UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:23-cv-00401 (ACR)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Alexander Williams, Jr., proceeding pro se, sued Defendants the U.S.

Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) under the Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA),

. Dkt. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 1–5. Before the Court are the

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Dkts. 20, 22. For the reasons explained below,

the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

In October 2022, Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to USMS seeking information about

his underlying criminal case in New York. Compl. ¶ 12; Dkt. 1-1 at 14. Specifically, he

requested:

(1) The name of the Marshals from Columbia, SC, who assisted [New York Police Department (NYPD) Detectives] Steven Snieder and Thomas Handley in or around July – September 2018 [in] locat[ing] Mr. David Walker;

1 (2) Any/all documentation signed by NYPD [Detectives] Steven Snieder and Thomas Handley when making the request for the USMS assistance when they traveled to Columbia, SC;

(3) Any/all reports generated by the two USMS that assisted NYPD [Detectives] Steven Snieder and Thomas Handley during that travel to Columbia, SC, [and;]

(4) Documentation as to where the USMS that [assisted] NYPD [Detectives] Steven Snieder and Thomas Handley ultimately met and spoke with David Walker indicating [if there were] any [audio] and video recordings made or records kept from their conversation[].

Dkt. 1-1 at 2 (cleaned up). 1

In October 2022, USMS’s FOIA Unit received Plaintiff’s FOIA request and stated that it

could neither confirm nor deny if it possessed records related to the referenced individuals. Dkt.

20-1 ¶ 13. It also stated it required an executed privacy waiver, known as Form DOJ-361, for

Mr. Walker. Id.; Dkt. 20-2 at 5. The next month, Plaintiff submitted an executed Form DOJ-361

for Mr. Walker. Dkts. 20-1 ¶¶ 14–15; 20-2 at 12. Plaintiff’s Complaint clarifies that he does not

seek records specifically regarding Mr. Walker but “documentation, records, [and] log book

entries that were generated when NYPD Detectives traveled to Columbia, SC, and applied for

and [were] granted assistance from the U.S. Marshals Service in Columbia, SC.” Compl. ¶ 12

(cleaned up).

Plaintiff then followed up with USMS’s FOIA Unit in November 2022, see

; Dkt.

1-1 at 16–17, but before receiving a response, he filed an administrative appeal to the Office of

Information Policy (OIP) in early December 2022, see Compl. ¶¶ 14–15; Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 16; Dkt. 1-

1 at 19–20. Also in December 2022, Plaintiff narrowed his request to “logbook entries from the

1 All pin citations in this Memorandum Opinion refer to the document’s ECF-stamped page number. 2 USMS office in Columbia, SC, in regards to the entries made when these two NYPD detectives

were granted assistance from the Marshals Service in Columbia, South Carolina.” Compl. ¶ 16

(cleaned up); Dkt. 1-1 at 22–23. OIP then closed Plaintiff’s appeal because USMS had yet to

render a final determination. See Dkts. 20-1 ¶ 16; 20-2 at 14–15.

Later in December 2022, USMS issued a “Glomar response,” 2 again indicating that it

could neither confirm nor deny that it possessed records pertaining to USMS and NYPD

personnel because such an acknowledgment would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy pursuant to

(b)(6) (FOIA Exemption 6) and 552(b)(7)(C)

(FOIA Exemption 7(C)). See Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 17; Dkt. 20-2 at 17–18. Plaintiff then appealed that

determination, and in April 2023, OIP affirmed USMS’s decision. See Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 17; Dkt. 20-2

at 21–22.

B. Procedural History

In February 2023, Plaintiff sued USMS and DOJ demanding the release of the records

sought in his FOIA request and subsequent related letters. Compl. at 6. After USMS learned of

this lawsuit, it maintained its Glomar response to Part (1) of Plaintiff’s FOIA request, Dkt. 20-1

¶ 26, but conducted searches for Parts (2), (3), and (4) of the request,

. Following these

searches, USMS did not find any responsive records.

.

In June 2023, Defendants answered the Complaint. Dkt. 13. Defendants completed their

review of Plaintiff’s FOIA request the next month, Dkt. 14, and then moved for summary

2 “The Glomar response takes its name from the CIA’s refusal to confirm or deny the existence of records about the Hughes Glomar Explorer, a ship used in a classified CIA project to raise a sunken Soviet submarine from the floor of the Pacific Ocean to recover the missiles, codes, and communications equipment onboard for analysis by United States military and intelligence experts.” PETA v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).

3 judgment in September 2023, Dkt. 20. Also in September 2023, Plaintiff filed his Cross-Motion,

combined with what appeared to be his Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkts.

21–22.

To ensure that Plaintiff had every opportunity to address Defendants’ arguments, the

Court modified the briefing schedule and provided Plaintiff with a long extension to file any

supplemental opposition or cross-motion by January 2024. Minute Order of Sept. 13, 2024. The

Court also entered an order advising Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 23 at 3 (citing Neal v. Kelly,

, 457–58 (D.C. Cir.

1992)). Despite this clear notice and additional time, Plaintiff did not submit any further briefing

as to either Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or in support of his own Cross-Motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In a FOIA case, a district court reviews the agency’s decisions de novo, Schoenman v.

FBI,

(D.D.C. 2009), and “the burden is on the agency to sustain its

action,”

(a)(4)(B). “[T]he vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on

summary judgment . . . .” Brayton v. Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep.,

(D.C. Cir.

2011). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party is entitled to summary judgment

only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment in the movant’s favor is proper as

a matter of law.” Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC,

(D.C. Cir. 2018) (cleaned up);

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[S]ummary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency

affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory

statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by

evidence of agency bad faith.” Aguiar v. DEA,

, 734–35 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned

up).

4 “[T]o satisfy [the] FOIA’s aims of providing more transparency into the workings of the

government,” an agency must show that it made an adequate search for records responsive to a

FOIA request. Montgomery v. IRS,

(D.C. Cir. 2022). This demonstration

“entails a showing that the agency made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested

records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.”

(cleaned up). “While the agency need not search every record system, it also may not limit

its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information

requested.”

(cleaned up). Moreover, “the adequacy of a FOIA search is generally

determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to

carry out the search.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency,

(D.C. Cir.

2003).

In short, summary judgment is inappropriate only “if a review of the record raises

substantial doubt as to the search’s adequacy, particularly in view of well defined requests and

positive indications of overlooked materials.” Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up), cert. denied,

(2022). In assessing an agency’s

fulfillment of its FOIA obligations, an agency’s declarations are given “a presumption of good

faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and

discoverability of other documents.”

(cleaned up).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Glomar Response (as to Part 1 of Plaintiff’s FOIA Request)

Upon receipt of a FOIA request, an agency may provide what is known as a Glomar

response—i.e., the agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records responsive to

the FOIA request because acknowledging the existence of responsive records would “cause harm

cognizable under an FOIA exemption.” Gardels v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 1982). 5 “A Glomar response is valid if the fact of the existence or nonexistence of agency records falls

within a FOIA exemption.” PETA v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). If a Glomar response is justified, an agency “need

not conduct any search for responsive documents or perform any analysis to identify segregable

portions of such documents.” Lindsey v. FBI,

(D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up).

“In determining whether the existence of agency records vel non fits a FOIA exemption, courts

apply the general exemption review standards established in non-Glomar cases.” Wolf v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 2007). “Courts can grant summary judgment upholding a Glomar

response based on agency affidavits explaining the basis for the response.” PETA,

. “Affidavits must contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory

statements and cannot be called into question by contradictory evidence in the record.”

(cleaned up).

USMS issued a Glomar response as to Part (1) of Plaintiff’s FOIA request, Dkt. 20-1

¶¶ 27–33, which sought the names and identifying information of U.S. Marshals in Columbia,

South Carolina, who allegedly coordinated with NYPD Officers Snieder and Handley around

July to September 2018 in locating Mr. Walker, Dkt. 1-1 at 2. USMS justifies its Glomar

response under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Dkt. 20-1 ¶¶ 27–33.

Exemption 6 protects “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

(b)(6). Exemption 7(C) protects “records or information compiled for law enforcement

purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or

information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy.”

§ 552(b)(7)(C). Because “[e]xemption 7(C)’s privacy language is broader than the

6 comparable language in Exemption 6,” U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the

Press,

(1989), the Court confines its analysis to Exemption 7(C), PETA,

.

Exemption 7(C) applies if the agency meets a two-part test. First, to invoke any

subsection of § 552(b)(7), the agency must first satisfy a threshold requirement that the “records

or information” are “compiled for law enforcement purposes.”

(b)(7); see FBI v.

Abramson,

(1982). The “focus is on how and under what circumstances the

requested files were compiled, and whether the files sought relate to anything that can fairly be

characterized as an enforcement proceeding.” Jefferson v. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Prof. Resp.,

, 176–77 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).

Second, an agency must show that “acknowledgment of responsive documents ‘could

reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’” PETA, 745

F.3d at 540–41 (quoting

(b)(7)(C)). “To answer that question,” a court must

“weigh the public interest in the release of information against the privacy interest in

nondisclosure.”

(cleaned up).

A plaintiff challenging a Glomar response based on “[a]llegations of government

misconduct” must provide a “meaningful evidentiary showing” because such allegations “are

easy to allege and hard to disprove.” Nat’l Archives and Recs. Admin. v. Favish,

(2004) (cleaned up). A plaintiff must submit “compelling evidence that the agency denying

the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity” and that access to third-party names and

information “appearing in the agency’s law enforcement files is necessary in order to confirm or

refute that evidence.” SafeCard Servs. v. SEC,

, 1205–06 (D.C. Cir. 1991). “Only

when the FOIA requester has produced evidence sufficient to satisfy this standard will there exist

7 a counterweight on the FOIA scale for the court to balance against the cognizable privacy

interests in the requested records.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174–75. Without sufficient evidence,

“there is no reason to believe that the incremental public interest in such information would ever

be significant,” and the information is exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7(C). SafeCard

Servs.,

.

1. USMS Compiled the Records for Law Enforcement Purposes

USMS is a law enforcement agency within DOJ. See Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 28 (citing

;

;

;

; Fed. R. Crim. P. 4). In her

sworn declaration, Kathleene Molen, an Associate General Counsel at USMS, stated, based on

personal knowledge, that the responsive records withheld under Exemption 7 were compiled for

law enforcement purposes. See Dkt. 20-1 ¶¶ 29, 32–33. And “it is especially convincing” that

the requested information was compiled for law enforcement purposes “in this case because

[Plaintiff] explicitly sought records related to his own criminal prosecution.” Blackwell v. FBI,

(D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Roberts v. FBI,

(D.D.C.

2012); Compl. ¶¶ 12, 16, 26; Dkt. 1-1 at 14. Thus, the Court concludes that USMS met its

threshold burden to establish that any responsive records were compiled for law enforcement

purposes. The Court now analyzes the applicability of Exemption 7(C) to USMS’s Glomar

response.

2. USMS Has Justified Its Glomar Response Under Exemption 7(C)

The Court finds that USMS has justified its Glomar response under Exemption 7(C).

USMS invoked the exemption to protect the identities of federal and local law enforcement

officers within any responsive investigatory records that may exist. Dkt. 20-1 ¶¶ 27–33. Ms.

Molen states that acknowledgment of the requested information “could trigger hostility toward

8 USMS personnel” by inciting “[i]ndividuals targeted by investigations and related proceedings.”

Id. ¶ 33. Such individuals “could seek to harass or threaten USMS personnel based on the

USMS’s employee[’s] participation in an investigation,” and the same is true “for law

enforcement officers from partnering law enforcement agencies.” Id. ¶¶ 32–33. Further,

acknowledging the existence of the requested information could “disrupt and impede official

agency activity,” hampering USMS’s ability to conduct its responsibilities. Id. ¶ 32. Without a

“countervailing public interest in disclosure,” USMS’s Glomar response—invoked to shield

personal identifying information of law enforcement agents—is “appropriate under Exemption

7(C).” Roth v. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff argues he is entitled to the requested information because USMS and NYPD

engaged in misconduct during his criminal case. See Compl. ¶¶ 12, 16, 26; Dkt. 1-1 at 14.

Plaintiff alleges that USMS oversaw an unlawful criminal investigation in Columbia, South

Carolina. Compl. ¶ 26. Specifically, he alleges that the named NYPD officers “applied for” and

were “granted assistance” by USMS “under false pretense[s],” and that USMS covertly

organized the officers’ travel from New York to South Carolina so they could assist with

USMS’s investigation there without obtaining the proper authorization from NYPD. Id. ¶¶ 12,

26.

Plaintiff fails to establish a countervailing public interest justifying disclosure.

“Exemption 7(C) takes particular note of the strong interest of individuals, whether they be

suspects, witnesses, or investigators, in not being associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal

activity.” Dunkelberger v. Dep’t of Justice,

(D.C. Cir. 1990) (cleaned up).

And Plaintiff’s broad allegations do not explain how public disclosure here would “ensure that

9 the Government’s activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny.” Reps. Comm.,

(cleaned up).

Plaintiff has not submitted any countervailing evidence and instead relies on “allegedly

suspicious circumstances [that] lack[] any substantiation,” which does “not come close to

meeting the demanding Favish standard for challenging the [Government’s] invocation of FOIA

Exemption 7(C).” Blackwell,

(cleaned up). Plaintiff points to a letter from New

York City’s Subpoena Litigation Unit, apparently released during discovery in his criminal case,

indicating that NYPD found no “reports, records, receipts, or authorizations for travel on the case

involving Alexander Williams.” Dkt. 1-1 at 14. But Plaintiff provides no context or explanation

for the significance of that letter. Nor is it otherwise indicative of “wrongdoing on the [federal]

government’s part[,]” Hand v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 20-cv-3690,

, at *5–6

(D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2023) (affirming DOJ’s use of a Glomar response under Exemption 7(C)

where the plaintiff sought records related to DOJ employees and agency contacts, and finding

that a purportedly threatening letter from a former federal agent did not constitute “evidence—let

alone compelling evidence—that anyone at DOJ acted improperly”), aff’d, No. 23-5080,

(D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 2023) (per curiam); see Sonds v. Huff,

,

157–59 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, No. 05-5428,

(D.C. Cir. June 22, 2006) (per

curiam); Manchester v. FBI, No. 96-0137,

, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2005).

Moreover, disclosure of the third-party information requested by Plaintiff is especially

disfavored “when the requester asserts a public interest—however it might be styled—in

obtaining information that relates to a criminal prosecution.” Blackwell,

. The

FOIA is “not a substitute for discovery rules which govern civil and criminal litigation where

different considerations are at issue.” Clay v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

, 248

10 (D.D.C. 2010) (cleaned up). Unlike a “constitutionally compelled disclosure to a single party”

during discovery in criminal litigation, Cottone v. Reno,

(D.C. Cir. 1999), a

FOIA disclosure is released “to the public at large,” Clay,

. Plaintiff’s

“personal interest in seeking documents that should have been produced and made available to

him at his criminal trial . . . does not suffice.” Petrucelli v. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up); Engelking v. DEA,

, 980–81 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per

curiam); Lazaridis v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2011); Brown v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2010).

Without more, Plaintiff has asserted “a generic public interest in the administration of

justice,” which cannot overcome the privacy interest of the third parties. Petrucelli,

(cleaned up). “A mere desire to review how an agency is doing its job, coupled with

allegations that it is not, does not create a public interest sufficient to override the privacy

interests protected by Exemption 7(C).” McCutchen v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,

. Even if Plaintiff had submitted compelling evidence of wrongdoing, based on the

representations in Ms. Molen’s declaration, any public interest that may exist would be

“outweighed here” by the privacy interests of the third parties involved. Lindsey v. FBI,

Supp. 3d 1, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2020) (FBI’s Glomar response was justified where the plaintiff

“barely touche[d] on the public interest” in disclosure). 3

* * *

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that USMS has justified its Glomar response

under Exemption 7(C) in response to Part (1) of Plaintiff’s FOIA request, thus satisfying its

FOIA obligations.

B. Adequacy of the Search (Parts (2)–(4) of the FOIA Request)

USMS bears the initial burden of showing that its searches were adequate. Prop. of the

People, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 61 (D.D.C. 2021). The adequacy of an

agency’s search is measured by a “standard of reasonableness” under the attendant

circumstances. Truitt v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

(D.C. Cir. 1990) (cleaned up).

“To demonstrate that it has conducted an adequate search, the agency may submit affidavits or

declarations that explain in reasonable detail the scope and method of its search, and in the

absence of contrary evidence, such affidavits or declarations are sufficient to demonstrate an

agency’s compliance with the FOIA.” Ahuruonye v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,

(D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up). “Once an agency has made a prima facie showing of

adequacy, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to provide countervailing evidence as to the adequacy

3 Plaintiff also argues that he is entitled to the disclosure of the responsive records sought in Part (1) of his FOIA request because he complied with his obligations by submitting a Form DOJ-361 for Mr. Walker. Dkt. 21-1 at 1–3. But this argument falls short for two reasons. First, Plaintiff has conceded he does not actually seek records related to Mr. Walker. See Compl. ¶ 12. Second, USMS did not assert its Glomar response to protect Mr. Walker; it did so to protect the identities and associated information for USMS agents and NYPD officers, see Dkt. 20-1 ¶¶ 27–33, which is appropriate under Exemption 7(C), see, e.g., Lewis v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 112–13 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2020); Black v. Dep’t of Just.,

, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2014); Fischer v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 47–48 (D.D.C. 2009); Schubert v. FBI, No. 22-3658,

, at *6–7 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2024). 12 of the agency’s search.” Schoenman v. FBI,

(D.D.C. 2011) (cleaned up).

Such evidence must “raise ‘substantial doubt’ concerning the adequacy of the agency’s search.”

(quoting Iturralde,

).

1. USMS Has Met Its Initial Burden to Show the Searches Were Adequate

Although the searches that USMS conducted in response to Parts (2), (3), and (4) of

Plaintiff’s FOIA request did not yield any responsive records, see Dkt. 20-1 ¶¶ 19–25, the Court

holds that they were adequate and reasonable under the attendant circumstances. As discussed

above, USMS submitted a declaration from Ms. Molen, who has experience and personal

knowledge regarding (1) the types of documents that USMS maintains, (2) USMS’s FOIA

policies and procedures, and (3) Plaintiff’s FOIA request. See id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 33. Ms. Molen states

that, upon receipt and review of the FOIA request, USMS’s FOIA Office “determined that the

District of South Carolina was the most likely to maintain records responsive to Mr. Williams’

request.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 19. She asserts that it is common for USMS’s primary FOIA Unit to refer and

“coordinate and/or conduct document searches” with FOIA liaisons from other USMS divisions

and districts who “are knowledgeable about the records and files maintained by their particular

office.” Id. ¶¶ 6–8. Those liaisons are also familiar with the subject matter (should it exist), and

then coordinate with their own local personnel. Id. After such a referral, a local liaison will

coordinate with their own “District Office, and/or Headquarters division[;]” direct and conduct

searches; and, if records are found, the liaison will then transmit them to the primary FOIA Unit

for final review “to ensure the records are, in fact, responsive to the FOIA request and [to] assert

any appropriate FOIA exemptions.” Id. ¶ 8.

Here, after referral to USMS’s District of South Carolina, the liaison and personnel there

conducted searches within two databases, the “Justice Detainee Information System” (JDIS), and

13 “Capture.” Id. ¶¶ 21–23, 25. Ms. Molen explains that “JDIS was designed to serve the needs of

USMS criminal investigators, administrative analysts, and supervisory personnel,” affording

“each of the USMS’s divisions with the information management tools to help apprehend

fugitives, track and manage the custody and transportation of prisoners, conduct authorized

criminal investigations, and protect the federal judicial process.” Id. ¶ 21. JDIS contains various

categories of information, including, “identifying data, incident reports, information identifiable

to informants, protected witnesses, confidential sources, and contact information for law

enforcement personnel.” Id. Ms. Molen also explains that, starting in 2016, “USMS has been

migrating multiple legacy systems, including JDIS, to the enhanced Capture system,” which

serves as a “single, integrated system [that] provides a comprehensive view of USMS data

centered around Prisoner Management, Security Management and Investigations.” Id. ¶ 22.

The District of South Carolina first searched both JDIS and Capture for “records

responsive to Mr. Walker, the individual for whom Mr. Williams provided a signed DOJ-361

Form,” by inputting “the identifiers provided on the signed DOJ-361 Form, namely [Mr.

Walker’s] date of birth and social security number.” Id. ¶ 20. No responsive records were

retrieved. See id. ¶ 23.

Next, Ms. Molen spoke directly with the District of South Carolina liaison regarding the

circumstances, if any, that would warrant their division to coordinate with NYPD. See id. ¶¶ 3,

24. The liaison stated that their division “would not assist the NYPD on a case unless it had been

asked, through a collateral lead request from one of the USMS’s New York district offices, to do

so.” Id. ¶ 24. Accordingly, the “District of South Carolina searched in both JDIS and Capture

for all of its incoming collateral lead requests from July 1, 2018, through September 30, 2018,

(the timeframe provided by Mr. Williams[,]” and it “located 91 collateral lead requests.”

14 Id. ¶ 25. Ms. Molen states that “four of these collateral lead requests involved the NYPD[,]” but

after review, none of those lead requests involved any of “the individuals named in Mr.

Williams’s request,” and therefore, no records were found responsive. Id.

Given this information, the Court concludes that Ms. Molen’s declaration sets forth in

reasonable detail, and in good faith, the type of information that USMS retains, how that

information is organized, the divisions and databases that were searched in responding to

Plaintiff’s FOIA request, the scope of the searches, and the specific search terms used. See id.

¶¶ 1, 3–10, 19–25. Her declaration specifically describes why particular divisions, databases,

and search terms were used and explains why no responsive records were found. See id. ¶¶ 6–

10, 19–25. Thus, the Court finds that USMS has shown “in reasonable detail the scope and

method of its search . . . to demonstrate [the] agency’s compliance with the FOIA,” Ahuruonye,

(cleaned up), and that those searches were reasonable under the

circumstances, see White v. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, No. 12-

5067,

(D.C. Cir. July 19, 2012) (per curiam).

2. Plaintiff Has Not Challenged the Adequacy of USMS’s Searches

USMS has met its prima facie showing of adequacy, and Plaintiff has not presented any

argument, let alone “countervailing evidence” to raise “substantial doubt” about the adequacy of

USMS’s searches. Schoenman,

(quoting Iturralde,

).

Plaintiff’s bare allegations that USMS possesses the information sought, and that he is entitled to

that information, see Compl. ¶¶ 1–2; Dkt. 21 at 1, cannot overcome the presumption of good

faith given to USMS’s declaration. “[I]t is well settled that conclusory allegations unsupported

by factual data will not create a triable issue of fact.” Broaddrick v. Exec. Off. of the President,

15

(D.D.C. 2001) (cleaned up), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (per

curiam).

As noted above, “whether a search is adequate is determined by methods, not results” and

“[a]n agency’s failure to locate . . . specific responsive document[s] will not, on its own, render

an otherwise reasonable search inadequate.” Nance v. FBI,

(D.D.C.

2012) (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s mere speculation that material exists does not undermine the

reasonableness of USMS’s search. See Meeropol v. Meese,

(D.C. Cir. 1986).

* * *

Therefore, given the evidence submitted by USMS, and the lack of countervailing

evidence from Plaintiff, the Court finds that USMS has met its obligations under the FOIA as to

Parts (2), (3), and (4) of Plaintiff’s FOIA request. See Truitt,

.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt.

20, and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 22. The Court has

entered a separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: June 6, 2024 _________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge

16