UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FELIX ACON-CHEN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-1529 (RDM)

PETE BUTTIGIEG, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Felix Acon-Chen, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Pete Buttigieg, in

his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation, Merrick Garland, in his

official capacity as United States Attorney General, and Matthew Graves, in his official capacity

as United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. Dkt. 1 at 1–2. Defendants move to

dismiss Acon-Chen’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(m) and 12(b)(5)

for insufficient service, and for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). See generally Dkt.

23. Acon-Chen filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss1 as well as a motion for

summary judgment. Dkts. 25, 26. Based on these submissions, the Court reaches three

conclusions:

First, the Court will dismiss Acon-Chen’s complaint, which spans hundreds of pages, on

the grounds that it is “excessively long, rambling, disjointed, incoherent, [and] full of irrelevant

and confusing material,” in violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10. Jiggetts v.

1 The Court notes that Acon-Chen’s opposition is 91 pages, with an additional 193 pages of exhibits. Under L.Cv.R. 7(e), an “opposition to a motion shall not exceed 45 pages.” Acon- Chen is advised that, absent leave of Court, any additional motions he may file in this District must comply with the page limits set by the Local Rules. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. District of

Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). Although Defendants moved for a more

definite statement under Rule 12(e) rather than for dismissal under Rule 8, the standards are

related: a court may grant a motion under Rule 12(e) where the complaint fails to comply with

Rule 8. McQueen v. Woodstream Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2007); see also 5C Charles

A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1377 (3d ed.) (“[T]he disposition of a

Rule 12(e) motion also should take account of the general pleading guidelines set out in Rule 8

and the judicial application of them.”). Here, the Court concludes that Rules 8 and 10, rather

than Rule 12(e), provide the most appropriate means of addressing the flaws in Acon-Chen’s

complaint.

Second, as for Defendants’ argument that they were not properly served, Acon-Chen

appears to have attached proof of service to his reply brief, showing that the summons and

complaint were sent via certified mail to Defendants by a third party. See Dkt. 36-1. The Court

will, accordingly, deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to effect service, but will do so

without prejudice. If the Court’s understanding that the summons and complaint were properly

served is incorrect, Defendants may renew that motion.

Finally, the Court concludes that Acon-Chen’s motion for summary judgment must be

denied as premature. Before moving for summary judgment, Acon-Chen must file a complaint

that conforms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that sets forth one or more coherent

claims that put Defendants on fair notice of the substance of his claims and that are sufficiently

focused to permit Defendants to answer or move in response.

Because Acon-Chen is proceeding pro se, the Court will afford him an opportunity to file

an amended complaint. The Court will, accordingly, GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

2 but will permit Acon-Chen to file an amended complaint within 21 days of this Order.

Defendants may renew their motion to dismiss for insufficient service to the extent they believe

they were not properly served. Finally, the Court will DENY Acon-Chen’s motion for summary

judgment as premature.

A. Violation of Rules 8 and 10

Acon-Chen’s complaint violates Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

First, Rule 10(b) provides:

Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence—and each defense other than a denial—must be stated in a separate count or defense.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). When a litigant—even a pro se litigant—fails to comply with Rule 10(b),

the court may dismiss the complaint. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Fudge, No. CV 21-01412 (CKK),

, at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2023); Lacy v. Tenn. Civ. Rule 15g Third Party, No. CV

22-3537 (JMC),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2022); Estrada v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank

An Fed. Rsrv. Chairman, No. 21-CV-528 (TSC),

, at *1 (D.D.C. July 13,

2021); Nastri v. Kerner, No. CV 20-1334 (CKK),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 19,

2020). Rule 10(b) ensures that a plaintiff breaks his or her complaint down into a series of

discrete factual allegations, which the defendant must, in turn, admit or deny. When a plaintiff

fails to comply with Rule 10(b), and instead combines his or her allegations in single, running

narrative, the defendant is left at a loss with respect to how to answer. A general denial is

permitted only when the defendant, in good faith, intends “to deny all the allegations of a

pleading,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(3), a prospect that is seldom possible. And, in all other cases, the

defendant must “either specifically deny designated allegations or generally deny all except those

3 specifically admitted,”

a prospect that is both daunting and riddled with potential pitfalls

when the plaintiff fails to comply with Rule 10(b).

Acon-Chen’s complaint is a prime example of why compliance with Rule 10(b) is so

important. The complaint is not organized in numbered paragraphs, and instead consists of a

haphazard assortment of rambling, single-spaced paragraphs and bullet points. See, e.g., Dkt. 1-

3 at 12–20. Moreover, it is “impossible” for the Court to determine the factual bases of Acon-

Chen’s claims. Jiggetts,

. By any measure, the complaint fails to comply with

Rule 10(b).

The Court recognizes that a pro se litigant’s pleadings are held to less stringent standards

than the standard applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner,

(1972). But even pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Jarrell v. Tisch,

(D.D.C. 1987), particularly where, as here, the

plaintiff’s failure to comply disadvantages the opposing party.

For similar reasons, the complaint also fails to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, which requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the

grounds” upon which the Court’s jurisdiction depends, “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and a demand for judgment for the relief the

pleader seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The purpose of the minimum standard of Rule 8 is to give

fair notice to the defendants of the plaintiff’s claim, sufficient to prepare an answer or responsive

motion, to conduct an adequate investigation of the facts, and to determine whether the doctrine

of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano,

(D.D.C. 1977). “When a

complaint ‘contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated,

nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal

4 comments[,]’ it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8.” Ferrell,

, at *7

(alterations in original) (quoting Jiggetts,

). “A confused and rambling

narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.”

(quoting Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2014).

Acon-Chen’s complaint fails to comply with the minimal pleading standard set forth in

Rule 8(a). The complaint spans over two hundred pages, not counting the hundreds of additional

pages of exhibits he filed and incorporates by reference. See generally Dkts. 1, 4–13. The

complaint alleges national origin discrimination and appears to reference various issues related to

Acon-Chen’s employment. Dkt. 1 at 6. But Acon-Chen’s allegations are vague and cryptic: he

asserts that “Defendants” “sabotage[d],” “[h]arassed,” and “defame[d],” him; “[e]xecuted

attacks” on him; “[c]reated a false pattern of firable [sic] misconduct to eventually fire the

Plaintiff under fraudulent false pretenses,” among other things. Dkt. 1 at 5. As Defendants

correctly observe, Acon-Chen provides no intelligible information about when or where these

events occurred, nor does he allege which Defendant “is responsible for each supposedly

discriminatory act.” Dkt. 23 at 12.

In light of these circumstances, and Acon-Chen’s pro se status, the Court will dismiss the

complaint and provide an opportunity for Acon-Chen to file an amended complaint. See

Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors,

(D.D.C. 2015). Acon-Chen is

advised, however, that assuming he intends to bring an employment discrimination claim, his

amended complaint must provide a “short and plain” statement setting forth: (1) the adverse

actions serving as the basis for his complaint, (2) the specific dates and circumstances of those

adverse actions, (3) the alleged unlawful basis for the adverse action (e.g., race discrimination,

retaliation), (4) the person or persons allegedly responsible for each alleged adverse action; and

5 (5) the facts supporting that the adverse actions were taken pursuant to a discriminatory purpose

or other unlawful motive.

B. Improper Service of Process

Defendants also seek dismissal on the basis of improper service because Acon-Chen’s

proof of service indicates that he mailed the summons and complaint himself. Dkt. 23 at 10–11;

see Dkt. 14 at 2 (“I, Felix Acon-Chen, hereby declare that . . . I mailed a copy of the summons

and complaint . . . .”); see also

at 3–4.

Acon-Chen, however, has attached to his reply what appears to be a new proof of service.

See Dkt. 36-1. And unlike his prior proof of service, the exhibit indicates that service was

effected by a third party. Compare Dkt. 14, with Dkt. 36-1. Accordingly, the Court will not

dismiss on this ground, but will permit Defendants to renew their motion to dismiss for

insufficient service to the extent Defendants believe they have not been properly served.

C. Motion for Summary Judgment

Finally, the Court concludes that Acon-Chen’s motion for summary judgment is

premature. Although Rule 56 permits a party to “file a motion for summary judgment at any

time until 30 days after the close of all discovery,” the Rule permits the Court to “order[]

otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). Here, Acon-Chen needs to clear the bar of filing a complaint

that complies with Rules 8 and 10 before moving for summary judgment. For the same reason

that Defendants cannot be expected to answer or move in response to a rambling and cryptic

complaint that, along with the attached exhibits, occupies many hundreds of pages, they cannot

be expected to defend that same, ill-defined case at summary judgment.

The Court will, accordingly, deny Acon-Chen’s motion for summary judgment as

premature.

6 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 23, is GRANTED. It is

further ORDERED that, within 21 days from the issuance of this Order, Plaintiff Acon-Chen

may file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies the Court has identified. Defendants

may renew their motion to dismiss for insufficient service if appropriate. Finally, the Court will

DENY Acon-Chen’s motion for summary judgment as premature.

Although the Court is providing Acon-Chen with the opportunity to file an amended

complaint, the Court cautions that, if he accepts this opportunity, he must comply with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the requirements that the amended complaint contain

“(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds of the court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for

the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In addition, his complaint must “state its claims or

defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of

circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Ultimately, Defendants must be able to understand the

nature of each separate claim asserted and the distinct factual allegations that support each claim,

and they must be able to answer the complaint by admitting or denying the separately numbered,

distinct factual allegations. Finally, the amended complaint must be concise. To assist Acon-

Chen in understanding what that means, the Court will direct that (absent obtaining relief from

the Court upon a proper showing) his complaint should not exceed 30 pages.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: October 5, 2024

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