UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES

v. Criminal Action No. 24-144 (LLA)

DEANGELO LORENZO LEWIS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on Defendant Deangelo Lorenzo Lewis’s Motion to Sever

Count One in the Superseding Indictment from Counts Two Through Four. ECF No. 54. For the

reasons discussed below, the court DENIES Mr. Lewis’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In October 2023, Mr. Lewis was charged by criminal complaint. ECF No. 1. The affidavit

in support of the complaint described several items observed in plain view during the execution of

an arrest warrant at his alleged premises. ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 5. The paraphernalia included a Canon

VersaCheck printer, computers, multiple bank cards and a Maryland driver’s license (none of

which were in Mr. Lewis’s name), blank check stock “commonly used to counterfeit checks,”

marijuana, and narcotics packing material. Id. A subsequent search warrant uncovered additional

bags of marijuana and several guns. Id. at ¶ 7.

In March 2024, Mr. Lewis was indicted on three counts: Unlawful Possession with Intent

to Distribute Marijuana in violation of

(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D); Unlawful Possession

of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Person Convicted of a Crime Punishable by Imprisonment for

a Term Exceeding One Year in violation of

(g)(1); and Using, Carrying, and Possessing a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Offense in violation of

(c)(1)(A)(i). ECF No. 15.

Eight months later, in November 2024, a grand jury returned a four-count Superseding

Indictment, which added the charge of Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud in violation of

(“Count One”). ECF No. 52. As support for Count One, the government alleges in the

Superseding Indictment that between August 20, 2023 and October 3, 2023, Mr. Lewis and his co-

conspirators “obtained legitimate bank checks, modified them, and then deposited the bank checks

at financial institutions.”

.

On November 23, Mr. Lewis moved to sever Count One of the Superseding Indictment

from the other counts. ECF No. 54. The United States opposes the motion. ECF No. 55.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 8(a) permits joinder of offenses if the “offenses charged . . . are of the same or similar

character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of

a common scheme or plan.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). Rule 8 “has generally been construed liberally

in favor of joinder.” United States v. Gooch,

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting United

States v. Richardson,

(D.C. Cir. 1998)). The “presumption in favor of joinder

‘is especially strong where the respective charges require presentation of much the same evidence,

testimony of the same witnesses, and involve . . . defendants who are charged, inter alia, with

participating in the same illegal acts.’” United States v. McGill,

(D.C. Cir. 2016)

(alteration in original) (quoting Richardson, 167 F.3d at 624). Indeed, joinder of offenses is

permitted “even if [the offenses] are entirely unrelated to each other.” Gooch,

(quoting United States v. Jackson,

(D.C. Cir. 1977)). Evaluating joinder under

Rule 8 requires the court to “focus[] solely on the indictment and pre-trial submissions,” not “the

2 evidence presented at trial.” Gooch,

. Thus, “the Government need merely allege,

not prove, the facts necessary to sustain joinder.”

However, Rule 8 cannot be stretched to join

offenses that are “discrete and dissimilar and which do not constitute parts of a common scheme

or plan.” Gooch,

(quoting Richardson,

).

Where joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant[,] . . . the court may order separate trials

of counts . . . or provide any other relief that justice requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). This Circuit

has recognized several kinds of prejudice under Rule 14: “1) the jury may cumulate evidence of

the separate crimes; 2) the jury may improperly infer a criminal disposition and treat the inference

as evidence of guilt; [or] 3) the defendant may become ‘embarrassed or confounded’ in presenting

different defenses to the different charges.” Gooch,

(quoting Blunt v. United

States,

(D.C. Cir. 1968)). Prejudice may also arise from joinder “when an

accused wishes to testify on one but not the other of two joined offenses which are clearly distinct

in time, place and evidence.” Cross v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1964).

It is the defendant’s burden to show the existence of prejudice. United States v. Brown,

(D.C. Cir. 1994). A showing of prejudice, however, “does not result in an automatic

grant of the motion [to sever].” Gooch,

; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a) (directing

that “the court may order” relief upon finding prejudice (emphasis added)). Determining whether

severance is appropriate remains within the discretion of the district court. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 14(a). Severance is proper “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would . . . prevent the

jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” United States v. Carson,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Zafiro v. United States,

(1993)). Absent a

showing of substantial prejudice, “[d]istrict courts should grant severance sparingly because of the

‘strong interests favoring joint trials, particularly the desire to conserve the time of courts,

3 prosecutors, witnesses, and jurors.’” United States v. Celis,

(D.C. Cir. 2010)

(quoting United States v. Mardian,

(D.C. Cir. 1976)).

III. DISCUSSION

The court denies Mr. Lewis’s motion to sever because he has failed to show that the counts

against him are improperly joined or that such joinder prejudices him.

A. Count One was Properly Joined Pursuant to Rule 8(a)

Mr. Lewis argues that the counts against him were improperly joined under Rule 8(a)

because “[t]he bank fraud conspiracy bears absolutely no relationship to the marijuana possession

charge or the gun charges.” ECF No. 54, at 3. Specifically, he contends that the conspiracy count

is “not of the same character,” “not based on the same act or transaction,” not “part of a common

scheme[] or plan,” and “do[es] not involve common witnesses or common evidence” as the

remaining counts.

The court disagrees. The United States alleges that Mr. Lewis’s discussion of bank fraud

via electronic messages occurred “at the same time that he was selling drugs and illegally

possessing firearms.” ECF No. 55, at 7-8. In fact, in one message exchange, Mr. Lewis states that

he sold marijuana to supplement the income that he was earning from “scamming.” Id. at 8. Based

on these intertwined communications, the United States correctly maintains that the “bank fraud

offenses provide the motive and necessity for the drug charge.” Id. at 9. And, in turn, the drug

charge provides the motive and necessity for the gun charge, “because the nature of drug

distribution is such that firearms are necessary to protect a drug dealer’s drugs, cash, and person.”

Id.

Additionally, there is “commonality of proof” between the offenses. United States v.

Wilkins,

, 87 (D.D.C. 2021); see McGill,

(explaining that

4 joinder is proper “where the respective charges require presentation of much the same evidence

[and] testimony of the same witnesses”). As the United States explains, the physical and digital

evidence underling each count were “seized simultaneously” and will require the same testimony

from the law enforcement agents who executed the arrest warrant, wrote the residential search

warrant, wrote the digital search warrant, and searched the digital extraction. ECF No. 55, at 8.

Given the interconnectedness of the offenses and the overlapping evidence, the counts were

properly joined.

B. Severance Pursuant to Rule 14 is Not Warranted

Mr. Lewis argues that even if the counts were properly joined under Rule 8(a), the court

should sever Count One under Rule 14(a) to avoid prejudice. ECF No. 54, at 5-7. He contends

that, absent severance, “the jury will cumulate the evidence of the offenses for which there is no

commonality,” id. at 5, and that he “will be both embarrassed and confounded in having to defend

against . . . disconnected evidence,” especially if he “want[s] to testify as to the bank conspiracy

but not to the marijuana and gun charges,” id. at 5-6. He additionally asserts that “[t]he only

purpose for introducing evidence of separate and distinct criminal acts is to suggest criminal

propensity,” id. at 5, and that, even if introduced for non-propensity purposes, evidence concerning

the bank fraud conspiracy charge would be unduly prejudicial, id. at 6-7.

Again, the court disagrees. First, there is considerable overlapping evidence for each count,

and any potential prejudice could be cured through jury instructions. Next, “the accused’s election

to testify on some but not all of the charges on trial does not automatically require a severance.”

Bradley v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1969). Rather, the defendant must

“make[] a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count

and [a] strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.” Baker v. United States,

,

5 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Mr. Lewis has not made such a showing, but he may renew his request

for severance at trial if he is later able to make such a showing. See Schaffer v. United States,

(1960) (explaining that “the trial judge has a continuing duty at all stages of the trial

to grant a severance if prejudice does appear”). Finally, while Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)

prohibits “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act” to “prove a person’s character,” Fed. R.

Evid. 404(b)(1), such evidence is admissible to “prov[e] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,”

R. 404(b)(2). Given the

United States’s allegations that Mr. Lewis “commit[ed] these crimes at the same time,” that he

“us[ed] the same electronic devices” for the offenses, and that the bank fraud conspiracy “provided

the motive and necessity for the [drug crime],” ECF No. 55, at 10, evidence about the bank fraud

conspiracy count is admissible under Rule 404(b)(2). To the extent that Mr. Lewis believes that

any specific piece of evidence concerning the bank fraud conspiracy is more prejudicial than

probative, he may raise an objection under Rule 403 at trial.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Sever, ECF

No. 54, is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge

Date: December 2, 2024

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