UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALIEU MANSARAY,

Plaintiff, Case No. 23-cv-144 (JMC)

v.

CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Alieu Mansaray, proceeding pro se, bought a car from a Maryland dealership in

October 2018. ECF 1-1 ¶¶ 7–32; ECF 5 at 2.1 He signed a contract with the dealership to finance

the transaction; Defendant Credit Acceptance Corporation (Credit Acceptance) is the assignee of

that contract. ECF 1-1 ¶¶ 18–20; ECF 5 at 2, 4. The contract includes an arbitration clause. ECF 5

at 3–5. After Mansaray stopped making monthly payments on the contract, Credit Acceptance

retained Defendant Collections Transport Impound Towing, LLC (CTIT) to repossess the vehicle.

ECF 1-1 ¶¶ 30–31; ECF 5 at 5. Mansaray alleges that, on October 22, 2022, CTIT unlawfully

repossessed his car. ECF 1-1 ¶ 90.

Mansaray filed this action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, suing Credit

Acceptance, CTIT, and an unnamed CTIT tow truck driver for various claims arising from the

unlawful repossession. See ECF 1-1. Only Credit Acceptance has been served. See ECF 1 ¶¶ 10,

26–27; ECF 9 ¶¶ 25–45, 58, 60. Credit Acceptance removed the action to federal court, ECF 1,

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.

1 and moved to compel arbitration, ECF 4. Mansaray opposes the motion to compel arbitration,

ECF 13, and moves to remand this action to D.C. Superior Court, ECF 9.

Because Credit Acceptance has not carried its burden to assure this Court of its subject

matter jurisdiction, see Novak v. Cap. Mgmt. & Dev. Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2006),

the Court will GRANT Mansaray’s motion for remand to D.C. Superior Court, ECF 9.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

As noted, two motions are pending before this Court: Mansaray’s motion to remand for

lack of jurisdiction, ECF 9, and Credit Acceptance’s motion to compel arbitration, ECF 4. Because

jurisdiction is a threshold question, the Court must begin with the motion to remand. See Vaden v.

Discover Bank,

(2009) (“Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act . . . authorizes a

United States district court to entertain a petition to compel arbitration if the court would have

jurisdiction, ‘save for [the arbitration] agreement,’ over ‘a suit arising out of the controversy

between the parties.’” (quoting

)).

“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton,

(2013) (quoting Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994)). When a case is removed from state to

federal court, “a plaintiff may move for the case to be remanded back to state court if it believes

that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Inst. for Truth in Mktg. v. Total Health

Network Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2018); see

(c). If the district court

finds that it lacks jurisdiction, it must remand the case. Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris

Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). The burden is on the party who sought removal to

establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, see Kokkonen,

; Gray v.

Gregory, No. 22-CV-1856,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2023), and “[t]he court must

2 resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of remand,” Busby v. Cap.

One, N.A.,

(D.D.C. 2012).

Credit Acceptance removed this case to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds.

ECF 1 ¶ 14. There are two requirements for diversity jurisdiction: (1) the amount in controversy

must exceed $75,000, and (2) each Defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each

Plaintiff—a requirement known as “complete diversity.” See

(a); Owen Equip.

& Erection Co. v. Kroger,

(1978).

II. ANALYSIS

Mansaray argues that this case should be remanded to D.C. Superior Court because this

Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the matter. ECF 9 ¶¶ 15, 93–113. The parties do not dispute

that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction,

Mansaray is a citizen of the District of Columbia and Credit Acceptance is a citizen of Michigan.

See ECF 1 ¶¶ 15-16, 23; see generally ECF 9. The parties disagree, however, about the citizenship

of CTIT and the unnamed tow truck driver. Mansaray argues that they are citizens of the District

of Columbia, defeating complete diversity. See ECF 9 ¶¶ 94–113. Credit Acceptance contends that

CTIT is a citizen of Maryland and that the citizenship of the John Doe defendant (the tow truck

driver) is immaterial. See ECF 11 at 37.

Credit Acceptance is correct that the Court need not consider the unnamed driver’s

citizenship in assessing diversity jurisdiction.

(b)(1) provides: “[i]n determining

whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) . . . the

citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” This includes cases

where the plaintiff names a John Doe defendant—or here, “Driver’s name (Unknown)”—because

the plaintiff does not know the defendant’s identity. See 14C Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal

3 Practice and Procedure § 3723 (4th ed. 2024) (explaining that Congress amended the removal

statute in 1988 to ensure that “the presence of Doe defendants no longer can defeat subject-matter

jurisdiction, and does not afford a ground for remanding an action to state court.”); see, e.g., Smith

v. Comcast Corp.,

, 939 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (holding that district court

correctly disregarded citizenship of defendants identified as “Number One” and “Number Two”).

But Credit Acceptance has not carried its burden to establish CTIT’s citizenship.2 CTIT is

a limited liability company (LLC). ECF 1 ¶ 17; ECF 9 ¶ 94. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction,

an LLC has the citizenship of each of its members. CostCommand, LLC v. WH Administrators,

Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2016). “An individual has citizenship in a state for diversity

purposes if he is an American citizen and is domiciled in the state.”

“Domicile is determined

by two factors: physical presence in a state, and intent to remain there for an unspecified or

indefinite period of time.” Prakash v. Am. Univ.,

(D.C. Cir. 1984).

Credit Acceptance has provided a sworn declaration stating that CTIT has one member,

William Evans, who resides in Maryland. ECF 11-3 at 2. Mr. Evans states that he has lived in

Maryland since 1969 and has resided at his current address in Prince George’s County since 2016.

While this certainly establishes Mr. Evans’ physical presence in Maryland, the declaration says

nothing about the second requirement of domicile: whether Mr. Evans intends to remain in the

state. See Prakash,

; see also ECF 1-7 at 2 (email from Mr. Evans confirming

only that he is “a resident of the state of Maryland”). The bare fact that a party resides in a state,

or has resided in a state, does not necessarily render him a citizen of that state for diversity

2 Although CTIT has not been served, “a court, in determining the propriety of removal based on diversity of citizenship, must consider all named defendants, regardless of service.” Pecherski v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

(8th Cir. 1981); see Woods v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc.,

, 757 (10th Cir. 2021) (“A defendant’s citizenship is part of the diversity analysis regardless of whether the defendant has been served.”); In re Levy,

(5th Cir. 2022) (similar).

4 jurisdiction purposes. See Lopes v. Jetsetdc, LLC,

(D.D.C. 2014)

(“Citizenship depends upon domicile, and, as domicile and residence are two different things, it

follows that citizenship is not determined by residence.”). Because Credit Acceptance focuses

exclusively on residency and offers no evidence or argument about Mr. Evans’ intentions to remain

in Maryland, the Court cannot determine whether he is a Maryland citizen.3 See, e.g., Baldwin v.

Monier Lifetile, L.L.C., No. 05-CV-1058,

, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2005)

(remanding to state court where defendants alleged that plaintiffs resided in Arizona, but “fail[ed]

to allege that the Plaintiffs [we]re citizens of the state of Arizona.”); Houston v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

No. 14-CV-2786,

, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (remanding to state court

where defendants alleged that plaintiffs were California citizens, but only presented evidence of

residency—that plaintiffs lived in California and owned property there); Villamil v. Fayrustin,

No. 23-CV-0428,

, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2024) (“[T]he mere fact that

Plaintiffs’ pleadings identify Villamil as a Texas resident doesn’t guarantee that she’s a Texas

citizen. To evaluate whether the parties are completely diverse, the Court must also know where

Villamil is domiciled—i.e., where she intends to remain indefinitely.” (emphases omitted)). And

because the Court cannot determine whether Mr. Evans is a Maryland citizen, the Court cannot

assure itself of complete diversity.

Such an outcome may seem unduly technical, but “[c]itizenship is an essential element of

federal diversity jurisdiction; failing to establish citizenship is not a mere technicality. The party

seeking the exercise of diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of pleading the citizenship of each

and every party to the action.” Novak,

. The party advocating for jurisdiction must

3 Nor does Credit Acceptance even argue that the Court could or should infer, from the fact of Mr. Evans’ longtime residence in the state, that he intends to remain there. Credit Acceptance simply says nothing about whether Mr. Evans intends to remain in Maryland.

5 check certain boxes to establish diversity jurisdiction, and Credit Acceptance has failed to check

one of those boxes. Because Credit Acceptance has provided no information or argument on the

second prong of domicile—whether Mr. Evans intends to remain in Maryland—the Court cannot

determine his citizenship and therefore cannot assure itself of complete diversity. Absent that

information, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action.4 And because the Court cannot satisfy

itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction, it may not address Credit Acceptance’s motion to

compel arbitration. See

(providing that a party may file a motion to compel arbitration

in “any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction”);

Hines v. Stamos,

, 565 (5th Cir. 2024) (“[A] court cannot rule on arbitrability without

subject-matter . . . jurisdiction.”); see Vaden,

.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to remand to D.C. Superior Court, ECF 9, is

GRANTED. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge

Date: October 7, 2024

4 Credit Acceptance also argues that the Court should deny Mansaray’s motion to remand as untimely, pursuant to

(c), because he filed his motion to remand more than 30 days after the case was removed. ECF 11 at 6. But, as Credit Acceptance itself recognizes, see

Section 1447(c) provides an exception for defects of subject matter jurisdiction: “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded,”

(c) (emphasis added).

6