UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

TIMOTHY ROWBOTTOM, Case No. 24-cr-211 (TNM)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

The Government brought several misdemeanor charges against Timothy Rowbottom,

claiming he participated in the attack on the U.S. Capitol. To expedite its disclosure of

potentially discoverable materials, the Government now seeks a protective order limiting the use,

dissemination, and reproduction of sensitive information. Rowbottom opposes the order, saying

the Government failed to show good cause. But the Court finds that the Government has shown

good cause, so it will grant the Government’s motion and issue its proposed protective order.

I.

The Government charged Rowbottom with four misdemeanors as a result of his alleged

conduct at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. See Information at 1–3, 1 ECF No. 12. During

its investigation of the attack, the Government obtained and continues to obtain “voluminous

amounts of information and evidence relating to both charged and uncharged individuals.”

Gov’t Mot. for Protective Order (“Gov’t Mot.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 14. More than 8.14 million files

relating to the Capitol attack are available to January 6 defendants. Id. ¶ 11.

Given the volume and nature of these materials, the Government believes they contain

sensitive information. Id. ¶ 4. For instance, the Government anticipates its productions may

1 The Court’s page citations refer to the pagination automatically generated by CM/ECF. contain “personal identity information,” information on “confidential sources,” medical records,

law-enforcement methods, “security information,” and “tax information.” Gov’t Proposed

Protective Order Governing Discovery (“Protective Order”) at 1–2, ECF No. 14-1.

If any such information appears in its productions, the protective order would allow the

Government to mark those materials as “Sensitive” or “Highly Sensitive.” Id. at 2. These

designations would, in turn, limit how Rowbottom and his legal team could use, disseminate, or

reproduce the information. See id. at 2–4. The Government says this system gives it the “ability

to provide voluminous discoverable materials expeditiously, while adequately protecting the

United States’ legitimate interests.” Gov’t Mot. ¶ 9.

Rowbottom disagrees. He claims the protective order is unjustified because the

Government failed to support its request with good cause. See Def.’s Opp’n at 2–5, ECF No. 18.

The Government’s motion is ripe.

II.

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the Government is required “to produce,

upon the defendant’s request, any documents and data that are material to preparing the defense.”

United States v. Dixon,

(D.D.C. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A)–

(G)). Under this rule, “the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or

inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d). In other words, the Court

may issue a protective order upon a showing of good cause. See

Three factors bear on the presence of good cause: “whether (1) disclosure of the

materials in question would pose a hazard to others; (2) the defendant would be prejudiced by a

protective order; and (3) the public’s interest in disclosure outweighs the possible harm.” Dixon,

. “[O]nce a showing of good cause has been made, the court has relatively

2 unconstrained discretion to fashion an appropriate protective order.” United States v. Johnson,

(D.D.C. 2018); see also Alderman v. United States,

(1969) (“[T]he trial court can and should” issue protective orders “where appropriate.”).

Because the Government is the party seeking a protective order, it bears the burden of

justifying its request with good cause. United States v. Cordova,

(D.C. Cir.

2015). Its justification must be “particularized” and “specific,” bearing in mind that “the level of

particularity required depends on the nature and type of protective order at issue.” Dixon,

(cleaned up).

III.

The Government has amply justified its request for a protective order.

First, the unfettered “disclosure of the materials in question would pose a hazard to

others.” Dixon,

. The discovery materials in this case are vast; Rowbottom

would have access to over 8.14 million documents and 32,000 videos. Gov’t Mot. ¶ 11. And

some of these materials include sensitive “information such as tips, witness statements, and the

results of searches performed upon other individuals’ devices and accounts.” Gov’t Reply ¶ 4

(emphasis added), ECF No. 19. Disclosing this information without any protective measures

could jeopardize potential witnesses, publicize personally identifiable information, and divulge

details about security at the U.S. Capitol. Accord United States v. McCaughey,

, 138–40 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding “hazard to others” absent protective order nearly identical to

the one proposed here).

Rowbottom does not quarrel with this conclusion. Instead, he faults the protective order

for being overbroad and for failing to “identify materials specific to this case.” Def.’s Opp’n at

4. True, the Government’s proposed order paints with a broad brush. But it is fashioned to

3 facilitate the efficient flow of discovery for one the largest prosecutions “in American history,

both in terms of the number of defendants prosecuted and the nature and volume of the

evidence.” Gov’t Reply ¶ 6.

Given this context, the proposed order is sufficiently “particularized” and “specific.”

Dixon,

; McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 138 (“The nature of the showing of

particularity . . . depends upon the nature or type of protective order at issue.” (cleaned up)). It

only applies to ten specific categories of protected information, none of which draw any

objection from Rowbottom. See Protective Order at 1. The Government has promised to

designate materials sparingly and only where necessary. See id. at 2 (“The Government agrees

to make every effort to provide discovery in a manner that will allow for most discovery to be

produced without such designations.” (emphasis added)). And if disputes arise, the Government

“will agree to redaction” as an alternative when it will “resolve the basis for which a sensitivity

designation was applied.” Id. at 4. The Government’s proposed order “is therefore not

impermissibly broad or unspecific.” McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 139.

Second, the proposed order will not prejudice Rowbottom. See Dixon,

. For starters, Rowbottom does not advance any allegations of prejudice. In his view, the Court

should consider prejudice only after the movant has shown good cause. See Def.’s Opp’n at 5.

That is incorrect as a legal matter. See Dixon,

(stating courts consider

prejudice “[i]n determining whether good cause exists”). And as a factual matter, the proposed

order gives Rowbottom and his “legal defense team”—which includes “defense counsel” and

“any attorneys, investigators, paralegals, support staff, and expert witnesses who are advising or

assisting defense counsel,” Protective Order at 2—access to the protected information to

formulate his defense. McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 140. If that allowance still proves too

4 burdensome, Rowbottom may object to a designation or seek modification of the order. See id.;

Protective Order at 4–5.

Rejecting the proposed order would prejudice both the Government and Rowbottom.

Recall that global discovery in this case consists of more than 8.14 million files. See Gov’t Mot.

¶ 11. The video files alone “would take more than a year to view if played continuously.” Id.

Requiring the Government to review and redact every file before production would severely

strain the Government’s resources and slow Rowbottom’s access to materials he needs to prepare

his defense. That process would be flatly “inconsistent with rules requiring efficient and

expeditious discovery.” Dixon,

.

Third, “any public interest in the materials covered under the protective order will not be

harmed by its issuance.” McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 142. The order excludes information

that has, or will become, part of the public record. See Protective Order at 5. And the public has

very little, if any, interest in the sensitive information covered by the proposed order.

Rowbottom does not claim otherwise. In sum, issuing the order will simply guard sensitive

information from publication “without due consideration of the relevant privacy interests

beforehand.” McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 142.

One final point: Good cause backs the Government’s request in this case, as it has in

countless others. Neither the Government, nor the Court, are aware of any court rejecting the

protective order proposed here—and there have been over 1,300 January 6 cases charged in this

District. See Gov’t Mot. ¶ 12 (collecting cases); McCaughey, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 142–43 (same).

5 IV.

For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Government’s [14] Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

2024.06.24 10:21:29 -04'00' Dated: June 24, 2024 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

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