UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NASR BASILY,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 23-2719 (RDM) LONNIE G. BUNCH III, Secretary, Smithsonian Institute,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff commenced this action with the aid of counsel on March 23, 2023, in the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. See generally Dkt. 1 (Compl.). Plaintiff named

as Defendant Lonnie G. Bunch III, the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, and alleged

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 1

(Compl. ¶ 1). That court, with the agreement of the parties, subsequently transferred the case to

the Court. Dkt. 9. In transferring the case, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

noted that “[c]ounsel for Plaintiff agrees that transfer to the District of Columbia is appropriate

[and] because counsel is not a member of the bar of that jurisdiction, he will withdraw as counsel

of record in this action.” Id. at 1 n.1.

Defendant then timely moved to dismiss on November 20, 2023. Dkt. 13. Plaintiff’s

counsel filed a motion to withdraw on the ground that he was not admitted to practice before this

Court, noting that Plaintiff was “aware” of this fact. Dkt. 14 at 1. The Court granted counsel’s

motion, Min. Order (Dec. 30, 2023), and promptly issued a Fox/Neal order warning Plaintiff of

the consequences of failing timely to respond to Defendant’s motion and giving him until

1 February 12, 2024, to do so, Dkt. 15 at 2. On January 9, 2024, Defendant’s counsel emailed

Plaintiff a copy of its motion to dismiss, stating:

Good Afternoon Mr. Basily,

I hope all is well and happy New Year. Please see a courtesy copy of Defendant’s motion to dismiss attached.

Dkt. 21 at 3. Plaintiff’s response, although cryptic (“Why. No I regret it”), confirmed the he

received the email. Id. Plaintiff, however, failed to file an opposition by February 12, 2024.

The Court then sua sponte extended his time to respond and “ORDERED [that he] respond to

Defendant’s motion . . . on or before May 7, 2024.” See Min. Order (Apr. 12, 2024). Plaintiff

did not do so.

Thus, despite the passage of almost six months from the filing of Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, and despite two orders from the Court directing that he respond to the pending motion,

Plaintiff neither sought an extension of time nor complied with the Court’s orders. To the

contrary, following the withdrawal of his counsel, the Court heard nothing at all from Plaintiff.

Accordingly, on May 15, 2024, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for failure to prosecute.

Dkt. 17. As the Court explained, “[t]he authority to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute

has long be recognized as ‘necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of

pending cases and to avoid congestion’ in the courts,” id. at 2 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R.

Co.,

, 629–30 (1962)), and “[d]ismissal is warranted when, ‘in view of the entire

procedural history of the case, the litigant has not manifested reasonable diligence in pursuing

the cause,’”

(quoting Bomate v. Ford Motor Co.,

(D.C. Cir. 1985).

Finally, the Court also explained that “dismissal without prejudice [for failure to prosecute]

may, at times, mitigate the severity of the sanction,” which “is less draconian than treating an

unopposed motion to dismiss as conceded” and disposing of the case “on the merits.” Id. at 3.

2 Three months later, on August 2, 2024, Plaintiff, with the assistance of new counsel, filed

a motion for reconsideration, seeking to vacate the Court’s dismissal. Dkt. 19. Plaintiff argues

that reconsideration is warranted because his former counsel provided him “no advice” as to how

Plaintiff should proceed, and Plaintiff “tried retaining other counsel but could not do so for

financial reasons.” Id. at 1. Defendant filed an opposition, Dkt. 20, and Plaintiff did not file a

reply.

For the reasons stated below, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Although Plaintiff does not identify which of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure he

relies upon, “a motion to reconsider a final judgment is generally treated as a Rule 59(e) or Rule

60(b) motion.” West v. Holder,

(D.D.C. 2015).1 Rule 60(b) authorizes a

district court to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or

proceeding” on one of six enumerated grounds: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect;” (2) “newly discovered evidence;” (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party; (4) “the judgment is void;” (5) “the judgment has been

satisfied, released, or discharged;” or (6) “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b).

In addition, a party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) “must at least establish that it

possesses a potentially meritorious claim or defense which, if proven, will bring success in its

wake.” Murray v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

1 Rule 59(e) is not applicable here because Plaintiff’s motion comes too late. A party can move to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) “no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The court does not have authority to extend this deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). 3 The party must provide the court with reason to believe that “vacating the judgment will not be

an empty exercise or a futile gesture.”

The movant under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to

relief. Norris v. Salazar,

(D.D.C. 2011). “‘[T]he decision to grant or deny a

[R]ule 60(b) motion is’ likewise ‘committed to the discretion of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.’” Williams

v. Brennan,

(D.D.C. 2018) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. 1974

Pension v. Pittston Co.,

(D.C. Cir. 1993)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff does not specify which rule he relies upon, and so the Court will construe his

filing as seeking relief under 60(b)(1) or (6). Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to relieve a party

from previous judgment based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b)(6) represents a catch-all provision, authorizing a court to relieve

a party for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Plaintiff has failed to

carry his burden of demonstrating that reconsideration is warranted under either provision.

Notably, Plaintiff does not argue that the Court erred in dismissing his case for failure to

prosecute or that the Court failed to consider a material fact or legal argument. Rather, Plaintiff

argues that he did not know how to proceed once his former counsel withdrew from the case and

did not respond to his inquiries. Dkt. 19 at 1. Plaintiff also asserts that he was unable to respond

to the motion to dismiss because he was unable to find new counsel, but his “interest in finding

new counsel to pursue his claim has never waned.”

at 1–2.

These justifications are insufficient to show “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1).

The Supreme Court has set out four factors for evaluating whether a movant has demonstrated

excusable neglect: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the party opposing the modification, (2) the

4 length of delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay,

including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the

movant acted in good faith.” In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions,

(D.C.

Cir. 2003) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,

(1993)).

The Court agrees with Defendant that the factors weigh against Plaintiff. Dkt. 20 at 9.

First, the Defendant contends that it will be prejudiced if the case is reopened because the matter

has been closed for months, the events alleged in the complaint occurred more than five years

ago, and the memories of witnesses will continue to fade as time passes.

Second, the length

of delay is significant because Defendant filed its motion to dismiss in November 2023. The

Court provided Plaintiff ample time to respond, but he failed to file anything with the Court

despite two Court orders directing that he respond and despite the Court’s warning that, if he

failed to respond, the Court might dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. The dismissal in this

case was not the result of “‘harsh calendar rules’ or a technicality,” Odutola v. Branch Banking &

Tr. Co.,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2021), but, rather, Plaintiff’s failure to abide

by two Court orders, failure to seek an extension of time, and complete absence from the case for

almost six months.

Moreover, Plaintiff does not claim that he failed to receive Defendant’s motion to dismiss

or the Court’s orders directing him to respond. See Dkt. 19. Plaintiff began proceeding pro se

after his counsel withdrew, but a litigant’s pro se status, without more, is insufficient to meet the

“excusable neglect” standard. Pro se litigants “are not excused from following procedural

rules,” including rules and court orders requiring a response to a motion to dismiss. Oladokun v.

Corr. Treatment Facility,

, 98–99 (D.D.C. 2015) (denying Rule 60(b)(1) motion

5 even where pro se plaintiff claimed he did not receive the court’s show cause order).

“[I]nadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute

‘excusable’ neglect . . . .” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co.,

. Nothing prevented Plaintiff

from—at a bare minimum—letting the Court know that he still wanted to pursue the case and

needed additional time to find a new lawyer. Instead, he simply ignored two Court orders and

the Court’s clear admonition about the consequence of doing so.

Nor is reconsideration warranted under Rule 60(b)(6). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6)

“should be only sparingly used” and only in “extraordinary circumstances,” Salazar ex rel.

Salazar v. District of Columbia,

, 1119–20 (D.C. Cir. 2011), such as “when a party

timely presents a previously undisclosed fact so central to the litigation that it shows the initial

judgment to have been manifestly unjust,” Walsh v. Hagee,

(D.D.C. 2013)

(quoting Taitz v. Obama,

(D.D.C. 2010)). Plaintiff does not point to any

similar circumstances here. See Dkt. 19 at 1–2.

Finally, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that his claim is potentially meritorious. See

Murray,

; Marino v. Drug Enf’t Admin.,

(D.C. Cir. 2012).

Defendant argued in its motion to dismiss that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as to most of his claims, that he failed to allege an “adverse action” under the standard

set forth in Chambers v. District of Columbia,

, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (and later,

largely embraced in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,

, 354–55 (2024)) as to other

claims, and that he failed adequately to allege that any alleged adverse action was taken because

of his race, color, or national origin. See generally Dkt. 13 at 14–30. Although many of those

arguments seem correct, Plaintiff has failed to offer any explanation for how he could, if the

Court were to vacate its decision, even survive a motion to dismiss. That is his burden at this

6 point, yet he offers no basis to believe that his claims are “potentially meritorious.” Murray,

Rather, he now focuses on the contention that a co-worker intentionally caused him

injury in the workplace, Dkt. 19 at 5 (Basily Decl.), but he has failed to explain how that injury

was the product of his employer’s discriminatory animus, and thus failed to explain why his

employer should be liable.

Plaintiff has not cleared the high bar necessary to obtain relief under Rule 60(b). None of

his arguments identifies any “excusable neglect” or “extraordinary circumstances” that would

warrant relief under Rule 60(b), nor has Plaintiff argued that his claim is meritorious.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, Dkt. 19, is denied.

A separate order shall issue.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: October 5, 2024

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