UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CARGYLE BROWN SOLOMON, et. al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 23-cv-3101 (TSC) ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiffs Cargyle Brown Solomon, Dominque Solomon, Ralph Hall, and Anna

Hall allege that Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance (“Allstate”) and its counsel, Hartel,

DeSantis & Murray, LLP and Mark. M. Kodama (“the Hartel Defendants”), wrongfully

disclosed Plaintiffs’ private information. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 12. Plaintiffs seek $88,000,000

in damages and an injunction barring Defendants from further disclosing their private

information. Id. at 3, 5–6. Allstate moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a

claim. Allstate Mot. to Dismiss (“Allstate Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 22. The Hartel Defendants

separately moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hartel Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Hartel

Mot.”) at 1–2, ECF No. 23.

Although the court ordered Plaintiffs to file “a single, combined response” to Defendants’

motions, Plaintiffs filed several motions in response. Order at 2, ECF No. 24; see also Order at

2, ECF No. 25. Plaintiffs replied to Allstate’s Motion, arguing for the first time that Allstate

violated provisions of the District of Columbia Code. Resp. to Allstate Mot. at 4–7, ECF No. 26.

Two days later, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Errata attaching their response to the Allstate Motion

Page 1 of 6 with handwritten additions throughout and explaining that the attached document was their

response to both Allstate’s and the Hartel Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Errata at 1, ECF No.

27. The court will treat the Errata as the operative response to Defendants’ motions. 1 Plaintiffs

then filed a motion to have counsel for the Hartel Defendants “removed from this case.” Mot. to

Remove Counsel at 1, ECF No. 29. And after the Hartel Defendants filed their reply in support

of the Hartel Motion, Plaintiffs attempted to file a sur-reply, which the court will construe as a

motion for leave to file. Leave to File Sur-Reply to Hartel Mot., ECF No. 31. Finally, chambers

received a motion for leave to file a sur-reply to the Allstate Motion. Leave to File Sur-Reply to

Allstate Mot., on file with chambers.

For the reasons set forth below, the court will GRANT Defendants’ motions and DENY

Plaintiffs’ motions.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Cargyle Brown Solomon sued Allstate in a separate case in the Superior Court of

the District of Columbia following a car accident. Hartel Mot. at 1. The Hartel Defendants were

counsel for Allstate in the Superior Court action, and State Farm Insurance Company (“State

Farm”) was a co-defendant. Compl. at Ex. 3. Plaintiffs allege that the Hartel Defendants and

Allstate wrongfully distributed Plaintiff Cargyle Brown Solomon’s and her family members’

private information—including their social security numbers, home and military addresses,

phone numbers, income information, and birthdates—to State Farm and its counsel during

discovery in the Superior Court action. Id. at 1–2. 2 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “broke the

1 The Hartel Defendants replied to the Errata in support of the Hartel Motion. Hartel Reply, ECF No. 28. Allstate also replied to the Errata in support of the Allstate Motion. Allstate Reply, ECF No. 33. 2 Plaintiffs here include Plaintiff Cargyle Brown Solomon’s son and parents. Compl. at 2, 5.

Page 2 of 6 law when they disclosed our social security number according to Section 7 of the Privacy Act of

1974” and “violated our right to privacy Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 as amended, 5

USC 552 note (Disclosure of Social Security Numbers.).” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs also claim that

Defendants “retaliated and harassed” them by releasing their private information because

Solomon filed the Superior Court action against Allstate. Id. at 5. The Complaint seeks money

damages and a preliminary injunction to stop Defendants “from disclosing [Plaintiffs’] private

information any further.” Id. at 6.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v. Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). The court

must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true” and “grant plaintiff the benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). That said, “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly,

(2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

And a court need not accept as

true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor “inferences . . . unsupported by the

facts set out in the complaint.” Trudeau v. FTC,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quotations

omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

While the court recognizes that complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less

stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Haines v.

Kerner,

(1972), even pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Page 3 of 6 Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch,

(D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure requires that complaints contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In other words,

Rule 8(a) requires that the plaintiff “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (holding that the complaint must

contain enough “factual matter” to suggest liability) (citation and alterations omitted).

Here, the Complaint appears to assert a claim under Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974.

Compl. at 2. The Privacy Act governs the collection, maintenance, and disclosure of personal

information by government agencies, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and was enacted “to protect the

privacy of individuals identified in [federal] information systems.” Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev.

Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz,

(2024) (alteration in original). The Privacy Act’s

focus on agency records is key: Plaintiffs cannot pursue a Privacy Act claim against Allstate or

the Hartel Defendants because the Privacy Act creates a cause of action only against federal

government agencies, not private corporations or individuals. See Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec.,

, 533 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Because Plaintiffs have not sued a

federal government agency, the court will dismiss their Privacy Act claim against the Defendants

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs also appear to assert claims for harassment and retaliation. Compl. at 5

(alleging that Defendants “retaliated and harassed” Plaintiffs because Solomon filed the

underlying Superior Court action against Allstate). These terms describe claims that often arise

in the employment context, but Plaintiffs have not identified a cause of action for their general

allegations that Defendants released their private information to harass or retaliate against them.

See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,

(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting)

Page 4 of 6 (“Popular misconceptions notwithstanding, sexual harassment is not a freestanding federal tort,

but a form of employment discrimination.”). Even if Plaintiffs could point to a federal,

freestanding harassment or retaliation tort, the court simply cannot infer a cause of action arising

from the facts here: Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries stem from the exchange of discovery in the

Superior Court action, during which counsel in that case disclosed unredacted documents in

response to Plaintiff Solomon’s requests for documents, and copied counsel for other parties.

See Compl. at 2, Ex. 3. Because the court cannot find that Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of

retaliation or harassment satisfy Rule 8’s standard, it will grant Allstate and the Hartel

Defendant’s motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim of harassment or retaliation.

In their response to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs argue that their claims arise under

D.C. Code sections 28-3852 and 28-3852(a), provisions governing maintenance of personal

information and notifications to consumers following data breaches of systems that include

personal information. Errata at 4–6. Given that none of the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint

refer to a data breach—to the contrary, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants intentionally distributed

Plaintiffs’ personal information,

at 6–7—Plaintiffs cannot “survive a motion to dismiss by

asserting new claims for relief in [their] responsive pleadings.” Coll. Sports Council v. Gov’t

Accountability Off.,

, 71 n.16 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Jung v. Ass’n of Am.

Med. Colls.,

(D.D.C. 2004) (plaintiffs “cannot reinforce their

complaint by creatively recasting and embellishing the allegations of their complaint in their

opposition brief”).

Because the court must dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief

can be granted, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remove Counsel, ECF No. 29, as well as Plaintiff Cargyle

Brown Solomon’s Motion for CM/ECF Password, ECF No. 14, will be denied as moot. The

Page 5 of 6 court will also deny the motions for Leave to File Sur-Reply to Hartel Motion, ECF No. 31, and

Leave to File Sur-Reply to Allstate Motion. The court’s Local Rules provide that there will

ordinarily be at most three memoranda associated with a motion: “(i) the movant’s opening

memorandum; (ii) the non-movant’s opposition; and (iii) the movant’s reply.” Glass v. Lahood,

, 230–31 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, No. 11-5144,

(D.C. Cir.

Dec. 8, 2011). Plaintiffs have not identified any new arguments or issues raised for the first time

in Defendants’ replies that would justify a departure from the normal rule.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will GRANT Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, ECF

Nos. 22 and 23, and DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remove Counsel, ECF No. 29, and Motion for

CM/ECF Password, ECF No. 14, as MOOT. The court will DENY Plaintiffs’ Motions for Leave

to File a Sur-reply to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, ECF No. 31 and on file with chambers.

An Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: September 29, 2024

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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