UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CLARA YUVIENCO, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 23-186 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 14 : TOM VILSACK, : Secretary of Agriculture, : : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Clara Yuvienco sued Tom Vilsack in his official capacity as Secretary of

Agriculture, alleging that she experienced employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a on the basis of her race and

national origin, age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“ADEA”), and a hostile work environment. This Court previously granted Defendant’s motion

to dismiss, finding that Yuvienco’s claims were factually deficient but affording her the

opportunity to amend her complaint to supplement her factual allegations. Following that

amendment, Defendant moves to dismiss once more. Because the Court concludes that

Yuvienco’s claims remain factually deficient, it grants Defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with its prior memorandum opinion and order evaluating

Yuvienco’s original Complaint. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1; Mem. Op. Granting Def.’s

Mot. Dismiss (“Mem. Op.”), ECF No. 10; Order Granting Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 9; Yuvienco v. Vilsack, No. 23-cv-186,

(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2024). In its prior

opinion, the Court concluded that Yuvienco’s race and national origin discrimination claims

were factually deficient, see Mem. Op. at 9, that she did not allege that any adverse actions were

taken because of her age, see id. at 10, that she offered insufficient facts to support the existence

of a proper comparator, see id. at 10–11, and that her hostile work environment claim was

unconnected to her race and not sufficiently severe, see id. at 11. The Court nonetheless granted

Yuvienco’s alternative request to amend her complaint. See id. at 14–15.

Yuvienco filed an Amended Complaint on March 25, 2024, which asserts the following

facts. See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 11. Yuvienco is a Black woman of Colombian

national origin. Id. ¶ 9. During the relevant period, she worked as a bilingual Technical

Information Specialist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection

Service. Id. ¶ 16. Although she does not state when she started working there, the Amended

Complaint indicates that the agency hired her some time before 2014. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. Her duties

included staffing a “Hotline,” and she also “wrote blogs [and] articles, did community outreach,

conducted radio and television interviews, updated databases, translated recalls and documents,

conducted podcasts, [and] translated and recorded food safety messages.” Id. ¶ 20. 1

Yuvienco’s factual allegations largely revolve around metrics measuring her responses to

Hotline calls. 2 See id. ¶¶ 29–48. She alleges that a January 2021 Hotline metrics report showed

1 Yuvienco’s Amended Complaint details alleged differences in treatment between her and another staff member, Janice López Muñoz, from 2014–2018. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20–27. Defendant points out that “Plaintiff does not allege” that these facts “are part of her claims here” and that they are unexhausted. Mot. Dismiss at 19–20, ECF No. 14. Yuvienco does not dispute this characterization. See generally Opp’n Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 16. The Court thus does not summarize those facts here or consider them further. 2 The Amended Complaint provides no details on what the Hotline actually is, how many people staff the Hotline, or how related duties are assigned. See generally Am. Compl.

2 that she had “the third highest percentage” of responses “on the team” and that “[s]everal team

members had a lower number of cases than her.” Id. ¶ 29. On July 1, 2021, Yuvienco’s

supervisor, who she states is Caucasian, “issued [her] a Letter of Instruction (‘LOI’) . . . alleging

that she failed to meet performance expectations.” Id. ¶ 31. “The LOI stated that effective

immediately, [Yuvienco] would need to achieve at least 25% of the total hotline inquiries per

month until the end of the fiscal year. This requirement was higher than [her] similarly situated

colleagues of a different protected class.” 3 Id. On August 19, 2021, supervisors placed

Yuvienco on “a Demonstration Opportunity” for thirty days even though she “had handled more

Hotline inquiries than any of her teammates.” Id. ¶ 42. Yuvienco alleges that she “was forced to

retire” in mid-September 2021 due to “management’s continued efforts to minimize [her] work,

and their continued efforts to assure she did not meet the metric necessary to prove successful

performance during the Opportunity period.” Id. ¶¶ 47–48.

Yuvienco alleges that managers’ metrics differed slightly from those she calculated

herself. Id. ¶ 34. When a supervisor issued the initial LOI in June 2021, she alleges that the

supervisor’s data was incorrect—Yuvienco had responded to 18.54 percent of Hotline requests,

not 17.3 percent as the supervisor reported. Id. 4 Her metrics for the month of June additionally

showed that she completed 233 cases, while her own count totaled 243 cases. Id. ¶ 37.

Supervisors then changed the way Yuvienco received her reports, first omitting the names of

other staff members and later omitting those staff members’ metrics. Id. ¶¶ 38, 40. She asserts

that she was the only employee to experience the latter change in reporting. Id. ¶ 40. Finally,

3 A supervisor issued Yuvienco an additional LOI on August 4, 2021 “regarding leave management and attendance.” Am. Compl. ¶ 53. 4 The Amended Complaint additionally asserts that Yuvienco saw Hotline record reports with varying record counts, and that her “metrics for October [2020] were impacted by the total record count change.” Am. Compl. ¶ 35.

3 Yuvienco alleges that a supervisor reported that she handled a total of 147 cases during August

2021, when she counted 149 cases handled. Id. ¶ 45.

The Amended Complaint also presents a potential comparator who allegedly received

different treatment from Yuvienco. See id. ¶ 35. Yuvienco asserts that another employee named

Sandy Stasiak had answered 6 percent of inquiries during October 2020, compared to

Yuvienco’s 9.8 percent. Id. ¶¶ 34–35. Stasiak is white, “much younger than” Yuvienco, also

worked as a Technical Information Specialist, “had essentially the same duties as” Yuvienco,

and reported to “the same first and second-line supervisors.” Id. ¶ 35. “Ms. Stasiak’s metrics

were consistently much lower than [Ms. Yuvienco]’s every month.” Id. ¶ 36. Despite this,

Stasiak “was not placed on a Demonstration Opportunity period.” Id. ¶ 43. 5

Based on these facts, Yuvienco alleges that she experienced employment discrimination

on the basis of race and national origin, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49–86, employment discrimination

on the basis of age, see id. ¶¶ 87–103, a hostile work environment, see id. ¶¶ 104–119, and

unlawful retaliation, see id. ¶¶ 120–133.

On May 13, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. See

Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 14. Yuvienco opposed the motion, see Opp’n Mot. Dismiss, ECF No.

16, and Defendant replied, see Reply to Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Reply”), ECF No. 17.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal

sufficiency of a complaint” by asking whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim for which

5 The Amended Complaint also asserts that on one occasion, supervisors delayed in approving Yuvienco’s leave request, although it was eventually approved. Am. Compl. ¶ 30. She claims that “[s]imilarly situated employees of a different protected class than Plaintiff had their Leave Request approved promptly.” Id.

4 relief can be granted. Browning v. Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). In considering such a motion, the complaint must be construed “liberally in

the plaintiff’s favor with the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.”

Stewart v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Kowal v. MCI

Commc’ns Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1994)). But a court may disregard “inferences

drawn by a plaintiff if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.”

Nurriddin v. Bolden,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting Kowal,

).

Thus, although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007), “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, [if] accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (internal quotation omitted). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are

insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

(citing Twombly,

). Similarly,

there is no obligation to accept plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, nor to presume the truth of

legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly,

. Finally,

the Court may consider “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and

matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial

Sch.,

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc.,

, 1017–18 (5th Cir. 1996)). That includes EEO filings with respect to exhaustion of claims.

See Williams v. Chu,

(D.D.C. 2009); Ward v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab.

Servs.,

, 120 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (considering charge of discrimination and

letter of determination).

5 IV. ANALYSIS

The Court concludes that Yuvienco’s Amended Complaint continues to “make[] little

connection between her employment issues and her race [or] national origin.” Mem. Op. at 5.

The only facts that link her treatment to her race or national origin arise from alleged Caucasian

comparators, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 35, and the Court finds those comparisons lacking in detail

and insufficient to state a plausible claim of unlawful employment discrimination. The Court

additionally concludes that the facts alleged fall short of stating a claim for an unlawful hostile

work environment. As Yuvienco has conceded the remaining ADEA and retaliation claims

found in Count Three and Count Five of the Amended Complaint, see Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 13,

the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss in full.

A. Race and National Origin Discrimination Claims

Yuvienco claims that she experienced unlawful employment discrimination in violation

of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a because she is Black and of Colombian national origin. See

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49–86. Defendant moves to dismiss these claims, asserting that Yuvienco fails

to plead an adverse employment action or facts indicating that she received workplace discipline

because of her protected status. Mot. Dismiss at 12–20. Yuvienco does not plead facts showing

direct evidence of animus related to her race or national origin, Defendant argues, and she offers

no appropriate comparator. Id. at 17–20. Yuvienco responds that she pleads adverse

employment actions, Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 7–9, that “Ms. Stasiak and other similarly situated

coworkers” received different treatment, id. at 9, and that Yuvienco was subject to constructive

discharge, id. at 10–11. The Court concludes that Yuvienco pleads insufficient facts showing

that her employer took actions because of her race or national origin.

6 As the Court explained in its previous memorandum opinion in this case, see Mem. Op.

at 6, a plaintiff can demonstrate the existence of employment discrimination through “direct

evidence of . . . animus” against the protected class or by pointing to a “similarly situated

comparator” outside the protected group. Burton v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2015). To present an individual as a comparator, a plaintiff must ultimately

“demonstrate that ‘all of the relevant aspects of [her] employment situation were nearly identical

to those of the [other]’ employee.” Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Holbrook v. Reno,

(D.C. Cir. 1999)). When

determining whether a plaintiff and another employee were similarly situated, courts typically

look to “the similarity of the plaintiff’s and the putative comparator’s jobs and job duties,

whether they were disciplined by the same supervisor, and, in cases involving discipline, the

similarity of their offenses.”

“Courts often look to the duties attending each employee’s

position when evaluating whether they are appropriate comparators.” Young v. Perdue, No. 19-

cv-2144,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2024) (citing, among others, Barbour v.

Browner,

(D.C. Cir. 1999)). “While no ‘numerosity’ requirement applies to

comparators, such that a ‘single comparator’ may suffice to support an inference of

discrimination, ‘the degree of similarity necessary may vary in accordance with the size of the

potential comparator pool, as well as to the extent to which the plaintiff cherry-picks would-be

comparators.’” Young,

, at *6 (quoting Burton,

).

The Court concludes that Yuvienco alleges insufficient facts to show that Stasiak is a

proper comparator for the purposes of her discrimination claims. The Amended Complaint does

7 allege that the two reported to the same supervisors and carried the same title. 6 Am. Comp. ¶ 35.

Yet although the Amended Complaint builds out further factual context regarding Yuvienco’s

Hotline metrics, it does little to otherwise show that “all of the relevant aspects of [her]

employment situation were nearly identical to those of” Stasiak. Burley,

. In

addition, Yuvienco fails to plead the high degree of similarity necessary to base a disparate

treatment claim off of a single comparator. 7 See Young,

, at *6.

One key omission is any allegation that the two employees had similar levels of

experience, seniority, or grade, such that managers might expect the two to respond to Hotline

requests at similar rates. Two employees are not similarly situated if they do not share “seniority

of position.” Williams v. Chertoff,

(D.D.C. 2007) (citing Neuren v.

Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks, & Schill,

(D.C. Cir. 1995)). Rather than pleading

that Stasiak and Yuvienco possessed similar seniority and experience, the Amended Complaint

contains indicia that the two employees were dissimilarly situated. Yuvienco asserts that she had

6 The Court recognized these factual omissions in its prior memorandum opinion. See Mem. Op. at 7–8. The Court did not imply that inclusion of these details would be sufficient to state a claim, but rather offered them as examples of typical factual allegations that add plausibility to a discrimination complaint. 7 Yuvienco attaches several documents from administrative proceedings to her opposition, including a 525-page EEO investigation report, see Ex. 4 to Opp’n Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 16-4, and relies on the report to assert additional facts in that briefing, see Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 12. Defendant seizes on this opportunity to point out that the investigative report shows Stasiak was a recent hire of a lower salary grade, and that Yuvienco’s job description required her to respond to at least 20 percent of hotline inquiries while her coworkers’ roles did not. See Reply at 5. The Court may not consider these facts outside the operative complaint unless it converts the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment and affords Defendant the opportunity to respond with its own material. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Hurd v. D.C., Gov’t,

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[A] court that decides to consider extra-pleading material is required to convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, with attendant procedural protections.”).

8 occupied her role since prior to 2014, Am. Compl. ¶ 20, and that Stasiak was, in contrast, “much

younger than Plaintiff,” id. ¶ 35.

The Amended Complaint additionally fails to provide any details on Stasiak’s

responsibilities other than the vague assertion that the two had “essentially the same duties.” Id.;

see also Mem. Op. at 7 (noting that Yuvienco failed to allege “how this co-worker’s

responsibilities compared to hers”); Barbour,

(concluding that a GS-12

employee was not similarly situated to another GS-13 employee because the GS-13 performed

several duties that the GS-12 did not). This is particularly problematic here given that

Yuvienco’s claims hinge entirely on the notion that she and Stasiak were both expected to

respond to the same number of Hotline requests. But she does not allege this fact or any other

facts that might support such a conclusion. Absent is any assertion that Hotline duties were

equally assigned or that Stasiak was expected to spend a similar amount of time on the Hotline.

Yuvienco thus does not plead facts indicating that the two were “subject to the same or similar

performance standards.” Coats v. DeVos,

(D.D.C. 2017). To the

contrary, Yuvienco’s allegation that the Hotline represented just one of her many job duties

indicates that other staff members similarly had an assortment of duties in addition to the

Hotline. See Am. Compl. ¶ 20. Without these facts, it is difficult to “isolate the critical

independent variable” of discrimination, Burton,

(quoting Hnin v. TOA

(USA), LLC,

, 504–505 (7th Cir. 2014)), and move Yuvienco’s claims regarding

Stasiak from a mere “possibility” to the necessary “plausibility.” Iqbal,

.

Yuvienco’s references to “similarly situated colleagues” who received unspecified

different treatment provide no further factual support for her claims. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 30,

31, 63, 82. As the Court previously explained, “[a] plaintiff’s assertion that she is similarly

9 situated to others is just a legal conclusion—and a legal conclusion is never enough to state a

claim.” Mem. Op. at 10–11 (quoting Doe #1 v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps.,

,

103 (D.D.C. 2021)). Yuvienco provides no details about these colleagues or facts about their

treatment, and thus does not “identify a discrete and focused group of comparators” to support

her claim. Daughtry v. kmG Hauling, Inc., No. 20-cv-3361,

, at *7 (D.D.C.

Sept. 8, 2021).

Finally, Yuvienco contends that she suffered constructive discharge because of her race

and national origin. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57, 110; Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 10–11. To plead a

constructive discharge, she must allege facts “that (1) intentional discrimination existed, (2) the

employer deliberately made working conditions intolerable, and (3) aggravating factors justified

the plaintiff’s conclusion that she had no option but to end her employment.” Douglas-Slade v.

LaHood,

(D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Lewis v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2009)). Yuvienco argues that “a reasonable person would have been

driven to retire” in her situation because her supervisors made the “work environment untenable”

by treating her differently from Stasiak, as well as “den[ying] information about her metrics,

den[ying] the opportunity of additional work to improve her metrics, issues with her leave

requests, and abrasive conduct on behalf of her managers.” Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 10. The

Court has already determined that Yuvienco fails to allege facts indicating that intentional

discrimination existed, rendering her constructive discharge theory non-viable on that basis

alone.

The Court additionally concludes that Yuvienco does not plead facts showing intolerable

working conditions. Her allegations surround her supervisors’ feedback regarding Hotline

metrics and placement on performance improvement plans, which she felt was unfair. See, e.g.,

10 Am. Compl. ¶ 110. She describes some of these meetings as “intimidating and not meant to

assist [her] in reaching the desired metrics of the LOI.” Id. ¶ 44. “[C]onstructive discharge . . .

requires a finding of discrimination and the existence of certain ‘aggravating factors’” beyond

“the mere existence of workplace discrimination.” Veitch v. England,

(D.C.

Cir. 2006). “The kinds of situations where courts have upheld constructive-discharge findings

tend to involve extreme mistreatment or thinly veiled (or even overt) threats of termination.”

Walden v. Patient-Centered Outcomes Rsch. Inst.,

(D.D.C. 2016)

(quoting Robinson v. Ergo Sols., LLC,

(D.D.C. 2015)). The D.C.

Circuit has observed that issues such as “a change in job duties, a transfer, . . . criticism, pressure

from a supervisor, or being ignored by co-workers” will not represent “aggravating factors.”

Veitch,

. Given this precedent, Yuvienco’s claims that supervisors pressured her

over approximately two months to increase her Hotline response rate, criticized her performance,

and used slightly inaccurate data do not evince the level of extreme mistreatment necessary to

support constructive discharge. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–48; see also Walden,

(concluding that receiving a negative review and having to conform to a performance

improvement plan “are not so harsh that they rise to the level of aggravating factors”); Manuel v.

Potter,

(D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that placement on a performance

improvement plan was not an aggravating factor); Stratton v. Bentley Univ.,

(1st

Cir. 2024) (same).

Because Yuvienco fails to plead facts indicating that her employer took any action based

on her race or national origin, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Counts One

and Two of the Amended Complaint. See Mot. Dismiss at 8–12; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49–86. As

11 such, the Court need not consider Defendant’s argument that Yuvienco fails to plead that she

suffered an adverse employment action. See Mot. Dismiss at 13–17.

B. Hostile Work Environment Claim

Yuvienco alleges that Defendant created a hostile work environment in violation of Title

VII. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 104–19. Defendant moves to dismiss this claim, arguing that Yuvienco

merely repeats her deficient disparate treatment claims, that the alleged actions are not

sufficiently extreme to support a hostile work environment, and that she cannot connect any

hostility to her membership in a protected class. Mot. Dismiss at 20–23. Yuvienco responds that

she alleges facts demonstrating an abusive working environment. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 11–13.

The Court agrees with Defendant that Yuvienco fails to state a hostile work environment claim.

To demonstrate a hostile work environment, “a plaintiff must show that [her] employer

subjected [her] to ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.’” Baloch v. Kempthorne,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris v.

Forklift Sys., Inc.,

(1993)). “Determining whether an actionable hostile

environment claim exists requires an examination of all the circumstances, including the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

(2002) (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

(1993)). “Importantly, the

plaintiff must establish that the allegedly harassing conduct complained of was based on a

protected characteristic.” Byrd v. Vilsack,

(D.D.C. 2013) (citing Davis v.

Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2002)).

12 The Court determines that Yuvienco has “not plausibly connected any of the actions

taken against her to her race, national origin, or age.” Mem. Op. at 11. As the Court previously

noted, “hostile behavior . . . cannot support a claim of hostile work environment unless there

exists some linkage between the hostile behavior and the plaintiff’s membership in a protected

class.”

at 12 (quoting Motley-Ivey v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C.

2013)). Because Yuvienco does not plead facts that her employer took any action because of her

race or national origin, her hostile work environment claim cannot proceed.

The Amended Complaint additionally alleges facts that fail to describe an unlawful

hostile work environment. Yuvienco asserts that between early July and mid-September 2021,

her supervisors pressured her to increase her Hotline response percentage from approximately 18

percent to 25 percent by issuing her a Letter of Instruction and then placing her on a

Demonstration Opportunity. 8 See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 34. She also alleges that some of the

meetings she had with supervisors were “intimidating,” id. ¶ 44, and that she disagreed with the

statistics to which her supervisors referred, id. ¶¶ 32–34. Yet “‘[c]riticisms of . . . work and

expressions of disapproval (even loud expressions of disapproval)’ are not sufficiently severe to

constitute a hostile work environment.” Brooks v. Grundmann,

(D.D.C.

2012) aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Singh v. U.S. House of Representatives,

(D.D.C. 2004)). Courts in this Circuit have repeatedly held that

placement on a performance improvement plan, even where feedback is distorted, does not arise

8 In her opposition to the motion to dismiss, Yuvienco relies on the EEO investigation report to assert additional facts to support the existence of a hostile work environment. See Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 12. It is well established that a party may not amend her complaint through a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss. See Pappas v. Dist. Columbia,

, 81 n.5 (D.D.C. 2021). Even if the Court were to incorporate these additional facts into its analysis, they would nonetheless fail to push the allegations into the realm of a hostile work environment.

13 to a hostile work environment. See Harris v. Mayorkas, No. 21-cv-1083,

, at

*16 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2022); Walden,

; Munro v. LaHood,

(D.D.C. 2012); see also Nurriddin v. Bolden,

(D.D.C. 2009)

(dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claims premised on “disparaging remarks,

criticisms of [plaintiff’s] work, and other negative comments”). These sorts of “work-related

actions by supervisors” generally “[cannot] be characterized as sufficiently intimidating or

offensive in an ordinary workplace context.” Harris,

, at *16 (citations

omitted). The Court thus concludes that the facts alleged are not “sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of [Yuvienco’s] employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Baloch,

(quoting Harris,

). As Yuvienco fails to

state a claim for a hostile work environment, the Court dismisses Count Four of the Amended

Complaint.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An order

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: December 3, 2024 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

14