UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANICA ASHBOURNE,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 17-752 (LLA) v.

DONNA HANSBERRY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In July 2024, this court granted summary judgment to the remaining Defendants in Anica

Ashbourne’s suit alleging violations of the Privacy Act and the Fifth Amendment stemming from

Defendants’ determination that she was “unsuitable” for employment with the U.S. Coast Guard.

ECF Nos. 57-58. Ms. Ashbourne now moves for the undersigned to recuse herself, ECF No. 62,

and she seeks to alter or amend the court’s judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),

ECF No. 59. For the reasons explained below, the court will deny both motions.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Ashbourne worked as a Senior Associate for the Coast Guard beginning in

November 2014. ECF No. 53-2 ¶¶ 1-2. She was employed by Immersion Consulting, a contractor.

Id. ¶ 2. On multiple occasions in 2014, Ms. Ashbourne answered questions on an Optional

Form 306, “Declaration for Federal Employment” (“OF-306”), as well as follow-up questions

from a government official, concerning whether she had ever been fired from a job or had ever

been delinquent on any federal debt. See ECF No. 53-2 ¶¶ 3-8; ECF No. 30-5, at 214-19; ECF

No. 53-1; ECF No. 30-3. In April 2015, after Ms. Ashbourne had repeatedly answered these questions in the affirmative and had provided further details in response to follow-up questions,

see ECF No. 53-2 ¶¶ 3-8; ECF No. 30-5, at 214-19; ECF No. 53-1; ECF No. 30-3, the Coast Guard

issued Ms. Ashbourne a letter stating that the information she had provided in her OF-306s and

the results of her background investigation “raise[d] a serious question of [her] current suitability

for employment,” ECF No. 30-4, at 1; see ECF No. 53-2 ¶ 9. As a result of the Coast Guard’s

unsuitability determination, Immersion Consulting terminated Ms. Ashbourne’s employment. See

ECF No. 30-5, at 77.

Ms. Ashbourne filed this suit in April 2017 against the Secretary of the Treasury in his

official capacity; three Treasury employees—Donna Hansberry, Donna Prestia, and Thomas

Collins—in their official and individual capacities; the Secretary of Homeland Security in his

official capacity; and Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) employees James Trommatter

and Thomas Harker in their official and individual capacities. ECF No. 1; ECF No. 19, at 1.1

Ms. Ashbourne alleged violations of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and her Fifth Amendment

due process rights. ECF No. 1. Defendants moved to dismiss. ECF No. 8. The court (Sullivan, J.)

dismissed Ms. Ashbourne’s claims against the Treasury Defendants in their individual and official

capacities, as well as her claims against the DHS employees in their individual capacities. ECF

No. 19, at 2-10, 23.

In June 2021, the remaining Defendants moved for summary judgment on

Ms. Ashbourne’s Privacy Act and due process claims. ECF No. 30. In July 2024, the court

granted their motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 58. The following month, Ms. Ashbourne

filed a motion to alter or amend the court’s judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

1 Ms. Ashbourne named former Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin and former Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly as defendants in their official capacities. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current Secretaries are “automatically substituted” in as parties.

2 ECF No. 59. That motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 59, 61. In October 2024, Ms. Ashbourne

also sought the undersigned’s recusal. ECF No. 62.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Recusal

Two federal statutes govern the recusal of judges. The first,

, provides for

the recusal of a judge where a party “files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before

whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against [her] or in favor of any

adverse party.”

The second,

, requires a judge to recuse herself “in any

proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

(a).

When assessing a recusal motion under Section 455, “courts must ask whether a reasonable and

informed observer would question a judge’s impartiality.” SEC v. Bilzerian,

(D.D.C. 2010).

Regardless of the statute under which a motion for recusal is made, “legal disagreements

with [a] district judge’s rulings . . . do not afford grounds for a recusal.” United States v.

Williamson,

(D.C. Cir. 2018). And “[b]ecause judges are presumed to be

impartial, ‘the Court must begin its analysis of the allegations supporting . . . a request [for recusal]

with a presumption against disqualification.’” Bilzerian,

(quoting Cobell v.

Norton,

(D.D.C. 2003)).

B. Rule 59(e)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to alter or amend

judgment within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment. Such a motion is only warranted in

“extraordinary circumstances.” Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2013), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). A party may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to

3 “relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior

to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,

, 485 n.5 (2008). And a

Rule 59(e) motion that “repeat[s] unsuccessful arguments,” Slate v. Am. Broad. Cos.,

(D.D.C. 2013), or is made based on “[m]ere disagreement” with the court’s judgment,

will not survive scrutiny, Wannall v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 10-CV-351,

,

at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Becker v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,

(4th Cir. 2002)).

A district court “need not” grant a Rule 59(e) motion “unless [it] finds that there is an

intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a

clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Messina v. Krakower,

(D.C.

Cir. 2006) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone,

(D.C. Cir. 1996)). In assessing

“clear error” in the Rule 59(e) context, “courts have required ‘a very exacting standard,’ . . . such

that the ‘final judgment must be “dead wrong” to constitute clear error.’” Wannall,

, at *3 (first quoting Bond v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

(D.D.C. 2012), then quoting Lardner v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,

(D.D.C. 2012)). Likewise, “manifest justice” is an “exceptionally narrow concept in the context

of a Rule 59(e) motion,” and it “entail[s] more than just a clear and certain prejudice to the moving

party, but also a result that is fundamentally unfair in light of governing law.”

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Recusal

The court begins with Ms. Ashbourne’s motion for recusal, ECF No. 62, because a finding

that the undersigned must recuse would preclude the undersigned from considering her Rule 59(e)

motion, ECF No. 59. Ms. Ashbourne contends that the undersigned’s “impartiality is called into

4 question” because the undersigned “misstated disputed material facts” and “failed to adhere to

controlling precedent from this Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court.” ECF No. 62, at 2.

Ms. Ashbourne further argues that the undersigned’s resolution of her case “endorses the same

conduct” that Congress outlawed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Privacy Act of 1974 and

violates the “accuracy standard” set forth in

. ECF No. 62, at 3.

Whether the court considers Ms. Ashbourne’s recusal motion under Section 144 or

Section 455, it fails. Ms. Ashbourne’s recusal motion focuses on her perception that the court

failed to follow controlling precedent, ECF No. 62, at 5-8; relied on misrepresentations of the law,

; misunderstood the Privacy Act,

; and improperly resolved disputed facts,

. These are the type of “legal disagreements with [a] district judge’s rulings [that] do not

afford grounds for a recusal.” Williamson,

. And such legal disagreements, even

if they were substantiated, would not be enough to make “a reasonable and informed

observer . . . question [the] judge’s impartiality.” Bilzerian,

.

Additionally, as for Ms. Ashbourne’s motion under Section 144, Ms. Ashbourne has not

complied with that statute’s procedural requirement that she file an affidavit substantiating her

allegations. See

. Thus, even if Ms. Ashbourne’s motion for recusal were not

improperly based solely on “legal disagreements,” the court could not consider it under

Section 144. The court therefore concludes that there is no basis for recusal and, accordingly, it

turns to Ms. Ashbourne’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. ECF No. 59.

B. Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment

As explained, it is appropriate for a district court to grant a Rule 59(e) motion where it

“finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or

the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Messina,

(quoting

5 Firestone,

). Ms. Ashbourne argues that the court’s decision to grant Defendants’

motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 30, was “premised on a misapplication of legal principles

and . . . endorses actions that Congress explicitly sought to eradicate with the enactment of the

Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fifth Amendment[,] and the Privacy Act,” ECF No. 59, at 5. She

thus contends that the judgment should be altered or amended under Rule 59(e) on the “grounds

of clear error” and “to prevent a manifest injustice.” ECF No. 59, at 5. The court considers each

argument in turn.

1. Clear error

In the Rule 59(e) context, “courts have required . . . that the ‘final judgment be “dead

wrong” to constitute clear error.’” Wannall,

, at *3 (quoting Lardner,

). “[M]ere disagreement” with a court’s judgment “does not support a Rule 59(e)

motion.”

(quoting United States ex rel. Becker,

). Ms. Ashbourne fails to

identify a “clear error” that the court must correct.

Ms. Ashbourne posits that the court clearly erred because it failed to “follow controlling

precedent,” ECF No. 59, at 7-12; relied on irrelevant cases, id. at 13-16; and improperly resolved

disputed issues of material fact, id. at 16-17. But in attempting to substantiate these claims,

Ms. Ashbourne neither makes new arguments nor points the court to any information to suggest

that its summary judgment ruling was “dead wrong.” Wannall,

, at *3

(quoting Lardner,

). Rather, Ms. Ashbourne repackages her arguments in

opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and contends that the court was wrong

to weigh the law and facts differently than she does. In other words, her argument is based on

“[m]ere disagreement” with the court’s ruling, which is not a basis to grant Rule 59(e) relief.

(alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Becker,

).

6 For example, Ms. Ashbourne criticizes the court’s reliance on McCready v. Nicholson,

F.3d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2006), for the proposition that “generally speaking, the Privacy Act allows

for correction of facts but not correction of opinions or judgments.” ECF No. 59, at 7 (quoting

ECF No. 57, at 10). She argues that the court “erroneously interpreted [the case] as it applie[s]

here” because the “opinions or judgments” at issue in McCready were those of medical

professionals and a military records correction board, and “the[] defendants [in her case] are

neither medical professionals nor a military records correction board.” Id. at 8. But nothing in

McCready itself limits the uncontroversial distinction between facts and opinions to medical

professionals or military personnel, nor does Ms. Ashbourne point to subsequent cases cabining

McCready’s reach. Accordingly, it is difficult to see how the court’s reliance on McCready was

“dead wrong.” Wannall,

, at *3 (quoting Lardner,

).

Similarly, Ms. Ashbourne takes issue, ECF No. 59, at 8, with the court’s determination,

ECF No. 57, at 10 n.4, that Doe v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1987), which she had

cited in her opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 53, at 1-2, is

distinguishable from her case. Again, Ms. Ashbourne does not argue that the court failed to

consider Doe in its opinion; instead, she merely disagrees with the court’s interpretation of Doe as

it applies to her case. ECF No. 59, at 8.2

Ms. Ashbourne further asserts that the court failed to consider certain Supreme Court cases

in arriving at its decision. Id. at 8-10. Setting aside the fact that the court explicitly discussed one

of the cases she mentions, see ECF No. 57, at 9, a court does not clearly err by declining to cite

every authority on which a plaintiff relies. The court’s discussion of the Privacy Act, id. at 9-14,

2 Ms. Ashbourne’s argument that the court clearly erred by relying on “[i]rrelevant [c]ases,” ECF No. 59, at 13-16, fails for the same reason.

7 makes plain that the court considered a wide body of law in arriving at its conclusions.

Ms. Ashbourne’s conclusory contention to the contrary is not enough to indicate clear error.

Finally, Ms. Ashbourne argues that the court impermissibly resolved disputed issues of

material fact. ECF No. 59, at 16-17. However, a quick review of these so-called “fact issues”

reveals that Ms. Ashbourne is actually challenging several of the court’s legal determinations—

again, with no more explanation than her assertion that the court was wrong and she is right. See

id. Once again, Ms. Ashbourne’s “[m]ere disagreement” with the court’s legal determinations is

not enough to suggest the presence of a clear error. Wannall,

, at *3 (alteration

in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Becker,

).

2. Manifest injustice

Ms. Ashbourne also posits that the court’s decision constitutes “manifest injustice” because

it is “morally untenable” and leaves her “without recourse against the defendants’ unsubstantiated

accusations.” ECF No. 59, at 6. As explained, “manifest justice” is an “exceptionally narrow

concept in the context of a Rule 59(e) motion” that “entail[s] more than just a clear and certain

prejudice to the moving party, but also a result that is fundamentally unfair in light of governing

law.” Wannall,

, at *3. Ms. Ashbourne fails to make this showing.

Most of Ms. Ashbourne’s argument boils down to an assertion that, because the court

disagrees with her interpretation of the law, it has committed a manifest injustice. See ECF No. 59,

at 5-6. Were that the standard, every losing party would be entitled to relief under Rule 59(e).

But, again, a party’s “[m]ere disagreement” with the court’s ruling is not enough to demonstrate

that a manifest injustice has occurred. Wannall,

, at *3 (alteration in original)

(quoting United States ex rel. Becker,

).

8 To the extent that Ms. Ashbourne argues more narrowly that she has been denied due

process and that this denial amounts to “manifest injustice,” see ECF No. 59, at 6, the court has

already addressed her concern at length in its opinion, ECF No. 57, at 14-17. Ms. Ashbourne’s

disagreement with the court’s determination does not make it “fundamentally unfair in light of

governing law.” Wannall,

, at *3.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Ms. Ashbourne’s Motion for

Recusal, ECF No. 62, and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, ECF No. 59, are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge

Date: February 19, 2025

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