UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 23-432 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 11, 13, 15 : U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., : : Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Harold Jean-Baptiste (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed the instant suit

against the Department of Justice (“DOJ”); Merrick B. Garland, in his official capacity as

Attorney General of the United States; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”); Christopher

Wray, in his official capacity as Director of the FBI; and the Civil Process Clerk for the United

States Attorney’s Office (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging various torts, violations of his

rights under the Ninth Amendment;

, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986;

; 10 NYCRR § 405.7; and a general “lack [of] care of duty [sic]” and “cruel and human

rights violations.” See Am. Compl. at 2, 17–18, ECF No. 2. In his amended complaint, 1

Plaintiff alleges that, on two separate occasions, the FBI planned operations to surveil and poison

1 Plaintiff docketed both a complaint, ECF No. 1, and an amended complaint, ECF No. 2, on February 16, 2023. The amended complaint appears to contain a few extra details that are excluded from the initial complaint. The differences between the documents are immaterial, but given that the amended complaint is slightly more comprehensive, the Court will refer to the amended complaint throughout this opinion. him in violation of his civil rights. 2 See id. at 6–10. Defendants move to dismiss the amended

complaint, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff fails

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion to

dismiss and has also moved for entry of default and default judgment against Defendants. For

the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted and Plaintiff’s motions for

entry of default and default judgment are denied.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On October 10, 2022, Plaintiff allegedly checked himself into Long Island Jewish

Hospital in Valley Stream, New York, to receive emergency treatment for chest pain and

increased blood pressure that began after he ate at a Dunkin’ Donuts in Huntington, New York.

Am. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff claims that, upon being admitted to the hospital, he saw an unnamed

“FBI Special Agent . . . advise[] the Nurses and Doctors to provide [him] adverse treatment,”

after which he was discharged without explanation of his symptoms. Id. at 6. Plaintiff had

apparently eaten at the same Dunkin’ Donuts two days prior without issue, and he believed that

FBI agents’ alleged presence at the hospital was indicative of their “target[ing]” and “complicity

with the allegations.” Id. According to Plaintiff, members of the hospital staff were aware of the

2 The Court is familiar with Plaintiff’s history of filing similar actions. See, e.g., Order, Jean-Baptiste v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 21-cv-2221 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2021), ECF No. 25 (dismissing Plaintiff’s claims that the FBI conspired to kidnap him in a van and administer a COVID vaccine designed to give him a heart attack); Order at 4, Jean-Baptiste v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 22-cv-0897 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2022), ECF No. 8 (dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s claims that the FBI conspired to kidnap and kill him were “patently frivolous”); Jean-Baptiste v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 23-cv-1054,

, at *1–2 (D.D.C. May 31, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff’s allegations that the FBI directed a Pep Boys manager to kill him for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and “patent insubstantiality”).

2 FBI agents’ presence in the hospital, and he claims that “some Nurses and administration staff

informed [him]” that the agents were “targeting him.”

The following day, Plaintiff claims to have experienced recurring symptoms “despite not

eating anything for 24 hours and . . . drinking a gallon of water,” and returned to the hospital for

additional treatment.

. When the hospital “refused to . . . tell [him] what treatment was

provided,” Plaintiff came to the conclusion that the FBI poisoned him because “[o]nly the FBI

would have [access to] such [a] toxic substance.”

After leaving the hospital, Plaintiff asserts

that FBI agents “troll[ed]” him while he was waiting to be picked up by his brother.

Plaintiff

attributes this alleged “attempt on [his] life” to a retaliatory effort against Plaintiff for “filing

many lawsuits and ‘Color of Law’ complaints [against] the DOJ.”

.

Plaintiff further claims that, on February 11, 2023, he checked himself into the hospital to

receive treatment for similar ailments that began after he ate at Key Food Supermarket in Valley

Stream, New York.

at 8–9. Plaintiff alleges that the “emergency nurse” at the hospital told

him that he “definitely [had] symptoms of someone who [had] been poison[ed].”

.

Plaintiff also claims that he saw an “FBI Special Agent” at the hospital texting another agent,

both of whom Plaintiff believed were planning to execute a “sophisticated [assassination]

attempt” against him. 3

.

3 The rest of Plaintiff’s amended complaint includes several pages of incoherent attacks on the supposed FBI agent. See Am. Compl. at 10–15 (claiming that “calling this FBI Special Agent In Charge an animal would be an insult to the animal kingdom,” and describing the agent as a “malevolent sadistic psychopath (Lucifer’s Son)” who “used all avenues to destroy the plaintiff’s life”).

3 B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed suit in federal court on February 16, 2023. 4 In his amended complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected him to “cruel, inhuman, [and] oppressive” treatment

in violation of his “Human Rights to be free,” the Ninth Amendment, and

,

1983, 1985(3) and 1986, Am. Compl. at 17–18; that Defendants conspired to deprive him of his

“rights under Color of Law,” in violation of

, id.; and that Defendants were

negligent, in violation of 10 NYCRR § 405.7 and their general “Care of Duty,” id. at 15, 18.

Plaintiff appears to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as $330,000,000 in punitive

damages. Id. at 18–20.

Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint. See generally Defs.’ Mem. P&A

Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 11. In their motion, Defendants argue that

the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 5–10. Defendants also

argue that because all claims brought against them are “wholly incredible, frivolous, and

incoherent,” see id. at 4–7, and because several claims do not confer causes of action against

Defendants, see id. at 10–11, Plaintiff fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted,

see id. at 4. In response, Plaintiff contends that his case should be allowed to proceed to

discovery in light of the public interest of full judicial review. See Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot.

Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 2–5, ECF No. 14. Plaintiff separately moves for entry of default and

default judgment, arguing that Defendants “did not appear as instructed by the Court and Fed. R.

4 Plaintiff was recently “enjoined from filing any pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia without first obtaining leave to file upon a showing that the complaint raises new, non-frivolous matters that have not been previously adjudicated.” Order at 3, Jean-Baptiste v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 23-cv-2298 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18. Plaintiff has repeatedly filed “frivolous or harassing” complaints, including “at least 47 separate lawsuits against the federal government.” Id. at 2.

4 Civ. P. 55(d).” See Pl.’s Mot. Def. J. (“Pl.’s Mot.”) at 4, ECF No. 15; Pl.’s Mot. Entry Default,

ECF No. 13.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“Article III of the Constitution prescribes that ‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited

subject-matter jurisdiction’ and ‘ha[ve] the power to decide only those cases over which

Congress grants jurisdiction.’” Bronner ex rel. Am. Stud. Ass’n v. Duggan,

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez,

(D.C. Cir. 2012)). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. See Arpaio v. Obama,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). When considering

jurisdictional questions under Rule 12(b)(1), the court must accept as true all material factual

allegations contained in the complaint and “construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff[]

the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hemp Indus. Ass’n v.

DEA,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC,

(D.C. Cir. 2011)). The court may also “cull additional facts from other parts of the record.”

West v. Lynch,

(D.C. Cir. 2017). “While complaints filed by pro se

litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers,” pro se plaintiffs still bear “the burden of establishing that the [c]ourt has subject matter

jurisdiction.” Newby v. Obama,

(D.D.C. 2010) (citations omitted).

In limited circumstances, “a court may dismiss a case . . . for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction if a complaint is ‘patently insubstantial’ and thus ‘presents no federal question

suitable for decision.’” Yi Tai Shao v. Roberts, No. 18-cv-1233,

, at *15

(D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting Vasaturo v. Peterka,

, 44

5 (D.D.C. 2016)). “Declining to hear a claim because it is patently insubstantial is ‘reserved for

complaints resting on truly fanciful factual allegations,’ while ‘legally deficient complaints’ are

still reserved for 12(b)(6) dismissals.”

(quoting Vasaturo, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 44). To meet

this standard, “claims must be flimsier than doubtful or questionable—they must be essentially

fictitious.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Vasaturo, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 44). ‘“[E]ssentially fictitious’

claims include ‘bizarre conspiracy theories, any fantastic government manipulations of [the] will

or mind, [and] any sort of supernatural intervention.’” Id. (quoting Vasaturo, 203 F. Supp. 3d at

44).

B. Failure to State a Claim

A plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (internal alteration omitted). A

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint” by determining

whether the plaintiff has appropriately stated a claim for which relief can be granted. See

Browning v. Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). In considering such a motion, the

complaint must be construed “liberally in the plaintiff’s favor with the benefit of all reasonable

inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Stewart v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2006).

Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, Twombly,

, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Twombly,

). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient to withstand a motion to

6 dismiss. Iqbal,

. A court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true,

see

nor is a court required to presume the veracity of legal conclusions that are expressed as

factual allegations, see Twombly,

.

“In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, [the court] may consider only

the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the

complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis

Xavier Parochial Sch.,

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Mindful that a pro se litigant’s

complaint should be “construed liberally and . . . held to ‘less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,’” Lemon v. Kramer,

(D.D.C. 2017)

(quoting Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (per curiam)), a court will, when necessary,

“examine other pleadings to understand the nature and basis of” a plaintiff’s pro se claims, Gray

v. Poole,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff is not excused

from adhering to the applicable procedural rules and “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the

court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton v. D.C. Off. of the

Mayor,

, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79).

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that the FBI planned operations to surveil and poison him, alleging

various torts and violations of his civil rights. See Am. Compl. at 5–10, 13–18. Defendants

argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see Defs.’ Mot. at 5–7, and that Plaintiff

fails to state plausible claims for relief, see

at 4–7. The Court will address these arguments

before turning to Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default and default judgment.

7 A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Even applying the more lenient standard and liberal construction afforded to pro se

litigants, see Lemon,

, Plaintiff fails to establish that the Court has subject

matter jurisdiction over his claims. For one thing, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the

Court from hearing Plaintiff’s

, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 claims. And second,

Plaintiff’s claims are unsubstantiated and clearly fanciful.

1. The United States Has Not Waived Its Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff alleges that FBI Agents subjected him to “cruel and violation [sic] of Human

Rights” in violation of

, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. Am. Compl. at 17–18.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims under these statutes are barred because the United

States has not waived its sovereign immunity. See Defs.’ Mot. at 7. The Court agrees with

Defendants.

It is well-established “that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that

the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell,

(1983). As relevant here, the United States’s sovereign immunity extends to federal

“agencies such as the DOJ and to [federal] employees where such employees are sued in their

official capacities.” Harris v. Holder,

(D.D.C. 2012) (“[A]bsent a

waiver of sovereign immunity, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff’s

claims for money damages against the FBI, the DOJ, or against the federal government officials

sued in their official capacities.”). “A waiver of the United States’s sovereign immunity must be

unequivocally expressed in statutory text.” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc.,

, 33–34 (1992).

There is nothing in the text of Sections 1981, 1983, 1985(3), or 1986 that suggests the

United States has waived its immunity to suit under these statutes. In fact, courts have expressly

8 held the opposite. First, take Section 1981. Section 1981 states that all persons in the United

States shall have “the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to

sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws.”

(a).

The statute does not, however, contain “any language . . . indicating that [it] authorizes suits

against the federal government or its employees.” Prince v. Rice,

(D.D.C. 2006). The upshot is that “the United States has not waived its immunity under § 1981,

and the [C]ourt lacks jurisdiction over [Plaintiff’s] claims against [Defendants] brought under

§ 1981. 5 See Strong-Fisher v. LaHood,

(D.D.C. 2009).

The same is true of Section 1983. Section 1983 prescribes a cause of action for “any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction” who has been “depriv[ed] of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by any person acting

“under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.”

. This Court has previously explained that “[Section] 1983 . . . does not contain

a provision that waives the United States’ sovereign immunity.” Stone v. U.S. Embassy Tokyo,

No. 19-cv-3273,

, at *6 (D.D.C. July 24, 2020); see also Settles,

. Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim. 6

5 In addition to this jurisdictional defect, Section 1981—by its plain text—only applies to actions taken “under color of State law.”

(c) (emphasis added). That being so, the statute “does not cover alleged actions of federal officials acting in their official capacities” because such actions are taken under color of federal law. See Strong-Fisher v. LaHood,

(D.D.C. 2009); see also Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (“[B]y its language, § 1981 does not apply to actions taken under color of federal law.”). 6 Like Section 1981, Section 1983 also “applies only to those acting under color of state law.” Faller v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 20-cv-1597,

, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2021). It therefore “cannot be the basis for an action against the federal government or a federal official.” Id.; see also Settles,

(“Section 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.”).

9 Finally, Section 1985(3) provides a cause of action against “two or more persons who

participate in a conspiracy motivated by class-based discriminatory animus.” Atherton,

; see

(3). Section 1986 imposes civil liability on anyone who knows of a

violation of the type “mentioned in section 1985” but fails to prevent the violation.

. But as many previous courts have explained, neither statute includes a waiver of the

United States’s sovereign immunity. See Boling v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,

(D.D.C. 2017) (“‘[Section] 1985 does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity,

so federal employees acting in their official capacities are immune from liability for alleged

violations of § 1985,’ and any other provision of the Civil Rights Act.” (quoting Roum v. Bush,

(D.D.C. 2006))); Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(7th Cir.

2000) (per curiam) (“Sovereign immunity, however, bars §§ 1985(3) and 1986 suits brought

against the United States and its officers acting in their official capacity.”).

2. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Patently Insubstantial

Defendants further contend that Plaintiff’s amended complaint can “only be described as

baseless and frivolous,” Defs.’ Mot. at 5, and that Plaintiff’s allegations “‘constitute the sort of

patently insubstantial claims dismissed’ frequently in similar cases,” id. at 6 (quoting Tooley v.

Napolitano,

(D.C. Cir. 2009)). The Court agrees.

Federal courts are “without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if

they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’” Curran v.

Holder,

(D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine,

(1974)). Though seldom used, “a court can invoke Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss a plaintiff’s

complaint that is ‘patently insubstantial, presenting no federal question suitable for decision.’”

Walsh v. Comey,

(D.D.C. 2015) (cleaned up) (quoting Best v. Kelly, 39

, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Such “essentially fictitious” claims include “bizarre conspiracy

theories” and “any fantastic government manipulations.” Best, 39 F.3d at 330.

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations that the FBI executed a plot to surveil and poison him are

“similar to those in a number of cases that district courts have dismissed for patent

insubstantiality.” See Tooley,

. Plaintiff claims that he would be able to prove

each of his assertions about the FBI’s supposed plot “to hurt [his] life and make [his] children

fatherless.” Am. Compl. at 13–14. Plaintiff further contends that his “complaint before the

Court has multiple witnesses, metadata data [sic] and video to support all allegations for the

Court to review.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. But these bare assertions—even along with Plaintiff’s

assurance that his allegations are “100% factual,” Am. Compl. at 13—can be characterized as

nothing else but “flimsier than doubtful or questionable.” See Walsh,

(cleaned up). The exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s amended complaint—photographs of a person

Plaintiff claims to be an FBI agent, a hospital receptionist, and the inside of Key Food

Supermarket—do not alter that result. 7 See Am. Compl. at 12–13. In short, Plaintiff’s

attenuated and unsubstantial accusations of surveillance and harassment are akin to those

“deriv[ed] from uncertain origins” that have been dismissed by this Court and others for patent

insubstantiality. See Tooley,

; see also Lewis v. Bayh,

, 54–

55 (D.D.C. 2008). The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Plausible Claim for Relief

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff “fails to state a plausible claim.” Defs.’ Mot. at 4.

They argue that Plaintiff’s claims are purely speculative and that a number of the constitutional,

7 Plaintiff attempts to substantiate his exhibits by inserting text boxes explaining that certain hospital receptionists and a camera inside the Key Food Supermarket “can identify the FBI special agent.” Am. Compl. at 12–13.

11 statutory, and other legal theories Plaintiff invokes do not confer a cause of action. See

at 4–

11.

1. Plaintiff’s Speculative Allegations Are Insufficient to Withstand a Motion to Dismiss

As explained above, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal,

(quoting Twombly,

). But no matter how liberally it is construed, see Lemon,

,

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails that test. Indeed, by his own account, Plaintiff’s belief that

the FBI sought to poison him is entirely speculative. Plaintiff’s stated reasoning for believing

that the FBI was plotting to poison him is his unsupported allegation that “[o]nly the FBI would

have [access to] such [a] toxic substance” as the one apparently administered to him at Dunkin’

Donuts. See Am. Compl. at 7. And the only factual support Plaintiff offers to show the FBI’s

“sophisticated [assassination] attempt” is his baseless assertion that he saw an alleged agent

texting another agent in the lobby of the hospital. See id. at 10. To be sure, he also claims that

an “emergency nurse” at the hospital told him that he “definitely [had] symptoms of someone

who [had] been poison[ed].” Id. at 9. But these bare assertions—without more—do not permit

the Court to infer “more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal,

.

Because Plaintiff has not pled any factual content that would “allow[] the [C]ourt to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable,” Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief as it

pertains to all alleged violations. See Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Trump, No.

18-cv-2820,

, at *2 (D.D.C. May 6, 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting Iqbal,

), aff’d sub nom. Xiu Jian Sun v. Trump, No. 19-5197,

(D.C. Cir.

Feb. 14, 2020).

12 2. The Ninth Amendment, the New York Statute, and Plaintiff’s Remaining Allegations Do Not Confer Causes of Action Against Defendants

Even if Plaintiff succeeded in pleading sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim

for relief, Plaintiff’s alleged violations of the Ninth Amendment, 10 NYCRR § 405.7,

, general “lack care of duty [sic],” and “cruel and human rights” do not confer viable causes

of action. See Am. Compl. at 2. This provides an additional basis on which to dismiss a number

of Plaintiff’s claims.

First, the Ninth Amendment provides that “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain

rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const.

amend. IX. “Courts in this district have repeatedly concluded that the Ninth Amendment is a

rule of construction, not a substantive basis for a civil rights claim.” Patterson v. Harris, No. 21-

cv-3339,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2023) (cleaned up) (quoting Rynn v. Jaffe,

(D.D.C. 2006)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under

the Ninth Amendment.

Second,

is a criminal statute “that provides no basis for an individual to

bring a private, civil action.” Alexander v. Wash. Gas Light Co.,

(D.D.C.

2006); see also Crosby v. Catret,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“The

district court properly rejected appellant’s attempt to invoke . . .

to initiate a

prosecution against the named defendants because there is no private right of action under [this]

criminal statute[].”); Johnson v. D.C. Crim. Just. Act,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (same).

That means that Plaintiff is “precluded from asserting any claims pursuant to”

.

See Rockefeller v. U.S. Ct. of Appeals Off., for Tenth Cir. Judges,

(D.D.C.

2003).

13 Third, 10 NYCRR § 405.7 prescribes a standard of care to certain New York hospitals

and does not appear to give rise to an independent private right of action against the United

States. See 10 NYCRR § 405.7 (outlining the generally accepted standards of professional

medical practice and establishing certain patient rights when interacting with a hospital within

the State of New York); Armstrong v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 98-cv-2416,

, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2002) (explaining that “a private cause of action based

on a violation of § 405.7 has not been recognized”). Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under

10 NYCRR § 405.7.

Finally, Plaintiff’s general “lack care of duty [sic]” and “cruel and human rights

violations” claims fail because Plaintiff does not identify any substantive legal basis for liability,

thereby failing to “give [Defendants] fair notice of what the claim[s] [are] and the grounds upon

which [they] rest[].” See Twombly,

(internal alteration omitted).

C. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Default Judgment

Plaintiff argues that because Defendants “did not appear as instructed by the Court and

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d),” he is entitled to default judgment. Pl.’s Mot. at 4 (emphasis omitted).

This argument fails for multiple reasons.

Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the entry of a default

judgment where a defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

The record demonstrates, however, that Defendants timely filed their motion to dismiss by the

ordered date of June 27, 2023, see Defs.’ Mot.; see also Minute Order, Jean-Baptiste v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just., No. 23-cv-432 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2023), and therefore did not fail to “plead or

otherwise defend,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); see Peavy v. Holder, No. 09-cv-5389,

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2010) (“[B]ecause the defendants timely filed a motion to

14 dismiss appellant’s complaint, the district court properly denied appellant’s motion for default

judgment.”).

Second, a default judgment may only be entered against the “United States, its officers,

or its agencies . . . if the claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that satisfies

the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d). But as explained above, Plaintiff has not established that the

Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims in the first place. See Strong-Fisher,

n.2 (denying plaintiff’s motion for default judgment because she failed to

establish subject matter jurisdiction over her claims and therefore failed to carry her burden

under Rule 55(d)); Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC,

, 7 (D.D.C. 2021) (denying

plaintiffs’ default judgment motion because the court determined that the plaintiffs did not have

standing). That being so, Plaintiff has necessarily failed to carry his burden of establishing “a

claim or right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court” as required by Rule 55(d). See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 55(d). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default and default judgment must

be denied.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED,

and Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default (ECF No. 13) and default judgment (ECF No. 15) are

DENIED. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and

contemporaneously issued.

Dated: March 25, 2024 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

15