UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HUBERT DE BONAFOS DE BELINAY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:24-cv-00240 (CRC)

ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Hubert de Bonafos de Belinay, a French citizen, brings this action to compel

several government agencies to adjudicate his nonimmigrant visa application. In August 2023,

the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) approved Plaintiff’s

application for an E-2 nonimmigrant treaty-investor visa. Three months later, Plaintiff attended

an interview at the U.S. Embassy in Paris to finalize the application. Following the interview,

the Embassy informed Plaintiff that his application had been placed into administrative

processing, leaving his case stalled with no clear timeline for resolution. Plaintiff then initiated

this action asserting that the government has unlawfully delayed final adjudication of his

application and seeking to compel the defendants to conclusively decide it. The government has

moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

Concluding that Plaintiff has standing, and that subject matter jurisdiction otherwise lies, the

Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s unreasonable delay claim for failure to state a claim. But it will

deny the motion as to his due process claim, as the government challenges only Plaintiff’s

standing to bring that claim, not the claim’s merits. I. Background

The Court draws the following background from the allegations in the Complaint

(“Compl.”).

Hubert de Bonafos de Belinay, a citizen of France, resides in Paris with his family.

Compl. ¶¶ 4, 8. In August 2023, USCIS approved Plaintiff’s application for an E-2

nonimmigrant visa. Id. ¶ 9. The E-2 visa is available to foreign nationals from certain countries

who invest substantial capital in a U.S. business, enabling them to manage and develop their

enterprise. See

(a)(15)(E)(ii);

; Compl. ¶ 9.

In preparation to obtain an E-2 visa stamp for foreign travel, Plaintiff scheduled an

interview at the U.S. Embassy in Paris for November 2023.

. As requested by the

Embassy, he submitted a new E-2 application three weeks before the interview.

. At the

interview, however, Plaintiff was informed that his application was “rejected” and that the

Embassy required “additional information for national security purposes.”

. Plaintiff

was given a form containing supplemental questions concerning his application, which he

completed and returned one week after the interview.

The following month, in December 2023, Plaintiff sent a follow-up email to the Embassy

seeking an update on the status of his application.

. The Embassy responded that the

application was still in “administrative processing.”

Plaintiff’s subsequent efforts to obtain

updates through both direct inquiries and congressional assistance have yielded no information

or timeline for adjudication.

¶¶ 13–15.

Plaintiff alleges that the delay has caused severe personal and financial harm to him and

his family. See

¶¶ 17–25. He claims his business has lost contracts, suffered employee

resignations, and incurred substantial financial burdens due to his inability to travel to the United

2 States.

¶¶ 18–22, 24. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges his family has experienced disruptions,

including his children’s inability to attend school in the United States, further compounding the

emotional toll of the delay.

.

In January 2024, Plaintiff filed this action against Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Antony Blinken, Secretary of State, and David

McCawley, Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Paris, in their official capacities.

¶¶ 5–7.1 He contends that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),

(b),

706(1), and the Mandamus Act,

, compel the defendants to adjudicate his visa

application without unreasonable delay and seeks a court order to that effect (Counts 1 & 3).

Compl. ¶¶ 26–35, 39–43. Plaintiff also brings a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, asserting that the delay in processing his application has deprived him of

procedural and substantive due process (Count 2).

¶¶ 32–38. The defendants have moved to

dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

II. Legal Standards

When analyzing a motion to dismiss under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the Court

“must treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true[] and must grant plaintiff the benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Giliana v. Blinken,

,

17 (D.D.C. 2022) (Cooper, J.) (quoting Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

, 1113

1 Plaintiff filed his complaint before the recent change in administrations and thus named individuals who no longer hold office as defendants in their official capacities. As appropriate, the Court substitutes the individuals currently holding these offices as named defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Specifically, the Court substitutes Secretary of State Marco Rubio in place of former Secretary Blinken, and Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem in place of former Secretary Mayorkas.

3 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). However, a court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff that are

unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint nor accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true.

Browning v. Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v.

Defs. of Wildlife,

(1992). But on a 12(b)(6) challenge, the defendant bears

the burden, and must show that the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007))”

III. Analysis

The government advances five arguments in support of its motion to dismiss: (1) Plaintiff

lacks standing; (2) the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State are improper

parties; (3) the doctrine of consular nonreviewability bars judicial review of the delay; (4) the

complaint fails to identify a discrete, non-discretionary duty on the part of the defendants; and

(5) the complaint fails to state a plausible claim of unreasonable delay. The Court will dismiss

Plaintiff’s unreasonable delay claim for failure to state a claim. But it will deny the motion as to

Plaintiff’s due process claim because the government only challenges standing, which the Court

finds present, and not the merits of the claim.

A. Standing

The Court begins with the government’s argument that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue

his claims. In order to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he has

suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged

4 action; and (3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed

by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.

The government argues that Plaintiff has suffered no concrete injury to support standing

because “allegations of delay in the State Department’s processes are insufficient themselves to

establish an injury in fact[,]” Mot. to Dismiss at 8–9, and “an inability to travel to the United

States” is not a harm recognized by common law, statute, or the Constitution.

This argument

is “intricately intertwined with [the government’s] other jurisdictional argument based on the

doctrine of consular nonreviewability,” which the Court will discuss further in Section III.B.

Nine Iraqi Allies Under Serious Threat Because of Their Faithful Serv. to the United States v.

Kerry,

(D.D.C. 2016). But courts in this district have long recognized

that a plaintiff who claims that the visa process is taking too long has “suffered an injury in fact:

the failure to receive final decisions on their [visa] application[] within a reasonable period.”

; Khan v. Blome, No. 22-cv-2422 (JEB),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 29,

2022) (collecting cases). Concurring with those other courts, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

standing.

The government next argues that the requested relief cannot redress Plaintiff’s injury

because he has not demonstrated that ordering further adjudication “will result in anything but

another refusal” of his application. Mot. to Dismiss at 15. The government also asserts that

Secretaries Rubio and Noem should be dismissed from this case because they have no “role in

re-adjudicating the Visa application” and therefore cannot provide the relief requested.

.

The Court interprets this argument, too, as a redressability challenge. The Court rejects the

government’s arguments that Plaintiff’s claims are not redressable and that Secretary Rubio is an

improper party, but agrees that Secretary Noem is an improper party.

5 Again, Plaintiff seeks only a final decision on his visa application. When visa

“applications are still pending administrative processing, . . . the Department’s review . . . is not

complete,” and the applicants’ injuries “may be redressed with an order to complete that review

more expeditiously.” Khazaei v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1419 (JEB),

, at *4

(D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023); see Giza v. Blinken, No. 23-CV-1641 (CRC),

, at *2

(D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2024). Thus, a court order directing Secretary Rubio to expedite Plaintiff’s

application, whether or not his visa is ultimately approved, would redress his claimed injuries

“caused by the Government’s failure to decide.” Nine Iraqi Allies,

.

Furthermore, “[f]or reasons that have already been well ventilated in prior cases,” the

Court rejects the government’s argument that Secretary Rubio is an improper party. Giza,

, at *2; see also Azeez v. Murphy, No. 23-cv-1947 (CRC),

, at *2

(D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2024); Shabestary v. Sanders, No. 24-CV-362 (CRC),

, at

*2 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2024); Stetsiuk v. Mesquita, No. 24-CV-62 (CRC),

, at *3

(D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2024). Although “the Secretary of State has no legal authority to control which

visa applications consular officers grant or deny, nothing precludes him from directing them to

decide pending applications ‘within a reasonable time,’ as the APA requires.” Khazaei,

, at *4; see also Baygan v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-2840 (JDB),

, at

*3 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2024) (“[C]ontrol over visa determinations is distinguishable from control

over the timing of visa determinations.”) (emphasis in original). Here, “[t]he Secretary of State

can provide relief [to Plaintiff] by directing consular officers to adjudicate pending visa

applications ‘within a reasonable time,’

(b).” Mashaghzadehfard v. Blinken, No.

23-cv-3164,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2024). Such an order would redress

Plaintiff’s harms.

6 The government is correct, however, that Secretary Noem is an improper party. Mot. to

Dismiss at 6. As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s opposition ignores this argument, effectively

abandoning his claims against Secretary Noem. In any event, the Court agrees with the

government that Secretary Noem should be dismissed. Plaintiff’s petition is currently pending

adjudication before consular officials in the U.S. Embassy in Paris, “and the Court is unaware of

any mechanism through which DHS . . . can exert authority over the timing of that process.” Al-

Gharawy v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,

, 9 (D.D.C. 2022). Therefore, with

respect to Secretary Noem, “there is no relief that the Court could order that would remedy

Plaintiff[’s] injury—that is, the Embassy’s delay in adjudicating Plaintiff[’s] visas.”

(emphasis in original).

B. Consular Nonreviewability

The government next argues this lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability, which “shields a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa from

judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise.” Baan Rao Thai Restaurant v. Pompeo,

(D.C. Cir. 2021); see Mot. to Dismiss at 16–20. Once again, the Court disagrees.

See Giza,

, at *3–4; Azeez,

, at *3; Shabestary,

, at *3–4; Stetsiuk,

, at *4.

As it has in a host of other cases, the government cites the Supreme Court’s recent

reaffirmation of Baan Rao in Department of State v. Muñoz,

, 1820 (2024). See

1st Notice of Supp. Auth., ECF No. 14, at 1–2. In Muñoz, the Court held that the doctrine of

consular nonreviewability applies when the plaintiff challenges “the executive officer’s decision

to admit or to exclude a[] [noncitizen].” 144 S. Ct. at 1820 (citation and quotation marks

omitted). As already explained, Plaintiff does not challenge the government’s decision to admit,

7 exclude, or deny his petition, but rather argues that the government has unreasonably delayed its

completion of administrative processing. “And as the Court has observed before, the doctrine of

consular nonreviewability does not bar challenges to timing as opposed to substance.”

Shabestary,

, at *3.

In addition, numerous courts in this district, including this one, have made clear that the

doctrine of consular nonreviewability applies only to “final visa determinations” and does not

bar challenges to decisions that are not yet final. Giliana, 596 F. Supp. 3d at 18 (quoting Joorabi

v. Pompeo,

, 100 (D.D.C. 2020)). But “applications in administrative

processing ‘have not been finally refused.’” Giza,

, at *3 (quoting Nine Iraqi

Allies,

). Plaintiff’s application is “still under administrative processing”

to assess his visa eligibility, so “there has been no final visa determination.” Id. at *3.

The Court acknowledges that one court in this district has diverged from the pack,

holding that consular nonreviewability applies to cases in administrative processing because, in

its view, courts lack authority to order “additional processing” or demand a “reexamination” of a

rejected visa application. Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft, No. 23-cv-03094 (TNM),

, at *11 (D.D.C. May 9, 2024). This Court respectfully disagrees. Plaintiff is “not

asking for a reevaluation of any determination.” Giza,

, at *3. Instead, he

requests that the government end his “administrative limbo” with a timely, final decision.

In

this context, consular nonreviewability has no application and does not bar the Court’s review.2

2 As the Court has explained in prior opinions, Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178,

(D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024) (per curiam), does not change this conclusion because it does not displace the principle that “the doctrine of consular nonreviewability applies to challenges based on substance, not timing.” Azeez,

at *3.

8 C. Discrete Action Requirement

Next, the government contends that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for

unreasonable delay under the APA or the Mandamus Act. Mot. at 11–12. Because “[t]he

standards for reviewing agency inaction—including visa delays—are the same under both the

APA and Mandamus Act,” the Court will address the claims together. Akrayi v. U.S. Dep’t of

State, No. 22-CV-1289 (CRC),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2023). “To state a

claim for unreasonable delay, [a plaintiff] must first allege that the agency ‘failed to take a

discrete agency action that it is required to take,’ and, second, that the delay was

unreasonable[.]” Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023)

(internal citations omitted).

The government argues that Plaintiff has not identified any discrete agency action. Mot.

to Dismiss at 20–25. It points to Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178,

(D.C. Cir.

July 24, 2024) (per curiam), which held that § 555(b) of the APA alone was too “general[] and

indistinct[]” to establish such a “crystal-clear legal duty” on behalf of the government. Id. at *3–

4 (quoting In re Ctr. for Biological Diversity,

(D.C. Cir. 2022)); 2nd Notice of

Supp. Auth., ECF No. 15, at 1–4.

Plaintiff, however, also invokes the INA and its existing regulations, Compl. ¶ 30, as the

source of the duty “to either issue or refuse a visa after receiving a properly completed and

executed application.” Karimova,

at *3. The Court need not decide whether

the INA or its regulations impose this duty because, either way, Plaintiff has not plausibly

alleged an unreasonable delay in adjudicating his visa application. See Baygan,

, at *5 (citing Rostamnia v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1638 (RDM),

, at *5

(D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2024)). Accordingly, the Court will “assume, without deciding, that the State

9 Department has a non-discretionary, discrete duty to adjudicate [Plaintiff’s] visa application.”

Azeez,

, at *3; Shabestary,

, at *4.

D. Unreasonable Delay

Finally, the government contends that Plaintiff has not shown that the processing of his

visa has been unreasonably delayed. To evaluate whether the delay in this case is unreasonable,

the Court applies the six-factor test established by Telecommunications Research & Action

Center v. Federal Communications Commission (“TRAC”),

, 79–80 (D.C. Cir.

1984). Under the TRAC test, courts must balance the following considerations:

1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of reason”; 2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; 3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; 4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; 5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and 6) the court need not “find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’”

In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union,

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting

TRAC,

).

“In analyzing a motion to dismiss, courts apply the TRAC factors not to ‘determine[e]

whether there has been an unreasonable delay,’ but to determine if a plaintiff’s complaint

‘alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for unreasonable administrative delay.’”

Varghese v. Blinken, No. 21-CV-2597 (CRC),

, at *4 (D.D.C. July 29, 2022)

(alteration in original) (quoting Jingjing Liu v. Mayorkas, No. 20-CV-654 (CRC),

, at *3 (D.D.C. May 25, 2021)). Moreover, “[t]here is no categorical prohibition on

deciding unreasonable-delay claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage.” Da Costa.,

at 12. “If a ‘record contains enough facts to evaluate the TRAC factors’ at that point, then a

Court may appropriately decide to do just that.”

(quoting Sarlak v. Pompeo, No. 20-CV-35

(BAH),

, at *5 (D.D.C. June 10, 2020)). Applying the TRAC factors, the

Court finds that the complaint fails to plausibly allege unreasonable delay. Factors one, two, and

four favor the defendants, factor six is neutral, and although factors three and five weigh in

Plaintiff’s favor, the other factors vastly outweigh them.

a. TRAC Factors One and Two

The Court begins with factors one and two: “(1) whether the response time is governed

by a rule of reason, as informed by (2) any congressional timetable.” Giliana, 596 F. Supp. 3d at

20. The first factor is “most important” to the TRAC analysis, In re Core Commc’ns, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008), though the two are “typically considered together,” Milligan v.

Pompeo,

, 317 (D.D.C. 2020). Where, as here, Congress has not prescribed

a statutory deadline, courts “turn to case law as a guide.”

.

Although “[t]here is no per se rule as to how long is too long to wait for agency action,”

In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United,

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation and

quotation marks omitted)), “courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess of

five, six, [or] seven years are unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not

unreasonable,” Sarlak,

, at *6 (citation omitted) (collecting cases). And in

assessing the length of a delay, the Court “calculate[s] the delay ‘from the last Government

action to the issuance of the opinion.’” Varghese,

, at *5 (quoting Mahmood

v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 21-CV-1262 (RC),

, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec.

20, 2021)).

11 These factors clearly favor the government. The now 16-month delay in processing

Plaintiff’s application since his November 2023 interview falls comfortably within the range that

courts in this district have held not to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Dastagir v. Blinken,

, 165 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding 29 months of “administrative processing” not

unreasonable); Sheibani v. Garland, No. 23-cv-2773 (TJK),

, at *4 (D.D.C.

June 18, 2024) (same for 24 months); Pourabdollah v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1603 (DLF),

, at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2024) (20 months). Using this “case law as a guide,” then, these

two important TRAC factors weigh in the government’s favor. Sarlak,

, at *6.

b. TRAC Factor Four

The fourth TRAC factor also favors the government. This factor examines “the effect of

expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority,” TRAC,

, and “carries the greatest weight in many cases,” Milligan, 502 F. Supp. 3d at 319. In

fact, “[t]his Circuit has refused to grant relief, even [when] all the other factors considered in

TRAC favored it, where a judicial order putting the petitioner at the head of the queue would

simply move all others back one space and produce no net gain.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting

Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton,

(D.C. Cir. 2003)).

Plaintiff argues that he “should not be penalized” for lack of agency resources, Opp’n at

6, but he cannot escape the reality that “[c]onsular processing capacity is presently a zero-sum

game, so granting [Plaintiff] relief would necessarily mean additional delays for other

applicants—many of whom undoubtedly face hardships of their own.” Lee v. Blinken, No. 23-

CV-1783 (DLF),

, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 2024) (citation and quotation marks

omitted). Although the impact of “prioritizing one visa application may prove minimal,” “the

accumulation of such individual cases being pushed by judicial fiat to the front of the line would

12 erode the ability of agencies to determine their priorities.”

(same). And the Court has no

basis on which to reorder agency priorities, especially where, as here, “[t]he agency is in a

unique—and authoritative—position to view its projects as a whole, estimate the prospects for

each, and allocate its resources in the optimal way.” In re Barr Lab’ys, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Arab v. Blinken,

, 71 (D.D.C. 2022) (“[D]eference

must be given to the State Department’s priority-setting and resource-allocation decisions.”

(collecting cases)).

c. TRAC Factors Three and Five

TRAC factors three and five—the delay’s impact on “human health and welfare” and the

“interests prejudiced by delay”—appear to favor Plaintiff. TRAC,

. The

complaint alleges that the processing delay has led to “deleterious effects on [Plaintiff], his

family, and his E-2 business.” Compl. ¶¶ 17. He asserts that his E-2 business has suffered

substantial setbacks, including the resignation of two employees and the inability to fulfill

contracts with major clients.

¶¶ 17–22. He claims the delay has also forced him to maintain

dual living arrangements in France and the U.S., incurring additional expenses, while his family

remains separated from their home in Maryland.

¶¶ 23–24. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges

that his children have been unable to attend school since November 2023 and are at risk of being

withdrawn due to their prolonged absence. Id. ¶ 25. These allegations plausibly allege that the

delay has negatively affected Plaintiff and his family, including their health and welfare. Thus,

factors three and five weigh in Plaintiff’s favor. The government’s contention that benefits to

Plaintiff would only direct resources away from others, Mot. to Dismiss at 34, goes to the fourth

factor rather than factors three and five.

13 d. TRAC Factor Six

The sixth and final TRAC factor is neutral because Plaintiff does not allege any bad faith

in his complaint, and “the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in

order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.” TRAC,

(citation and

quotation marks omitted).

***

After carefully considering the TRAC factors, the Court finds that the complaint does not

plausibly allege an unreasonable delay. While the Court recognizes that two factors favor

Plaintiff, “the Court is also mindful that ‘many others’ face similarly difficult circumstances as

they await adjudication of their visa applications.” Mohammad v. Blinken,

,

168–69 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting Palakuru v. Renaud,

, 53 (D.D.C. 2021)). As

a result, these considerations “are not enough to overcome the other factors that weigh strongly

in the government’s favor.” Palakuru, 521 F. Supp. at 53.

E. Due Process

Plaintiff also brings a due process claim. Compl. ¶¶ 32–38. The government only

discusses this claim as part of its standing argument; it offers nothing on the merits. See Mot. to

Dismiss at 12–13. But as explained above, Plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims. Supra

Section III.A. Setting aside the issue of whether Plaintiff has the constitutional right he asserts—

a merits question distinct from the standing inquiry—the conduct alleged, if taken as true, would

satisfy the requirement of harm to a legally protected interest. See also Olenga v. Gacki,

, 273 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[W]hether a foreign plaintiff may claim protection under the

due process clause is not jurisdictional, but rather a merits issue.”). Because the government

does not argue that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for procedural or substantive due process, the

14 Court will decline to do the government’s work for it and will allow that claim to proceed. The

government may make any additional arguments against Plaintiff’s due process claim in a

motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion for summary judgment, should Plaintiff’s

application not be finally adjudicated in the meantime.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Counts 1 and 3 of the [1] Complaint and that those counts are

DISMISSED. It is further

ORDERED that Secretary Noem is DISMISSED as a defendant. It is further

ORDERED that [12] Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is otherwise DENIED.

ORDERED that Defendants file any motion for judgment on the pleadings or for

summary judgment by May 2, 2025.

SO ORDERED.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

Date: March 3, 2025

15