UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TRAVELERS UNITED, INC.,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 23-2776 (CKK)

HYATT HOTELS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION (January 3, 2025)

Travelers United, Inc., a nonprofit public interest organization, filed this putative class

action lawsuit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that Hyatt Hotels

Corporation, Hyatt Corporation, and Hyatt Franchising, LLC (collectively, “Hyatt” or “the Hyatt

Defendants”) violated the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”),

to 28-3913, by charging so-called “junk fees” to consumers. See Compl.,

ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 1–9. Hyatt removed the case to this Court, invoking this Court’s jurisdiction

under a provision of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”),

(d). See

Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.

Now pending before the Court is the Plaintiff’s [10] Motion to Remand to the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia, in which the Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded

because Travelers United lacks standing to proceed with its claims in federal court. See Mem. in

Support of Pl.’s Mot. to Remand (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 10-1, at 5–11. Travelers United also

requests an award of attorney’s fees and costs incurred because of the removal. See

at 11–12.

Hyatt opposes Travelers United’s Motion and requests jurisdictional discovery to support its

1 arguments that Travelers United has standing. See Hyatt Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Remand

(“Defs.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 12, at 8–18.

Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions,1 the relevant legal authority, and the entire

record, the Court shall GRANT the Motion to Remand, DENY Hyatt’s requests for jurisdictional

discovery, and DENY Travelers United’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. This case shall be

remanded to the D.C. Superior Court.

I. BACKGROUND

The pending Motion comes before the Court in an unusual procedural posture. Travelers

United, the Plaintiff, denies that it has suffered any concrete injury and argues that it therefore

lacks standing to pursue its claims in federal court. See Pl.’s Mem. at 5–11. The Hyatt Defendants

take the opposite view, insisting that Travelers United has alleged a concrete injury and that the

case should go forward in this Court. See Def.’s Opp’n at 8–17. In this posture, the usual rules of

federal standing apply, but “the roles are reversed and the burden flips” so that the defendants bear

the burden of establishing that the plaintiff has standing. See Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Sys., LLC,

(7th Cir. 2020). To provide context for this unusual posture, the Court shall

begin by providing a brief overview of the unusual statute from which this case arises. The Court

will then turn to the plaintiff’s allegations and the procedural history of this case.

1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents: • the Defendants’ Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1; • the Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1-1; • the Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Remand to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, ECF No. 10-1; • the Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 12; • the Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of its Motion to Remand (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 13; • the Plaintiff’s two Notices of Supplemental Authority (“Pl.’s Notice I” and “II”), ECF Nos. 15, 17; • the Defendants’ Responses to those notices (“Def’s Resp. I” and “II”), ECF Nos. 16, 18; and • the attachments to each of those submissions.

In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument on the pending Motion is not necessary to the resolution of the issues before the Court. See LCvR 7(f).

2 A. The District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”)

The CPPA, a D.C. consumer protection statute, prohibits any “unfair or deceptive trade

practice, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby.”

. It is a violation of this statute to “misrepresent,” “fail to state,” or “use innuendo

or ambiguity as to” any “material fact” in trade if doing so is misleading.

§ 28-3904(e), (f), (f-

1). It is also a violation to “advertise or offer goods or services without the intent to sell them or

without the intent to sell them as advertised or offered.” Id. § 28-3904(h). And it is a violation to

“make false or misleading representations of fact concerning . . . price in comparison to price of

competitors.” Id. § 28-3904(j).

Like many consumer protection statutes, the CPPA authorizes private civil actions to

enforce its provisions. See

(k). Available remedies in private suits include

“[t]reble damages, or $1,500 per violation, whichever is greater, payable to the consumer.”

§ 28-3905(k)(2). Successful plaintiffs may also be entitled to attorney’s fees, punitive damages,

and injunctive relief against the unfair or deceptive practice. Id.

The unusual feature of the CPPA at play in this case is that some private plaintiffs may

bring suit under the CPPA without alleging any injury to themselves. Specifically, under a private-

right-of-action provision of the CPPA that the D.C. Council adopted in 2013, “a public interest

organization” may bring a civil action “on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of

consumers . . . seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law

of the District,” whenever three basic conditions are satisfied. Id. § 28-3905(k)(1)(D); see

Consumer Protection Act of 2012, D.C. Act 19-647 § 2(b)(3) (Jan. 25, 2013). First, the

organization must be “a nonprofit ‘organized and operating,’ at least in part, ‘for the purpose of

promoting interests or rights of consumers.’ ” Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Hormel Foods Corp.,

, 185 (D.C. 2021) (quoting

(a)(15)). Second, “the consumer or 3 class of consumers must be capable of bringing suit in their own right.”

at 183 (citing

(k)(1)(D)). Third, the organization “must have a sufficient nexus to the interests

involved of the consumer or class . . . to adequately represent those interests.”

(alteration in

original) (quoting

(k)(1)(D)). If these three conditions are satisfied, the

plaintiff organization may proceed with its case in D.C. Superior Court, even if the organization

itself has not suffered any injury. See

In its report recommending that this unusual private-right-of-action provision be adopted

as an amendment to the CPPA, the D.C. Council’s Committee on Public Services and Consumer

Affairs explained that the relevant part of the amendment was intended to give plaintiff public

interest organizations “the full extent of standing as may be recognized by the District of Columbia

courts.” See Report on Bill 19-0581, D.C. Council Comm. On Pub. Servs. & Cons. Aff., at 6 (Nov.

28, 2012) [https://perma.cc/X4FT-MSU2]. The Committee went on to state that the provision at

issue in this case:

is intended to explicitly and unequivocally authorize the court to find that a public interest organization has standing beyond . . . what would be afforded under a narrow reading of prior DC court decisions, and beyond what would be afforded in a federal case under a narrow reading of prior federal court decisions on federal standing.

Consistent with that express intention, the D.C. Court of Appeals has held that the CPPA

does not require that an organization or its members have suffered any injury at all for the

organization to bring a civil action in Superior Court under the private-right-of-action provision at

issue in this case. See Animal Legal Def. Fund, 258 A.3d at 183–84. Instead, it has concluded

that “the [D.C.] Council intended public interest organizations bringing suit under [the relevant

provision,

](k)(1)(D)[,] to be free from any requirement to demonstrate their

4 own Article III standing” to sue in D.C. courts.

; see also Ctr. for Inquiry Inc. v. Walmart,

Inc.,

, 116 n.4 (D.C. 2022) (“If an entity . . . meets the CPPA statutory test governing

public interest organization standing, it has [statutory] standing to sue [in D.C. courts] ‘without

regard to whether it also satisfies traditional Article III standing requirements.’ ” (quoting

)).

B. Travelers United and Its Claims

Travelers United is “a nonprofit public interest organization” with a mission “to improve

and enhance travel for consumers.” Compl. ¶¶ 12–13. The organization is incorporated in

Delaware, registered as a foreign corporation in D.C., and “based in Washington, D.C. and

Virginia.”

.

In this action, Travelers United alleges that some of the ways that Hyatt advertises and

charges fees to customers who book its hotel rooms are unfair or deceptive practices prohibited by

the CPPA. See Compl. ¶¶ 46–75, 105–07. Specifically, Travelers United challenges Hyatt’s

former practice of charging “resort” and “destination” fees that were not advertised as part of the

regular nightly rate for a hotel room. See

¶¶ 105–07. Travelers United labels these mandatory

charges “junk fees.” See

Travelers United alleges that Hyatt’s practice of charging these fees

amounted to unfair “partitioned pricing” because consumers were shown “the actual total price”

of a hotel room only “toward the end of the purchase,” hindering their ability to “compare the costs

and benefits of a given Hyatt hotel” with those of other available options. See

¶¶ 57–58.

Travelers United further alleges that Hyatt continues to mislead consumers by grouping “resort”

and “destination” fees under a “Taxes & Fees” heading in an itemized list of room charges

presented at the end of the purchase process.

¶¶ 58–59. It alleges that this grouping gives

consumers the false impression that the “change in price” from the additional fees “may have

resulted from mandatory government charges.”

. 5 Travelers United contends that these practices violate the CPPA in two ways. First, it

alleges that by advertising per-night prices for hotel rooms that did not include mandatory “resort”

or “destination” fees, Hyatt unlawfully advertised or offered its rooms “without the intent to sell

them as advertised or offered,” in violation of

(h). Compl. ¶ 105. Second, it

alleges that because Hyatt sometimes failed to include mandatory fees in the advertised per-night

price of its hotel rooms, some of its representations about those per-night prices were false or

misleading, in violation of

(e), (f), (f-1), and (j). Compl. ¶ 106.

Travelers United proposes to represent two classes of consumers in this action: a “National

Class” consisting of individuals in the United States who booked a room at a Hyatt hotel in D.C.

for personal use and paid one of the fees at issue, and a “District Class” consisting of D.C. residents

who booked a room at a Hyatt hotel anywhere in the U.S. for personal use and paid one of those

same fees.

¶¶ 84–85. Travelers United alleges that Hyatt’s fee practices violated “each [c]lass

member[’s] individual statutory right to truthful information from Hyatt about the actual price of

nightly room rates purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia.”

. It further

alleges that Hyatt’s practices “have resulted in actual injury and harm to the [c]lass members.”

. Specifically, it alleges that each class member suffered harm “in the amount of the

[challenged fees] which were absent from the advertised price and which they paid as a result of”

Hyatt’s fee practices.

In its Complaint, Travelers United asserts that its case against Hyatt satisfies the

requirements for certification as a class action under D.C. Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Compl.

¶ 83. The class certification requirements in D.C. Rule 23 are facially identical to their federal

counterparts. Compare D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 23(a), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). For a class to

be certified, (1) the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,”

6 (2) there must be “questions of law or fact common to the class,” (3) the “claims or defenses of

the representative parties” must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” and (4) the

representative party must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” D.C. Super.

Ct. R. Civ. P. 23(a). As relevant to the pending Motion, Travelers United alleges that the third of

these requirements—typicality—is satisfied because its own claims are “typical, if not identical,

to the claims that could be asserted by all members of the [two putative classes].”

.

Travelers United seeks several remedies on its own behalf and on behalf of the putative

classes. See Compl. ¶ 111. It seeks a permanent injunction barring Hyatt from “advertising rates

for hotel rooms that exclude mandatory resort, destination, and/or other similar fees,” and from

“partitioning advertised hotel room prices from mandatory resort, destination, and/or other similar

fees,” including by “placing these mandatory fees under a ‘Taxes & Fees’ heading at checkout.”

(a)–(b). On behalf of the putative class members, it seeks actual damages; treble damages

or statutory damages of $1,500 per violation, whichever is greater; and punitive damages.

(c)–(e). It seeks “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs” for itself and for the putative class

members.

(f). And it seeks “any additional relief as may be necessary to restore to the

[c]lass members money which may have been acquired by means of Hyatt’s unlawful trade

practices” or that the Court may find “necessary and proper.”

(g)–(h).

C. Procedural History

Travelers United filed its Complaint in D.C. Superior Court on August 17, 2023. Notice

of Removal, ECF No. 1, ¶ 1; see Compl. at 25. Travelers United served each of the Hyatt

Defendants on August 22, 2023. Notice of Removal ¶ 1; see Notice of Removal Exs. B–D, ECF

Nos. 1-2 to 1-4. The Hyatt Defendants then jointly filed a timely Notice of Removal in this Court

on September 21, 2023. See Notice of Removal at 13; see also

(b)(2)(B).

7 The Hyatt Defendants’ Notice of Removal invoked this Court’s jurisdiction under CAFA,

which provides that federal district courts have original jurisdiction in cases in which at least one

member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a different state than any defendant, there are at least

100 putative class members, and the total amount in controversy exceeds “$5,000,000, exclusive

of interest and costs.” See Notice of Removal ¶ 14;

(d)(2)(A), (d)(5)(B), (d)(6).

In their Notice of Removal, the Hyatt Defendants did not address whether Travelers United

has standing to pursue this case in federal court. See generally Notice of Removal. The only

description of Travelers United or its organizational structure in the Notice of Removal is a

restatement of Travelers United’s own allegation that it “is a nonprofit public interest organization”

that is incorporated in Delaware, registered as a foreign corporation in D.C., and “based in

Washington, D.C. and Virginia.” Notice of Removal ¶ 8 (quoting Compl. ¶ 12).

Shortly after removal, this Court ordered the Hyatt Defendants to file an Answer. Minute

Order (Sept. 22, 2023). The Court then granted a consent motion to stay the deadline for the Hyatt

Defendants’ Answer so that the parties could first litigate motions to remand or transfer this case.

See Minute Order (Sept. 29, 2023); Consent Mot. to Defer Time to Answer, ECF No. 4.

Travelers United then filed a Motion to Remand this case to D.C. Superior Court, arguing

that it lacks standing to proceed with its claims in federal court. See Pl.’s Mem. at 5–11. In its

Motion, Travelers United requests an award of fees and costs it incurred because of the removal.

See

at 11–12. Hyatt opposes the Motion to Remand, arguing that this case should proceed in

federal court because Travelers United has both organizational standing and associational standing

to pursue its claims. See Def.’s Opp’n at 8–17. Hyatt also requests jurisdictional discovery to

substantiate its arguments about Travelers United’s standing. See

at 12 n.7, 15 n.8, 17 n.11.

8 Finally, after briefing on the Motion to Remand was complete, Travelers United filed two

Notices of Supplemental Authority, to which Hyatt responded. See Pl.’s Not. I (Apr. 4, 2024);

Defs.’ Resp. I (Apr. 9, 2024); Pl.’s Not. II (June 18, 2024); Def.’s Resp. II (June 21, 2024).

Travelers United’s Motion to Remand is now ripe for decision.2

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Remand

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Murthy v. Missouri,

, 56–

57 (2024); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Consistent with that limitation, if a federal district court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case that a party has removed from the Superior Court of

the District of Columbia, the federal court must remand the case back to the Superior Court. See

(c), 1451; Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc.,

(D.C.

Cir. 2002); see also Plazzi v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.,

, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2022)

(collecting cases). The party that removed the action “bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction

exists in federal court.” Steele v. Salb,

(D.D.C. 2010) (CKK) (quoting

Downey v. Ambassador Dev., LLC,

(D.D.C. 2008) (JDB)); Toxin Free USA

v. J.M. Smucker Co.,

, 44 (D.D.C. 2020) (DLF). However, when—as in this

case—a party invokes federal jurisdiction under CAFA, there is no presumption in favor of

remand. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens,

, 89 (2014); Toxin

Free USA, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 44. And although remand orders are generally not appealable, under

CAFA, a United States Court of Appeals may accept an appeal from an order granting or denying

a motion to remand a putative class action.

(c)(1); cf.

(d).

2 Hyatt has also filed a Motion to Transfer this case to the Northern District of Illinois, which this Court held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Motion to Remand. See Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer, ECF No. 11; Minute Order (Oct. 22, 2023). Because the Court concludes that Travelers United lacks standing to proceed in federal court and the case must be remanded to the D.C. Superior Court, the Order accompanying this Memorandum Opinion denies the Motion to Transfer as moot.

9 B. Standing

One necessary condition for a case to come within this Court’s limited subject-matter

jurisdiction is that the plaintiff must have standing to pursue the case in federal court. Attias v.

Carefirst, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2017). To have standing, the plaintiff ordinarily must

have suffered an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized,” “actual or imminent,” and

“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,” which “likely” will be “redressed

by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

(1992) (alterations in

original) (first quoting Allen v. Wright,

(1984); then quoting Whitmore v.

Arkansas,

(1990); and then quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights

Organization,

, 41–42 (1976)). A party must have standing “for each claim that [it]

press[es] and for each form of relief that [it] seek[s].” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

(2021). For a plaintiff to have standing to pursue “forward-looking” relief such as an

injunction, a party must show that the plaintiff “face[s] ‘a real and immediate threat of repeated

injury.’ ” Murthy,

(quoting O’Shea v. Littleton,

(1974)). The

party asserting standing must show that each of these requirements is satisfied “with the manner

and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan,

.

These standing requirements apply with equal force to a named plaintiff seeking to

represent a class. To have standing, class action plaintiffs “must allege and show that they

personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of

the class to which they belong.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

, 338 n.6 (2016) (quoting

Simon,

n.20); see also TransUnion,

(“Article III does not give

federal courts the power to order relief to any uninjured plaintiff, class action or not.” (quoting

Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,

(2016) (Roberts, C.J., concurring))).

10 However, the Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to the general rule that a

party must personally have suffered a concrete injury to have standing. Under this exception, a

membership organization has standing to “bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its

members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests [the

organization] seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim

asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm’n,

(1977).

The burden of establishing standing rests with “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction.”

Lujan,

; TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 430–31. Therefore, when a defendant removes

a case to federal court and seeks to proceed there over the plaintiff’s objection, the burden of

showing that the plaintiff has standing rests with the defendant. See Fox v. Dakkota Integrated

Sys., LLC,

(7th Cir. 2020); Tailford v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc.,

, 1099 (9th Cir. 2022); see also Gardner v. Erie Ins. Co.,

, 139 (D.D.C.

2022) (RC) (holding that the burden of establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction over a

removed action rests with “[t]he party opposing the motion to remand”); cf. Culhane v. Aurora

Loan Servs. of Nebraska,

(1st Cir. 2013) (noting that if the plaintiff chooses to

go forward with the claim in federal court after removal, the burden of establishing standing then

“rests with the plaintiff”).

To establish standing, the party invoking federal jurisdiction “must explain how the

elements essential to standing are met.” Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,

(2019). “[S]imply alleg[ing] a nonobvious harm” is not sufficient.

“As a general

matter, a plaintiff’s standing to pursue a claim rests on the theory of injury presented in the

complaint and the facts alleged in support of the claim.” Haase v. Sessions,

, 907

11 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Warth v. Seldin,

, 500–01 (1975)). A defendant may rely on

these allegations to show that the plaintiff has standing, even if the plaintiff insists that standing is

absent. See Tailford, 26 F.4th at 1099 n.2. A defendant removing a case to federal court under

CAFA may also supplement the plaintiff’s allegations in its notice of removal, and the court must

consider those allegations in its jurisdictional analysis. See Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 87–88;

(a). Finally, a court may also “consider materials outside the pleadings” when

determining whether it has jurisdiction over a removed case if the court “still ‘accept[s] all of the

factual allegations in [the] complaint as true.’ ” See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA.,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gaubert,

(1991)); see also Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack,

(D.C.

Cir. 2015) (“In determining standing, we may consider materials outside of the complaint.”).

III. DISCUSSION

Neither party disputes that Hyatt’s Notice of Removal was timely or that this Court has

statutory original jurisdiction under CAFA; on its face, the Notice of Removal shows that both of

those jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. See

(b)(2)(B), 1332(d); Notice

of Removal ¶¶ 1, 14–33. Therefore, the primary issue for the Court to resolve is whether Travelers

United has standing to pursue its claims in federal court. The discussion that follows begins by

addressing that issue. It then addresses the parties’ other requests: Hyatt’s requests for

jurisdictional discovery and Travelers United’s request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred

because of the removal to this Court. The Court concludes that Travelers United does not have

standing, rejects Hyatt’s requests for jurisdictional discovery, and rejects Travelers United’s

request for attorney’s fees and costs. This case shall be remanded to the D.C. Superior Court.

12 A. Because Travelers United Lacks Standing, This Case Shall Be Remanded.

Because standing is an element of federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court

must consider whether the plaintiff has standing as a threshold issue, even if the case satisfies the

prerequisites for a statutory grant of original jurisdiction like the one in CAFA. See Busic v.

Transportation Sec. Admin.,

, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2023); Tanner-Brown v. Jewell,

(D.D.C. 2016) (RC), aff’d sub nom. Tanner-Brown v. Zinke,

(D.C. Cir. 2017). If standing is absent, then the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and the

case must be remanded. See Busic, 62 F.4th at 549;

(c).

There are two ways that an organization like Travelers United can have standing to sue in

federal court. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach,

, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006). First, an organization can have standing “on its own behalf,” which is

called “organizational standing.” Id. (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,

, 378–

79 (1982); and Warth,

). Second, an organization can have standing to advance a

claim “on behalf of its members,” which is called “associational standing.”

(citing United

Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.,

(1996);

and Hunt,

); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. United States Dep’t of Com.,

(D.C. Cir. 2019).

Hyatt argues that Travelers United has both organizational standing and associational

standing in this case. Defs.’ Opp’n at 13–17. Travelers United denies that it has either form of

standing. Pl.’s Reply at 10–14. The Court agrees with Travelers United that it has neither

organizational standing nor associational standing to pursue its claims in federal court.

1. Organizational Standing

To have standing “in its own right,” an organization must make “the same showing required

of individuals: an actual or threatened injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s

13 allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.” Am. Anti-

Vivisection Soc’y v. United States Dep’t of Agric.,

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (first quoting

Abigail All., 469 F.3d at 132; and then quoting Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

v. Feld Entertainment, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011)). “To demonstrate injury in fact, an

organization must allege a ‘concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities’ that

is ‘more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.’”

(quoting Havens,

).

Hyatt argues that Travelers United has alleged an injury to itself in at least two ways. See

Defs.’ Opp’n at 8–15. First, Hyatt argues that Travelers United alleged such an injury by asserting

that its claims are “typical, if not identical to” the claims of putative class members, who Travelers

United alleges suffered actual injuries when they paid so-called “junk fees” to Hyatt.

at 9

(quoting Compl. ¶ 94). Second, Hyatt argues that Travelers United has alleged an injury by

asserting that it has expended resources to combat the fee practices at issue in this case, which are

contrary to Travelers United’s stated mission.

at 13 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 13–14).

Neither of Hyatt’s arguments for organizational standing is successful. An allegation under

D.C. class action law that a lead plaintiff’s claims are “typical” of putative class members’

damages claims, without more, does not confer Article III standing. See infra, Section III.A.1.a.

The mere expenditure of resources to research and advocate against the practices at issue in a case

does not confer standing, either. See infra, Section III.A.1.b. Travelers United therefore lacks

organizational standing in this case.

a. Typicality

Hyatt’s first argument in favor of Travelers United’s standing hinges on the meaning of the

word “typical.” Hyatt argues that by asserting that its claims “are ‘typical’ of the ‘actual damages’

claims of putative class members,” Travelers United has, in effect, alleged that it “was harmed in 14 a manner similar to the class” and therefore suffered damages. Defs.’ Opp’n at 12. This assertion,

Hyatt contends, “must be accepted as true for jurisdictional purposes” and establishes that

Travelers United has standing.

Hyatt’s argument that Travelers United has standing on this basis is unpersuasive, for three

reasons.

First, context makes clear that Travelers United’s assertion that its claims are “typical” of

class members’ claims is a legal conclusion about a matter of D.C. class action law, not a factual

allegation. See Compl. ¶ 94. Travelers United raises this assertion in a section of its Complaint

entitled “Class Allegations.” See

¶¶ 83–96. The first paragraph of that section alleges that this

action “is brought and may properly proceed as a class action pursuant to D.C. Rule of Civil

Procedure 23.” Id. ¶ 83. One of the class certification requirements in that rule, as in the analogous

federal rule, is that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or

defenses of the class.” D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). And the

specific paragraph in which Travelers United describes its claims as “typical” begins with the

heading “Typicality” and cites precedent from this District applying the analogous federal class-

certification requirement that a representative party’s claims be “typical” of the claims of the class.

Compl. ¶ 94 (citing Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2017) (ESH)). Taken together, these facts show that Travelers United’s assertion that its

claims are “typical” of those of the class is a legal conclusion, not a factual allegation.

Because Travelers United’s assertion of typicality is a legal conclusion, Hyatt’s contention

that the assertion “must be accepted as true for jurisdictional purposes” is mistaken. See Defs.’

Opp’n at 12. “[G]eneral factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may

suffice” to establish standing at the pleading stage. Lujan,

. But in contrast to the

15 treatment of factual allegations, courts “do not assume the truth of legal conclusions” set forth in

a plaintiff’s complaint when assessing standing. In re U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach

Litig.,

(D.C. Cir. 2019); see also Browning v. Clinton,

(D.C.

Cir. 2002) (explaining that courts do not accept the truth of “legal conclusions,” even when they

are “cast in the form of factual allegations” (quoting Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1994))). Courts also do not “accept inferences that are unsupported by the

facts set out in the complaint.” Kareem v. Haspel,

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting

Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales,

(D.C. Cir. 2007)). Instead, to establish

federal jurisdiction, the pleadings “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim [of standing] that is plausible on its face.’ ” Arpaio v. Obama,

(D.C. Cir.

2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009)). Measured against these standards,

the bare legal assertion that Travelers United’s claims are “typical” of those of class members,

without more, is not an allegation of an injury-in-fact that is sufficient to support standing.

Second, even if the Court were to accept, for purposes of the standing analysis, the legal

conclusion that Travelers United’s claims are “typical” of those of other class members as a matter

of D.C. class action law, that conclusion alone would not support a determination that Travelers

United has standing in federal court. Although the D.C. Court of Appeals has not yet decided

whether a CPPA plaintiff must have suffered a direct injury for that plaintiff’s claims to be

“typical” of the claims of class members who did suffer such injuries for purposes of D.C. Rule

23, a recent D.C. Superior Court decision in another case brought by Travelers United suggests

that D.C. Rule 23 does not impose such a requirement.

In Travelers United, Inc. v. Sonesta Int’l Hotels Corp., No. 2023 CAB 5254,

(D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2024), Judge Todd E. Edelman granted a class

16 certification motion in a case in which Travelers United advances CPPA claims that parallel the

claims in this case.

. In Sonesta, as in this case, Travelers United alleges that the

defendant hotel corporation has violated the CPPA by charging improper fees to consumers.

at *2–3. And as in this case, Travelers United maintains that it has not suffered an injury to its

own interests, but instead is suing under the CPPA purely as a representative of D.C. consumers

who have paid the challenged fees.

at *1–2.

On those facts, Judge Edelman concluded that Travelers United “sufficiently stands in the

shoes” of the consumer class members that it is a “member[] of the class” entitled to sue in a

representative capacity under D.C. Rule 23, even though Travelers United was not alleging any

injury to its own interests.

; see D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (“One or more members

of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if . . . .”

(emphasis added)). Judge Edelman further concluded that Travelers United had satisfied the

requirement that its claims must be “typical” of those of class members, even though it had alleged

no injury to itself, because the CPPA allows Travelers United to “stand[] in the shoes” of injured

class members, most or all of whom who suffered injury “in the same manner.”

at *30.

Judge Edelman acknowledged Sonesta’s argument that these conclusions were in tension

with federal class action precedent suggesting that the lead plaintiff in a class action must “possess

the same interest and suffer the same injury” as class members.

at *19 (quoting Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,

(2011)). But he reasoned that the local courts of D.C. are

not bound to follow federal precedent on that issue because the relevant federal decisions reflect

“Article III constraints” on federal class-action jurisdiction that do not apply to the local courts of

D.C., which Congress established using its Article I powers.

at *20 (quoting Amchem Prods.

17 v. Windsor,

(1997)). Because the D.C. Court of Appeals has held that “public

interest organizations bringing suit under [the CPPA provision at issue here] [are] free from any

requirement to demonstrate their own Article III standing,” Judge Edelman reasoned, these Article

III-related obstacles to class certification in federal court are not applicable in CPPA cases in which

a public interest organization sues in D.C. Superior Court on behalf of injured consumers. Id at

*22 (second alteration in original) (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Hormel Foods Corp.,

, 184 (D.C. 2021)).

The Sonesta decision supports the conclusion that, as a matter of D.C. class action law, a

public interest organization may have claims that are “typical” of the claims of injured consumer

class members even if the organization has not suffered an injury that would support federal

standing under Article III. See

at *29–30; cf. Spokeo,

(“Article III standing

requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”). Accordingly, even if this

Court were to accept as true the assertion that, as a matter of D.C. law, Travelers United has claims

that are “typical” of the claims of class members who suffered actual injuries, that assertion would

not provide a stand-alone basis for concluding that Travelers United has standing in federal court.

Third, and finally, Travelers United has not alleged any facts that plausibly show how it

could have been directly “harmed in a manner similar to the class.” See Defs.’ Opp’n at 12.

Travelers United alleges that “[c]lass members suffered actual injuries” when they paid mandatory

fees for hotel rooms that “were not included in the advertised price” of those rooms. Compl. ¶ 108.

But Travelers United does not allege that it is a member of the class that suffered these injuries or

that it ever paid fees directly to Hyatt. Cf. ¶¶ 84–85 (proposing classes composed of “individuals”

and “residents of the District of Columbia” who “booked a room at a Hyatt hotel . . . for personal

use and paid a resort, destination, and/or similar fee to Hyatt”). In the absence of those allegations,

18 an assertion that Travelers United’s claims are “typical” of the claims of others who suffered

“actual damages” is not sufficient to show an injury in fact. See Collier v. SP Plus Corp.,

(7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“A mere reference to ‘actual damages’ in the complaint’s

prayer for relief does not establish Article III standing.”).

For all these reasons, the Court rejects Hyatt’s argument that Travelers United has standing

based on its allegation that its claims are “typical” of claims by class members who it alleges have

suffered actual injuries.

b. Expenditure of Resources

Next, Hyatt argues that Travelers United has organizational standing because the

allegations in this case show that the fee-charging practices at issue are contrary to Travelers

United’s mission and those practices have caused Travelers United to expend resources that it

otherwise would have expended on other efforts. Defs.’ Opp’n at 13–15. This argument, too, is

unsuccessful.

Hyatt relies for this argument on the Supreme Court’s decision in Havens Realty Corp. v.

Coleman,

(1982). See Defs.’ Opp’n at 13. In that case, the Supreme Court

considered whether an organization that provided “counseling and referral services for low-and

moderate-income homeseekers” had standing to challenge discriminatory housing practices that

the organization alleged had “perceptibly impaired” its ability to provide its services. Havens,

. In its opinion, the Court emphasized that the alleged interference with the

organization’s services was “far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social

interests.”

Instead, it was a “concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities”

that resulted in a “drain on the organization’s resources.”

On those facts, the Court concluded

that the organization had standing to challenge the discriminatory practices at issue.

19 However, as the Supreme Court recently emphasized in Food and Drug Administration v.

Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine,

(2024), “Havens was an unusual case,” and the

Court “has been careful not to extend the Havens holding beyond its context.” Id. at 396.

“Critically,” the Court explained, the organizational plaintiff in Havens was not only “an issue-

advocacy organization,” but also a provider of “a housing counseling service.” Id. at 395. The

Court went on to explain that the organization’s standing in Havens arose not from any harm to its

abstract social objectives, but rather from an injury to “core business activities” like its counseling

service. Id.

Applying that understanding of the holding in Havens, the Court held in Alliance for

Hippocratic Medicine that several medical associations lacked organizational standing to

challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of mifepristone, a drug used to perform

abortions. Id. The Court acknowledged the medical associations’ allegations that the agency’s

actions had caused them to expend “considerable resources” on research, advocacy, and public

education related to mifepristone and abortion. Id. at 394. But it held that under Article III, an

organization “cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending money to gather

information and advocate against the defendant’s action.” Id.

So too here. The allegations in this case demonstrate that Travelers United, like the medical

associations that lacked standing in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and unlike the plaintiff

organization that had standing in Havens, is principally “an issue-advocacy organization.” See id.

at 395; Compl. ¶¶ 13–14. The additional evidence of Travelers United’s activities that Hyatt offers

in its Opposition only reinforces this conclusion. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 14–15; Decl. of Lindsay

Harrison (“Harrison Decl.”), ECF No. 12-1, ¶¶ 3–5, Exs. A–E. Relying on information from

Travelers United’s public website and financial reports, Hyatt describes the range of policy

20 advocacy activities that Travelers United has undertaken in its fight against “junk fees,” including

giving testimony before Congress, providing comments in Department of Transportation

rulemaking proceedings, and meeting with staff of federal agencies and congressional committees.

Defs.’ Opp’n at 14. Hyatt also describes Travelers United’s educational and research activities,

which include publishing a newsletter, producing instructional videos, and conducting surveys.

Id. But Hyatt does not identify any “core business activities” undertaken by Travelers United that

are plausibly hampered by the conduct challenged in this case. See All. for Hippocratic Med., 602

U.S. at 395. Instead, Hyatt merely identifies several kinds of research and issue advocacy activities

that are responsive to, but not directly impaired by, the practices challenged in this case. Like the

medical organizations that lacked standing in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, Travelers United

“cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending money to gather information and

advocate against the defendant’s action.” Id. at 395. Accordingly, Travelers United’s research

and advocacy activities, without more, do not show that it has organizational standing.

The two decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that Hyatt cites are not

to the contrary. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 13–15 (citing Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011); and Fair Emp. Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC

Mktg. Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1994)). Relying on these two decisions, Hyatt argues

that any organization that has used its resources to “counteract” a practice that is contrary to its

mission has standing to challenge that practice. See

Not so. Just as the Supreme Court did in

Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, the D.C. Circuit made clear in each of the decisions Hyatt cites

that only certain kinds of efforts to “counteract” challenged conduct will support organizational

standing. See Equal Rights Ctr.,

; Fair Emp. Council, 28 F.3d at 1276–77. In

both decisions, the D.C. Circuit concluded that efforts by civil rights organizations to investigate

21 discriminatory practices and “increas[e] legal pressure” on the defendants to change those

practices were not sufficient to confer standing. See Fair Emp. Council, 28 F.3d at 1276–77; Equal

Rights Ctr.,

(quoting id.). If the rule were otherwise, “the time and money that

plaintiffs spend in bringing suit against a defendant would itself constitute a sufficient ‘injury in

fact,’ a circular position that would effectively abolish the [standing] requirement altogether.” Fair

Emp. Council,

. Instead, in the decisions that Hyatt cites, the D.C. Circuit analyzed

standing by focusing on whether the defendant’s conduct prompted the plaintiff organizations to

divert resources toward providing additional direct services designed to offset the harmful effects

of the challenged conduct. See

(distinguishing expenditures of resources on an

organization’s core service programs, which can support standing, from expenditures on “the allied

efforts at increasing legal pressure on civil-rights violators,” which cannot); Equal Rights Ctr., 633

F.3d at 1141–42 & n.4 (analyzing standing by focusing on the “diversion of resources to programs

designed to counteract the injury,” including “increased educational and counseling efforts”).

These decisions are therefore consistent with the Supreme Court’s more recent holding in Alliance

for Hippocratic Medicine that expenditures on investigations and advocacy alone are not sufficient

to confer standing. See 602 U.S. at 395.

In sum, Hyatt has not shown that the fee practices challenged in this case have “perceptibly

impaired” Travelers United’s ability to provide relevant services aligned with its mission. Havens,

. Travelers United therefore lacks organizational standing to challenge the

practices at issue in this case on its own behalf.

2. Associational Standing

Even if an organization lacks standing to pursue a claim on its own behalf, it may have

associational standing to sue on behalf of its members. This path to standing is always available

to a “voluntary membership organization with identifiable members” that “represents [its 22 members] in good faith.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard

Coll.,

, 201 (2023). An organization not meeting that description may also have

associational standing, but to do so, it “must have” at least “the ‘indicia of a traditional membership

association.’ ” Viasat, Inc. v. FCC,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Sorenson

Commc’ns v. FCC,

(D.C. Cir. 2018)); see also Hunt,

. When

determining whether these “indicia” are present, courts weigh multiple “considerations,” including

“whether members finance the organization, guide its activities, or select its leadership.”

“[I]t

is not enough for putative members simply to read a group’s publications, subscribe to its e-mail

list, or follow its Facebook page.”

(citing Sorenson,

; and Gettman v. DEA.,

(D.C. Cir. 2002)). If the party that bears “the burden of proof” on the issue of

standing fails to show that these indicia are present, a federal court should not proceed based on

associational standing.

If these threshold requirements are satisfied, a party may show that an organization has

associational standing by showing that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in

their own right; (b) the interests [the organization] seeks to protect are germane to the

organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the

participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt,

; Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr.,

928 F.3d at 101. The first two prongs of this test are constitutional requirements rooted in

Article III; the third is prudential, and Congress may modify it through legislation. See United

Food & Com. Workers Union, 517 U.S. at 556–57; Tanner-Brown v. Haaland,

(D.C. Cir. 2024). But all three requirements are jurisdictional, and unless each is satisfied—or, in

the case of the third requirement, abrogated by an act of Congress—associational standing is not

a valid basis for a federal court’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. See Tanner-

23 Brown,

; see also Arpaio,

(noting that standing is an element of the

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction).

Hyatt argues that information on Travelers United’s website shows that it is a membership

organization and that the allegations in its Complaint support a plausible inference that each of the

other three requirements for associational standing are satisfied. See Opp’n at 15–17; Harrison

Decl. ¶¶ 3–5, Ex. A. The Court will assume, without deciding, that Travelers United is a voluntary

membership organization, that at least one of its members is a travelling consumer who would

have standing to advance the damages claims in this case as an individual plaintiff, and that the

interests that Travelers United “seeks to protect” in this case are “germane to the organization’s

purpose.” See United Food & Com. Workers Union, 517 U.S. at 556–57; Compl. ¶ 12 (“The

mission of Travelers United is to improve and enhance travel for consumers. . . .”). Each of these

facts either can be inferred from the allegations in the Complaint or the Notice of Removal or could

plausibly be established through jurisdictional discovery. And collectively, these facts would

satisfy the first and second prongs of the associational standing test. The Court’s analysis will

therefore focus on the remaining prong of that test: the “member-participation” prong.

One purpose of the member-participation prong of the associational standing test is to

“guard against the hazard of litigating a case to the damages stage only to find the plaintiff lacking

detailed records or the evidence necessary to show the harm with sufficient specificity.” United

Food & Com. Workers Union,

. Accordingly, although “a request for monetary

relief by an association does not absolutely preclude standing in all cases, the question in each case

is whether the monetary relief can be awarded without ‘individualized proof.’ ” Air Transp. Ass’n

of Am. v. Reno,

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 515–16). If such

proof is required to resolve a claim—whether monetary or not—the member-participation prong

24 is not satisfied. See id.; Warth, 422 U.S. at 515–16 (declining to recognize associational standing

to pursue a damages claim when “both the fact and extent of injury would require individualized

proof”); Tanner-Brown,

(declining to recognize associational standing to pursue

a claim for an accounting that would require “individualized determinations”); cf. Int’l Union,

United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock,

, 287–88 (1986)

(recognizing associational standing where the claim “raise[d] a pure question of law” and any

individualized determinations regarding appropriate remedies for members would be made by “the

proper state authorities”). The plaintiff then lacks associational standing to proceed in federal

court unless Congress has, by statute, abrogated the member-participation prong for the claim at

issue. See United Food & Com. Workers Union, 517 U.S. at 556–57; Tanner-Brown,

.

Congress has not abrogated the member-participation prong for the claims at issue here.

The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may remove this requirement, for example by

authorizing an association to sue in federal court for damages on its members’ behalf. See United

Food & Com. Workers Union,

. Neither of the two statutes at issue in this case

alters the member-participation requirement in this way.

First, the CPPA provision creating Travelers United’s cause of action and giving it the

right to sue for damages on behalf of individual consumers does not abrogate the member-

participation requirement for associational standing because it is an act of the D.C. Council, not of

Congress. See

(k)(1)(D); Compl. ¶ 100. The jurisdiction of the federal

district courts is within the sole control of Congress, subject only to those limits imposed by the

Constitution. See Mark v. Republic of the Sudan,

(D.C. Cir. 2023), cert. denied,

25

(2024). Therefore, the D.C. Council enactment under which Travelers United

sued in this case cannot abrogate the member-participation requirement. See

Second, CAFA does not abrogate the member-participation requirement for associational

standing because it does not purport to give any association the power to seek relief on behalf of

its members without their participation. See

(d). Instead, it merely authorizes

federal district courts to exercise original jurisdiction over certain putative class actions, regardless

of the relationship between the named representative and the putative class. See

That

authorization does not alter the member-participation prong of the test for associational standing.

See

To the contrary, multiple courts have applied the member-participation prong when

analyzing the standing of plaintiffs in putative class actions proceeding in federal court under

CAFA. See, e.g., Coll. of Dental Surgeons of Puerto Rico v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.,

, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2009); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp.,

(2d Cir. 2004).

As these decisions indicate, CAFA does not abrogate the member-participation prong of the test

for associational standing.

Because the member-participation prong has not been abrogated for the claims at issue in

this case, the Court must apply that prong and decide whether either “the claim[s] asserted” or “the

relief requested requires the participation of individual members” of Travelers United in this

action. See Hunt,

. If “detailed and individualized proof” from individual members

is required, then Travelers United lacks associational standing. See Air Transp.,

.

At the threshold, the Court rejects Hyatt’s argument that Travelers United’s decision to

pursue this case as a putative class action under D.C. Rule 23 satisfies the member-participation

prong. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 16. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has rejected a

similar argument, concluding that the rule against associational standing for claims requiring

26 individual member participation should not be relaxed in putative class actions. See Bano,

. As that court explained:

Associational standing carves only a narrow exception from the ordinary rule that a litigant “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” If the involvement of individual members of an association is necessary, either because the substantive nature of the claim or the form of the relief sought requires their participation, we see no sound reason to allow the organization standing to press their claims, even where it seeks to do so as a putative class representative.

(quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,

Inc.,

(1982)). This Court agrees with the Second Circuit’s reasoning and

concludes that a plaintiff’s decision to pursue a case as a putative class action does not satisfy the

member-participation prong.

The Court therefore proceeds to assess each claim and form of relief that Travelers United

seeks, evaluating whether individual members’ participation would be required to resolve each

one. See TransUnion,

(holding that a party must have standing “for each claim

that [it] press[es] and for each form of relief that [it] seek[s]”). The Court concludes that in each

instance, individual members’ participation would be required, precluding the recognition of

associational standing.

First, adjudicating Travelers United’s claims for actual damages would require individual

members’ participation in this case. See Compl. ¶ 111(c). Some evidence relevant to individual

members’ actual damages is likely in the possession of those members, not Travelers United or

Hyatt. For example, suppose that an individual traveler’s actual damages include the difference

between the price that the individual paid for a Hyatt hotel room and the price of a similar hotel

room that the individual would have booked if not for the fee practices at issue in this case.

Although Hyatt may have discoverable records that would show the amount that the individual

27 ultimately paid to the Hyatt hotel, it is unlikely that either Hyatt or Travelers United would have

records indicating what other, non-Hyatt hotels the individual may have considered or what their

prices were at the relevant times. Instead, the most likely source of that information would be the

individual traveler’s record. The need for this kind of “detailed and individualized proof” from

individual members of Travelers United bars the recognition of associational standing over the

actual damages claims in this case. See Air Transp.,

.

Second, for a similar reason, evaluating Travelers United’s claims for either treble damages

or statutory damages of $1,500 per violation would require individual members’ participation in

this case. See Compl. ¶ 111(d). The CPPA provides for the award of either treble damages “or”

statutory damages, “whichever is greater.” D.C. Code 28-3905(k)(2)(A) (emphasis added). This

statutory scheme makes it necessary for the Court to consider evidence of individual members’

actual damages before awarding statutory damages. Failing to do so would prejudice any

individual claimant who suffered more than $500 in actual damages from a single violation,

entitling them to more than the statutory amount of $1,500 as treble damages.3 The Court therefore

must consider some “detailed and individualized proof” to resolve these claims, meaning that

Travelers United lacks associational standing to pursue them. See Air Transp.,

.

Third, adjudicating Travelers United’s claim for punitive damages would require

individual members’ participation in this case because any award of punitive damages must be

proportionate to a corresponding award of compensatory damages. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co. v. Campbell,

(2003); Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

Such extensive individual damages may be unlikely if the Court accepts Travelers United’s assertion that “[e]ach night that Hyatt charged Junk Fees constitutes a violation of the CPPA.” See Compl. ¶ 109. But this assertion is a legal conclusion, not a factual allegation, and the Court is not required to accept it as true. See In re U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d at 54. For example, the Court could conclude instead that all of Hyatt’s representations to an individual consumer constitute a single collective violation. Under that analysis, any individual who stayed at a Hyatt hotel for more than 25 nights in total since 2020 and paid $20 in “resort” or “destination” fees for each night could have a plausible claim for more than $500 in actual damages. See Compl. ¶¶ 56–58 & n.26.

28 51, 82 (D.D.C. 2010) (RCL). Because the Court has already concluded that it cannot fairly assess

actual damages without considering “detailed and individualized proof” from individual members

of Travelers United, it follows that the Court cannot assess a proportionate award of punitive

damages without that same proof. See Air Transp.,

.

Fourth, resolving Travelers United’s claims for injunctive relief will require individual

members’ participation in this case because without their participation, the Court will be unable to

determine whether any of Travelers United’s members has standing to pursue injunctions against

Hyatt’s alleged practices—and by extension, whether Travelers United has standing to pursue that

relief on its members’ behalf. See Compl. ¶ 111(a)–(b); Hunt,

(requiring, as a

condition of associational standing, that “members would otherwise have standing to sue in their

own right”).

To have standing to seek an injunction against Hyatt’s alleged fee practices, a member of

Travelers United would need to face “a real and immediate threat of repeated injury” from those

practices.4 Murthy,

(quoting O’Shea,

). Establishing such a threat

would require, at a minimum, an allegation that the member has a specific plan to book a Hyatt

hotel room at a definite point in the future. See O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96 (holding that “[p]ast

exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding

injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects”); Lujan,

(holding that generalized “ ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete

4 Notably, according to Travelers United’s own allegations, some of the practices at issue stopped or changed “in and around August 2023,” when Hyatt began advertising per-night prices for hotel rooms that include the relevant “destination fee.” See id. ¶ 72. The only allegedly ongoing practice that Travelers United seeks to enjoin is Hyatt’s practice of including the “destination fee” or “resort fee” under a “Taxes & Fees” heading in the itemized list of costs presented to consumers before they complete their transactions. See id. ¶¶ 72, 111(b). Any claim of standing to pursue injunctive relief would therefore need to be related to a threat of injury from this allegedly ongoing practice, rather than Hyatt’s alleged past practice of advertising per-night prices that excluded certain mandatory fees. See O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96.

29 plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of

the ‘actual or imminent’ injury” that is necessary to show Article III standing).

If Travelers United had intended to proceed in federal court, it may have been able to satisfy

this requirement at the outset of the case with only minimal participation by its members. For

example, Travelers United could have filed affidavits or declarations from some of those members

stating that they plan to visit Hyatt hotels in the future. Cf. Students for Fair Admissions, 600 U.S.

at 201 (relying in part on members’ declarations to conclude that the plaintiff organization had

associational standing); Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell,

, 596–97 (D.C. Cir.

2015) (same). But Travelers United has not alleged or shown that anyone, let alone any of its own

members, plans to book a Hyatt hotel room in the future. See generally Compl.

The absence of any allegation or showing by the plaintiff organization that an individual

member has standing distinguishes this case from others in which courts have allowed

organizations to pursue non-monetary relief on behalf of their individual members. For example,

in Center for Sustainable Economy v. Jewell,

(D.C. Cir. 2015), the D.C. Circuit held

that an organization had associational standing to seek invalidation of an agency action where the

plaintiff organization had already filed declarations by two of its members describing those

members’ ongoing interests in the places affected by the challenged action.

at 596–96. The

court concluded that those declarations established that the individual members had standing to

sue “in their own right,” supporting the organization’s associational standing.

Similarly, in

Equal Rights Center v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2021) (KBJ), then-

Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held that a civil rights organization had associational standing to

pursue declaratory and injunctive relief where the organization had already filed a declaration by

a member showing that the member would have standing to pursue the case as an individual.

30 at 81. In this case, by contrast, the Court does not yet have any indication that any of Travelers

United’s members have standing to pursue injunctive relief. Accordingly, if this case proceeds in

federal court, this Court—unlike the courts in either Center for Sustainable Economy or Equal

Rights Center—will eventually need to consider additional, member-specific facts to determine

whether at least one member has standing to seek injunctive relief. See O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–

96; Lujan,

; Hunt,

. As the party invoking federal jurisdiction,

Hyatt would have the burden of identifying such a member, presumably through third-party

discovery into the future travel plans of Travelers United’s many members. The necessity for that

kind of “detailed and individualized proof”—to say nothing of the intrusive nature of the discovery

necessary to produce it—precludes the recognition of associational standing as to Travelers

United’s claims for injunctive relief. See Air Transp.,

.

Finally, none of Travelers United’s remaining claims for relief supports the recognition of

associational standing here. Travelers United requests “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs,”

Compl. ¶ 111(f), but “[a] request for attorney’s fees or costs cannot establish standing because

those awards are merely a ‘byproduct’ of a suit that already succeeded, not a form of

redressability.” Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski,

(2021) (quoting Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env’t,

(1998)). Travelers United also requests “any

additional relief as may be necessary” to compensate class members and “other and further relief

as the Court finds necessary and proper,” Compl. ¶ 111(g)–(h), but any such relief would

inevitably require “detailed and individualized proof” from Travelers United’s members, either to

calculate a monetary award or to establish the organization’s standing to pursue forward-looking

remedies like declaratory or injunctive relief. Air Transp.,

.

31 In sum, the Court concludes that none of Travelers United’s claims can proceed without

the “participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt,

. Travelers United

therefore lacks associational standing to pursue these claims in federal court. See

Because Travelers United does not have either organizational standing to sue on its own

behalf or associational standing to sue on behalf of its members, this Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction to adjudicate its claims. See Busic, 62 F.4th at 549; accord Travelers United, Inc. v.

Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., No. 23-cv-3584,

, at *58–59

(D.D.C. June 7, 2024) (BAH). This case shall therefore be remanded to the D.C. Superior Court.

See

(c).

B. Jurisdictional Discovery Is Not Warranted.

To support its arguments about standing, Hyatt requests that the Court allow it to conduct

jurisdictional discovery regarding the extent to which Travelers United’s claims are “typical” of

those of other class members, the amount of its “financial expenditures related to the complained-

of fees,” and the identities of its members. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 12 n.7, 15 n.8, 17 n.11. Travelers

United opposes Hyatt’s requests for jurisdictional discovery. See Pl.’s Reply at 12 n.5, 14 n.6.

The Court agrees with Travelers United that jurisdictional discovery is not warranted and shall

deny Hyatt’s requests.

Federal district courts should permit a party to obtain jurisdictional discovery if

“allegations indicate its likely utility” in determining a party’s standing to pursue the case. See

Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Peña,

(D.C. Cir. 1998). “[I]f a party demonstrates

that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery, then jurisdictional discovery

is justified.” Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley,

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting GTE New

Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000)). However, “the

discovery request cannot be a ‘fishing expedition.’ ” Lewis v. Mutond,

(D.C. 32 Cir. 2023) (quoting Bastin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n,

(D.C. Cir. 1997)). And

“[a] district court acts well within its discretion to deny discovery when no ‘facts additional

discovery could produce . . . would affect [the] jurisdictional analysis.’ ”

(second and third

alterations in original) (quoting Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank,

(D.C.

Cir. 1994)).

Jurisdictional discovery into the extent to which Travelers United’s claims are “typical” of

the “actual damages” claims of consumer class members is not warranted. Hyatt has not shown

any “likely utility” in jurisdictional discovery on this topic. See Nat. Res. Def. Council,

. In fact, it has not explained what relevant evidence, if any, might emerge from

jurisdictional discovery on this issue. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 12 n.7. In the absence of that kind of

specificity, it appears likely that jurisdictional discovery on this topic would be an impermissible

“fishing expedition.” Lewis,

(quoting Bastin,

). Hyatt’s request

for discovery regarding the typicality of the plaintiff’s claims shall be denied.

Similarly, jurisdictional discovery into the amount and purposes of Travelers United’s

expenditures is not warranted. As the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alliance for Hippocratic

Medicine makes clear, “no degree of expenditure . . . could create organizational standing” for an

organization engaged solely in the kinds of research and issue-advocacy activities identified in the

parties’ pleadings and arguments. See 602 U.S. at 394. Therefore, “no ‘facts additional discovery

could produce . . . would affect [the] jurisdictional analysis’ ” regarding standing based on

Travelers United’s expenditures. Lewis,

(alterations in original) (quoting Goodman

Holdings,

). The Court shall not permit jurisdictional discovery on this topic.

Finally, jurisdictional discovery is not warranted regarding the details of Travelers United’s

membership. Hyatt requests this discovery to support its contention that “at least one of [Travelers

33 United]’s (presumably at least thousands of) members is also a putative class member.” See Defs.’

Opp’n at 17 n.11. But as the Court has already explained, even if at least one of Travelers United’s

members is also a member of at least one of the putative classes, Travelers United lacks

associational standing because each of the claims and forms of relief requested in this case would

“require[] the participation of individual members in the lawsuit” if the case were to proceed in

federal court. Hunt,

; see supra, Section III.A.2. Accordingly, additional facts

about Travelers United’s membership would not affect the jurisdictional analysis and Hyatt’s

request for jurisdictional discovery on this topic shall be denied. See Lewis,

.

In sum, Hyatt has not shown that any form of jurisdictional discovery would produce

evidence that would affect the Court’s jurisdictional analysis. See

Its requests for jurisdictional

discovery shall therefore be denied.

C. Travelers United Is Not Entitled to Fees and Costs.

Finally, Travelers United requests an award of the attorney’s fees and costs it has incurred

because of the removal to federal court. Pl.’s Mem. at 11–12. The Court shall deny this request.

When the Court grants a motion to remand, it may award to the prevailing party attorney’s

fees and other “just costs” and “actual expenses” that the party “incurred as a result of the

removal.”

(c). But “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s

fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for

seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp.,

(2005). “Conversely, when

an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.”

A party has an “objectively

reasonable basis” for removal when the “asserted basis for removal . . . has at least some logical

and precedential force behind it.” See Knop v. Mackall,

(D.C. Cir. 2011).

Applying these standards, other courts in this District have declined to award attorney’s fees under

§ 1447(c) unless there is “clear, controlling case law from the D.C. Circuit” refuting the removing 34 party’s jurisdictional arguments. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. BlueTriton Brands,

, 112 (D.D.C. 2022) (JEB); Toxin Free USA v. J.M. Smucker Co.,

, 47

(D.D.C. 2020) (DLF); see also Breathe DC v. Santa Fe Nat. Tobacco Co.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (denying request for fee award under § 1447(c) based on, among other factors,

the “lack of controlling precedent in this Circuit”).

Travelers United argues that an award of fees and costs is warranted here because Hyatt

did not address standing in its removal papers, which Travelers United argues is “objectively

unreasonable” and “contrary to well-settled law.” Pl.’s Mem. at 12. But Travelers United cites no

authority for the proposition that a defendant must affirmatively allege the plaintiff’s standing in

a notice of removal. At least one federal district court has reached the opposite conclusion, holding

that a defendant is not obligated to establish the plaintiff’s standing in the notice of removal, but

instead must do so only after the plaintiff has moved for remand to state court. See Mittenthal v.

Fla. Panthers Hockey Club, Ltd.,

, 1221–22 (S.D. Fla. 2020). In the absence

of “clear, controlling case law from the D.C. Circuit” on this issue, the Court declines to find that

Hyatt’s failure to address standing in its Notice of Removal was objectively unreasonable. See

Earth Island Inst., 583 F. Supp. 3d at 112.

Finally, as other courts in this District have recently recognized, the jurisdictional issues

that arise when a membership organization sues as a “public interest organization” under the CPPA

are often not so clear-cut that a defendant lacks “an objectively reasonable basis for seeking

removal.” See, e.g., Travelers United, Inc. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., No. 23-cv-3584,

, at *59 n.14 (D.D.C. June 7, 2024) (BAH); Nat’l Ass’n of

Consumer Advocs. v. Gemini Tr. Co., No. 24-cv-2356,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 18,

2024) (JDB). The same is true in this case. Because there was “at least some logical and

35 precedential force behind” Hyatt’s decision to remove this case to federal court under CAFA, the

Court shall deny Travelers United’s request for fees and costs. See Knop,

.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall GRANT Travelers United’s Motion to Remand,

DENY Hyatt’s requests for jurisdictional discovery, and DENY Travelers United’s request for

attorney’s fees and costs. The Court shall also DENY AS MOOT Hyatt’s Motion to Transfer this

case to the Northern District of Illinois. This case shall be REMANDED to the Superior Court of

the District of Columbia. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: January 3, 2025 /s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge

36