UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TYESHA ISOM, ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-01109 (UNA) v. ) ) AMY CHANG LEE, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The

court grants the in forma pauperis application and, for the reasons explained below, it dismisses

the case pursuant to

(e)(2)(B)(i).

“A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009), quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis either in

law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams,

(1989), and a “complaint plainly

abusive of the judicial process is properly typed malicious,” Crisafi v. Holland,

(D.C. Cir. 1981).

Here, plaintiff, a resident of Denton, Texas, sues Amy Chang Lee, the Associate Director

of the Department of Justice’s International Prisoner Transfer Unit (“IPTU”), and Paul Johnson,

the Denton County District Attorney. See Compl. at 1–4, 7, 9. The complaint is vague and

rambling, consisting mostly of unfounded vitriol directed at Ms. Lee and plaintiff’s paranoid

regarding the IPTU, which she considers a “fake prisoner transfer exchange program,” borne out of a widespread international conspiracy that has harmed the United States and its citizens

financially. See id. at 4, 6. The complaint also oscillates through disparate topics, including,

alleged preferential treatment of “immigrants on work visas, at the expense of “U.S. citizens [who]

can work for an income,” plaintiff’s suspicions regarding “too many Haitians, or alien immigrants

in the southern border with French names,” “professional music federalists,” the NFL and various

professional athletes. See id. at 6. Plaintiff demands “$500 million from Ms. Chang Lee . . . held

by the U.S. Federal Reserves, which a federal reserve’s dealer to protect U.S. government

interests.” Id. at 8.

The court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a frivolous complaint. Hagans

v. Lavine,

, 536–37 (1974) (“Over the years, this Court has repeatedly held that the

federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are

‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”) (quoting Newburyport

Water Co. v. Newburyport,

(1904); Tooley v. Napolitano,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent insubstantiality,” including where the

plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of surveillance and harassment deriving from

uncertain origins.”). A court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to

the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992),

or “postulat[e] events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind,” Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1307–08.

The instant complaint satisfies this standard.

Consequently, the complaint and this case are dismissed without prejudice. A separate

order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

__________/s/_____________ Date: May 20, 2024 AMIT P. MEHTA United States District Judge