UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ADAEZE NWOSU,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-2213 (CRC)

YALE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Adaeze Nwosu, proceeding pro se, brings fraud and Title VI claims against the

Yale School of Medicine, the University of Miami School of Medicine, the United States

Department of Education, employees of the Liaison Committee for Medical Education

(“LCME”), and various other individual defendants associated with these institutions because

she was not admitted as a transfer student to Yale’s or the University of Miami’s school of

medicine. The University of Miami defendants and the LCME employees have moved to

dismiss the complaint on several grounds. The Court will dismiss the claims against them for

lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court will also deny Nwosu’s motion for recusal and strike her

notice of removal.

The Department of Education defendants have yet to appear and the Yale defendants

have appeared but have not replied to the complaint. The claims against those defendants

therefore remain live.

I. Background

Although Nwosu’s amended complaint is not a model of clarity, the Court takes the

following facts from her filings as true. See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA,

, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The defendants no doubt contest many of these allegations. Nwosu first applied to the Yale School of Medicine in 2017 and was “waitlisted

indefinitely.” Compl., ECF No. 1, at 6. She claims that when she applied, she “endured a very

racist interview by one of the admissions team.” Id. at 10. Then, in the spring of 2022, she

sought to transfer to the Yale School of Medicine from an institution in Ireland and spoke to the

Yale dean of admissions over Zoom about doing so. Compl. at 4, 7. 1 During the Zoom call, the

dean of admissions sent Nwosu the school’s transfer policy, which, according to Nwosu, stated

that transfer applications would be considered in April 2022. Id. at 7. The dean also “accepted

that [Nwosu] could be considered for a transfer application.” Id. at 9. Nwosu’s mother later sent

a letter to Yale’s admissions director 2 “detailing race based prejudice” faced by Nwosu at her

current school. Id. at 7. In preparation for her application, Nwosu obtained six letters of

recommendation from physicians and scientists. Id. Her current institution also submitted its

curriculum to Yale. Id. When Nwosu visited the Yale School of Medicine’s website at the end

of the month, however, she found that the school’s transfer policy had changed such that transfer

applications would not be considered until June. Id.

Nwosu wrote to the admissions director asking for a transfer application. Id. The dean

responded that the school was waiting to see whether there would be space for transfer students

in the class. Id. Then, in early May, the dean informed Nwosu that there would be no space for

transfer students to begin in the fall of 2022. Id. Nwosu alleges that the school’s decision not to

accept transfer applicants after all was an act of “race-based discrimination” because it

“unfavorably prevented a black female applicant, who had testified in confidence . . . about the

1 Because the Complaint does not use paragraph numbers consistently, the Court will cite to page numbers of the Complaint instead. 2 Nwosu alternately refers to the dean of admissions and the director of admissions at Yale’s School of Medicine. It is not clear whether she means to refer to the same person.

2 racial prejudice and actions precluding her from continuing her medical education” from

applying to transfer. Id. at 8.

Nwosu then complained to a Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion official at Yale “about

possible admissions discrimination.” Id. at 7. She also reached out to the Liaison Committee of

Medical Education (“LCME”), which serves as an accrediting body for medical education

programs leading to the M.D. degree. Id. at 8; LCME Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 21, at 3. She

was advised to lodge formal complaints with Yale and the LCME. Compl. at 8. In September

2022, Nwosu filed a complaint with the LCME, alleging that the Yale School of Medicine had

prevented her from applying to transfer because of her race. Id. at 15–16. A few days later,

LCME responded with its determination that Nwosu’s complaint did “not contain issues relating

to the program’s compliance with accreditation standards nor performance in accreditation

elements.” Id. at 18. Accordingly, LCME closed the file on Nwosu’s complaint and informed

her that no further action would be taken. Id. Nwosu then wrote a letter to LCME Co-Secretary

Barbara Barzansky seeking reconsideration of LCME’s decision not to act on her complaint. Id.

at 19; LCME Mot. to Dismiss at 5. Barzansky is not alleged to have responded. Compl. at 19.

Nwosu also filed a complaint with the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights.

Id. at 11. One Department of Education official, Jillian Siegelbaum, allegedly told her that

Yale’s actions were “protected by immunity.” Id. Nwosu spoke to another official, Gilian

Thompson, who purportedly told her that she would convey Nwosu’s response to “Yale’s

comments about her allegations” to the school. Id. at 12. Thompson also informed Nwosu via

email that her response would be considered in connection with the Department’s investigation.

Id. When Nwosu followed up over email about Yale’s response to her “subsequent enquiries,”

3 Thompson told her that the Department was considering the information provided by Nwosu and

Yale. Id. at 13.

Nwosu also applied to the University of Miami’s MD/MPH program during the 2020

admissions cycle. Id. at 20. After her interview, she complained about the “type, tone and

a[g]gressive manner” of the interviewing physician and subsequently received a low interview

score. Id. at 21. Nwosu followed up on her application in the spring of 2022 with Dean of

Admissions Dr. Richard S. Weisman. Id. at 20–21; Miami Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 10, at 1.

Dr. Weisman informed Nwosu over email that she had not been waitlisted for the M.D. program

because her M.D. Program score “was lower and out of the alternative list range.” Id. at 21. She

had, however, been placed on the waitlist for the MD/MPH program, but the university had not

ultimately offered her admission. Id. 3 Nwosu alleges that the University of Miami “negligently

removed” her “from the waitlist because of her race/national origin.” Id.

Nwosu filed suit against the Yale School of Medicine and two of its employees, Laura

Ment and Barbara Watts (together, the “Yale Defendants”); two LCME employees, Robert Hash

and Barbara Barzansky, and an LCME independent contractor, Kenneth Simons (together, the

“LCME Defendants”); the University of Miami and Dr. Weisman (the “Miami Defendants”);

and the United States Department of Education and three of its employees, Jillian Siegelbaum,

Meighan McCrea, and Gilian Thompson (the “Government Defendants”). See Compl. at 1–2.

Nwosu alleges that Yale and the University of Miami violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (“Title VI”) and made fraudulent representations by declining to admit her as a transfer

3 Nwosu appears to have pasted text from an email exchange with Weisman in the complaint, though it is not entirely clear which text is attributable to Nwosu and which to Weisman. See Compl. at 21. It appears that Weisman told Nwosu that the University of Miami never reached her score on the MD/MPH waitlist such that she would have been admitted, but Nwosu alleges that “[y]ou did reach my score on the MD/MPH program alternate list.” Id.

4 student, and that LCME and the Department of Education made fraudulent representations while

investigating her complaints.

The Miami Defendants and LCME Defendants filed motions to dismiss. Nwosu opposes.

She has also filed a motion for recusal and a notice of removal purporting to remove or transfer

this case to the Southern District of New York under

(a) or 28 U.S.C § 1441. 4

See ECF Nos. 31, 39. The Court will grant the motions to dismiss, deny Nwosu’s motion for

recusal and strike her notice of removal.

II. Legal Standards

LCME and the University of Miami have moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6).

Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a suit for lack of personal

jurisdiction. Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad,

(D.C. Cir. 2021). A plaintiff

“bear[s] the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendants.” Clay v. Blue

Hackle N. Am. L.L.C.,

(D.D.C. 2012). To establish personal jurisdiction,

a plaintiff “‘must allege specific acts connecting [the] defendant with the forum’ and ‘cannot rely

on conclusory allegations.’”

(quoting Second Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors,

(D.C. Cir. 2001)).

Under Rule 12(b)(5), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for “insufficient service

of process.” The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he effectuated proper service. See

Hilska v. Jones,

(D.D.C. 2003) (citing Light v. Wolf,

(D.C.

Cir. 1987)). “[T]o do so, he must demonstrate that the procedure employed satisfied the

4 Nwosu actually cites “28 U.S.C § 144,” Notice, ECF No. 39, at 1, but presumably means to invoke 28 U.S.C § 1441.

5 requirements of the relevant portions of Rule 4 and any other applicable provision of law.”

Light,

(quotation marks omitted). “[U]nless the procedural requirements for

effective service of process are satisfied, a court lacks authority to exercise personal jurisdiction

over the defendant.” Candido v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2007).

“Although district courts have broad discretion to dismiss a complaint for failure to effect

service, dismissal is not appropriate when there exists a reasonable prospect that service can be

obtained.” Novak v. World Bank,

(D.C. Cir. 1983). In such cases, the

court has discretion to quash service and instruct the plaintiff to try again. See, e.g., Angelich v.

MedTrust, LLC,

(D.D.C. 2012).

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

A

court “must treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff the benefit of

all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). Although a complaint need not provide “detailed

factual allegations” to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion, it must offer “more than labels and

conclusions.” Twombly,

. Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” so long as the pleading contains “factual matter” that

allows the Court to “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Atherton v. D.C. Off.

of Mayor,

, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

6 III. Analysis

Because the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over either the Miami or LCME

Defendants, it will dismiss Nwosu’s claims against them. The Court will not transfer Nwosu’s

claims because, in any event, she fails to state any claim for relief. The Court will also deny

Nwosu’s motion for recusal and strike her notice of removal.

A. Miami Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

1. Personal Jurisdiction

The Miami Defendants contend that Nwosu has failed to meet her burden of establishing

personal jurisdiction over them. The Court agrees.

Two forms of personal jurisdiction empower a court to exercise coercive authority over a

non-resident defendant: general and specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction arises when the

“non-resident defendant maintains sufficiently systematic and continuous contacts with the

forum state, regardless of whether those contacts gave rise to the claim in the particular suit.”

App Dynamic ehf v. Vignisson,

(D.D.C. 2015) (citing Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,

, 414–15 (1984)). Section 13–422 of the

D.C. Code enables a District of Columbia court to exercise general jurisdiction “over a person

domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in,

the District of Columbia as to any claim for relief.” When a corporate defendant is neither

incorporated in nor has its principal place of business in the forum state, “a court has general

jurisdiction over the defendant only if its affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so

constant and pervasive as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum state.” Moldauer v.

Constellation Brands Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2015) (Cooper, J.) (citation and

quotation marks omitted), aff’d, No. 15-5103,

(D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2019).

7 Neither of the Miami Defendants meets the requirements for the Court to exercise general

jurisdiction. The University of Miami is a not-for-profit corporation that is not organized under

the laws of, nor maintains its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia. Miami

Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1 (“Goldberg Decl.”) ¶ 3. Dr. Weisman is domiciled in Florida and has

never resided in the District of Columbia.

Ex. 2 (“Weisman Decl.”) ¶ 3. The Court therefore

may not exercise general jurisdiction over the Miami Defendants.

Nor does the Court have specific jurisdiction over either defendant. Specific jurisdiction

exists when the plaintiff’s claim arises “out of or [is] related to the defendant’s contacts with the

forum.” Helicopteros,

n.8. “A plaintiff seeking to establish specific jurisdiction

over a non-resident must establish that specific jurisdiction comports with the forum’s long-arm

statute, D.C. Code § 13–423(a), and does not violate due process.” FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX

Mkts., Ltd.,

, 1094–95 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The District of Columbia’s long-arm

statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over persons “as to a claim for relief arising

from” certain specified activities in the District of Columbia, including transacting business,

contracting to supply services, and causing tortious injury. D.C. Code § 13–423(a).

Nwosu’s claims do not arise from any action taken by the Miami Defendants in the

District of Columbia. 5 Her claims are entirely based on the School of Medicine’s decision not to

admit her as a transfer student, which was made in Florida.

Without specifying whether her argument goes to general or specific jurisdiction, Nwosu

responds the University of Miami has an externship program for law students in D.C.,

5 Nwosu’s unsupported allegation that “all defendants have significant minimum contacts in the District of Columbia,” Compl. at 4, does not move the needle. A plaintiff must put forward “specific, non-conclusory allegations that establish personal jurisdiction over” the defendants. Dean v. Walker,

(D.D.C. 2010)

8 occasionally sends lobbyists to D.C., and that the LCME, which is responsible for medical-

school accreditation, has a D.C. address. Opp’n, ECF No. 30, at 3–9. Those contacts are not

enough to assert general jurisdiction over the Miami Defendants. And Nwosu’s claims do not

arise from the University of Miami’s externship program, lobbying efforts, or accreditation

process, so specific jurisdiction does not exist, either. The Court therefore may not exercise

personal jurisdiction over the Miami Defendants. 6

And because the plaintiff’s claims “demonstrate[] significant substantive problems,” as

the Court will next discuss, the Court does not find it in the interests of justice to transfer this

case to another court. Ananiev v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

(D.D.C.

2013).

2. Failure to State a Claim

In any event, Nwosu fails to state either a Title VI or negligence claim against the Miami

Defendants. First, her claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Title VI claims

and negligence claims are both governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Stafford v.

George Washington Univ.,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (Title VI); Shenton v. Potomac Elec.

Power Co., No. 19-cv-1426 (RBW),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2020)

(negligence). Nwosu’s claims relate to the University of Miami’s decision not to admit her

during the 2020 admissions cycle. She was aware that she had been waitlisted by March 2020.

Compl. at 21. But she did not follow up on her application until March 2022, Compl. at 20–21,

6 Since Nwosu has failed to establish jurisdiction over the defendants under the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, “the Court does not have to resolve whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable or fair based on the District of Columbia’s interest in adjudicating the dispute.” Dean,

n.3 (cleaned up) (citation omitted).

9 and did not file her complaint against the University of Miami Defendants until July 2024. Her

claims are therefore time-barred.

Nwosu responds that she did not know of Weisman’s “wiles and guiles” until March

2022. Opp’n at 10; Compl. at 20. It is not clear what she means. But to the extent she attempts

to invoke the discovery rule applicable to negligence claims, she fails. The discovery rule

provides that when “the relationship between the fact of injury and the conduct is obscure . . . the

claim does not accrue until the claimant knows or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should

know of (1) the injury, (2) its cause[-]in[-]fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.’”

Shenton,

, at *3 (alteration in original). Here, the relationship between

Nwosu’s injury—not being admitted as a transfer student—and Weisman’s conduct—

communicating with her in his capacity as the Dean of Admissions— is not obscure. Even if it

was, Nwosu could have exercised reasonable diligence to learn more about the status of her

application by following up promptly, rather than waiting for two years.

And even if Nwosu’s claims were not time-barred, her allegations do not state either a

Title VI or negligence claim. She alleges nothing more than the University of Miami placed her

on the waitlist for its MD/MPH program and ultimately did not admit her off the waitlist. Both

her Title VI and negligence claims center on the conclusory allegation that she was removed

from the waitlist either “negligently” or “because of her race.” Compl. at 21. But she alleges no

facts in support. The only facts she offers are that she was not admitted off the waitlist and that

Weisman told her the school never reached her score on the waitlist such that it would have

admitted her. Nwosu does baldly state that the school “did reach my score,”

but that entirely

conclusory opinion, without any factual support, does not state a legal claim by any stretch of the

10 imagination, even under the “less stringent standards” afforded to pro se complaints. Atherton,

567 F.3d at 681–82. 7

B. LCME Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

1. Personal Jurisdiction

Nwosu’s claims against the LCME Defendants arise out of their response to her

complaint against Yale after her transfer application there was denied. She sued three

individuals who she believes were involved with LCME’s consideration of the decision not to act

on her complaint: Barzansky, the LCME Co-Secretary, Hash, an American Medical Association

employee assigned to the LCME, and Simons, an LCME contractor. LCME Mot. to Dismiss at

5–6. The Court does not have personal jurisdiction over any of these defendants.

First, none of the three defendants are domiciled or work in D.C., so the Court cannot

exercise general jurisdiction over them. See Duarte v. Nolan,

, 12–13 (D.D.C.

2016) ) (Cooper, J.). Barzansky lives and works in Chicago. LCME Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A

(“Barzansky Decl.”) ¶¶ 5-7. Hash has at all relevant times lived and worked in Illinois or

Tennessee. LCME Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B (“Hash Decl.”) ¶¶ 5–6. And Simons resides in

Wisconsin and has never worked in D.C. LCME Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C (“Simons Decl.”) ¶ 6–

7.

The Court also cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the LCME Defendants

because Nwosu’s claims do not arise from any of their contacts with D.C. See D.C. Code § 13–

423(a). Indeed, they have no such contacts, as none of the LCME Defendants have ever lived or

7 Nwosu also concedes her failure to properly serve the Miami Defendants. Opp’n at 1– 2. This appears to be another ground supporting dismissal, except that given her representation that she is attempting to serve the correct address, there may “exist[] a reasonable prospect that service can be obtained.” Barot v. Embassy of the Republic of Zambia,

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

11 worked in D.C. Barzansky Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; Hash Decl. ¶¶ 5–6; Simons Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; LCME Mot.

to Dismiss at 6.

The Court will therefore dismiss the claims against the LCME Defendants for lack of

personal jurisdiction. And it will not transfer the case because of the “significant substantive

problems” the Court will next discuss. Ananiev,

.

2. Failure to State a Claim

Nwosu also fails to state a claim of fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, or constructive

fraud against Hash and Simons. The elements of fraud include “(1) a false representation (2)

made in reference to a material fact, (3) with knowledge of its falsity, (4) with the intent to

deceive, and (5) an action that is taken in reliance upon the representation.” Hercules & Co. v.

Shama Rest. Corp.,

(D.C. 1992). Constructive fraud, too, requires that the

defendant make a false representation. See Himmelstein v. Comcast of the Dist., LLC,

(D.D.C. 2012).

Here, Nwosu has not alleged any false representation by Hash or Simons. The only

representation identified in the complaint is the LCME Defendants’ response to Nwosu’s

complaint about Yale. LCME responded that Nwosu’s complaint “does not contain issues

relating to the program’s compliance with accreditation standards nor performance in

accreditation elements” and therefore closed its file on the matter. Compl. at 18. As the LCME

Defendants point out, though Nwosu may disagree with it, there is nothing false about that

response. LCME Mot. to Dismiss at 15–16.

Nwosu similarly fails to state a claim of negligent representation against Defendant

Barzansky. Nwosu does not allege that Barzansky made any representations to her at all, merely

that Barzansky never responded to Nwosu’s letter seeking reconsideration of the LCME’s

12 decision not to pursue the complaint against Yale. Compl. at 19. Given that Nwosu has not

identified any false representation made by Barzansky, either, her negligent misrepresentation

claim fails. See C & E Servs., Inc. v. Ashland, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2007). 8

C. Motion for Recusal

The Court also denies Nwosu’s motion for recusal. Nwosu rests her motion on

substantively the same allegations as those in the motion for recusal filed in Nwosu v. Four

Seasons, No. 24-cv-25 (CRC), where she complained about the service she allegedly received at

several Four Seasons hotels across the country. For the reasons the Court denied Nwosu’s

motion in that case, see ECF No. 37 at 5–6, the Court again denies Nwosu’s motion for recusal

here.

D. Notice of Removal

Finally, the Court strikes Nwosu’s notice purporting to remove this case to the Southern

District of New York. For the reasons already explained, the Court does not find it in the

interests of justice to transfer Nwosu’s meritless claims to any other district court under

(a). And, as the Court previously noted, Nwosu is not a defendant and this Court

is not a state court, so removal under

is not appropriate. See Nwosu v. Four

Seasons, No. 24-cv-25 (CRC), ECF No. 37 at 6.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, it is hereby

8 Nwosu did not serve the LCME Defendants properly, which is another ground for dismissal. She “only mailed copies of the complaint via certified mail to a District of Columbia office address where none of the LCME Defendants work,” LCME Mot. to Dismiss at 1, rather than complying with Rule 4(e).

13 ORDERED that [Dkt. No. 10] Miami Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. It

is further

ORDERED that [Dkt. No. 21] LCME Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. It

is further

ORDERED that [Dkt. No. 31] Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that [Dkt. No. 39] Plaintiff’s Notice of Removal is STRICKEN.

SO ORDERED.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

Date: November 5, 2024

14