UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

THE CHEROKEE NATION et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 20-2167 (TJK) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

This case is about the validity of certain tribal-gaming compacts governed by the Indian

Gaming Regulatory Act. But before the parties could get to litigating the merits, a dispute broke

out over who may properly represent the State of Oklahoma. Until now, Governor J. Kevin Stitt—

sued in his official capacity, which makes Oklahoma the real party in interest—has been repre-

sented by retained counsel. Now, Oklahoma’s Attorney General, Gentner F. Drummond, seeks to

assert his authority to “take and assume control” of the defense of the state’s interests, as he argues

an Oklahoma statute permits. He has also moved to certify the question of whether he may do so

to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Regrettably, despite the further delay this will cause in resolving

the case, for the reasons explained below the Court will do so on its own initiative.

I. Background

The Court assumes familiarity with the background of this case and summarizes it only

briefly. Plaintiffs are four Native American tribes that each operate casinos in Oklahoma. They

sued in August 2020, seeking to invalidate tribal-gaming compacts entered into by Governor Stitt

with four other Native American tribes, which were then approved by the inaction of the U.S.

Secretary of the Department of the Interior under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,

et seq. Plaintiffs sued three sets of defendants: (1) the Department of the Interior (and related

federal officials there); (2) Governor Stitt, in his official capacity; and (3) the leaders of the tribes

who entered into the compacts with Governor Stitt. Plaintiffs assert, among other things, that

Governor Stitt violated Oklahoma law when he entered into the compacts. ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 2–3.

Even before the suit was filed, Attorney General Drummond’s predecessor expressed the view in

a legal opinion that Governor Stitt did not have the authority to enter into two of the compacts.

.

In late November 2022, the Court resolved the Department of the Interior’s motion to dis-

miss, granted Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss a counterclaim, and denied various other motions. See

ECF No. 157. The Court set a briefing schedule to govern the production of the administrative

record and summary judgment briefing. See Minute Order of Jan. 3, 2023. In April 2023, Plain-

tiffs moved to compel the Department of the Interior to complete the administrative record by

producing certain documents, which the parties briefed over the course of a few months.

Not long after, in July 2023, Attorney General Drummond sought to notice his appearance

on behalf of Governor Stitt. Until then, Governor Stitt had been represented by retained private

counsel. But in a five-page notice of appearance, Attorney General Drummond explained that

because the State of Oklahoma is the real party in interest, and because Governor Stitt, through his

retained counsel, has “inexplicably abrogated his constitutional duties in this case,” he was exer-

cising his statutory authority “to take and assume control of the defense of the State’s interests in

this case” as provided by Oklahoma law. See ECF No. 176 at 1, 3; Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 18b(A)(3).

Attorney General Drummond also represented that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had “clearly and

unambiguously” already ruled that “the Governor had no authority to unilaterally execute the com-

pacts at issue in this case”—citing Treat v. Stitt,

(Okla. 2020) and Treat v. Stitt, 481

(Okla. 2021)—and so continuing to defend them violated his “constitutional duty to

faithfully execute Oklahoma law.” ECF No. 176 at 3. Attorney General Drummond also attached

to his filing letters from the Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives and the President

Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma Senate, purporting to request on behalf of their bodies that he in-

tervene in this case. See ECF Nos. 176-1, 176-2.

In response, Governor Stitt, through his private counsel, moved to strike Attorney General

Drummond’s appearance, as well as that of Oklahoma’s Solicitor General, who also sought to

enter his appearance “[a]t the request of the Oklahoma Attorney General.” ECF No. 177. Gover-

nor Stitt accused Attorney General Drummond of trying to “hijack” the case for political purposes.

ECF No. 178 at 3. According to Governor Stitt, Attorney General Drummond lacks the statutory

authority to act as he suggests, and his attempt to do so violates the Oklahoma Constitution as well.

Further, Governor Stitt argued, Attorney General Drummond’s reliance on the Speaker’s and

President Pro Tempore’s letters is misplaced, because those legislative bodies may not authorize

Attorney General Drummond’s actions, and even if they could, letters from individual legislators

would not do the trick.

.

About a month after briefing on Governor Stitt’s motion to strike was complete, Attorney

General Drummond moved to certify the question of whether he may “take and assume control”

of the defense of the state’s interests in this case to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in part, because

there is no controlling state case law on the matter. ECF No. 183. Governor Stitt opposed the

motion, arguing that the Attorney General lacks standing to file it, and even if he had standing,

certification is inappropriate. See ECF No. 186.

II. Legal Standards

A federal court may only certify a question to a state court “to the extent authorized by

state law.” In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-mc-197 (TFH),

, at *1 (D.D.C.

3 July 14, 2000). The relevant Oklahoma statute provides: “The Supreme Court and the Court of

Criminal Appeals may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States . . .

if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and

there is no controlling decision of the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals, constitutional

provision, or statute of this state.”

. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has

confirmed that it has the power to answer such questions. See White Star Petroleum, LLC v.

MUFG Union Bank, N.A.,

, 889 (Okla. 2020) (“This Court is vested with discretion-

ary authority to review questions of law certified to it by a court of the United States, so long as

(1) the answer would be dispositive of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court; and (2)

there is no established and controlling law on the subject matter.”). The certified question need

not be “dispositive of the cause”; rather, “[a]ll that is required for [the Oklahoma Supreme Court]

to answer a certified question is that the response be determinative of a single issue in the cause

and that no controlling state law exist.” Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC v. Century Sur. Co.,

(Okla. 2017).

If certification is authorized by state law, the Court must then determine whether certifica-

tion is proper under federal law. The Supreme Court has recognized that certification “does, of

course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial

federalism.” Lehman Bros. v. Schein,

(1974). But the process “is not without

its costs,” including imposition of time and resources on the state court, and additional delay and

expenditure for the parties. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.,

, at *1 (quotation

omitted). Ultimately, however, the decision to certify “rests with the sound discretion of the

court.” Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Lehman Bros.,

). In considering whether certification is appropriate, the D.C. Circuit has identified

4 the same key threshold question as Oklahoma law, recognizing that “[t]he most important consid-

eration . . . is whether the reviewing court finds itself genuinely uncertain about a question of state

law that is vital to a correct disposition of the case before it.”

. A court should also

consider whether the “case is one of extreme public importance in which the [relevant state] has a

substantial interest.” Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 1993)

(internal quotations omitted). Finally, courts disfavor certification if the party seeking certification

is the party that first chose to litigate in the federal forum. See Metz v. BAE Sys. Tech. Sols. &

Servs. Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2014).

III. Analysis

As explained below, the question of Oklahoma law presented by this dispute between Gov-

ernor Stitt and Attorney General Drummond meets all the criteria for certification to the Oklahoma

Supreme Court. The Court need not consider whether Attorney General Drummond has standing

to move for such certification because the Court has the power to do so on its own initiative, which

it will exercise. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisher,

(10th Cir. 2010).

A. Whether the Attorney General Can “Take and Assume Control” of the De- fense of Oklahoma’s Interests in this Case is an Unsettled and Genuinely Un- certain Question of Oklahoma State Law

To begin, the question of whether Attorney General Drummond can enter his appearance

and “take and assume control” of the defense of Oklahoma’s interests in this case is a question of

state law. The Supreme Court has explained that “a State must be able to designate agents to

represent it in federal court.” Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,

(2019) (internal quotation omitted). Although Governor Stitt is the named defendant, he is sued

in his official capacity, making Oklahoma the real party in interest. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of

State Police,

(1989). And Governor Stitt conceded as much in his Answer to the

Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint. ECF No. 110 at 2 (referring to the State of

5 Oklahoma as “the real party in interest”). Thus, Oklahoma law controls who may properly repre-

sent Oklahoma’s interests in this case.

The next question is whether there is “established and controlling law on the subject mat-

ter,” White Star Petroleum, LLC., 480 P.3d at 889, and whether the Court is “genuinely uncertain”

about the right answer, Tidler,

. By statute, Attorney General Drummond is “the

chief law officer of the state.” Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 18b(A). He asserts that the statute so designat-

ing him also gives him the authority to assume control of the defense of the state’s interests in this

litigation. Under that law, the Attorney General has the power “[t]o initiate or appear in any action

in which the interests of the state or the people of the state are at issue . . . and when so appearing

in any such cause or proceeding, the Attorney General may, if the Attorney General deems it ad-

visable and to the best interest of the state, take and assume control of the prosecution or defense

of the state’s interest therein.” Id. § 18b(A)(3). Thus, a plain reading of this statute appears to

support Attorney General Drummond’s position. On the other hand, Governor Stitt offers some

statutory support for his contrary view. He points to a nearby provision that prohibits state officers

from retaining their own attorneys to represent them—and vests all “legal duties” of those officers

in the Attorney General—while also providing the Governor with the “authority to employ special

counsel to protect the rights or interest of the state” as set forth elsewhere.1 Id. § 18c(A)(1), (4).

According to Governor Stitt, this provision excludes his appointed counsel from being subject to

the Attorney General’s otherwise sweeping “legal duties,” including his statutory power to assume

control of litigation involving the state’s interests. Attorney General Drummond responds, in part,

by arguing that the statutory language on which he relies is broader because it permits him to “take

1 Oklahoma Statute Title 74 § 6 provides that the Governor “shall have power to employ counsel to protect the rights or interests of the state in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, which has been, or is about to be commenced . . . .”

6 and assume control” of litigation involving the state’s interests, while that relied on by Governor

Stitt only allows him to hire counsel. All in all, in the Court’s view, the statutory scheme alone

provides no established and controlling law that resolves the dispute.

Nor is there any established and controlling case law interpreting these statutes that clears

things up. Attorney General Drummond cites State ex rel. Pruitt v. Steidley, a case in which the

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals—the highest court in the State of Oklahoma with appellate

jurisdiction in criminal cases—interpreted § 18b(A)(3) to allow the Attorney General to take and

assume control over a local criminal prosecution.

, 558 (Okla. Crim. App., 2015).

But as Governor Stitt points out, there, the Attorney General sought to displace a state official

whose role that court called “subservient” to the Attorney General’s—a district attorney—rather

than the Governor. Id. And while Attorney General Drummond also cites seemingly helpful lan-

guage from an Oklahoma Supreme Court case that he “possesses complete dominion over every

litigation in which he properly appears in the interest of the State,” State ex rel. Derryberry v.

Kerr-McGee Corp.,

(Okla. 1973), that line bypasses the key issue here: whether

he may properly appear here in the first place.

The parties’ dispute also presents an issue of how to construe the Oklahoma Constitution,

and the uncertainty on this aspect of the dispute underscores the Court’s conclusion that there is

no established and controlling law resolving it. Governor Stitt argues that, even if the statutory

scheme does authorize the Attorney General to appear and assume control of this litigation, any

such authority would violate the Oklahoma Constitution, which grants him “Supreme Executive

power.” Okla. Const. art. VI, § 2. According to Governor Stitt, the Oklahoma Constitution does

not permit inferior executive officers, such as the Attorney General, to overrule him on decisions

that exercise that executive power. ECF No. 186 at 2. Attorney General Drummond counters that

7 while the Oklahoma Constitution vests the Governor with “Supreme Executive power,” it does not

vest in him exclusive executive authority; instead, it provides that “Executive authority of the state

shall be vested” in several different state offices, including the Attorney General. Okla. Const. art.

VI, § 1(A). And it requires these officers to “perform such duties as may be designated in this

Constitution or prescribed by law.” Id.

Governor Stitt’s argument has some commonsense appeal, given the Oklahoma Constitu-

tion’s use of the word “Supreme” to describe his executive power. On the other hand, that same

document permits the state legislature to “prescribe by law” the duties of the Attorney General,

which it has by allowing him to “take and assume control” of the defense of the state’s interests in

litigation. And taken to its logical conclusion, Governor Stitt’s position would mean that there is

no sphere in which the Attorney General—an independently elected constitutional officer—may

act to prosecute or defend the interests of the state against the wishes of the Governor. Whatever

“Supreme Executive power” means under the Oklahoma Constitution, the Court is skeptical that

it sweeps that broadly. In any event, the parties have brought to the Court’s attention no case in

which any Oklahoma court has addressed whether, under the Oklahoma Constitution, the Attorney

General has a sphere of responsibility in which he may act independently from the Governor, and

if so, the contours of that sphere.

For these reasons, the Court finds that there is no established and controlling law about

whether, under these Oklahoma statutes and the Oklahoma Constitution, Attorney General Drum-

mond may take and assume control of the defense of the state’s interests in this case over the

objection of Governor Stitt, and the Court is genuinely uncertain about whether he may do so.2

2 Attorney General Drummond makes another argument he claims relates to this legal ques- tion, but in the Court’s view, the argument does not contribute to whether the question is unsettled

8 B. Whether the Attorney General Can “Take and Assume Control” of the De- fense of Oklahoma’s Interests is Dispositive of a Vital Issue in this Case

Not every question of state law is a candidate for certification—it must also resolve a vital

issue in the case. The question of who properly represents Oklahoma in this case is such a ques-

tion. Governor Stitt argues that the question over his representation is not “vital to the disposition

of the case” because—however that issue comes out—it will not “resolve this litigation.” ECF

No. 186 at 4. That may be true, but it gets the standard wrong. Although earlier D.C. Circuit

opinions used the “vital to the disposition of the case” language, Tidler,

, later

opinions clarified that the standard only requires that the state law issue be “a dispositive question”

in the case,3 Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transportation, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 1998). That

aligns with Oklahoma law, which unambiguously allows certification for any question that “may

be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court.”

(emphasis added); Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC,

(“All that is required for us

or whether the Court is uncertain about it. Attorney General Drummond also purports to proceed at the request of the “Legislature, or either branch thereof,” as authorized under § 18b(A)(3). And he points to the letters on behalf of the Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma Senate requesting that he assume the defense of Okla- homa’s interests in this case. But he cites no persuasive authority that these individual legislators have the power to make such a request on behalf of their bodies. Generally, letters from individual legislators do not constitute a request of the legislature itself. Cf. Kucinich v. Bush,

(D.D.C. 2002) (“The Supreme Court has observed that individual members of Congress cannot represent the interests of an entire House or all of Congress.”) (citing United States v. Ballin,

(1892)). And even if Attorney General Drummond is right that an Oklahoma House rule that authorizes the Speaker to “engage legal counsel” reflects an action taken by the House itself, that rule allows the Speaker to do just that—engage counsel—and nothing more on behalf of that body. See ECF No. 179 at 7. 3 Even under the “vital to the disposition of the case” standard, the certified question need not definitively resolve the litigation, as Governor Stitt suggests. A question may be vital to the disposition of a case if, for example, the litigation cannot proceed with that issue pending, even if the resolution of the question would not end the litigation. Governor Stitt is right that, no matter how the motion to strike is resolved, the case will proceed. But the case can hardly proceed if it is unclear who properly represents Oklahoma. Resolving the motion to strike, therefore, is “vital to the disposition of the case,” even if it will not itself resolve the entire litigation.

9 to answer a certified question is that the response be determinative of a single issue in the cause

and that no controlling state law exist.”) (emphasis added). Whether Attorney General Drummond

has the power to assume control of the defense of Oklahoma’s interests resolves a pending issue

in this case—i.e., whether the Court should strike his appearance. And that issue, it appears, will

materially affect how Oklahoma litigates the merits, given the differing views of Governor Stitt

and Attorney General Drummond about the validity of the tribal-gaming compacts at issue.

C. Oklahoma Has a Substantial Interest in Resolving the Question of Whether the Attorney General Can “Take and Assume Control” of the Defense of its Interests in this Case

In the D.C. Circuit, courts must also weigh another consideration in deciding whether to

certify a question. The Circuit has explained that certification is especially prudent if a “case is

one of extreme public importance in which the [state] has a substantial interest.” Joy,

(internal quotations omitted). Later decisions suggest that this may operate as an either/or—

either the case is one of extreme public importance or the state has a substantial interest. See Metz,

(“We have also certified where we found the question to be on a matter of public

importance, in which the [state] has a substantial interest, without insisting that the importance be

extreme.”) (internal quotations omitted). In any event, the key principle is that the state’s “interest

be something more than that the question is one of [state] law, else every diversity case would

come within its compass.”

The Court has little difficulty concluding that Oklahoma has a

substantial interest in resolving the question here.

The question of whether Attorney General Drummond can take and assume control of the

defense of Oklahoma’s interests in this case over Governor Stitt’s objection is one that involves a

fundamental interpretive question of Oklahoma Constitutional law affecting the very structure of

Oklahoma’s government. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]hrough the structure of its

government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself

10 as a sovereign.” Gregory v. Ashcroft,

(1991). In Joy, the D.C. Circuit observed

that “one can hardly imagine a more significant issue for [a state] than the conditions under which

its police officers will be held liable in tort for actions taken in the course of performing their

public functions.”

. No need to imagine—in the Court’s view, this case presents

a more significant issue. The decision over who has the ultimate authority to represent Oklahoma’s

interests in this case goes to the very core of its sovereignty.4 Moreover, that interest is heightened

given the differing views of Governor Stitt and Attorney General Drummond on the merits.

D. Oklahoma’s Certification Process

Having determined that certification of a question is appropriate, the Court must comply

with Oklahoma’s certification process, which requires a certifying court to issue a certification

order and forward it to the Supreme Court.

. That certification order

must include: (1) the question of law to be answered; (2) the facts relevant to the question, showing

fully the nature of the controversy out of which the question arose; (3) a statement acknowledging

that the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals of the state, acting as the receiving court,

may reformulate the question; and (4) the names and addresses of counsel of record and parties

appearing without counsel.

§ 1604.

A proposed certification order is attached to this Memorandum Opinion and Order. The

Court will provide Governor Stitt and Attorney General Drummond 14 days to file any objections

or proposed edits to that proposed order and to designate any docket entries in this matter that they

propose should be sent to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.

4 The final consideration in evaluating certification is whether the party seeking certifica- tion first chose to litigate in a federal forum. Metz,

. Neither Attorney General Drummond nor Governor Stitt did so, so that consideration is not implicated here.

11 IV. Conclusion and Order

For all the above reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that by April 4, 2024, Governor Stitt and Attorney General Drummond shall

file any objections or proposed edits to the Court’s proposed certification order and designate any

docket entries that they propose should be sent to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, and it is further

ORDERED that, because the Court will certify the question identified to the Oklahoma

Supreme Court on its own initiative, the Attorney General’s Motion to Certify Question to the

Oklahoma Supreme Court, ECF No. 183, is DENIED AS MOOT.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: March 21, 2024

12 ATTACHMENT 1: COURT’S PROPOSED CERTIFICATION ORDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

THE CHEROKEE NATION et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 20-2167 (TJK) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al.,

Defendants.

[PROPOSED] ORDER CERTIFYING QUESTION OF LAW TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, pursuant to the Revised Uni-

form Certification of Questions of Law Act,

et seq., hereby certifies to

the Oklahoma Supreme Court the following question of law which is determinative of an issue in

the above-entitled case now pending before this Court, and which appears to be unanswered by

controlling precedent of the Supreme Court or the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

I. Question of Law

May the Attorney General of Oklahoma, under Title 74, Section 18 of the Oklahoma Stat-

utes, “take and assume control” of the “defense of the state’s interests,” Okla. Stat. tit 74 §

18b(A)(3), in the instant case before this Court—in which the Governor of Oklahoma is named as

a defendant in his official capacity for his role in entering into certain tribal-gaming contracts on

behalf of the State of Oklahoma—over the objection of the Governor, who is vested with “Supreme

executive power” under Article VI, Section 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution, and when the Gover-

nor has already exercised his authority under Title 74, Section 6 of the Oklahoma Statutes to “em-

ploy counsel to protect the rights or interests of the state,” Okla. Stat. tit 74 § 6? ATTACHMENT 1: COURT’S PROPOSED CERTIFICATION ORDER

II. Factual Background

The instant case before this Court was brought in August 2020 by four Native American

tribes who each operate casinos in Oklahoma under a tribal-gaming compact with Oklahoma under

the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”),

et seq. In their operative com-

plaint, they seek to have set aside four tribal-gaming compacts for casino operations that four other

Native American tribes entered into with Oklahoma that were submitted to the U.S. Secretary of

the Department of the Interior for approval and that were approved through the Secretary’s inaction

by operation of law. Plaintiffs allege that the Governor of Oklahoma played a role in violating

their rights under the IGRA because these compacts were not lawfully entered into by the Governor

and violated Oklahoma law in other ways. Since the suit began, the Governor has been represented

by retained counsel, whom he represents he hired under Title 74, Section 6 of the Oklahoma Stat-

utes, which allows him to “employ counsel to protect the rights or interests of the state.” Okla.

Stat. tit 74 § 6. And in October 2021, the Governor filed an answer, in which he disputes that any

of the compacts at issue are invalid or violate Oklahoma law.

In July 2023, the Attorney General of Oklahoma entered an appearance in the case, claim-

ing authority under Oklahoma law to “take and assume control” of the “defense of the state’s

interests,” Okla. Stat. tit 74 § 18b(A)(3), because in his view, the compacts at issue were invalid.

In addition, he represented, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has “clearly and unambiguously” held

that the Governor had no authority to unilaterally enter into them, citing Treat v. Stitt,

(Okla. 2020); and Treat v. Stitt,

(Okla. 2021). Thus, he argued, the Governor had

abrogated his constitutional duty to “cause the laws of the State to be faithfully executed.” Okla.

Const. art. VI, § 8. The Governor objected, arguing that the Attorney General does not have the

statutory authority to replace the counsel he had already hired, and even if the Attorney General

2 ATTACHMENT 1: COURT’S PROPOSED CERTIFICATION ORDER

did have this statutory authority, doing so would violate the Oklahoma Constitution, which vests

the Governor with “Supreme executive power.” Okla. Const. art. VI, § 2.

III. Acknowledgment of Authority to Reformulate Question

Pursuant to Oklahoma Statute Title 20, Section 1604(A)(3), the Court acknowledges that

the Oklahoma Supreme Court may reformulate this question presented.

IV. Names and Addresses of Counsel of Record

Plaintiff CHEROKEE NATION represented by Chad C Harsha a federally recognized Indian Tribe CHEROKEE NATION-ATTORNEY GEN- ERAL OFFICE P.O. Box 1533 Tahlequah, OK 74465-1533 918-453-5369 Fax: 918-458-6142 Email: [email protected]

Colin Cloud Hampson SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE, EN- DRESON & PERRY, LLP 145 Willow Street Suite 200 Bonita, CA 91902-1349 619-267-1306 Fax: 619-267-1388 Email: [email protected]

Sara Hill CHEROKEE NATION ATTORNEY GEN- ERAL OFFICE P.O. Box 1533 Tahlequah, OK 74465-1533 918-207-3836 Fax: 918-458-6142 Email: [email protected]

Frank Sharp Holleman , IV SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE, EN- DRESON & PERRY, LLP

3 ATTACHMENT 1: COURT’S PROPOSED CERTIFICATION ORDER

145 Willow Street Suite 200 Bonita, CA 91902 619-267-1306 Email: [email protected]

Plaintiff represented by Colin Cloud Hampson CHICKASAW NATION (See above for address) a federally recognized Indian Tribe Meredith Presley Turpin THE CHICKASAW NATION Office of Executive Counsel 2021 Arlington Street Ada, OK 74820 580-272-5748 Email: [email protected]

Stephen Greetham GREETHAM LAW, P.L.L.C. Office of Senior Counsel 512 N. Broadway Suite 205 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 580-399-6989 Email: [email protected]

Frank Sharp Holleman , IV (See above for address)

Plaintiff represented by Colin Cloud Hampson CHOCTAW NATION (See above for address) a federally recognized Indian Tribe Bradley Harold Mallett CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA Legal & Compliance 1802 Chukka Hina Durant, OK 74701 580-380-3024

Brian Danker CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA 1802 Chukka Hina Durant, OK 74701 580-380-7410

4 ATTACHMENT 1: COURT’S PROPOSED CERTIFICATION ORDER

Email: [email protected]

Frank Sharp Holleman , IV (See above for address)

Plaintiff represented by Colin Cloud Hampson CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION (See above for address) a federally recognized Indian Tribe Frank Sharp Holleman , IV (See above for address)

Defendant represented by Kristofor R. Swanson UNITED STATES DOJ-ENRD DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR Natural Resources Section PO Box 7611 Washington, DC 20044-7611 202-305-0248 Fax: 202-305-0275 Email: [email protected]

Matthew M. Marinelli U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Natural Resources Section 4 Constitution Square 150 M Street, NE Suite 3.206 Washington, DC 20002 202-305-0293 Email: [email protected]

Defendant represented by Daniel Webber , Jr J. KEVIN STITT RYAN WHALEY COLDIRON in his official capacity as the Governor of JANTZEN PETERS & WEBBER the State of Oklahoma PLLC 400 North Walnut Avenue Oklahoma City, OK 73104 405-239-6040 Fax: 405-239-6766 Email: [email protected]

Gentner F Drummond OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL/OK

5 ATTACHMENT 1: COURT’S PROPOSED CERTIFICATION ORDER

313 NE 21st Street Oklahoma City, OK 73105 405-521-3921 Email: [email protected]

Jason Reese GOODWIN LEWIS, PLLC Office of the Governor 420 NW 6th Street Second Floor Oklahoma City, OK 73102 405-900-5700 Email: [email protected]

Jeffrey B. Wall SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 1700 New York Avenue, NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20006-5215 202-956-7500 Fax: 202-956-7676 Email: [email protected]

Mary Catherine Zinsner TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP 401 9th Street, N.W. Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20004 202-274-1932 Email: mary.zinsner@troutman- sanders.com

Matthew Kane RYAN WHALEY COLDIRON JANTZEN PETERS & WEBBER PLLC 400 North Walnut Avenue Oklahoma City, OK 73104 405-239-6040 Fax: 405-239-6766 Email: [email protected]

Patrick Pearce , Jr RYAN WHALEY COLDIRON JANTZEN PETERS & WEBBER

6 ATTACHMENT 1: COURT’S PROPOSED CERTIFICATION ORDER

PLLC 400 North Walnut Avenue Oklahoma City, OK 73104 405-239-6040 Fax: 405-239-6766 Email: [email protected]

Phillip Whaley RYAN WHALEY COLDIRON JANTZEN PETERS & WEBBER PLLC 400 North Walnut Avenue Oklahoma City, OK 73104 405-239-6040 Fax: 405-239-6766 Email: [email protected]

Austin Philip Mayron SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004-2498 212-558-3733 Email: [email protected]

Garry M. Gaskins , II OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 313 NE 21st Street Oklahoma City, OK 73105 405-521-3921 Email: [email protected]

Judson Owen Littleton SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 1700 New York Avenue NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 956-7085 Fax: (202) 239-6330 Email: [email protected]

Zoe A. Jacoby SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 1700 New York Avenue NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20006

7 ATTACHMENT 1: COURT’S PROPOSED CERTIFICATION ORDER

202-956-7507 Email: [email protected]

Defendant represented by Wyatt M. Rosette JOHN R. SHOTTON ROSETTE, LLP in his official capacity as Chairman of Tribal 1100 H Street, NW Council-Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Suite 820 Indians Washington, DC 20005 Email: [email protected]

Brett Stavin ROSETTE, LLP 4111 Perimeter Center Pl Oklahoma City, OK 73112 405-256-1910 Email: [email protected]

Defendant represented by Ben Kappelman MARK WOOMMAVOVAH DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP in his official capacity as Chairman of the 50 South Sixth Street Business Committee-Comanche Nation Suite 1500 Minneapolis, MN 55402-1498 612-492-6744 Email: [email protected]

D. Michael McBride , III CROWE & DUNLEVY 222 N. Detroit Ave. Suite 600 Tulsa, OK 74120 918-592-9800 Email: [email protected]

Vernle Charles Durocher , Jr. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 50 South Sixth Street Suite 1500 Minneapolis, MN 55402 (612) 340-7855 Fax: 612-340-2807 Email: [email protected]

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Defendant represented by Kristofor R. Swanson DEB HAALAND (See above for address)

Matthew M. Marinelli U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Environment and Natural Resources Divi- sion 4 Constitution Square 150 M Street, NE Suite 3.206 Washington, DC 20002 202-305-0293 Email: [email protected]

Defendant represented by Kristofor R. Swanson BRYAN NEWLAND (See above for address) in her official capacity as the Assistant Matthew M. Marinelli Secretary of the Interior - Indian Affairs (See above for address)

__________ TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date:

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