UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 21-2168 (RDM) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff America First Legal Foundation (“AFLF”) brings this action against

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and its parent agency, the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”), seeking to compel ICE to respond to AFLF’s May 18, 2021,

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request. Dkt. 1. Early in the proceedings, ICE reported

that it had conducted multiple searches and had identified over 20,000 pages of potentially

responsive records, as well as approximately 140 excel spreadsheets that included potentially

responsive material. Dkt. 18 at 1–2. The Court, in turn, ordered ICE to process “at least 2,000

rows” of material from the cumulative spreadsheets or 500 pages of records each month. Id. at 2.

Concerned that the processing of records would take years to complete, AFLF sought leave to

file an early motion for summary judgment to resolve any disputes between the parties regarding

ICE’s withholdings from the spreadsheets. As AFLF explained, ICE was consistently applying

the same withholdings in each monthly release of rows from the spreadsheets, and by addressing

the permissibility of those withholdings before the productions were complete, the Court could provide the parties with guidance as the process continued to unfold and could avoid the need for

any “do-overs.”

The Court agreed to AFLF’s proposal on the condition that AFLF agree not to raise any

alternative or new grounds for relief at a later point in the case, except to the extent that ICE

altered existing or adopted new parameters for withholding responsive material. AFLF accepted

that condition, which was intended to avoid the inefficiency of multiple rounds of summary

judgment briefing, and the Court permitted AFLF to identify 40 sample rows from the

spreadsheets for ICE to include in its Vaughn index. With that framework in place, the parties

have now briefed the disputed withholdings, which all turn on the application of FOIA

Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E). Dkt. 26-1, Dkt. 29, Dkt. 32, Dkt. 33. The parties disagree about

whether ICE has permissibly redacted the columns of the spreadsheets that contain information

that, in ICE’s view, unduly intrude on privacy interests or reveal law enforcement techniques and

procedures.

As explained below, the Court will GRANT summary judgment to ICE with respect to

its withholdings of names, docket numbers, attempts to locate non-citizens, and apprehension

locations contained in the cumulative spreadsheet report, and will GRANT summary judgment

to AFLF with respect to ICE’s wholesale withholdings of month and years of birth; city, state,

and country information of residential addresses; gang, cartel, and terrorist group information;

and monikers. Because the permissibility of ICE’s withholdings is presented in the abstract

without any individual-specific information, however, the Court will permit ICE to withhold any

such information in the latter category if, and only if, it can demonstrate that the specific

withheld information would effectively identify the particular individual at issue or reveal ICE’s

law enforcement techniques or procedures.

2 I. BACKGROUND

In early 2021, ICE’s Acting Director, Tae Johnson, issued an “interim guidance”

memorandum to all ICE employees setting forth the agency’s “priorities” for its “enforcement

and removal” operations. Dkt. 1-2 (“Interim Guidance”). The Interim Guidance designated

three priority groups of non-citizens for removal: (1) individuals who posed threats to national

security, (2) individuals who unlawfully entered the United States (or attempted to do so) after

November 1, 2020, and (3) individuals who “pose[d] a threat to public safety.” Id. at 5–6. The

Interim Guidance explained that “[e]nforcement and removal actions” against individuals that

fell into one or more of these categories “are presumed to be a justified allocation of ICE’s

limited resources.” Id. at 4. If a non-citizen did not fall into one of the three “presumed priority”

categories, ICE officers needed to obtain “preapproval” for any enforcement action against them,

absent exigent circumstances. Id. at 6. As ICE has explained, the purpose of this approach was

to ensure that the agency’s scarce resources were used devoted to the highest priority cases.

The Interim Guidance also created weekly “reporting requirements on all enforcement

and removal actions.” Dkt. 26-2 at 5 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 14). In particular, “[e]ach Friday,” ICE

directors would “compile and provide” to ICE leadership a “written report: (1) identifying each

enforcement action [or removal] taken in the prior week, including the applicable priority

criterion, if any; (2) providing a narrative justification of the action; and (3) identifying the date,

time, and location of the action.” Dkt. 1-2 at 8. The purpose of these reports was to allow ICE

leadership to assess the “effectiveness” of the enforcement priorities set forth in the Interim

Guidance. Id.

Several months later, AFLF submitted a FOIA request to ICE seeking all weekly “written

reports” referenced in the Interim Guidance. Dkt. 26-2 at 2 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 8). ICE ultimately

3 located a cumulative spreadsheet (“Spreadsheet Report”) containing “all of the non-citizens in

the prior reports.” Id. at 4 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 11). The Spreadsheet Report contains two tabs. The

first, titled “All-Priorities,” contains 48 columns of information regarding non-citizens for whom

“enforcement and removal actions have been approved.” Id. at 6 (Pineiro Decl. ¶¶ 16–17). The

columns contain extensive data about each non-citizen, including the non-citizen’s “name, date

of birth[,] age, Alien Number (A-Number), . . . complete criminal histories, including uncharged,

dismissed, pending and misdemeanor cases; complete immigration histories, including visa

information, arrival and entrance information, . . . health information[;] the existence of United

States Citizen (USC) relatives; outstanding warrant information; residential address information,

and criminal organization affiliation.” Id. at 5–6 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 15). It also sets forth “removal

priority” of each non-citizen, enforcement actions already taken, the “basis” for those actions,

and, if enforcement or removal has yet to occur, “where” and “when” an enforcement action

“may potentially take place.” Id. at 6–9, 7& nn.8–9 (Pineiro Decl. ¶¶ 16–23). The second tab,

titled “Denials,” “pertains to non-citizens for wh[om] the requested enforcement and removal

action was denied at the time of the request.” Id. at 10 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 24). “In addition to the

48 columns contained in the All-Priorities Tab, the Denials Tab contains information pertaining

to those denials,” such as the date and the reason for the denial. Id.

AFLF submitted its FOIA request in May 2021 and commenced this litigation two

months later, before ICE provided a final response to AFLF’s request. Id.at 3–4 (Pineiro Decl.

¶¶ 9–10). ICE began producing the Spreadsheet Report (the first tab of which contains over

57,000 rows and forty-eight columns of information) at a rate of 2,000 rows per month. Dkt. 29

at 9; Dkt. 26-1 at 11. ICE redacted certain categories of information, however, pursuant to FOIA

Exemptions 6, 7(C), or 7(E). AFLF maintains that these redactions were improper, and it

4 requested that the Court set an early schedule for summary judgment briefing on the following

categories (or columns) of withholdings: “(1) court case numbers; (2) gang, cartel, and terrorist

group information; (3) names and monikers; (4) month and year from dates of birth; (5) city,

state, and country from residential addresses; and (6) apprehension locations.” Dkt. 29 at 9. The

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are now before the Court. Dkts. 26-1; 29.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Freedom of Information Act is premised on the notion that an “informed citizenry” is

“vital to the functioning of a democratic society” and “needed to check against corruption and to

hold the governors accountable to the governed.” NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,

(1978). The Act embodies a “general philosophy of full agency disclosure.” U.S.

Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth.,

(1994) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v.

Rose,

, 360–61 (1976)). It thus mandates that an agency disclose records on

request, unless they fall within one of nine exemptions. “These exemptions are ‘explicitly made

exclusive’ and must be ‘narrowly construed.’” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy,

, 565

(2011) (quoting EPA v. Mink,

(1973), and FBI v. Abramson,

(1982)). As explained further below, the present dispute turns on the scope and application of

Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Both of those exemptions “seek to protect the privacy of individuals

identified in certain agency records.” ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir.

2011). Exemption 6 extends to “personnel and medical files and similar files,”

(b)(6), while Exemption 7(C) applies to “records or information compiled for law

enforcement purposes,”

§ 552(b)(7)(C). In addition, AFLF challenges ICE’s withholding of

certain information pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(E). That exemption applies to records

compiled for law enforcement purposes that reflect techniques or procedures for law

5 enforcement investigations or prosecutions or guidelines for law enforcement investigations or

prosecutions, where disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

Id. § 552(b)(7)(E).

FOIA cases are typically resolved on motions for summary judgment under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56. See, e.g., Beltranena v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

(D.D.C. 2011). To prevail on a summary judgment motion, the moving party must demonstrate

that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

(1986). In

a FOIA action, the agency may meet its burden by submitting “relatively detailed and non-

conclusory” affidavits or declarations, SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC,

(D.C.

Cir. 1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted), and an index of the information withheld,

which is commonly known as a “Vaughn index,” see Vaughn v. Rosen,

, 827–28

(D.C. Cir. 1973). An agency “is entitled to summary judgment if no material facts are in dispute

and if it demonstrates ‘that each document that falls within the class requested either has been

produced . . . or is wholly exempt from the [FOIA’s] inspection requirements.’” Students

Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State,

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Goland v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 1978)). The Court reviews the agency’s decision de novo, and the

agency bears the burden of sustaining its action.

(a)(4)(B).

III. ANALYSIS

ICE withheld non-citizens’ names; court docket numbers; dates of birth; residential

addresses; gang, cartel, and terrorist group affiliation; and monikers pursuant to FOIA

Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Dkt. 26-1 at 20–33. Both exemptions protect personal privacy, but they

differ in scope. Exemption 6 shields “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure

6 of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

(b)(6). “[T]he mere fact that an agency file or record contains personal, identifying

information,” however, “is not enough to invoke Exemption 6;” in addition, the information must

be “‘of such a nature that its disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted privacy

invasion.’” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

, 49–50 (D.D.C. 2017)

(quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton,

(D.C. Cir. 2002)).

Exemption 7(C), in contrast, applies only to records or information “compiled for law

enforcement purposes,” and it offers more robust protection for those records. See Tracy v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2016). While Exemption 6 is limited to records

“the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,”

(b)(6), “[t]he adverb ‘clearly’ . . . is not used in Exemption 7(C),” Nat’l Archives &

Recs. Admin. v. Favish,

, 165–66 (2004). Moreover, while “Exemption 6 refers to

disclosures that ‘would constitute’ an invasion of privacy, Exemption 7(C) encompasses any

disclosure that ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute’ such an invasion.” U.S Dep’t of Just.

v. Reps. Comm. For Freedom of the Press,

(1989).

ICE argues that the Spreadsheet Report was compiled for law enforcement purposes and

thus falls within the scope of Exemption 7(C), and that, because Exemption 7(C) “is more

protective of privacy” than Exemption 6, the Court need consider only whether the agency

properly invoked Exemption 7(C). Dkt. 26-1 at 33. As explained below, the Court agrees. See

ACLU,

. And, applying Exemption 7(C), the Court further concludes that ICE

permissibly invoked the exemption with respect to non-citizens’ names and docket numbers, but

that it improperly invoked the exemption with respect to its wholesale redactions of the month

7 and year of non-citizens’ dates of birth; the city, state, and country of their residence; their gang,

cartel, and terrorist affiliation; and their monikers.

A. Compiled for Law Enforcement Purposes

“To fall within Exemption 7, documents must first meet a threshold requirement: that the

records were ‘compiled for law enforcement purposes.’” Pub. Emps. for Envt’l Resp. v. U.S.

Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mexico (“PEER”),

, 202–03 (D.C.

Cir. 2014) (quoting

(b)(7)). To show that the Spreadsheet Report was “compiled

for law enforcement purposes,” ICE “need only ‘establish a rational nexus between [the

withholding] and one of the agency’s law enforcement duties,” as well as a “connection between

an individual or incident and a possible . . . violation of federal law.’” Blackwell v. FBI,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Campbell v. Dep’t of Just,

(D.C. Cir.

1998)).

In considering this issue, “it is not the nature of the agency that controls, but the character

of the records withheld.” Elkins v. Fed. Aviation Admin.,

(D.D.C. 2015).

Nonetheless, as ICE notes, and as AFLF does not dispute, ICE’s “principal function is law

enforcement,” and so its invocation of Exemption 7 for the Spreadsheet Report is entitled to

deference. PEER,

(quoting Tax Analysts v. IRS,

(D.C. Cir.

2002)); see Dkt. 26-1 at 15–17; Dkt. 29 at 13–15; Dkt. 26-2 at 20–21 (Pineiro Decl. ¶¶ 59–61)

(explaining that ICE “upholds U.S. immigration law at, within, and beyond our borders,” and

“manages all aspects of the immigration enforcement process”).

Applying these standards, the Court has no difficulty concluding that the Spreadsheet

Report was compiled for law enforcement purposes. The Spreadsheet Report is a comprehensive

record of information detailing ICE’s enforcement and removal actions, Dkt. 26-2 at 4–5

8 (Pineiro Decl. ¶¶ 11–15), and, accordingly, shares an obvious “nexus” with ICE’s “law

enforcement duties,” Blackwell,

; accord Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (holding that records that “incorporate information compiled in

the course of enforcing” the law were “compiled for law enforcement purposes”). The

Spreadsheet Report shows ICE “investigating and prosecuting” violations, PEER,

, and reveals, among other things, which individuals ICE believes should be subject to

enforcement; where, when, and why ICE has taken enforcement action against these individuals;

and, in cases in which ICE has not yet acted, enforcement steps it plans to take, Dkt. 26-2 at 5

(Pineiro Decl. ¶ 14). Moreover, as the Interim Guidance explains, the purpose of collecting these

data was to allow ICE leadership to monitor enforcement actions and to ensure the

“effectiveness” of ICE’s prioritization scheme. Dkt. 1-2 at 8; see Sack v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that reports that help law enforcement assess the

efficacy of polygraph examinations are “compiled for law enforcement purposes”). By any

measure, the Spreadsheet Report qualifies for Exemption 7.1

None of AFLF’s arguments to the contrary is persuasive. AFLF contends that the Pineiro

Declaration is too vague and conclusory to satisfy ICE’s burden under Exemption 7. Dkt. 29 at

13. The Court disagrees. The Pineiro Declaration explains that the data collection, weekly

reporting, and preapproval process (all of which ultimately comprised the Spreadsheet Report)

related to ICE’s efforts to implement and to monitor the efficacy of its law enforcement

priorities. Dkt. 26-2 at 5 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 14). AFLF also argues that Exemption 7 does not

1 ICE does not fully explain how or why it created the Spreadsheet Report, as distinguished from the individual reports upon which it is based. See Dkt. 26-2 at 4 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 11). In any event, the parties do not rely on this distinction, and Exemption 7 nonetheless applies to records that “contain[ ] or essentially reproduce[ ] all or part of a record that was previously compiled for law enforcement reasons.” Abramson,

. 9 apply because “the true purpose behind these records [was] political,” not “law enforcement.”

Dkt. 29 at 15. Even assuming AFLF has drawn a meaningful or administrable distinction, the

Court concludes that the Spreadsheet Report easily falls on the “law enforcement” side of

AFLF’s line because the record serves a “legitimate law enforcement purpose.”

(citing

Rosenfeld v. FBI,

, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2011) (holding that Exemption 7

did not apply to “political favors to Reagan [that] serve[d] no legitimate law enforcement

purpose”)).

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Spreadsheet Report was compiled for

ICE’s law enforcement purposes.

B. Balance of Interests Under Exemption 7(C)

The second question posed by Exemption 7(C) is whether disclosure of the information

“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

(b)(7)(C). In resolving that question, the Court “must balance the public interest in

disclosure against the [privacy] interest[s] Congress intended the Exemption to protect.” Reps.

Comm. For Freedom of the Press,

.

At the outset, however, the parties dispute whether FOIA’s privacy protections apply to

non-citizens. Dkt. 29 at 10. AFLF contends that “FOIA’s privacy protections only apply when a

‘citizen’ is identified in the records,” and so the Court need not engage in any balancing with

respect to non-citizens’ information contained in the Spreadsheet Report.

On AFLF’s view,

this interpretation is consistent with FOIA’s “general policy of disclosure” and “how U.S. law

broadly distinguishes between citizens and noncitizens.” Id. at 12.

The Court is unpersuaded. As ICE notes, the text of FOIA protects “personal privacy”—

it does not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens.

(b)(6) & (7)(C); cf.

10 Person, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “person” as “[a] human being”). Nor

does AFLF cite any authority for the proposition that non-citizens lack cognizable privacy

interests under FOIA, and Supreme Court precedent indicates otherwise. In U.S. Dep’t of State

v. Wash. Post Co.,

(1982), the Court applied FOIA’s prohibition on

“unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” to Iranian nationals. Similarly, in U.S. Dep’t of State

v. Ray,

(1991), the Court concluded that FOIA’s privacy protections

applied to “Haitian nationals who had attempted to emigrate illegally to the United States and

were involuntarily returned to Haiti.” See also Tuffly v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(9th Cir. 2017) (applying Exemption 7 to protect non-citizens’ personal information);

Graff v. FBI,

(D.D.C. 2011) (“[F]oreign nationals are entitled to the

privacy protections embodied in FOIA.”) (citing cases).

AFLF, in effect, would have the Court apply a presumption that federal statutes do not

apply to non-citizens unless the text says otherwise. But, if anything, courts apply the opposite

presumption, because when Congress wants to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, it

does so explicitly. Non-citizens, for example, are expressly prohibited from voting in federal

elections,

, yet both citizens and non-citizens enjoy the protection of federal

criminal laws, may generally bring suit in federal court, and are entitled to protection under an

array of federal statutes that apply in civil cases. Indeed, non-citizens are permitted to bring suit

under FOIA itself. See, e.g., Emuwa v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(D.C. Cir.

2024); Hussain v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(D.D.C. 2009). Lest

there be any doubt, AFLF’s interpretation of FOIA would mean that millions of lawful

permanent residents’ private health, residential, demographic, or contact information could be

disclosed to the public at large as the result of a single FOIA request. Because the statute

11 provides no indication that Congress intended that result—but, rather, provides broad protection

for “personal privacy”—the Court concludes that FOIA’s privacy protections apply to the

individuals identified in the Spreadsheet Report.

Accordingly, the Court will balance the individuals’ privacy interest in each category of

disputed information against the public interest in disclosure. In doing so, the Court notes that

“[t]he concept of personal privacy under Exemption 7(C) is not some limited or ‘cramped

notion’ of that idea.” Favish,

. A disclosure implicates privacy interests if it

affects “the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person,” or involves the

“disclosure of records containing personal details.” Reps. Comm. For Freedom of the Press,

. In particular, the Court must consider “the consequences that would follow”

from disclosure. Favish,

. Oftentimes, “[d]isclosure does not, literally by itself,

constitute a harm; it is the requester’s (or another’s) reaction to the disclosure,” as well as the

context of the disclosure, “that can sting.” Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner,

(D.C. Cir. 1989). For example, the disclosure of “a list of names” is not “inherently

and always a significant threat to the privacy of the individuals on the list.” Ray,

n.12. But such disclosure becomes problematic when a name can be “linked” to other “highly

personal information,” such as “marital and employment status, children, living conditions and

attempts to enter the United States.”

. “Although disclosure of such personal

information constitutes only a de minimis invasion of privacy when the identities of the

[individuals] are unknown, the invasion of privacy becomes significant when the personal

information is linked to particular [individual].”

(emphasis added). “Disclosures that

would subject individuals to possible embarrassment, harassment, or the risk of mistreatment

12 constitute nontrivial intrusions into privacy.” Tuffly,

; accord Ray,

n.12.

On the other side of the Exemption 7(C) scale, the FOIA requester “bears the burden of

showing (1) that ‘the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest more

specific than having the information for its own sake,’” and (2) that “the information [it] seeks

‘is likely to advance that interest.’” Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 1174–75 (D.C.

Cir. 2011) (quoting Favish,

). The relevant inquiry under the “FOIA balancing

analysis is the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would she[d] light on an

agency’s performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their

government is up to.” Bibles v. Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n,

, 355–56 (1997) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Names

It is well-established that individuals have a privacy interest in not being publicly

associated with law enforcement efforts, even where they are the targets of those efforts. See

Computer Pros for Soc. Resp. v. U.S. Secret Serv.,

(D.C. Cir. 1996)

(“Exemption 7(C) takes particular note of the strong interest of . . . suspects . . . in not being

associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity.”); Laborers’ Int’l. Union of N. Am. v.

U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (withholding report under 7(C)

containing “the names of numerous individuals and [documenting] alleged illegal activities of

several of these individuals”). This privacy interest extends to “convictions and public pleas,”

ACLU,

, as well as “the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain information”

regarding an individual’s criminal history, Reps. Comm. For Freedom of the Press,

. The interest “becomes significant” in cases where the release of someone’s name is

13 accompanied by a release of other pieces information, such that named individuals could be

“linked” to their “highly personal information.” Ray, 502 U.S. at 175–76 (1991).

In this case, releasing the names of individuals in the Spreadsheet Report would implicate

significant privacy concerns. Release of that information would identify non-citizens who are

subject to removal from the United States. As other courts have recognized, “undocumented

immigrants face a serious risk of ‘harassment, embarrassment, and even physical violence and

reprisal by citizens and law enforcement.’” Tuffly,

(quoting district court

opinion); cf. Ray,

n.12 (concluding that release of returnees’ names “would be a

significant invasion of their privacy because it would subject them to possible embarrassment

and retaliatory action” in Haiti). But even putting that risk aside, releasing the names included in

the Spreadsheet Report would permit the public to connect the other information that ICE has

released without redactions to specific individuals. This includes “highly personal information,”

Ray,

, such as their “immigration status, immigration histories, visa information,

DACA and employment authorization information, citizenship, ethnicity, criminal histories”

(including “pending and uncharged conduct”), “health information and immigration enforcement

activities against the non-citizens, as well as information on family members and associates of

the non-citizens.” Dkt 26-2 at 32 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 101). Permitting members of the public to

associate a particular individual with this information would result in a “significant invasion[ ] of

personal privacy.” Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2019) (quoting Tuffly,

).

AFLF suggests that these individuals have diminished privacy interests in their names

because they are not “third parties” incidentally named in a law enforcement file—they are the

subjects of the enforcement actions. AFLF further maintains that “many have been convicted of

14 heinous crimes[] and [that] their privacy interests (if any) are substantially diminished.” Dkt. 29

at 28. The problem with this argument is that this interest—however weak it may be—is only

the tip of the iceberg here. Although individuals have weakened privacy interests in their public

“conviction[s] or plea[s],” ACLU,

, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that “the scope

of Exemption 7(C) can extend even to convictions and public pleas,”

But, in any event, the

Spreadsheet Report implicates much more than that. The information in the Spreadsheet Report

is not limited to identifying non-citizens who have public convictions or pleas, nor to non-

citizens who were “approved” for ICE enforcement actions (which, presumably, remains

confidential until implemented). As explained above, disclosure of names would “link[]”

particular individuals to a trove of highly personal data, not just public proceedings brought

against them. Ray,

.

Union Leader Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(1st Cir. 2014)—

the case upon which AFLF principally relies—illustrates this point. In that case, the plaintiff

submitted a FOIA request to ICE for “the names . . . [of] six individuals arrested in New

Hampshire” as part of a nationwide ICE enforcement operation.

at 48–49. The First Circuit

ordered ICE to release the names, reasoning that this was a “narrow[]” request,

, and the

arrestees’ privacy interest was “attenuated” by the “public record” of their arrests and

convictions,

. In contrast to this case, the disclosure of those names in the Union Leader

case was not accompanied by the disclosure of the type of detailed and extensive personal data

included in the Spreadsheet Report.

As a result, the disclosures that AFLF seeks is more closely akin to the disclosure the

Supreme Court rejected in Reporters Committee,

, although the privacy interests

at stake here are, if anything, stronger than in Reporters Committee. In that case, the Court

15 sustained the agency’s decision to withhold individuals’ FBI “rap sheets,” which “revealed the

subjects’ ‘date of birth and physical characteristics, as well as a history of arrests, charges,

convictions, and incarcerations’ in every jurisdiction in the country.” ACLU,

(quoting Reps. Comm. For Freedom of the Press,

). The Court held “as a

categorical matter” that “a third party’s request for law enforcement records or information about

a private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen’s privacy,” even where they

are the subject of the investigation, and especially where those records would reveal other highly

personal information. Reps. Comm.,

.

Having concluded that release of the names contained in the Spreadsheet Report

implicates a cognizable privacy interest, the Court must balance that interest against the public

interest in disclosure. On AFLF’s telling, the public has a strong interest in knowing the names

of those identified in the Spreadsheet Report so it can “determine if the same person appears

multiple times in the records, confirming that the same individual is repeatedly subject to

removal actions.” Dkt. 29 at 26. But as ICE explains, the Spreadsheet Report contains this

information. E.g., Dkt. 26-3 at 5 (Vaughn Index) (“Basis for ICE Enforcement Action: Subject

previous voluntarily removed by Border Patrol via Nogales, Arizona on or about 08/21/2006 and

08/25/2006.”); id. at 10 (explaining that non-citizen had twice before been removed to El

Salvador). AFLF also asserts that knowing the non-citizens’ names would allow the public to

“review other material about [them].” Dkt. 33 at 19. Yet AFLF does not explain what

“material” the public has an interest in reviewing that is not already captured by the Spreadsheet

Report, nor how reviewing such material would help the public assess ICE’s operations. See id.

The Court therefore concludes that the public interest is outweighed by the unwarranted

invasion of privacy that would be caused by releasing the names in the Spreadsheet Report, and

16 will, accordingly, grant ICE’s motion for summary judgment and deny AFLF’s motion for

summary judgment with respect to release of these names.

2. Docket Numbers

The parties next dispute whether ICE properly withheld docket numbers from the

narrative portions of the Spreadsheet Report. Relying on this Court’s decision in Brennan Ctr.

for Just. at N.Y.U. Sch. of L. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. July 1, 2021),

AFLF argues that the non-citizens have “de minimis” privacy interest in docket numbers of cases

resulting in convictions and that the Court should order release of docket numbers of cases

resulting in acquittals because, unlike Brennan Center, there is no risk of associating acquitted

individuals with any particular “stigmatic” charge, such as terrorism. Dkt. 29 at 18–20.

In response, ICE explains that “[t]he derivative use of court case numbers, of course, is to

identify the noncitizens who appear in the Spreadsheet Report.” Dkt. 26-1 at 25. The Court

agrees that disclosing the docket numbers would simply circumvent the Court’s decision

upholding the agency’s decision to redact the names of those identified in the Spreadsheet

Report. After all, “it would take little work for an interested person to use the docket

information” to locate the underlying case files and “identify” the non-citizens. ACLU, 655 F.3d

at 7–8. AFLF appears to concede as much, arguing that docket numbers should be disclosed

because obtaining non-citizens’ “names” would enable it to assess their criminal history and

“ICE’s performance of its duties.” Dkt. 29 at 17.

To be sure, “an agency’s disclosure of public docket numbers for cases that resulted in

convictions implicates” a substantially weaker privacy interest “[b]ecause the conviction or plea

is already public.” Brennan Center,

, at *3 (quoting Brennan Center for

Justice at N.Y.U. Sch. of L. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, at *6). But as explained

17 above, disclosing the docket numbers would, in effect, release much more than a public

conviction, plea, and underlying court filings. An interested person armed with a docket number

could link a particular individual to all the other information contained in the Spreadsheet Report

that ICE has already released. Dkt 26-2 at 32 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 101). The Court is persuaded that,

in this context, release of the docket numbers would constitute an unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy.

On the other side of the balance, AFLF insists that the public interest in the docket

numbers is high “because those numbers will allow the public to consider the criminal histories

of those aliens who ICE officers sought to remove but were required first to receive political

approval.” Dkt. 29 at 17. As AFLF acknowledges, however, ICE fully released the “Criminal

History” column of the Spreadsheet Report, Dkt. 26-2 at 10 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 26), which sets forth

“complete criminal histories, including uncharged, dismissed, pending and misdemeanor cases,”

(Pineiro Decl. ¶ 15); see, e.g., Dkt. 26-3 at 157 (Vaughn Index) (detailing criminal history

including court, offense, sentence, and probation violations, among other facts). AFLF

nonetheless maintain that this information “will not . . . satisf[y]” public interest in the docket

numbers because the public should be able to “evaluat[e] the information contained in a whole

trial.” Dkt. 29 at 18.2 The public interest that exists in “evaluating . . . whole trial[s]” in order to

evaluate ICE’s operations,

is at least one step removed from the public interest in

understanding how ICE operates; the relevant question for purposes of understanding ICE’s

operation is what data and information ICE has before it and not what occurred before a trial

2 Plaintiff also argues that the criminal histories ICE has provided are insufficient because they do not include “uncharged conduct.” Dkt. 29 at 18. But as the Pineiro Declaration explains, the criminal histories do include uncharged conduct where applicable. Dkt. 26-2 at 5 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 15). 18 court. But, in any event, the interest in connecting ICE’s operations to “whole trial[s]” occurring

in state or federal court is outweighed by the privacy interests described above.

The Court will, accordingly, grant ICE’s motion for summary judgment and deny

AFLF’s cross-motion for summary judgment with agency’s withholding of the docket numbers.

3. Dates of Birth

AFLF also challenge ICE’s “withholding of full dates of birth.” Dkt. 29 at 29. In

pressing this argument, AFLF appears to concede that disclosure of each individual’s day,

month, and year of birth would implicate the same privacy interests discussed above,

(relying

on American Immigration Council v. U.S. Immigration & Custom Enforcement,

, 239 (D.D.C. 2020), and arguing that individuals have minimal, if any, privacy interest in the

month and year of their birth), and the Court is persuaded that release of that detailed

information, along with other information in the Spreadsheet Report, would be tantamount to

releasing the names of those listed in the Spreadsheet Report. But AFLF makes a more modest

request—it seeks disclosure of the month and year of each non-citizens’ birthdates, arguing that

“ICE cannot identify any privacy interest” in those pieces of information. Dkt. 33 at 22. ICE

responds that non-citizens do retain a privacy interest in the month and year of their birth, and, in

any event, “[t]here is no public interest in releasing this information because ICE has fully

informed the public about its law enforcement operations by releasing noncitizens’ ages.” Dkt.

32 at 21–22 (citing Dkt. 26-2 at 10 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 26)).

The withholding agency bears the burden of demonstrating that that “there is any privacy

interest at stake.” ACLU,

. Until it does so, moreover, there is no need to consider

the other side of the balance—that is, whether there is a significant public interest in disclosure.

. Here, ICE has failed to offer sufficient basis for the Court to conclude that there is a

19 freestanding privacy interest in one’s month and year of birth when it is not linked to a particular

individual, nor does ICE argue that it plausibly could be used to identify individuals in the

Spreadsheet Report. The Court can imagine circumstances in which disclosure of a person’s

month and year of birth (along with other information) could be used to identify them, but ICE

does not point to any evidence or examples of this in the Spreadsheet Report. Indeed, ICE has

already released the non-citizens’ ages, presumably because it believed that that information

would not allow an observer to discern the non-citizens’ identities.

The Court is unpersuaded, moreover, that the fact that ICE has already provided non-

citizens’ ages relieves it of its obligation to disclose the month and year of non-citizens’ birth

dates. An agency may not avoid the statute’s mandate to segregate and disclose exempt portions

of the record by claiming that the requested information is redundant.

(b); see

Abramson,

(explaining that “FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed”

because “the basic policy of the Act is in favor of disclosure”).

The Court will, accordingly, grant summary judgment in favor of ICE with respect to the

full dates of birth, will deny ICE’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the month and

year of birth, and will grant AFLF’s cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to the

agency’s wholesale redaction of all listed months and years of birth. But, in an exceptional case,

if ICE concludes that such a withholding is warranted because it would effectively identify a

particular individual, ICE may redact that information, so long as it supports its determination

with a declaration or Vaughn index explaining why on a case-by-case basis. See

(b) (requiring agencies to “segregate and release nonexempt information”); Kwoka v.

Internal Revenue Serv.,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2018).

20 4. City, State, and Country Information of Residential Addresses

The parties next dispute whether ICE properly redacted non-citizens’ residential

addresses, which appear in some of the narrative portions of the Spreadsheet Report. Dkt. 26-3

at 222–24 (Vaughn Index). Sensibly, AFLF does not seek non-citizens’ full addresses, but only

the city, state, and country information. Dkt. 29 at 30. The Court agrees with AFLF that, at least

in most circumstances, disclosure of this information would not constitute an unwarranted

intrusion on non-citizens’ privacy. ICE does not explain how disclosure of this information

could be used to identify particular non-citizens. See Dkt. 32 at 24. Thus, because “the identities

of the [non-citizens] [would be] unknown,” disclosure “constitutes only a de minimis invasion of

privacy.” Ray,

.

In light of ICE’s failure to demonstrate a privacy interest in this information, at least in

general, the Court will deny ICE’s motion for summary judgment and will grant AFLF’s cross-

motion with respect to the wholesale redaction of city, state, and country information. But as

with non-citizens’ months and years of birth, ICE may redact this information on a case-by-case

basis. To the extent disclosure of this information might, in a particular case and when

considered along with other information that ICE has released, effectively identify an individual,

ICE may withhold that specific information upon making a proper showing.

5. Gang, Cartel, Terrorist Group Affiliation, and Monikers

ICE also redacted “non-citizens’ affiliations with gangs, terrorist groups and cartels” and

non-citizens’ “monikers” pursuant to Exemption 7(C). Dkt. 26-2 at 12 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 31). ICE

contends that, just as criminals maintain some privacy interest in their criminal histories or “rap

sheets,” non-citizens maintain a similar privacy interest in their affiliation with criminal

organizations. See Dkt. 32 at 23 (citing Reps Comm.,

). ICE further insists

21 that “release of [this information] in conjunction with the compilation of other information

included in the Spreadsheet Report could be used to identify the non-citizens at issue.” Dkt. 26-2

at 28 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 87). As for monikers in particular, ICE reasons that they “function in a

similar fashion to names,” Dkt. 26-1 at 32, and “could also be used to identify the non-citizen at

issue, at least by the population familiar with the moniker if not the broader public,” Dkt. 26-2 at

24 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 73).

In general, the Court disagrees. Even assuming the privacy interest in one’s “rap sheet”

is sufficiently analogous to one’s gang, cartel, and terrorist group affiliation, that privacy interest

is implicated only when it is accompanied by identifying information. See Reps. Comm., 489

U.S. at 763–65. As the Supreme Court explained in Ray, even the disclosure of highly personal

information will generally not constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy where that

information cannot be linked to an individual. Ray,

; see Dep’t of Air Force v.

Rose,

, 373–77 (1976) (holding that disciplinary case summaries containing

sensitive information were disclosable with identifying names redacted). The problem here is

that ICE does not explain how anyone could identify an individual non-citizen if it were to

release this information. The Pineiro Declaration contains no specific details on this score,

simply asserting that this criminal organization affiliation “could” reveal non-citizens’ identities.

Dkt. 26-2 at 28 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 87). The same is true for non-citizens’ monikers: ICE cites no

authority for the proposition that individuals have a privacy interest in monikers, see Dkt. 26-1 at

33, and it makes only a conclusory assertion that they “could” be used in to identify particular

citizens, Dkt. 26-2 at 24 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 73). Although an agency’s declarations are entitled to a

presumption of good faith, they must nonetheless advance justifications that “appear[] logical or

22 plausible.” Larson v. Dep’t of State,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

That said, the Court’s consideration of whether a gang affiliation or moniker might

implicate significant privacy interests is limited because the issue is presented in the abstract,

without the benefit of examples or particular circumstances that might permit an observer to

identify a specific individual based on the disclosure. A hypothetical “gang,” for example, might

have only a dozen members. Or a particular moniker might have sufficient public salience that

disclosing it would be no different from disclosing the person’s name. It is common knowledge

who Ike, Honest Abe, the Iron Lady, El Chapo, Smokin’ Joe, J. Lo, Dr. J, Buffalo Bill, Flo Jo,

and the Desert Fox were. Here, of course, it is far less likely that a moniker will carry public

import, but there remains the possibility that a moniker will, in a particular instance, permit the

public to discern whose personal information is otherwise disclosed in the Spreadsheet Report.

Nonetheless, “the existence of a few possible exceptions does not justify [ICE’s] blanket

withholding here.” Kwoka,

, at *4. The Court will, accordingly, deny ICE’s

motion for summary judgment with respect to the withholding of monikers and gang, cartel, and

terrorist group affiliations, and will grant AFLF’s cross-motion with respect to ICE’s wholesale

redaction of this information from the Spreadsheet Report. To the extent ICE concludes that a

particular disclosure would identify a specific individual, “it can redact those portions, but it

must justify its redactions ‘with reasonably specific detail.’”

(quoting Mil. Audit Proj. v.

Casey,

(D.C. Cir. 1981)).

D. Exemption 7(E)

In addition to Exemption 7(C), ICE invokes Exemption 7(E) to withhold residential

addresses; apprehension locations; gang, cartel, terrorist group affiliation; and monikers.

23 Under Exemption 7(E), an agency may withhold:

records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

(b)(7)(E). Although not the most natural reading of the statutory text (or, more

precisely, the statutory sentence structure), the D.C. Circuit has held that the risk-of-

circumvention requirement applies both (1) to techniques and procedures for law enforcement

investigations or prosecutions and (2) to guidelines for law enforcement investigations or

prosecutions. See PEER,

n.4; but cf. Allard K. Lowenstein Int’l Human Rights

Proj. v. Dep’t of Homeland Security,

, 681–82 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the risk-

of-circumvention requirement applies only to records containing guidelines). But the D.C.

Circuit has also construed the risk-of-circumvention requirement to set “a relatively low bar for

the agency to justify withholding: ‘Rather than requiring a highly specific burden of showing

how the law will be circumvented, exemption 7(E) only requires that the [agency] demonstrate

logically how the release of the requested information might create a risk of circumvention of the

law.’” Blackwell,

(quoting Mayer Brown, LLP v. IRS,

(D.C.

Cir. 2009)).

The term “law enforcement” includes the enforcement of both civil and criminal statutes

and regulations. PEER,

. The exemption applies, moreover, both to the

disclosure of “details about a law enforcement technique or procedure itself” and to disclosures

revealing “‘when . . . agencies are likely to employ’ certain techniques or procedures.’”

Sheridan v. U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Sack,

. Exemption 7(E) does not exempt techniques and procedures “already well known to

24 the public.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-1380, at 229 (1975); see also Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2016). But it does protect “confidential details” regarding

techniques and procedures even if their “general contours [are] publicly known.” Sussman v.

U.S. Marshals Serv.,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Blanton v. Dep’t of Just.,

, 788–89 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam)); see also Advancement Proj. v. U.S. Dep’t

of Homeland Sec.,

, 145 (D.D.C. 2021).

1. Residential Addresses and Attempts to Locate Non-Citizens

ICE invokes Exemption 7(E) to “protect from disclosure information pertaining to law

enforcement gathered and located residential addresses and attempts to locate at-large non-

citizens.” Dkt. 26-2 at 33 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 105). “Specifically, the information identifies specific

locations that ICE is aware of where at large non-citizens may be located,” it “includes ICE[’]s

next enforcement steps in locating the non-citizens at issue,” and it reveals “how many officers

will be utilized, when and how the location will be targeted[,] and how the enforcement action

will take place.”

(Pineiro Decl. ¶ 107). Disclosure of this information will, according

to ICE, “reveal techniques and/or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions

or disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions which could reasonably

be expected to risk circumvention of the law.”

The Court agrees that the disclosure of the precise addresses at which non-citizens

targeted for removal “may be located” would reveal procedures for law enforcement

investigations—that is, the specific targets of future enforcement actions—that could invite

circumvention of the law. But ICE fails to explain how disclosure of only the city, state, and

country would pose such a risk. If ICE discloses that a non-citizen resides in Los Angeles,

California, for example, that disclosure would not reveal anything about how ICE went about

25 collecting that information or how the agency intends to use it. Nor would such a disclosure risk

circumvention by the targets of those future enforcement actions. Because ICE does not offer

any examples or otherwise explain (in non-conclusory terms) how disclosure of that limited

information could reveal law enforcement techniques and procedures, the Court concludes that

ICE has failed to support the wholesale withholding of this information under Exemption 7(E).

ICE stands on firmer ground with respect to its withholdings related to its past and future

attempts to locate non-citizens. ICE redacted details regarding enforcement actions it took in the

past, as well as “the particular enforcement action that was to take place and how that

enforcement action was going to be executed.”

(Pineiro Decl. ¶ 106); see, e.g., Dkt. 26-

3 at 148–49 (Vaughn Index) (redacting the specific enforcement action that ICE planned to take

next with respect to the non-citizen at issue in the record). ICE asserts that disclosure could

“compromis[e] the security of ICE enforcement actions, should bad actors learn the specific

location of planned enforcement activities and how those activities will be executed.” Dkt. 26-2

at 34 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 109). The Court concludes that ICE has explained how disclosure would

reveal a law enforcement investigation procedure and has “demonstrate[d] logically” how the

release of this information could assist those seeking to circumvent the law. Blackwell,

. Information regarding ICE’s enforcement operations—such as their operational plans for

enforcement and the number of officers involved—could allow a bad actor to counter those

operations. See Pejouhesh v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2022)

(holding that agency’s operation plan for executing warrant, including “information about how

many law enforcement officers [would] be utilized,” was properly withheld under Exemption

7(E)). ICE has met Exemption 7(E)’s “low bar” as to this category of information.

26 2. Apprehension Locations

ICE also invokes Exemption 7(E) “to protect from disclosure information pertaining [to]

the specific apprehension locations of non-citizens attempting to enter the U.S. illegally.” Dkt.

26-2 at 35 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 114). The withheld information includes “mile markers, roadway

addresses and locations, specific lanes of entry at points of entry utilized by the subject non-

citizens, as well as the indications utilized by border patrol” that helped identify specific non-

citizens.

(Pineiro Decl. ¶ 115). ICE argues that the withheld material contains information

“used in furtherance of maintaining border security,” which “could reveal techniques and

procedures, as well as guidelines for law enforcement investigation or prosecutions,” Dkt. 26-3

at 247 (Vaughn Index), and that “disclosure risks circumvention of the law because bad actors

could learn ‘of border security vulnerabilities [and] where DHS is focusing its attention,’” Dkt.

32 at 25 (quoting Dkt. 26-3 at 248 (Vaughn Index)). AFLF acknowledges that this “could be

true” with respect to certain “mile markers, roadway addresses, [and] specific lanes of entry at

points of entry,” but maintains that it is not true for all locations. Dkt. 33 at 24. AFLF observes,

for example, that “it certainly would not be a surprise to anyone that noncitizens were

apprehended in El Paso, Texas.”

AFLF’s argument misses the mark. Although any given location standing alone may not

reveal much about ICE’s techniques and procedures, the compilation of these data “might create

a risk of circumvention of the law.” Blackwell,

; see also Am. Immigr. Council,

464 F. Supp. 3d at 244–45 (holding that ICE’s apprehension location data could be used to

circumvent the law, and thus qualified for withholding under Exemption 7(E)). By comparing

the rate of apprehension at different locations, for example, one could determine “where staffing

is located and focused,” as well as “strengths and weaknesses at individual points of entry,”

27 which would “allow bad actors to target or avoid certain places to illegally enter the United

States.” Dkt. 26-2 at 36 (Pineiro Decl. ¶ 117). This is true even for “unsurprising” apprehension

locations, when the data are considered in the aggregate. A comparison between San Diego and

El Paso, for instance, could show that one is more crowded or has more agents, effectively

steering individuals towards one entry point over another. The Court, accordingly, concludes

that this information is exempt under Exemption 7(E).

3. Gang, Cartel, Terrorist Group Affiliation, and Monikers

Finally, ICE invokes Exemption 7(E) to justify its withholdings of “the names of specific

gang, cartel and terrorism groups, of which the non-citizens are alleged to be affiliated with, as

well as monikers that the non-citizens utilize in connection with that affiliation.” Dkt. 26-2 at 39

(Pineiro Decl. ¶ 128). The Pineiro Declaration explains that “the names and monikers

themselves are law enforcement sensitive, as they were generated based upon law enforcement

intelligence and evaluations.”

(Pineiro Decl. ¶ 131). In ICE’s view, disclosure would

risk revealing its “techniques and/or procedures” because it employed sensitive techniques and

procedures to gather this information.

(Pineiro Decl. ¶ 132).

The Court agrees with AFLF that ICE has not adequately carried it burden to justify its

invocation of Exemption 7(E) with respect to this information. Without further explanation, the

Court fails to see how disclosure of affiliations and monikers would reveal how ICE went about

collecting that information—or would reveal any other technique, procedure, or guideline for law

enforcement investigations or prosecutions. As with ICE’s invocation of Exemption 7(C),

however, the Court recognizes that there could be exceptions. If divulging this information

would compromise ICE’s sources inside a certain gang, or reveal that it has infiltrated a criminal

organization, that would likely reveal sensitive law enforcement techniques or procedures and

28 would likely permit bad actors to circumvent those activities. But ICE has not made this claim,

and the Pineiro Declaration does not explain the connection between the affiliations and

monikers themselves and the methods used to obtain them. As a result, the Court reaches the

same conclusion with respect to ICE’s withholding of this information under Exemption 7(E) as

under Exemption 7(C): the mere possibility that the exemption might apply under some

circumstances does not justify a wholesale withholding. The Court will, accordingly, deny ICE’s

motion for summary judgment with respect to this withholding, and will grant AFLF’s cross-

motion with respect to the wholesale withholdings. But to the extent ICE concludes that

disclosure of particular individuals’ affiliations or monikers would reveal confidential law

enforcement techniques or procedures and would jeopardize its law enforcement efforts, it may

redact that information (so long as its redactions are accompanied by detailed justifications).

Kwoka,

, at *4.

E. Foreseeable Harm

Whether records fall into a FOIA exemption does not end the inquiry. Under the 2016

amendments to FOIA, an agency may not withhold exempt materials unless the agency

“reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by” the exemption.

(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). To meet its burden under the “foreseeable harm” standard, an

agency must “articulate both the nature of the harm [from release] and the link between the

specified harm and specific information contained in the material withheld.” Reps. Comm. for

Freedom of the Press v. FBI,

, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 114-391,

at 9 (2016)). Here, ICE argues—and AFLF does not dispute—that disclosing the otherwise

exempt information in the Spreadsheet Report (as determined above) would cause foreseeable

harm to the interests protected by Exemption 7—that is, protecting personal privacy and law

29 enforcement procedures. Dkt. 26-1 at 41. The Court, accordingly, agrees that release of the

exempt information in the Spreadsheet Report would cause foreseeable harm.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS summary judgment to ICE as to its

withholdings of names, docket numbers, attempts to locate non-citizens, and apprehension

locations contained in the Spreadsheet Report, and GRANTS summary judgment to AFLF as to

wholesale withholding of the month and year of birth dates; the city, state, and country

information of residential addresses; gang, cartel, and terrorist group information; and monikers.

The Court expresses no view on whether disclosure of information in particular cases would be

tantamount to revealing an individual’s identity or would reveal ICE’s law enforcement

techniques and procedures.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: December 2, 2024

30