UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GERARD NGUEDI,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 23-2965 (RDM) ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Gerard Nguedi, proceeding pro se, brings this action against the Administrative

Office of the U.S. Courts (“Administrative Office”) and General Dynamics Information

Technology (“General Dynamics”). He alleges, among other things, that during his employment

with General Dynamics he suffered racial discrimination and a hostile work environment.

Although General Dynamics has answered the complaint, Dkt. 18, the Administrative Office

moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including Plaintiff’s failure to effect service, Dkt. 17.

The Court agreed but granted Plaintiff additional time to effect service, while reserving judgment

on the Administrative Office’s remaining arguments. Dkt. 32. After Plaintiff filed proof of

service, as required by the Court’s order, the Administrative Office renewed its motion to

dismiss on those remaining grounds. That motion is now before the Court, Dkt. 35, as is

Plaintiff’s motion for a hearing, Dkt. 44.

For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT the Administrative Office’s

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and will DENY Plaintiff’s motion for a hearing as

moot. I. BACKGROUND

For the purposes of evaluating the Administrative Office’s motion to dismiss, the

following facts, taken from Plaintiff’s complaint, are accepted as true. See Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v.

FDIC,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Thomas v. Principi,

(D.C.

Cir. 2005)).

Plaintiff was hired for “a permanent position” with General Dynamics in January 2023.

Dkt. 1 at 2 (Compl. ¶ 2). He was employed as a manager and supported IT-related projects on a

contract with the Administrative Office.

Plaintiff alleges that from the beginning of his

employment he was subjected to “harassments and complications” when he was asked to submit

the same paperwork multiple times because it would “miraculously disappear[].”

(Compl.

¶ 4). He further alleges that the General Dynamics human resources department (“HR”)

“sabotaged” his healthcare and dental coverage by forcing him to pay for options he did not

want.

(Compl. ¶ 5). He also alleges that he was the only Black employee on his team, that

his salary was “$10,000 less than the average salary of his own team,” and that even employees

who reported to him were making, on average, $10,000 more than him.

(Compl. ¶ 6).

Plaintiff alleges that he also “realized that he was making thousands of dollars less than his

predecessor who was not African American.”

(Compl. ¶ 7). After a positive mid-year

performance review, he took this issue up with his manager at General Dynamics, Bob

Bassinger, and asked for a “salary adjustment.”

at 2–3 (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10). Bassinger said that

he would speak with the Administrative Office and get back to Plaintiff in a few days. Id. at 3

(Compl. ¶ 11).

Plaintiff also alleges that he “was kept from controlling his own meetings.” Id. (Compl.

¶ 12). Paul Pollard, a white Project Manager, “control[led] key meetings,” even though “he was

2 not really active in any of [Plaintiff’s] core meetings.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 13). As a result, Plaintiff

could not invite his “official manager from the Government side[] to his last meeting.” Id. The

Administrative Office also pressured Plaintiff to conduct his “recurring/daily meetings under the

name of [his] predecessor.” Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 12–13).

According to Plaintiff, another white man, Thomas Pedicone, a former General Dynamics

employee who became an employee of the Administrative Office, “decided to take ownership of

[P]laintiff’s most important monthly meeting, the Internal Project Review . . . meeting,

conspiring with the [Administrative Office] to take away [P]laintiff’s key role and job functions,

in order to embarrass [him].” Id. (Compl. ¶ 15). He further alleges that on certain occasions,

Pedicone, Keira Unterzuber, and other Administrative Office employees pressured him to not

report certain “major security breaches,” including computer viruses and infiltrations by hackers.

Id. at 4 (Compl. ¶ 17–18).

On July 19, 2023, Bassinger (Plaintiff’s manager at General Dynamics) called Plaintiff

into a meeting with HR. Id. (Compl. ¶ 20). At that meeting, Plaintiff was informed that he was

going to be removed from his position and moved to “internal mobility” because “the client

want[ed] to move in another direction.” Id. According to Plaintiff, however, Bassinger’s reason

for removing him was false, and that, in fact, the next day Christopher Smith, a client

representative, informed Plaintiff that the work he had done was going to “guide the team

forward.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 22). He alleges: “Mr. Bassinger was lying to the [P]laintiff, since the

client was not trying to go in another direction.” Id. Eventually, Plaintiff came to believe that he

was “the victim of racism,” id. at 5 (Compl. ¶ 24), and he filed this action against General

Dynamics and the Administrative Office.

3 General Dynamics waived service, appeared, and answered. Dkt. 18. The

Administrative Office, in contrast, moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it for lack of

jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, and failure to state a claim. Dkt. 17. The

Administrative Office argued that Plaintiff’s service was defective because he had mailed it

himself in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The Court agreed, but rather than

dismiss the action, the Court exercised its discretion to “direct that service be effected within a

specified time.” Dkt. 32 at 3. The Court, accordingly, denied the Administrative Office’s

motion without prejudice and gave Plaintiff 45 days to effect service. The Court further

explained, however, that the Administrative Office would “be free to renew its [remaining]

arguments” after Plaintiff effected service. Id. at 4.

Plaintiff attempted to effect service within 45 days, as required by the Court’s order. See

Dkt. 33, Dkt. 34. The Administrative Office, in turn, renewed its motion to dismiss. Dkt. 35.

The Administrative Office first argued that Plaintiff’s second attempt at service was, once again,

insufficient—this time because, although he “served the Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney

through a person other than himself,” he did properly serve “the agency itself.” Id. at 2. In the

alternative, the Administrative Office renewed its contentions that Plaintiff’s “claims warrant

dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.” Dkt. 35 at 3 (cross-

referencing Dkt. 17).

After the Administrative Office filed its renewed motion (and after Plaintiff’s 45-day

window to effect service had expired), Plaintiff attempted service a third time. The third time

was the charm, and Plaintiff successfully served the Administrative Office. See Dkt. 41 at 1.

Despite that success, the Administrative Office continues to ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint because he failed to “comply with this Court’s directive to effect service of process on

4 Defendant within forty-five days of its order.” Id. For reasons similar to those that dissuaded

the Court from granting the Administrative Office’s first motion to dismiss for insufficient

service of process, see Dkt. 32 at 3, the Court again declines to impose the draconian penalty of

dismissing the case entirely. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and has made a good faith and

diligent effort to comply with Rule 4; the Administrative Office has now been served, see Dkt.

39-1; and the federal courts favor resolving cases, when possible, on the merits.

The Court will, accordingly, reach the Administrative Office’s alternative arguments for

dismissal and consider whether Plaintiff has established that this Court has subject-matter

jurisdiction over each of his claims and, if so, whether he has stated a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Although pleadings by pro se litigants are “held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (citation omitted),

they still must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Jarrell v. Tisch,

(D.D.C. 1987).

At the motion to dismiss stage, a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction “may take one of

two forms.” Hale v. United States,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2015). First, a

Rule 12(b)(1) motion “may raise a ‘facial’ challenge to the Court's jurisdiction.”

A facial

challenge asks whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish the court’s jurisdiction.

See Erby v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2006); see also Owner-Operator

Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.,

, 346–47 (D.C. Cir. 2018). In this

posture, the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, Erby,

, but must also assess the “plausibility” of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations in

5 light of the relevant context and the Court’s “judicial experience and common sense,” Humane

Soc’y of the U.S. v. Vilsack,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009)). Alternatively, “a Rule 12(b)(1) motion may pose a ‘factual’ challenge to the

Court’s jurisdiction.” Hale,

, at *3. When a motion to dismiss is framed in

this manner, the court “may not deny the motion . . . merely by assuming the truth of the facts

alleged by the plaintiff and disputed by the defendant” but “must go beyond the pleadings and

resolve any disputed issues of fact the resolution of which is necessary to a ruling upon the

motion to dismiss.” Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola,

(D.C. Cir.

2000).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may also move to dismiss a

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To survive a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal,

(2009) (citation omitted). A court must consider the whole

complaint, accepting factual allegations as true and construing all reasonable inferences in favor

of the plaintiff. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). But a court need not

“accept as true ‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,’ nor inferences that are

unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Laughlin v. Holder,

(D.D.C. 2013). A court may consider “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the

complaint and matters of which [a court] may take judicial notice.” E.E.O.C. v. St. Francis

Xavier Parochial Sch.,

(D.C. Cir. 1997).

For pro se litigants, the D.C. Circuit has instructed that a district court should “consider a

pro se litigant’s complaint ‘in light of’ all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to

6 dismiss.” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015); see also

Ho v. Garland,

(D.C. Cir. 2024). Applying this principle, the Court will review

Plaintiff’s complaint, Dkt. 1, in light of his other filings. See Hylton v. Watt,

,

at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2018). These additional materials, however, may be used only as

interpretive aids; they may not substitute for a well-pleaded complaint. The complaint itself

must, therefore, still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face,” Ho,

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asserts several claims against both the Administrative Office and General

Dynamics. He asserts Title VII claims (Counts I, IV, and V), Equal Protection Clause and

Section 1981 claims (Count II), a District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) claim

(Count VIII), breach of contract claims (Counts VI and VII), and an intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim (Count III). For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that

each of Plaintiff’s claims against the Administrative Office fails, either for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A. Title VII Claims (Counts I, IV, V)

Title VII broadly prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,

or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3. Title VII, however, “covers only those

individuals in a direct employment relationship with a government employer.” Al-Saffy v.

Vilsack,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation and alteration omitted). “Individuals who are

independent contractors or those not directly employed by such an employer are unprotected.”

Spirides v. Reinhardt,

(D.C. Cir. 1979). In the case of government contracts,

7 however, employees can sometimes qualify as joint employees of both the contractor and the

government agency. See Al-Saffy,

.

Title VII offers no meaningful definition of “employee” or “employer.” See, e.g., Juino

v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5,

(5th Cir. 2013); Gulino v. N.Y. State

Educ. Dep’t,

, 371 (2d Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court, accordingly, has instructed

that courts should look to “traditional agency law principles.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Darden,

(1992) (construing identical definition of “employee” under ERISA).

In drawing the line between “independent contractors” and “employees,” the D.C. Circuit has

applied a multi-factor and non-exhaustive test. Spirides,

. First and foremost,

courts must consider “the employer’s right to control the ‘means and manner’ of the worker’s

performance,” including both the “result to be achieved” and “the details by which that result is

achieved.”

at 831–32 (citation omitted). Beyond this, Spirides identified eleven other

factors—ranging from the “kind of occupation” and “skill” required to who “furnishes the

equipment used and the place of work” to “whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits”

and “whether the ‘employer’ pays social security taxes”—all of which must be considered, along

with any other circumstances, in defining the work relationship.

.

The D.C. Circuit “has suggested in dictum,” however, that the Spirides test, which was

adopted to distinguish between independent contractors and employees, ought not control in

“‘joint employment’ discrimination cases like this one.” Harris v. Attorney General,

, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Clayton v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2015). The D.C. Circuit explained in Redd v. Summers,

(D.C. Cir.

2000), that it “has never invoked Spirides to resolve an issue of joint employment,” and it

expressed “doubt whether the Spirides test is suited to” that purpose,

at 937–38. Instead, as

8 this Court has previously observed, the Browning-Ferris test is better suited than the Spirides test

to resolve claims of joint employment. Clayton,

; see also Coles v. Harvey,

(D.D.C. 2007) (same). But, even if the Spirides test were applicable, the

result at this stage of the proceedings would be the same, since the Browning-Ferris test “is not

terribly distinct from the primary consideration in the Spirides test,” Dean v. Am. Fed’n of

Government Emps.,

(D.D.C. 2008); see also Harris,

. Both involve a core inquiry regarding the degree to which the purported “employer” or

“joint employer” exercised control over the worker’s performance and the terms and conditions

of his or her engagement.

Here, Plaintiff has not pled facts that, taken as true, would establish that the

Administrative Office exercised sufficient control over him to cross the line from contractor to

joint employee—under either Spirides or Browning-Ferris. He asserts that the Administrative

Office asked him to conduct all his regular meetings under the name of his predecessor, Dkt. 1 at

3 (Compl. ¶ 12), and pressured him not to report certain alleged security breaches,

(Compl. ¶ 17). He also alleges that someone named Paul Pollard controlled his key meetings,

although the complaint does not make clear whether Pollard is an employee of the

Administrative Office, General Dynamics, or some other organization.

(Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15).

Even though these allegations suggest that the Administrative Office exercised some day-to-day

supervision over Plaintiff’s working conditions, they do not support an inference that the

Administrative Office had authority over the terms and conditions of his employment for

purposes of the Browning-Ferris test or that it could control and direct both the details and the

results of his work for purposes of the Spirides factors. See Mack v. Aspen of DC, Inc.,

, 219–20 (D.D.C. 2017). Unlike cases in which courts have concluded that a

9 contracting entity exercised sufficient control over a contractor to qualify as a joint employer,

Plaintiff does not allege that the Administrative Office participated in the hiring process, trained

him, controlled his schedule, approved his timesheets, or had the power to fire or discipline him.

Contra Young v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth.,

, at *4 (D.D.C.

Apr. 4, 2019) (authority exercised over plaintiff by “setting her schedule and approving her

timesheets and any leave requests, training her, assigning the work she did, [] supervising that

work,” “and fir[ing] her”); Coles v. Harvey,

(D.D.C. 2007) (authority

exercised over “hir[ing],” “supervis[ion],” and “terminat[ion]”); Brown v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(D.D.C. 2009) (authority exercised over “training, supervision and

discipline of employees” and “policies and procedures”); Clayton,

(authority exercised when defendant “played significant roles in” plaintiff’s “hiring and

supervision” and “repeatedly threatened her” with termination).

By contrast, the complaint alleges sufficient facts to conclude that General Dynamics did

exercise such control. Dkt. 1 at 3 (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10). General Dynamics (not the Administrative

Office) informed Plaintiff that he had been removed from his position and moved to “internal

mobility,” indicating that General Dynamics had control over his responsibilities and could

discipline him, terminate him, or remove him from the Administrative Office contract. Id. at 4

(Compl. ¶ 20). Furthermore, when Plaintiff “fe[lt] targeted” or “underpaid” he contacted

General Dynamics and not the Administrative Office. Dkt. 1-1 at 2; Dkt. 1 at 13 (Compl. ¶ 10).

General Dynamics also determined and paid Plaintiff’s salary. See Dkt. 1 at 13 (Compl. ¶ 10).

Plaintiff nonetheless insists that he was “a federal employee engaged in work” for the

Administrative Office. Dkt. 22 at 17. It is unclear what he means by that. To the extent he

intends to suggest that he was solely employed by the Administrative Office, that allegation is

10 implausible and directly conflicts with the allegations in his complaint, including the allegation

that he “started a permanent position with [General Dynamics]” in January 2023. Dkt. 1 at 2

(Compl. ¶ 2). If, on the other hand, he intends to allege that he was jointly employed by General

Dynamics and the Administrative Office, that is a conclusion of law that need not be taken as

true.

Even reading Plaintiff’s complaint in light of statements included in other filings, see

Brown,

, he has not alleged facts that would support an inference that he is a joint

General Dynamics/Administrative Office employee. His filings contain various conclusory

assertions that he is, in fact, a federal employee. See Dkt. 39 at 7 (“Plaintiff realleges that he was

a federal employee within Title VII’s scope.”);

(“Plaintiff was not an ‘independent contractor’

contrary to what Defendant is suggesting.”). Beyond those assertions, he points to a handful of

additional facts about his employment situation. He says that he was “integrat[ed] into the work

processes and team structure of both entities,” Dkt. 22 at 19, that he had a “relationship with

Thomas Pedicone, who transitioned from a [General Dynamics] employee to a full-time

employee of the Administrative Office,” id. at 20, and that he had a “Government Manager, Troy

Pomeroy,” who was “an executive level employee” of the Administrative Office, Dkt. 39 at 7–8.

He also alleges that he had “a government badge with building access” and “managed almost 2

dozen Government and non-Government employees, working directly with Government co-

workers every day, in a fully integrated Government team.” Dkt. 39 at 8. Finally, he notes that

he “signed a Declaration of Federal Employment,” id., and provided a copy of that form, see

Dkt. 22-1.

But none of this suffices to establish joint employment. Apart from Plaintiff’s allegations

about his manager, his relationships with various Administrative Office employees do not

11 establish that those employees (or the Administrative Office generally) exercised control over the

terms and conditions of his employment. Nor does the fact that he was given a government

badge have anything to do with such control. And the “Declaration for Federal Employment”

form states directly under the title that “This form may also be used to assess fitness for federal

contract employment.” Dkt. 22-1 at 1. As a result, it adds little to Plaintiff’s argument.

The contention that he had a “Government Manager” arguably weighs in Plaintiff’s

favor, because it does suggest some level of control. But the degree of control—and the nature

of that control—are critical to the relevant analysis, and without that detail, the Court cannot

conclude that this generic label is sufficient to “nudge[] [his] claim[]” that he was jointly

employed “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly,

. To do so,

he would need to provide facts that pertained not just to the Administrative Office’s management

of his day-to-day tasks, but also to the terms and conditions of his employment. The Court thus

concludes that Nguedi has not alleged facts sufficient to permit a plausible inference that he is a

joint employee of General Dynamic and the Administrative Office. See Mack,

(“[Plaintiff] must provide more detail than she has for the Court to [conclude] that the

District was her employer for purposes of Title VII liability, particularly when she explicitly

alleges that another entity—Aspen—was her employer.”).

Even beyond this threshold difficulty, assuming that Plaintiff was jointly employed by

General Dynamic and the Administrative Office, his complaint also fails to allege facts sufficient

to support a Title VII claim against the Administrative Office. He does not allege, for example,

that the Administrative Office played any role in setting his compensation level or his benefits;

to the contrary, he alleges that he raised these concerns with General Dynamic, not the

Administrative Office. Dkt. 1-1 at 2. Similarly, although he alleges that he was demoted in

12 retaliation for making inquiries about his salary, he contends that General Dynamics falsely

placed blame for this move on the Administrative Office. In his words, his General Dynamics

supervisor “was lying” when he said that the Administrative Office wanted “to move in another

direction” and that, in truth, the Administrative Office “was not trying to go in another

direction.” Dkt. 1 at 4 (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 22). Thus, even Plaintiff’s complaint lays the decision to

remove him from his post at the feet of General Dynamics, not the Administrative Office. In

short, he fails to identify anything that the Administrative Office did that might plausibly have

violated Title VII.

The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the

Administrative Office. 1

B. Equal Protection Clause and

Claim (Count II)

Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause and Section 1981 claims against the Administrative

Office also fail as a matter of law. The federal government is entitled to sovereign immunity,

which bars claims against it for money damages absent express congressional authorization. See

FDIC v. Meyer,

(1994). Here, Congress has not authorized suits for money

damages against a federal agency under either the Equal Protection Clause or Section 1981.

First, it goes without saying that the Equal Protection Clause does not, standing alone,

authorize suits against federal agencies for money damages. To be sure, in enacting

, Congress authorized “an injured person” to recover “money damages if a state official

violates his or her constitutional rights,” but it has not created “an analogous statute for federal

1 Given that the Court is dismissing Plaintiff’s Title VII claims for failure to establish that he was a federal employee or that the Administrative Office did anything that might have violated Title VII, the Court will decline to reach the Administrative Office’s other arguments as to whether Plaintiff had adequately pled that he held a competitive service position, see Dkt. 17-1 at 16–18.

13 officials.” Ziglar v. Abbasi,

(2017) (emphasis added). Nor does the Federal

Torts Claims Act waive sovereign immunity for constitutional torts. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at

477–78. Finally, although sovereign immunity does not bar suits for constitutional torts brought

against federal officials in their personal capacities, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics

Agents,

(1971), it does bar suits against federal officials sued in their

official capacities, see Clark v. Library of Cong.,

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that

sovereign immunity “bar[s] suits for money damages against officials in their official capacity

absent a specific waiver by the government” (emphasis in original)), and clearly bars suits

against federal agencies for money damages. “Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature,”

Meyer,

, and, accordingly, suits like this one, which seek money damage from the

federal government without congressional consent, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,

United States v. Mitchell,

(1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may

not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for

jurisdiction.”).

Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim against the Administrative Office fares no better. Section

1981 is explicit: It provides that “[t]he rights protected by this section are protected against

impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.”

(c). The Administrative Office is not, of course, a “nongovernmental” actor, and it

does not act “under color of State law.” Because Section 1981 “does not apply to actions against

the United States,” Brookens v. Solis,

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 2009),

Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim cannot stand.

14 The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause claim for lack of

jurisdiction and his Section 1981 claim against the Administrative Office for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.

C. D.C. Human Rights Act Claim (Count VIII)

Sovereign immunity bars any claim under the DCHRA against a federal agency. See

Burford v. Yellen,

(D.D.C. 2017) (dismissing DCHRA claims because

“[t]he D.C. Council, not Congress, enacted the DCHRA, and there is no federal statute that

evinces Congress’s intent to waive the United States’ immunity from suit under the DCHRA”

(quoting Marcus v. Geithner, 813 F. Supp, 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2011)). Plaintiff “challenges the

notion of sovereign immunity as a defense for the alleged discriminatory actions.” Dkt. 22 at 29.

But sovereign immunity does not depend on the substance of an underlying claim; it depends on

whether the United States has waived its immunity from suit for money damages. See Crowley

Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. GSA,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (“The United States and its

agencies are generally immune from suit in federal court absent a clear and unequivocal waiver

of sovereign immunity”).

The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiff’s DCHRA claim against the Administrative

Office for lack of jurisdiction.

D. Breach of Contract Claims (Counts VI, VII)

The Administrative Office argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s

breach of contract claim because the damages he seeks exceed $10,000. Dkt. 17-1 at 25–26.

Under the Little Tucker Act, district courts and the Court of Federal Claims have concurrent

jurisdiction over breach of contract claims against the United States when the damages sought

are below $10,000. See

(a)(2). When the plaintiff is seeking more $10,000,

15 however, the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction. Id.; Kidwell v. Dep’t of Army,

Bd. for Correction of Mil. Recs.,

(D.C. Cir. 1995). Here, even though Plaintiff

repeatedly alleges that he was earning $10,000 less than other members of his team, the

complaint fails to tie this amount to any contractual undertaking; rather, the allegations regarding

the pay differential are most clearly related to his discrimination claims. When it comes to his

claims for breach of contract, he merely alleges that “Defendants breached the employment

contract by failing to provide Plaintiff with the terms, conditions, and compensation as promised

or implied in the employment offer and contract.” Dkt. 1 at 8 (Compl. ¶ 39).

Because Plaintiff fails to identify the contractual provision, whether express or implied,

that Defendants allegedly breached, the Court cannot conclude that his claim exceeds $10,000.

But that does little to help Plaintiff, since the complaint fails to set forth a plausible theory of

breach of contract. Among other things, Plaintiff never alleges that he entered into an

employment contract with the Administrative Office; to the contrary, he alleges that he was hired

by General Dynamics to support that company’s contract with the Administrative Office. Id. at 2

(Compl. ¶ 2). Nor does he allege what contractual terms the Administrative Office allegedly

breached. It is not enough to allege in conclusory terms that “Defendants entered into an

employment contract” with him and breached that contract by failing to comply with its terms or

by failing to treat Plaintiff fairly. Id. at 8 (Compl. ¶¶ 38–39, 43–45).

If Rule 8 means anything at all, it requires more than this to state a claim for relief. See

Hildreth v. Obama,

(D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing the case because “the

complaint [did] not contain sufficient factual matter to suggest the existence of a contract” with

the federal government). Here, the complaint contains nothing more than legal conclusions and

“an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal,

.

16 Because the complaint lacks “factual content” sufficient to allow the Court “to draw the

reasonable inference that the [Administrative Office] is liable for” a breach of contract—or even

that it was a party to an employment contract—Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims against the

Administrative Office cannot stand.

The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims against the

Administrative Office for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (Count III)

As explained above, sovereign immunity bars any claims against the federal government,

including federal agencies like the Administrative Office, that are not authorized by statute. See

Meyer,

. Here, the only federal statute that might even arguably serve that

function with respect to Plaintiff’s tort claims is the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which

waives sovereign immunity for certain tort claims against the United States. See

(b)(1). In order to recover under the FTCA, however, a plaintiff must first exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court. See

§ 2675(a); McNeil v. United

States,

(1993) (upholding dismissal of FTCA claim when plaintiff failed to

exhaust administrative remedies). To do so, a plaintiff must “first present[] [his] claim to the

appropriate Federal agency” and wait until it is “finally denied by the agency in writing and sent

by certified or registered mail.”

(a). Unlike some exhaustion requirements, the

FTCA’s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and must be pled by the FTCA claimant. See

Norton v. United States,

, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2021); accord Bellecourt v. United

States,

(8th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to include any mention of the Federal Tort Claims Act, nor

does it allege that Plaintiff made any effort to exhaust any administrative remedies before

17 bringing suit. He alleges neither that he presented his claim to the Administrative Office (or any

other agency) nor that he received a denial from that agency in writing. Nor do any of his other

filings fill that gap; he merely asserts, without explanation, detail, or support that “he contends

that he has exhausted his claim” for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dkt. 22 at 31.

But even then, he fails to say (even in conclusory terms) that he “presented [a] claim” pursuant to

the FTCA to an “appropriate Federal agency.”

(a). Because Plaintiff bears the

burden of demonstrating that the Court has jurisdiction to consider his claims, more than a

conclusory assertion that he “contends” that “he has exhausted his claim” in an opposition brief

is required to proceed with this claim. Moreover, even if the Court were to credit Plaintiff’s

conclusory assertion, his FTCA claim would fail to satisfy even the most undemanding pleading

requirements; the Court is simply left to wonder which federal employee took what action that

could possibly be characterized as “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a

civilized community,” Homan v. Goyal,

(D.C. 1998) (citation omitted), but

that would not fall within the intentional tort exception to the FTCA,

(h).

The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim against the Administrative Office for lack of jurisdiction.

18 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Administrative Office’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 35, is

hereby GRANTED and Plaintiff’s motion for hearing, Dkt. 44, is DENIED as moot.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: December 3, 2024

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