UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Criminal Action No. 23-227 (JEB)

JEFFREY REED,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On September 18, 2024, after a bench trial, the Court found Jeffrey Reed guilty of five

counts arising from his participation in the insurrection at the United States Capitol on January 6,

2021. Defendant has now filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict

as to one count, which the Court will deny.

I. Background

On the infamous date of January 6, Reed was one of the first people who bypassed

multiple barricades to access restricted Capitol grounds and enter the building. The Government

consequently charged him with five counts arising from those events: (i) Civil Disorder, in

violation of

(a)(3); (ii) Entering and Remaining in a Restricted Building or

Grounds, in violation of

(a)(1); (iii) Disorderly and Disruptive Conduct in a

Restricted Building or Grounds, in violation of

(a)(2); (iv) Disorderly Conduct

in a Capitol Building, in violation of

(e)(2)(D); and (v) Parading,

Demonstrating, or Picketing in a Capitol Building, in violation of

(e)(2)(G).

See ECF No. 9 (Indictment). After the Court denied two pretrial motions to dismiss — one

1 specific to Count I and one focused on all other counts — Defendant went to trial last September.

See Minute Order of September 4, 2024; Minute Entries of Sept. 16–18, 2024.

At the end of trial, the Court convicted Reed of all five counts. See Trial Transcript of

Sept. 18, 2024, at 47–53. He has now filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding

the Verdict regarding only the charge of Civil Disorder. See ECF No. 57 (Mot.).

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)(1) provides that “[a] defendant may move for a

judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the

court discharges the jury, whichever is later.” When considering such a motion, the court must

“consider[] th[e] evidence in the light most favorable to the government” and uphold a guilty

verdict if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Wahl,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Put another way,

the court must determine whether “a reasonable juror must necessarily have had a reasonable

doubt as to the defendants’ guilt.” United States v. Weisz,

(D.C. Cir. 1983).

III. Analysis

Title

(a)(3) makes it unlawful to “commit[] or attempt[] to commit any

act to obstruct, impede, or interfere with any . . . law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the

lawful performance of his official duties incident to and during the commission of a civil

disorder which in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or adversely affects commerce or the

movement of any article or commodity in commerce or the conduct or performance of any

federally protected function.” Reed stipulated that “the officers were engaged in the lawful

performance of their duties incident to and during a civil disorder.” See Tr. Trans. at 47:24–

48:1. The only question left for the Court was thus “whether . . . [D]efendant committed an act

2 with the intended purpose of obstructing, impeding, or interfering with one or more law

enforcement officers.”

at 48:3–5; see also

at 28:6–9. The Court answered affirmatively in

its verdict, finding that Reed had committed such an act at breach points one (snow fencing at the

Peace Monument), two (bike racks at the top of the Pennsylvania walkway), and four (bike racks

at the base of the scaffolding at the Southwest staircase).

at 47–50.

Defendant now challenges the Court’s holding that he committed a requisite “act” at any

of the breach points and that he possessed the intent to obstruct officers at any time. The

Government counters that Reed committed an act with the required intent at all three points. The

Court need only find that there was one act that violated

(a)(3) to uphold its

verdict on Count I. Since Reed’s conduct at breach point four is the clearest violation of the

statute, the Court will focus its discussion there.

A. Act

At breach point four, the Court found that “[D]efendant was yanking and pulling on the

bike rack by the inaugural stage and that such actions were clearly interfering or were impeding

law enforcement officers who were attempting to maintain those racks.” Tr. Trans. at 48:14–17.

The Court credited the testimony given by Lieutenants Hopkins and Cruz to prove this fact but

stated that they were unnecessary, as its conclusion was “the only logical inference” to be drawn

from Government Exhibit 508, the video of the incident.

at 48:20–21.

Defendant rejoins that the exhibit was unclear. See Mot. at 10. He contends that the

video shows only portions of his body, so the factfinder is left to infer his actions based on mere

flashes of his sweatshirt and boots in a large crowd.

The Government asserts that Exhibit

508 “clearly shows . . . [D]efendant with his knees bent and arms out engaging in a forceful tug

3 of war over a bike rack with a police officer, ultimately ending as the defendant’s final yank

caused an officer to fall to the ground.” ECF No. 59 (Resp.) at 6. This is accurate.

Reed does not contest that he was at the bike racks at the base of the Southwest staircase,

and that his sweatshirt, beard, and boots are visible in the video. The video shows more than his

mere presence, however, as it depicts Defendant leaning down, swaying backward, leaning

forward again, and finally falling backwards. That parts of his body are partially blocked is

irrelevant; a rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant

forcefully shoved the bike racks at the officers. As Reed has offered no convincing evidence to

undermine this finding, the Court sees no reason to change its decision.

B. Intent

Reed next asserts in a footnote that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he possessed the intent to interfere with officers at breach point four. See Mot. at 11

n.1. The Government counters that the requisite intent is abundantly clear because “[D]efendant

surged forward — through every police line and barricade line in his way — until he reached the

Capitol building . . . . He disarmed police officers of critical defensive tools (bike racks) and

used force to overpower the officer lines. . . . [D]efendant screamed threatening remarks at

police officers for protecting the Capitol building at times when . . . [D]efendant was stopped

from progressing.” Resp. at 5. In response, Reed argues that the Government cannot rely on “a

bunch of different actions” to show intent but instead must prove his mental state as to the

specific act in question. See ECF No. 60 (Reply) at 2.

Yet Defendant does not proffer any argument as to why a rational factfinder could not

find beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions at breach point four were done with the intent to

obstruct officers. Indeed, that is the only logical inference. There is no other reason to shove a

4 bike rack at an officer other than to obstruct him. The Court can also use Defendant’s prior

actions to understand what he knew when he arrived at the Southwest staircase. See U.S. v.

Moore,

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The intent with which a person commits an act on a

given occasion can many times be best proven by testimony or evidence of his acts over a period

of time prior thereto, particularly when the activity involves a continuous course of dealing.”)

(quoting U.S. v. Harrison,

(D.C. Cir. 1982)); U.S. v. Maude,

(D.C. Cir. 1973) (“As everybody knows, because of the impossibility of demonstrating

directly just what a person might at any given time have in mind, intent must be proved

circumstantially by resort to the surroundings of the objective activities.”). At that point, Reed

had watched the mob break the officers’ barricades at multiple breach points and repeatedly run

toward the next set of barriers to get closer to the Capitol as officers retreated. A reasonable

factfinder could thus infer beyond a reasonable doubt that by the time he arrived at the Southwest

steps, Reed knew that the officers were trying to stop the crowd from moving forward, and that

using a bike rack to play tug-of-war with the officers would interfere with that objective.

He has thus not convinced the Court to reverse its requisite intent finding.

IV. Conclusion

Since the Court upholds its verdict as to both elements of Count I, it will deny

Defendant’s Motion for Acquittal. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: November 15, 2024

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