa application.

Courts in this district have repeatedly held that it is appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss based

on the “application of the TRAC factors to the factual allegations of a complaint asserting a claim

8 of ‘unreasonable delay.’” Chowdhury,

, at *3 (quoting Desai v. U.S. Citizenship

& Immigr. Servs., No. 20-cv-1005 (CKK),

, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2021)).

The Court may, for the purposes of this analysis, assume that plaintiffs have asserted the

existence of “a discrete agency action that [the agency] is required to take” because in any event,

Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege unreasonable delay. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All.,

(2004); see also Pourabdollah v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1603 (DLF),

,

at *6 & n.5 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2024) (assuming without deciding the existence of a “discrete, required

duty” as a baseline for applying the TRAC factors to reject the allegation of unreasonable delay).5

Applying the TRAC factors to the allegations in the Complaint and judicially noticeable facts, this

Court holds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim that the delayed adjudication of Mr.

Momeni’s application was unreasonable.

1. TRAC Factors 1 and 2

The first TRAC factor, which commands that the time agencies take to make decisions must

be governed by a rule of reason, is the “most important.” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008). The second TRAC factor “provides that the content of such a rule [of

reason] may be found in a ‘timetable or other indication . . . in the enabling statute.’” Ctr. for Sci.

in the Pub. Int. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,

(D.D.C. 2014) (quoting

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). Put together, these factors “get at whether the agency’s response time

complies with an existing specified schedule and whether it is governed by an identifiable

5 Again here, the Court is mindful of the D.C. Circuit’s recent unpublished decision in Karimova, which casts doubt on whether consular officers are subject to a discrete, mandatory duty to timely complete administrative processing after initial refusal.

, at *3-4. As several other courts in this Circuit have done in the wake of this opinion, the Court will dismiss plaintiffs’ claim based on their failure to allege unreasonable delay, without deciding whether Karimova independently requires dismissal. See, e.g., Baygan v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-2840 (JDB),

, at *5 n.1 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2024); Fallahi v. Bell, No. 23-cv-3292 (APM),

, at *3 n.3 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2024); Liu v. Garland, No. 23-cv-1914 (RBW),

, at *5 n.2 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2024).

9 rationale,” and whether there is any “rhyme or reason” for the agency’s delay.

Because the

INA does not prescribe any statutory timetable, courts “typically turn to case law as a guide” to

determine the timeframe in which the State Department or consular official must adjudicate a

pending visa application. Sarlak v. Pompeo, No. 20-cv-35 (BAH),

, at *6

(D.D.C. June 10, 2020). “[D]istrict courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess

of five, six, seven years are unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not

unreasonable.” Rahman,

, at *4 (quoting Sawahreh,

, at *5).

As plaintiffs themselves correctly note, TRAC factors 1 and 2 favor defendants in this case

because Mr. Momeni had only been waiting sixteen months at the time of filing the opposition

(now twenty-three months). See Pls.’ Opp’n at 11-12.

2. TRAC Factor 4

The fourth TRAC factor, which asks the Court to consider the effect of expediting delayed

action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority, weighs in Defendants’ favor. “Where

the agency action sought is one of many similar adjudications that the agency must complete, the

court should be even more cautious before intervening.” Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d. 147,

153 (D.D.C. 2017). This factor has been characterized as one that “often . . . carries the greatest

weight.” Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off.,

, 15 (D.D.C. 2022) (citing

Milligan v. Pompeo,

, 319 (D.D.C. 2020)), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2023).

Plaintiffs initially concede that this factor weighs in defendants’ favor “due to the

importance of ‘competing priorities.’” Pls.’ Opp’n at 12. However, Plaintiffs attempt to carve out

a distinction in their case, arguing “not that their case should be moved ahead of others waiting in

line, but rather that the entire administrative processing line be granted additional priority to

expedite final decisions on these visa applications.”

. To the Court, this reads as a

10 distinction without a difference—at bottom, Plaintiffs are still asking for this Court to re-order the

agency’s priorities, an action that courts are foreclosed from taking. Granting Plaintiffs’

“requested relief would simply move them ahead in the processing queue to the detriment of other

similarly situated visa applicants.” Thakker v. Renaud, No. 20-cv-1133 (CKK),

, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-5079,

(D.C. Cir. July 14, 2021).

3. TRAC Factors 3 and 5

“The third and fifth factors are often considered together, and require the Court to consider

plaintiffs’ interests, health, and welfare.” Chowdhury,

, at *4 (alteration brackets

omitted) (quoting Thakker,

, at *7). These factors weigh in favor of plaintiffs.

Mr. Momeni and Ms. Honari were 90 and 86 years of age, respectively, at the time of filing this

action. Compl ¶ 42. They are currently living in Iran without any immediate family members to

care for them, and given their age, they urgently require the care and support of their family in the

United States. Compl. ¶ 42. Three of their four daughters live in the United States, and they have

not seen their grandchildren in eighteen years. Compl. ¶ 42. “Taking these alleged adverse effects

as true, as the Court must at this stage, the plaintiffs are in a worse position than visa applicants

who merely claim that their lives have been put ‘on hold’ by the visa delay.” Pourabdollah,

, at *8 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Palakuru v. Renaud,

, 53

(D.D.C. 2021)).

4. TRAC Factor 6

The last TRAC factor asks whether the agency has acted in bad faith. Fakhimi v. U.S. Dep’t

of State, No. 23-cv-1127 (CKK),

, at *11 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2023). The Circuit

11 has cautioned that a finding of bad faith or impropriety is not necessary to hold that an agency

action is unreasonably delayed. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80.

Plaintiffs argue that they “repeatedly informed the embassy of the urgency of the situation,

namely of Plaintiffs’ advanced age and lack of support in Iran, along with Plaintiff Honari’s

immigrant visa being scheduled to expire in a year.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 13. In their view, “[t]he

embassy’s failure to act on Plaintiff Momeni’s via application given this significant time constraint

and hardship to Plaintiffs, along with the additional requirements placed on Iranian applicants such

as Plaintiffs,” allows the Court to draw an inference of bad faith. Id. These allegations, however,

do not constitute a showing of bad faith, but instead appear to reflect plaintiffs’ understandable

frustration with their predicament. While the Court sympathizes with plaintiffs, the agency’s delay

does not appear “intentional” or to be “the result of any impropriety.” Sawahreh v. United States

Dep't of State,

, 164 (D.D.C. 2022).6

Overall, TRAC factors 1, 2, and 4 weigh in defendants’ favor; TRAC factors 3 and 5 weigh

in plaintiffs’ favor; and TRAC factor 6 is at best neutral for Plaintiffs. As noted above, factors 1,

2, and 4 carry the most weight, and here, factors 3 and 5 are insufficient to overcome the factors

that favor the defense. On balance, this Court finds that plaintiffs have not stated a claim for

unreasonable delay of Mr. Momeni’s visa application under the APA, and defendants’ 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss will be granted.

6 Though plaintiffs do not argue this specifically, the only conceivable allegation of bad faith that could be extrapolated from the complaint is that the defendants intentionally misdirected Ms. Honari to wait until the adjudication of Mr.Momeni’s visa application before taking action, and thereby misleading her into letting the one-year deadline lapse on her own application. For several reasons, however, this argument falters in plaintiffs’ case. For one, there are no facts to suggest any bad faith behind the delay of Mr. Momeni’s application, which is what TRAC factor 6 considers— regardless of the impact on Ms. Honari’s application. Second, there are no facts to suggest that any information from the embassy was intentionally misleading, and in fact, plaintiffs’ opposition suggests that they were aware that Ms. Honari’s visa approval was set to expire after one year. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 13.

12 D. Ms. Honari’s Visa Cancelation

Defendants argue that “cancelation and any delay in [Ms. Honari] receiving her visa after

such cancelation was caused by Honari’s failure to act on her approved visa within a year after it

was approved,” and therefore, there is no relief the Court can grant for her failure to timely act.

Defs.’ Mot. at 19 (citing the redressability requirement of standing). Plaintiffs respond by noting

that Ms. Honari “repeatedly informed the embassy” that she “was unable to ‘take action’ on her

immigrant visa” given Mr. Momeni’s pending application. Pls. Opp’n at 9. Plaintiffs also contend

that Ms. Honari delayed action on her application “as instructed by the U.S. Embassy.” Pls.’ Opp’n

at 2; see also Compl. ¶ 12 (stating that “Ms. Honari was informed by the Embassy that she could

delay receipt of her immigrant visa until her husband’s visa was adjudicated” and that she “agreed

to delay the receipt of her approved immigrant visa”).

Regardless of the specific chain of events resulting in Ms. Honari’s visa cancelation, the

Court is unable to provide declaratory or injunctive relief to reinstate Ms. Honari’s visa.7 “Courts

can compel an agency to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Anglers

Conservation Network v. Pritzker,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Norton,

). The required action must be “‘ministerial or non-discretionary[,]’ amounting to a ‘specific,

unequivocal command.’”

(quoting Norton, 542 U.S. at 63–64). This Court cannot locate any

authority to support the proposition that the agency is required to reinstate a visa for an applicant

in Ms. Honari’s position, and therefore, this Court cannot command such action. Indeed, Ms.

Honari’s requested relief runs head-on into the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, as

Defendants suggest. See Defs.’ Mot. at 10; see also Dep’t of State v. Munoz,

, 1814

7 The Court assumes that plaintiffs have invoked the Declaratory Judgment Act,

, as the basis for relief for Ms. Honari to reinstate her visa. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 42(2).

13 (2024) (“Under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, an executive officer's decision to admit

or to exclude an alien is final and conclusive, and not subject to judicial review in federal court.”)

(citations omitted); see also Saavedra Bruno v. Albright,

(D.C. Cir. 1999)

(noting “the long history of judicial noninterference with the judgments of consular officers

regarding visas” and that “the immigration laws preclude judicial review of consular visa

decisions”). Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to re-adjudicate Ms. Honari’s

visa because the agency is shielded by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.

E. Due Process

As Defendants note, Plaintiffs do not specify whether they are bringing a procedural or

substantive due process challenge. In either event, the challenge fails. “To state a [procedural]

due process claim, plaintiffs must plausibly allege, first, that ‘there exists a liberty or property

interest of which plaintiff has been deprived,’ and second, that the procedures the government

provided were constitutionally inadequate.” Ghadami,

, at *10 (citing

Swarthout v. Cooke,

(2011) (per curiam)). Plaintiffs correctly identify this

standard but recycle the same arguments informing their unreasonable delay challenge, without

identifying any constitutionally protected interest. See Pls. Opp’n at 14. And indeed, there is no

constitutionally protected interest here: the Supreme Court has long held that “an alien seeking

initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding

his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” Landon v.

Plasencia,

(1982). In other words, non-citizens “ha[ve] only those rights regarding

admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,

, 139 (2020).

14