UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GARRY ROSEMOND,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-927 (TJK)

PAMELA B. WASHINGTON et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

In February 2024, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sued Defendants—two employees of the

District of Columbia—in D.C. Superior Court. Plaintiff alleges that they violated several of his

federal constitutional and statutory rights when they suspended his driver’s license because of his

failure to pay child support without proper notice. Defendants removed and now move to dismiss

for failure to state a claim. Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants are

liable to him, the Court will grant the motion and dismiss the case.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleges that, as far back as 2013, he has been litigating whether he must pay child-

support payments. ECF No. 16 at 6–9. Though he argues that the courts and administrative agen-

cies lack jurisdiction over him, he alleges that he was in fact ordered to pay child support in 2018.

Id. at 8. Although it is unclear to the Court what Plaintiff contends happened next, he appears to

allege that, at some point before July 2019, he received a “notice proposing to suspend his driver’s

license or vehicle registration based on an alleged failure to pay child support.” ECF No. 1-2 at 9.

Though Plaintiff began administrative proceedings to “dispute” that notice, the Administrative

Law Judge assigned to the case dismissed it with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Id. at 9–10. Plaintiff does not allege when his license ultimately was suspended. But he alleges that, in June

2023, employees at the D.C. Attorney General’s Office mailed him a “Notice of Suspension.” ECF

No. 14-1 at 1. But because he no longer lived where the notice was sent, he says he never received

it. Id. Thus, he “wasn’t aware of [his] suspension until [he] was pulled over by law enforcement”

sometime later. Id.

In February 2024, Plaintiff sued to challenge his driver’s license suspension. He alleges

that Defendants, particularly “Kimberly Smith[,] an agent for the Child Support Services Divi-

sion[,] failed to properly serve notice before suspension of [his] driver[’]s license.” ECF No. 1-2

at 2. That failure allegedly violated about a dozen federal statutes, “federal rule of civil procedure

rule [sic] 4 service of process, due process[,] and several Constitutional rights.” Id. at 2–3. De-

fendants subsequently removed the case and now move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. ECF

Nos. 1, 12.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009)

(quotation omitted). A claim is plausible if “it contains factual allegations that, if proved, would

allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Hurd v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).

The Court must “accept all the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw

all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.”

(quotation omitted).

But it must disregard “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Cason v. NFL Players

Ass’n,

, 109 (D.D.C. 2021) (quotation omitted).

When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must construe his complaint liberally. See

Bowman v. Iddon,

(D.C. Cir. 2017). And the Court must consider not only

2 the facts in the complaint, but also those he presents in opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

See Watson v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth.,

(D.D.C. 2017); Brown v.

Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). At the same time, “when a

plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by

the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”

Buggs v. Powell,

(D.D.C. 2003); Stubbs v. L. Off. of Hunter C. Piel, LLC,

(D.D.C. 2015), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (applying this rule

to pro se plaintiffs).

III. Analysis

Defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim for

several reasons, and Plaintiff fails to respond to most to them. As explained below, the complaint

must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Begin with Plaintiff’s constitutional claims against Defendants in their individual capaci-

ties.1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to procedural due process when they “au-

tomatically suspend[ed]” his driver’s license with insufficient notice and “without assessing

whether his failure to pay [child support] was willful or the result of [his] inability to pay.” ECF

No. 1-2 at 1; ECF No. 16 at 1. Even assuming Defendants’ conduct violated his Fifth Amendment

rights,2 as individuals, they are entitled to qualified immunity unless their actions violate “clearly

established” law. McGinnis v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2014) (quo-

tation omitted). And while Defendants asserted qualified immunity in their motion to dismiss,

The Court construes Plaintiff’s constitutional claims as being brought under 42 U.S.C. 1

§ 1983. See ECF No. 16 at 3. 2 That amendment contains the Due Process Clause applicable to the District of Columbia. See Bolling v. Sharpe,

(1954).

3 ECF No. 12 at 8–9, Plaintiff fails to respond to their argument or explain how Defendants’ actions

violated clearly established law. By failing to respond or to identify any cases clearly “iden-

tify[ing] the ‘contours of the right’ at issue, let alone in a manner that would make it ‘clear to a

reasonable official that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted,’” Plaintiff has

forfeited this argument. Fox v. Gov’t of D.C.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Saucier

v. Katz,

, 202 (2001)). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants

are individually liable for this deprivation of his right to due process.3

Plaintiff explains in his opposition that he seeks to press his constitutional claims against

Defendants in their official capacities as well. ECF No. 16 at 10. But that gets him no further. A

“section 1983 suit for damages against municipal officials in their official capacities is . . . equiv-

alent to a suit against the municipality itself.” Atchinson v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1996). And to trigger municipal liability under § 1983, “the plaintiff must show both a

predicate violation of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States and ‘that the municipality’s custom or policy caused the violation.’” Miner v.

District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2015) (citation omitted) (quoting Warren

v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2004)).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that any constitutional viola-

tions stemmed from municipal policy or custom, and again, Plaintiff does not meaningfully re-

spond to their argument. At best, he alleges with no support that “all agents . . . automatically

suspend[] the driver’s licenses of those who fail to pay court fines or fees.” ECF No. 16 at 1. But

3 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated “several” of his other “Constitutional rights,” but he does not identify them. ECF No. 1-2 at 2. In any event, because he has failed to respond to Defendants’ qualified-immunity arguments, he has conceded those arguments for these asserted claims, too.

4 to nakedly assert that “all agents” partake in an allegedly unlawful practice, without alleging any

further factual detail, is simply a conclusory assertion that the jurisdiction has an unlawful custom.

“When a plaintiff seeks to establish ‘custom and policy’ municipal liability under § 1983 in the

absence of an express policy, []he must allege ‘concentrated, fully packed, precisely delineated

scenarios’ as proof that an unconstitutional policy or custom exists.” Page v. Mancuso,

(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia,

(D.C.

Cir. 1988)). To the contrary, “a mere assertion in one’s complaint that a city has a ‘custom and

practice’ of committing the complained of constitutional violation is not” “sufficient to satisfy the

relevant pleading standards.” Id. at 285. In the end, then, a blanket allegation of a widespread

custom, without “cit[ing] any incident other than the events alleged in [the] complaint that might

provide a basis for concluding” the District of Columbia has an unlawful custom, is not enough.

Trimble v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2011). Thus, Plaintiff has not

plausibly alleged that Defendants, in their official capacities, are liable for any constitutional vio-

lations.

Finally, Plaintiff does not meaningfully respond to Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff’s

claims based on the over-a-dozen federal statutes, regulations, and cases referenced in the com-

plaint should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim. As Defendants point out, Plaintiff’s

inclusion of these authorities amounts to a conclusory assertion that Defendants violated them.

Yet “legal conclusions” of this kind are not enough to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Iqbal,

. In response, Plaintiff merely reasserts that “[t]he Office for the

Attorney General, Child Support Services Division, and DC Superior Court Judges could . . . be

in violation” of the same statutes he referenced. ECF No. 16 at 5. Again, this does not grapple

with any of the pleading requirements or explain how such “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

5 harmed-me accusation[s]” comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Iqbal,

. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants are liable under the string of

cases, regulations, and statutes he lists in his complaint as well. See ECF No. 1-2 at 3.

IV. Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and dismiss

the case for failure to state a claim. A separate order will issue.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: February 25, 2025

6