UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CHRISTIE STEWART,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 23-cv-1194 (TSC) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Christie Stewart—a disabled Black woman—sued her former employer, the U.S.

Department of Agriculture, alleging it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the

Rehabilitation Act by, inter alia, harassing her, reprimanding her, lowering her performance

review, denying her a salary increase, and placing her on administrative leave indefinitely

without cause. Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Having considered the

record and the briefs, the court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendant’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff was hired as a Supervisory Personnel Security Specialist in September 2016.

Am. Compl., ECF No. 17 ¶ 9. Throughout her employment, Plaintiff had mental disabilities,

including “anxiety disorder, major depression disorder,” and post-traumatic stress disorder

(“PTSD”) as well as “several physical impairments.” Id. ¶ 111. Despite these challenges, she

had received only outstanding performance reviews as of June 2020 and earned a salary increase.

Id. ¶¶ 19–20.

Page 1 of 21 Plaintiff alleges she began experiencing discrimination in the summer of 2020 when she

had a “minor dispute” with a coworker regarding the coworker’s suggestions for a presentation

Plaintiff put together. Id. ¶ 25. As a result of the dispute, she was berated and humiliated by her

second-line supervisor, and her first-line supervisor made her feel targeted, anxious, and

embarrassed by bringing it up in a team meeting. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. Her first-line supervisor later

“presented a falsified note of . . . what occurred” during the meeting to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. ¶ 31.

In response to this incident, Plaintiff was “harassed and treated unfairly” in several ways.

Id. ¶ 35. She began receiving denials for issuance of contract funds, and additional requirements

were placed on only her to obtain such approvals. Id. ¶¶ 35–36. When she raised her concerns

about how she was being treated, her supervisor “began to repeatedly and continuously refer to

the way Plaintiff spoke or emailed written communications as ‘improper,’” and issued her a note

of caution about communication. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. Plaintiff’s third-line supervisor eventually

directed her to take a “plain English” class and an interpersonal communication training course.

Id. ¶¶ 32, 237. The only other employees Plaintiff knew of who were required to take these

classes were also Black women. Id. ¶ 34. After she repeatedly raised concerns about harassment

both at work and by filing an EEO Complaint, her first-line supervisor directed Defendant’s

labor department to investigate her allegations, but Plaintiff never heard anything further about

the investigation. Id. ¶¶ 42–44. Instead, she later learned that Defendant conducted a

“performance assessment” of her, rather than an investigation of her discrimination allegations.

Id. ¶¶ 46–48, 146–47.

Plaintiff requested reasonable accommodations in August 2020, seeking practical

situational telework, an emotional support contact person, ability to remove herself from certain

Page 2 of 21 confrontational situations without reprisal, and greater privacy at work. Id. ¶¶ 112–14. Before

requesting the accommodations, Plaintiff regularly closed her office door, without any reaction

from her supervisors. Id. ¶ 115. Once she requested accommodations, however, her supervisors

limited how long she could close her door, and denied her privacy accommodation altogether.

Id. ¶¶ 115–17. Plaintiff’s request to telework was approved, but she was told she needed to

provide advance notice of when she would telework, which posed challenges “because her

disabilities were not those that could be planned in advance.” Id. ¶¶ 118–20. Plaintiff’s request

for an emotional support contact person was denied, and she was told that instead, her first-line

supervisor would hold biweekly check-ins with her. Id. ¶¶ 128–32, 134. Her supervisor,

however, “failed to follow through with any of these meetings.” Id. ¶ 132. Finally, Plaintiff’s

request to remove herself from confrontations was approved “with restrictions”—her supervisor

noted that she could not walk away from just any situation she “perceives is frustrating or

confrontational,” and “necessary corrective actions” would still be taken. Id. ¶¶ 135–36. That

response made Plaintiff feel that she could not use the accommodation without reprimand. Id.

¶¶ 138–40. Throughout the accommodation process, her supervisor also treated her as if she was

incompetent and “less than.” Id. ¶¶ 121–26.

Plaintiff was then issued a letter of reprimand, which was used to justify lowering her

annual performance review in 2020. Id. ¶¶ 52–54, 150–52. That performance review

contributed to Plaintiff being denied a salary increase in 2021. Id. ¶¶ 54, 108. Plaintiff was also

denied access to training, which “would have assisted with strengthening her skill for

advancement.” Id. ¶ 153. Defendant encouraged Plaintiff’s coworkers to “over-scrutinize

Plaintiff’s work, downgrade her performance, and harass her on a daily basis,” as well as

“micromanage her tasks,” and “use condescending microaggressions to undermine Plaintiff’s

Page 3 of 21 role.” Id. ¶¶ 56, 61, 68. It also refused to switch Plaintiff’s first-line supervisor, despite the

supervisor’s request to transfer her or Plaintiff, id. ¶¶ 58, 88, and required Plaintiff to complete

tasks assigned to White, male coworkers or be disciplined, id. ¶¶ 63–67.

Plaintiff’s first-line supervisor then removed one of Plaintiff’s employees from her

supervision, and later lied in a misconduct investigation by denying advising the employee not to

tell Plaintiff he had been reassigned in order to “spare her feelings.” Id. ¶¶ 70–73. When that

employee made an unfounded complaint to their supervisors about Plaintiff, the complaint was

“immediately addressed,” and her supervisors were “excited” at the “opportunity to reprimand

Plaintiff.” Id. ¶¶ 85–87. Defendant also “fabricated false counter-allegations of harassment”

against Plaintiff, and falsified complaints from a Black woman subordinate to Plaintiff. Id.

¶¶ 154–57.

Another employee subordinate to Plaintiff reported sexual harassment by one of

Plaintiff’s supervisors in February 2021. Id. ¶¶ 89–90. Plaintiff discussed the allegations with

her first-line supervisor, who lied about reporting it. Id. ¶¶ 90–91, 93. After Plaintiff reported

the allegations herself, Defendant instructed Plaintiff’s supervisor to “harass her to gain more

details about her complaint.” Id. ¶¶ 92–96. When Plaintiff did not respond to her supervisor’s

inquiry, she was reprimanded. Id. ¶¶ 98–100.

Finally, Plaintiff received an unacceptable performance review in September 2021, and

her second-line supervisor consequently denied her a salary increase. Id. ¶¶ 105, 108, 177, 182.

Plaintiff was then placed on administrative leave indefinitely without cause. Id. ¶¶ 172–75. She

accordingly felt obliged to retire earlier than she would have liked. Id. ¶ 187. Plaintiff also

suffered “lost wages, lost benefits, legal fees and emotional distress, anxiety, and mental

anguish” due to the discrimination. Id. ¶ 186.

Page 4 of 21 B. Procedural Background

Beginning in August 2020, Plaintiff “made over 20 complaints and disclosures to

Defendant’s employees with delegated authority . . . to receive and investigate employee

grievances, complaints, and disclosures.” Id. ¶ 84. Plaintiff also filed complaints with the

EEOC and Office of Inspector General in August 2020, and later filed second and third

complaints with the EEOC. Id. ¶¶ 141, 165, 180. She was issued a right to sue notice on

February 3, 2023, id. ¶ 6, and did so on April 28, 2023, see Compl., ECF No. 1. She amended

her Complaint in October 2023, and Defendant moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for

failure to state a claim, ECF No. 18.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (citation omitted). In other words, the plaintiff must plead “factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.”

(citation omitted). The court presumes the truth of the complaint’s

factual allegations under Rule 12(b)(6), Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000), but need not “accept as true ‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation,’” nor “inferences [that] are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint,”

Trudeau v. FTC,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

Page 5 of 21 III. ANALYSIS

A. Count 1 – Failure to Accommodate

In Count 1, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to

reasonably accommodate her disability. See

(a); Solomon v. Vilsack,

(D.C. Cir. 2014). “To state a claim for a violation of the Rehabilitation Act’s reasonable

accommodation requirements, a plaintiff must allege that ‘(i) she was disabled . . . (ii) her

employer had notice of her disability; (iii) she was able to perform the essential functions of her

job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (iv) her employer denied her request for a

reasonable accommodation of that disability.’” Menoken v. Dhillon,

(D.C. Cir.

2020) (citation omitted). Defendant concedes that Plaintiff is disabled, it had notice of her

disability, and she was able to perform the essential functions of her job. It argues only that it

did not deny her a reasonable accommodation.

Reasonable accommodations may include, for example, “making existing facilities used

by employees readily accessible,” “modified work schedules,” or adjusting “training materials or

policies.”

(9). “It is not sufficient to merely provide a qualified individual

with any accommodation; the accommodation needs to address the limitation arising from the

individual’s disability.” Di Lella v. Univ. of D.C. David A. Clarke Sch. of L.,

(D.D.C. 2008). “Whether a provided accommodation is effective or reasonable depends on the

facts and circumstances of each case.”

Consequently, courts in this district have held that

“the reasonableness of an accommodation request is typically an inappropriate inquiry at the

motion to dismiss stage.” Pappas v. District of Columbia,

, 96 (D.D.C. 2021)

(citing cases). For example, in Buie v. Berrien,

(D.D.C. 2015),

defendant argued that it accommodated plaintiff’s disability by changing her office location to

allow her to telework and have a private office, but her other desired accommodations were not Page 6 of 21 reasonable or feasible. The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that “the

reasonableness of plaintiff’s requests and of the solution she was eventually offered are questions

of fact that are inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.”

Plaintiff states a claim for failure to accommodate. She alleges that she requested and

was denied four separate accommodations: situational telework, an emotional support contact

person, permission to remove herself from confrontation, and permission to close her office door

for privacy. Am. Compl. ¶ 199. First, regarding situational telework, Plaintiff alleges Defendant

required her to provide advance notice, which rendered telework an ineffective and unreasonable

accommodation.

¶¶ 205–07. Second, Defendant offered bi-weekly check-ins with a

supervisor instead of an emotional contact person, but her supervisor did not follow through with

the check-ins, leaving her with no accommodation.

¶¶ 212–17. Third, Plaintiff alleges she

was never permitted to remove herself from confrontation because she was threatened with

“corrective actions” if she used this accommodation.

¶¶ 220–26. And finally, Plaintiff was

formally denied her request for privacy. Id. ¶ 202.

Defendant argues that it did grant her reasonable accommodations. Mem. in Supp. of

Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18-1 at 7–9 (“Mot.”). In doing so, Defendant confounds the burden

on a motion to dismiss with the burden on summary judgment. Whether the accommodations

Defendant authorized were effective or reasonable “are questions of fact that are inappropriate

for a resolution on a motion to dismiss.” Buie,

.

B. Counts 2 and 3 – Race and Sex Discrimination

i. Legal framework

Title VII prohibits “discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”

in “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in executive

Page 7 of 21 agencies” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). “[T]he two essential elements of a

discrimination claim” under Title VII “are that (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment

action,” Baloch v. Kempthorne,

(D.C. Cir. 2008), and (ii) “the motive to

discriminate was one of the employer’s motives,” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,

(2013).

“Courts in this Circuit ‘have consistently recognized the ease with which a plaintiff

claiming employment discrimination can survive . . . a motion to dismiss.” McNair v. District of

Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Fennell v. AARP,

(D.D.C. 2011)). “Though the ‘initial burden’ of pleading the ‘because of’ element is

‘not onerous,’” Keith v. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., No. 21-cv-2010,

,

at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022) (citation omitted; formatting modified), a “plaintiff must ‘allege

some facts that demonstrate . . . race was the reason for defendant’s actions,’” Doe #1 v. Am.

Fed’n of Gov’t Emps.,

, 102 (D.D.C. 2021) (citation omitted). One way that a

plaintiff may plead an inference of discrimination is “by showing ‘that she was treated

differently from similarly situated employees who are not part of the protected class.’” Brown v.

Sessoms,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To do so, the plaintiff “must

allege some facts to ground a reasonable inference that [she] was in fact similarly situated to

comparator employees.” Keith,

, at *3. The plaintiff, however, does not need

to “nam[e] comparators,” or allege “specifics” at the motion to dismiss stage. Jbari v. District of

Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2018) (citation omitted).

Defendant contends that the court should apply the “personnel action” definition from

Babb v. Wilkie,

, 1173–74 (2020), in determining whether Plaintiff alleged an

adverse employment action. In Babb, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal sector provision

Page 8 of 21 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), concluding that “age must be a but-for cause of

discrimination—that is, of differential treatment—but not necessarily a but-for cause of a

personnel action itself.” The Court incorporated the statutory definition of “personnel action”

from the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”), which “broadly defines a ‘personnel

action’ to include most employment-related decisions, such as appointment, promotion, work

assignment, compensation, and performance reviews.” Id. (citing

(a)(2)(A)).

The only Courts of Appeals to consider whether Babb applies to § 2000e-16—Title VII’s federal

sector provision—have concluded that it does. Babb v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,

, 1198–1205 (11th Cir. 2021) (applying Babb’s causation holding to § 2000e-16(a)); Huff v.

Buttigieg,

, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2022) (same).

In interpreting Title VII’s private sector provision, however, the D.C. Circuit recently

held that all a plaintiff need establish under Title VII’s “plain text” is “that an employer has

discriminated against an employee with respect to that employee’s ‘terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment’ because of a protected characteristic”—no proof of “objectively

tangible harm” is required. Chambers v. District of Columbia,

, 874–75 (D.C. Cir.

2022) (en banc). But rather than “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” the text of

§ 2000e-16(a) prohibits discrimination in “personnel actions affecting employees.” In doing so,

Chambers expressly overruled the D.C Circuit’s decision in Brown v. Brody,

(D.C.

Cir. 1999), which interpreted § 2000e-16. Chambers,

(“Brown’s approach is

clearly mistaken.”).

Because Chambers overruled Brown, it is binding D.C. Circuit precedent that Chambers

applies to § 2000e-16. See Cameron v. Blinken, No. 22-cv-31,

, at *4 (D.D.C.

Mar. 22, 2023) (“Because it remains binding Circuit case law that Title VII’s public and private

Page 9 of 21 sector provisions ‘contain identical prohibitions,’ Chambers governs here.”); Garza v. Blinken,

No. 21-cv-2770,

, at *4–5 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2023) (same). The only court in

this district to consider Babb and Chambers together, moreover, held that “the D.C. Circuit has

consistently interpreted Title VII’s federal-sector and private-sector language in parallel, and

there is no sign that Chambers wedged those provisions apart.” Doe v. Austin, No. 22-cv-3474,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2024). Other courts in this district have also applied

Chambers to § 2000e-16 without considering Babb. See, e.g., Black v. Guzman, No. 22-cv-1873,

, at *6–7 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2023); Leach v. Yellen, No. 18-cv-3075,

, at *5–6 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2023). The court will therefore apply Chambers’ “terms and

conditions of employment” standard to Plaintiff’s § 2000e-16 claims.

Chambers held that “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” include “the

transfer of an employee to a new role, unit, or location,” and that the phrase “evinced an intent to

strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment in employment.”

. Of course,

“the phrase is not without limits”—it may not include “de minimis harms.”

at 874–75.

Although “not all changes in work assignments necessarily constitute adverse actions” under

Chambers, “actions that meet this test include transferring an employee to a new position, firing

an employee, decreasing pay,” “stripping [an employee] of the duties normally associated with

that” position, or giving an employee “significantly different responsibilities.” Yazzie v. Nat’l

Org. for Women,

, 79 (D.D.C. 2024); Montgomery v. McDonough,

, 11 (D.D.C. 2023); accord Holmes v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 22-cv-

1478,

, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2024) (“suspension, demotion, and docking of

pay” “are textbook examples of” adverse actions). Actions that do not meet this test include

inquiring about an employee’s performance, reprimanding an employee, giving an employee a

Page 10 of 21 poor performance review, investigating an employee for an alleged violation of company policy,

or failing to investigate an employee’s complaints. Heavans v. Dodaro,

, 14

(D.D.C. 2022); Holmes,

, at *9; accord Moore-Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy,

, 124 (D.D.C. 2023).

ii. Many of Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of race and sex discrimination

Plaintiff alleges she was discriminated against based on race and sex because her

employer showed favoritism to White, male employees, required her to take courses on writing

in “plain English” and on “interpersonal communication,” micromanaged her work, required her

to take additional steps to obtain approval for contract funds, required her to complete tasks

assigned to White and male employees and then disciplined her for not doing so, failed to inform

her that she must respond to inquiries made regarding her complaints, subjected her to

investigations, “unwarranted ‘notes of caution,’ letters of reprimand, lowered performance

reviews,” denied her a salary increase, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 237, 258, falsified documents in response

to her discrimination complaint,

¶¶ 184–85, placed her on administrative leave indefinitely

without cause,

, denied her access to training,

, denied her a new

supervisor, see

, fabricated a complaint against her,

, and constructively

discharged her,

.

Many of Plaintiff’s alleged adverse actions state a claim under Chambers. First, as courts

in this district have explained, decrease in pay, suspension (or here, involuntary placement on

administrative leave), and constructive discharge “are textbook examples” of adverse actions.

Holmes,

, at *9; accord Yazzie, 712 F. Supp. 3d at 78–79. Second, Plaintiff’s

allegations that she was required to take additional steps to obtain funding and to complete her

coworkers’ tasks are sufficient, at the motion to dismiss stage, to plead that she was given

Page 11 of 21 “significantly different responsibilities.” Yazzie, 712 F. Supp. 3d at 79. Finally, Plaintiff’s

allegations that she was not given a new supervisor after requesting one, was denied access to

training that would have improved the quality of her work, and had complaints fabricated about

her all state a claim under Chambers because they created significant hurdles to her ability to

complete her work. See id.

Some of Plaintiff’s allegations, however, do not state a claim. First, her allegation that

she was required to attend two one-time training courses does not plead that she was given

“significantly different responsibilities,” affecting the terms or conditions of her employment.

Id. Second, her allegations that she was investigated, reprimanded for not completing tasks,

issued notes of caution, letters of reprimand, and received lowered performance reviews are the

same allegations that the court determined did not state a claim in Heavans, 648 F. Supp. 3d

at 14. And finally, Plaintiff’s allegations that her employer showed favoritism to her White,

male coworkers, and did not inform her that she must respond to inquiries from her supervisor,

while unprofessional, did not affect the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of her employment.

See Chambers,

.

Defendant argues that none of Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim because they had no

“discernible impact on Plaintiff’s employment.” Mot. at 13–15. The court disagrees. For

example, Plaintiff alleges that her workload was increased when she was forced to take

additional steps to complete tasks and take on her coworkers’ tasks, that she was denied a salary

increase, and that she had to retire early to escape the discrimination. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 187, 237–

39, 258. Those allegations are sufficient to state a claim.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that all her allegations are adverse actions because,

while the “average person” might experience some of her allegations as “petty slights,” she “has

Page 12 of 21 known mental disabilities, including anxiety disorder, major depression disorder, and PTSD.”

Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 20-2 at 18–19

(“Opp’n”). But the Chambers analysis “is a purely objective inquiry.”

.

Consequently, the court cannot take into account Plaintiff’s particular mental and emotional

circumstances in determining whether Defendant took adverse actions.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to allege a causal connection between the

adverse actions and her race or sex because her allegations that her comparators were similarly

situated to her are “conclusory.” Mot. at 15–16. Defendant once again overstates the burden at

the motion to dismiss stage. Plaintiff gave eight examples of comparators—Jeff Hayes, Michael

Wiggett, Sharon Wagner, Hillary Clark, Keli Martin, Michelyn Boyd, Ivy Williams, and

Matthew Payer. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. These comparators were at a similar salary grade to Plaintiff

and most were also supervised by Plaintiff’s supervisors.

Plaintiff therefore “allege[d] some

facts to ground a reasonable inference that [she] was in fact similarly situated to comparator

employees.” Keith,

, at *3.

C. Count 4 – Retaliation

i. Legal framework

To state a retaliation claim, “a plaintiff must allege: (1) she engaged in protected activity;

(2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between

the protected activity and the adverse action.” Menoken,

(citation omitted). The

adverse action requirement to state a retaliation claim differs from that needed to state a discrete

discriminatory act claim. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,

, 976 (2024). An adverse

action must be “materially adverse” for retaliation purposes, meaning “it well might have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”

Page 13 of 21 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,

(2006) (citation omitted); see

Muldrow, 144 S. Ct. at 976 (reiterating that “materially adverse” remains the adverse action

standard for retaliation claims); Baloch,

(applying “materially adverse”

standard to Rehabilitation Act). Materially adverse actions are “not limited to discriminatory

actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.” Durant v. D.C. Gov’t,

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

Denial of financial awards, low performance ratings resulting in loss of financial awards,

making false reports to government authorities, and termination “involve conduct that [the D.C.

Circuit] or the Supreme Court has already indicated can support a retaliation claim.” Steele v.

Schafer,

(D.C. Cir. 2008). Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has held that increasing

an employee’s workload fivefold to keep an employee too busy to file complaints counts as an

adverse action. Mogenhan v. Napolitano,

, 1166–67 (D.C. Cir. 2010). By

contrast, letters of reprimand setting forth allegations of deficient work performance, Durant,

, lowered performance evaluations unrelated to loss of pay, “alteration of job

responsibilities,” Taylor v. Solis,

(D.C. Cir. 2009), and other actions that

result in mere “trivial harms” are not materially adverse action, Ramos v. Garland,

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).

Temporal proximity between protected activity and an adverse action alone can support

an inference of causation “where the two events are ‘very close’ in time.” Woodruff v. Peters,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The D.C. Circuit has found temporal

proximity of less than one month to be close enough in time to support such an inference,

but

temporal proximity of two and a half months to be “untenable,” Taylor,

.

Alternatively, a plaintiff can plead an inference of causation by alleging their employer engaged

Page 14 of 21 in a “pattern of antagonism” in the intervening period.

. But such a pattern requires

more than a stray occasion of criticism or yelling. See

at 1322–23.

ii. Only Plaintiff’s allegations of a lowered performance review and letter of reprimand state a claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against her through the same adverse actions as

she alleges in her discrimination claims, including by subjecting her to investigations, giving her

unwarranted letters of reprimand, lowering her performance review, and denying her a salary

increase. Am. Compl. ¶ 269. She fails, however, to plead a causal connection between most of

her alleged adverse actions and Defendant’s knowledge of her protected activity.

Plaintiff alleges she filed an EEOC Complaint in August 2020 and Defendant was on

notice of that action by August 26, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 141, 148. She also claims she filed another

EEOC Complaint and one Office of Special Counsel Complaint, see id. ¶¶ 5, 50, 269, but does

not provide any dates for when those were filed, let alone when she put her employer on notice

about them. She claims she filed an Office of the Inspector General Complaint on August 18,

2020, id. ¶ 51, but again fails to provide any information regarding when her employer was put

on notice of her protected activity. Plaintiff does not allege any pattern of antagonism or other

connection between her protected activity and adverse actions. Consequently, she pleads

causation only for adverse actions taken within two or so months of August 26, 2020.

Plaintiff argues that “entire series of these events all occurred within approximately 18

months,” so causation “can be inferred from the temporal proximity.” Opp’n at 27. She cites no

case, however, for the notion that 18 months is sufficiently close to infer temporal proximity,

which contradicts the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the one-to-two-month range is the limit for

inferring causation from temporal proximity. Compare Woodruff,

(one month

sufficient), with Taylor,

(two and a half months insufficient).

Page 15 of 21 Plaintiff alleges three potential adverse actions within the relevant timeframe: (1) a letter

of reprimand issued on or about September 30, 2020, that “negatively affected her promotions or

future job opportunities,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 53, 150; (2) having to attend an interpersonal

communication course in September 2020, id. ¶ 272; and (3) a lowered annual performance

review in October 2020, id. ¶¶ 54, 152. Plaintiff’s allegation that she was forced to attend an

interpersonal communication course fails to state a claim of a materially adverse action because

it was, at most, a temporary “alteration of job responsibilities,” Taylor,

, that

would not “dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination,” White,

. By contrast, her allegations that she was issued a letter of

reprimand and had her performance review lowered are actionable adverse actions because she

sufficiently pleaded that they were causally connected to her denial of a within-grade salary

increase in 2021. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 150, 173, 177, 239, 269; see also Steele,

;

Taylor,

.

Defendant argues that denying Plaintiff a within-grade salary increase in 2021 was not a

foreseeable consequence of her letter of reprimand and lowered performance review almost one

year prior, citing Bain v. Office of Attorney General,

, 58 (D.D.C. 2022).

Mot. at 20. The court disagrees. In Bain, 648 F. Supp. 3d at 31–32, 58, a court in this district

held that plaintiff’s termination in September 2020 was not a “foreseeable” result of receiving a

letter of counseling in June 2015 and poor performance review in August 2015 because the

“connection between the events” was “apparent only in hindsight and would have been entirely

speculative at the time.” In this case, however, there was less than a year between Plaintiff’s

poor performance review and letter of reprimand and the denial of a salary increase. It was far

more foreseeable at the time that Plaintiff could be denied a salary increase in the coming year

Page 16 of 21 because of poor performance than it was that Bain would be terminated five years after she

received a letter of counseling and poor performance review.

D. Count 5 – Hostile Work Environment

i. Legal framework

To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, “a plaintiff must show that his employer

subjected him to ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive work

environment.’” Baloch,

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

(1993)). “Severity and pervasiveness are complementary factors.” Yazzie, 712 F. Supp. 3d at 87

(citation omitted). Consequently, although a hostile work environment is typically “comprised

of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice,”

Singletary v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), it could

also constitute “a single, particularly severe incident,” Yazzie, 712 F. Supp. 3d at 87 (citation

omitted).

To state a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she is a

member of a protected class, (2) she was “subjected to unwelcome harassment,” (3) “the

harassment occurred because of [her] protected status,” (4) the harassment was “severe to a

degree which affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment,” and (5) “the employer

knew or should have known about the harassment, but nonetheless failed to take steps to prevent

it.” Outlaw v. Johnson,

(D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted).

“[C]ourts in this jurisdiction frown on plaintiffs bootstrapping discrete claims of

discrimination and retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim.” Foxworth v.

McDonough,

, 11 (D.D.C. 2024) (citation omitted). Consequently, isolated

Page 17 of 21 allegations that a plaintiff “was denied promotions, hired at a lower initial grade, and given

subjective job-performance reviews” typically “cannot alone support a hostile-work-environment

claim.” Outlaw,

. Instead, the plaintiff must allege “intimidation, ridicule,

or insult in [her] day-to-day work environment.”

(citation omitted). For example, in Wise v.

Ferriero,

(D.D.C. 2012), a court in this district held that plaintiff

alleged a hostile work environment claim because he alleged “continuous harassment,” including

being called a racial slur, receiving threats of discipline based on false accusations, being singled

out and excluded from training, and being denied promotions. Accord Yazzie, 712 F. Supp. 3d at

86–87. Similarly, in Holmes-Martin v. Leavitt,

(D.D.C. 2008), the

court found plaintiff’s allegations that her employer treated her negatively, including by

ridiculing her continuously over time and causing her psychological illness, sufficient to state a

claim.

ii. Plaintiff states a hostile work environment claim

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered a hostile work environment because Defendant

encouraged her coworkers to fabricate complaints about her, showed favoritism to her White,

male coworkers, required her to attend additional training courses, micromanaged her work,

required her to take additional steps to obtain contract funding, required her to complete her

coworkers’ tasks when they failed to do so and then disciplined her if she did not, subjected her

to unwarranted investigations, reprimands, and lowered performance reviews, and prevented her

from using her accommodations. Am. Compl. ¶ 287. At the motion to dismiss stage, these

allegations collectively suffice to state a claim of a hostile work environment by painting a

picture of continuous negative treatment constituting “intimidation, ridicule, or insult in [her]

day-to-day work environment.” Outlaw,

; see also Wise, 842 F. Supp. 2d

Page 18 of 21 at 126; Holmes-Martin,

. The harassment resulted in tangible

consequences to her employment, including rendering her ineligible for a salary increase,

Am. Compl. ¶ 287, and exacerbated her health issues, including her anxiety, id. ¶ 293. See

Holmes-Martin,

(harassment contributed to psychological illness).

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s allegations “fall short of the high hurdle required to

plead a hostile work environment claim,” citing several cases in this district. Mot. at 26–28. In

each case Defendant cites, the court found that the plaintiff alleged typical workplace clashes

that were not severe or pervasive. See Barrett v. Pepco Holdings,

, 122–23

(D.D.C. 2017) (allegations that plaintiff was segregated from her peers, given reduced break

times, and was subjected to greater scrutiny during breaks did not “rise to the level of conduct

that supports a hostile work environment claim”); Golden v. Mgmt. & Training Corp.,

, 286 & n.7 (D.D.C. 2017) (administrative concerns and placement on

performance improvement plan insufficient); Allen v. Napolitano,

(D.D.C. 2011) (allegations that plaintiff was excluded from meetings, given unreasonable

deadlines, denied training opportunities, and assigned “busy work” did not include “objectively

tangible harm to the terms or conditions of her employment”); Heavans, 648 F. Supp. 3d at 18

(allegations “paint[ed] a picture of repeated clashes with an allegedly hostile and rude

supervisor,” but were not sufficiently “offensive, intimidating, or out of the ordinary in a typical

workplace to change the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment”); Sandler v. Blinken, No. 21-

cv-2226,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2022) (allegations consisted of work-

related actions by supervisors and stray “offensive utterances” (citation omitted)); Taylor v.

Haaland, No. 20-cv-3173,

, at *4–5 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2022) (allegations that

plaintiff’s arrival and departure time were monitored, she was taunted by coworkers, given a set

Page 19 of 21 lunch hour, was suspended from her employment, investigated, and offered an unconscionable

settlement agreement involved issues with her “work product” rather than a hostile

environment). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations, however, go beyond typical workplace clashes. She

claims that Defendant not only increased her workload in several ways, but also encouraged her

coworkers to fabricate complaints against her, intentionally lowered her performance

evaluations, and issued reprimands because of her protected classes. Rather than a disagreement

with her supervisor, Plaintiff alleges a workplace turned against her that continuously placed

additional hurdles in her way while favoring her White, male coworkers.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s allegations constitute “little more than an additional

label that she has placed on a series of discrete discrimination and retaliation claims.” Mot.

at 28. This argument, however, was “expressly rejected by the D.C. Circuit’s . . . decision in

Baird v. Gotbaum,

(D.C. Cir. 2011).” Wise,

. In Gotbaum,

, the D.C. Circuit clarified that there is “no authority for the idea that particular

acts cannot as a matter of law simultaneously support different types of Title VII claims, and of

course, plaintiffs are free to plead alternative theories of harm that might stem from the same

allegedly harmful conduct.” Consequently, discrete discriminatory acts simply “must

collectively meet the independent requirements” of a hostile work environment claim and be

“part of the same unlawful employment practice.”

(citation omitted). Plaintiff has pleaded a

continuous pattern of harassment that is made up in part of discrete discriminatory acts, many of

which also support her discrimination and retaliation claims.

Page 20 of 21 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 18. An Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: September 27, 2024

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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