UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ILMIYA YARULLINA, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gordon Casey,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:24-cv-01022 (TNM)

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Ilmiya Yarullina’s son was shot and killed by U.S. Secret Service officers after causing a

disturbance at an ambassador’s residence. As the representative of his estate, Yarullina sued the

Government and the officers who shot him. Her claims are many, but the current dispute is

narrow. The Government moves to dismiss the Secret Service officers as defendants as to

Counts IV through VII, asserting they are immune under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).

Yarullina retorts that discovery is necessary to determine immunity. The Government also

moves to dismiss Count VIII, which alleges negligent training and supervision. It contends the

Court lacks jurisdiction over that claim because Yarullina did not administratively exhaust it and

an FTCA exception bars it. Alternatively, the Government moves to dismiss the count for failure

to state a claim.

Because the Government has provided the necessary certification to immunize the federal

officers under the FTCA, the Court dismisses them as defendants as to Counts IV through VII.

The Court also rejects Yarullina’s contention that discovery is necessary to determine immunity,

so it denies her motion for early discovery. As for Count VIII, Yarullina administratively

exhausted her claim and the cited FTCA exception is inapplicable, so the Court has jurisdiction. The Court still dismisses Count VIII because it cannot plausibly infer that the Secret Service was

on notice of past dangerous or incompetent behavior by the three officers—a necessary element

of the claim.

I.

In recounting the background of this case, the Court accepts the facts in Yarullina’s

Amended Complaint as true. Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C.,

(D.C. Cir.

2011). Yarullina is the personal representative of the estate of her late son, Gordon Casey. Am.

Compl., ECF No. 13, ¶ 1. On the morning of April 20, 2022, 19-year-old Casey experienced a

mental health crisis. Am. Compl. ¶ 13. For unknown reasons, he entered the grounds of the

Peruvian Ambassador’s residence in Washington, DC, and began causing a ruckus. Am. Compl.

¶¶ 10, 14. After grabbing a decorative tiki torch, he started striking it against the windows of the

residence while yelling nonsensical phrases in Spanish. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–16. The Peruvian

Ambassador’s staff tried placating him to no avail, so they called the U.S. Secret Service. Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 17, 21.

Three Secret Service officers arrived about five minutes later. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 24,

26. The dispatcher told them that Casey was breaking windows and vandalizing the property but

was otherwise not combative. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22–23. Peruvian Embassy staff directed the

officers to the backyard of the residence, where they encountered Casey. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27.

They instructed him to drop the tiki torch, but Casey did not comply or respond. Am. Compl. ¶¶

28, 49. One of the officers then tasered Casey, striking him in the left bicep. Am. Compl. ¶ 29.

The other two officers opened fire, shooting at Casey seven times and hitting him twice. Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 33–36. Immediately afterward, the officers called in emergency medical services.

2 Am. Compl. ¶ 40. They arrived five minutes later but could not save Casey. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40–

42. He was pronounced dead at the scene.

In April 2023, Yarullina filed an administrative claim with the Secret Service. Am.

Compl. ¶ 8; see also Admin. Claim Letter, ECF No. 16-4. She included several contentions, but

the core of her claim was that the Secret Service officers used excessive force. See Admin.

Claim Letter. The agency did not respond, which paved the way for Yarullina to pursue her

claims in federal court. 1 Am. Compl. ¶ 8;

(a). She lodged a ten-count

Complaint against the United States and the three unidentified Secret Service officers. See ECF

No. 1 at 28. The Government moved to partially dismiss the case, and Yarullina responded by

amending her Complaint. ECF Nos. 9, 13.

The Government again moved to partially dismiss the case. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.

16. It maintains that the three unidentified officers should be dismissed from Yarullina’s tort

claims in Counts IV through VII because the United States is the only proper defendant under the

FTCA. See Mot. to Dismiss at 6–7; see also Reply, ECF No. 21, at 1–4. And it says that Count

VIII for negligent supervision and training should be dismissed for three reasons, two of which

are jurisdictional. It contends that: (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction because Yarullina did not

administratively exhaust the claim; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction because of the FTCA’s

discretionary function exception; and (3) even if the Court has jurisdiction, Count VIII fails to

state a claim. See Mot. to Dismiss at 7–15. Yarullina disagrees on all fronts. See Opp’n, ECF

1 Yarullina followed up in another letter to the agency in March 2024 and included more claims. Opp’n, ECF No. 19, at 7. But neither party treats the follow-up letter as an amendment to her original claim, so the clock for administrative exhaustion began running when she filed her initial claim. See

(a);

(c) (discussing amendments).

3 No. 19. The Government also challenged Counts IX and X. Mot. to Dismiss at 16. Yarullina

conceded both counts, Opp’n at 3 n.2, so the Court dismisses them.

The motion is now ripe, and the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under

and 1346(b).

II.

Courts must ensure they have jurisdiction over disputes before resolving them. See Nat’l

Mining Ass’n v. Kempthorne,

(D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1). When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden

of establishing jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

(1992). Courts “accept

all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true” when assessing jurisdiction but may also

“consider materials outside the pleadings.” Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).

For tort claims against the United States, the FTCA lays out the jurisdictional parameters.

See generally Brownback v. King,

, 210–12 (2021). It waives sovereign immunity

for the government, but also limits a plaintiff’s ability to sue the government employees who

caused the harm.

Among other conditions, the FTCA requires a plaintiff to administratively

exhaust her claims with an agency before resorting to federal court.

(a).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal,

(2009) (cleaned up). Courts draw all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor, Am. Nat. Ins. Co.,

, but need not accept “legal conclusion[s]

couched as [] factual allegation[s].” Papasan v. Allain,

(1986). While the

FTCA may confer jurisdiction, the underlying cause of action comes from state law. See Art

4 Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1985). So to survive a

motion to dismiss, an FTCA action must still state a plausible claim for relief under the law of

the state where the tort occurred. See

III.

A.

The Court first considers whether the three unidentified officers are proper defendants for

Counts IV through VII. The FTCA allows tort claims against the United States, but it rarely

permits actions against federal employees acting in their official capacities. See Osborn v.

Haley,

(2007). If government employees are sued in their official capacities,

the Government can establish immunity for them by providing a Westfall Certification. See

. The certification comes from the Attorney General or her delegee and attests that the

officers were “acting within the scope of [their] office or employment at the time of the incident

out of which the claim arose.”

(d)(1);

(b) (delegation

provision).

Such is the case here. The Government has submitted a proper Westfall Certification for

the officers. Westfall Certification, ECF No. 16-3. It certifies that they were “acting within the

scope of their employment as employees of the United States of America at the time of the

alleged incidents.”

Yarullina still maintains the Government cannot move to dismiss these

defendants without first identifying them and allowing her to serve them. Opp’n at 5–6. She

asserts their identities are necessary to “determine if they were acting within the course and

scope of their employment.” Opp’n at 6. To this end, Yarullina moves for early discovery to

learn the officers’ identities. Pl.’s Mot. for Early Discovery, ECF No. 14; see also Opp’n at 6

n.3.

5 But Yarullina’s own pleading forecloses this line of attack: the Amended Complaint

directly alleges in Counts IV through VII that the officers were acting in the scope of their

employment as agents of the United States. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 122 (Count IV), 129 (Count V),

139 (Count VI), 143 (Count VII). More, she offers no compelling support for her assertion that

the Government must identify the officers before moving to dismiss them. To the contrary, the

Westfall Act provides covered officials full immunity from suit rather than being a mere

affirmative defense after litigation commences. See Osborn,

. Requiring service

on parties who are immune from suit imposes on them an improper litigatory burden. See

Siegert v. Gilley,

(1991) (explaining that immunity protects against the

“expensive and time consuming preparation to defend” against a lawsuit).

The Court will thus deny Yarullina’s motion for early discovery and dismiss the three

officers as defendants in Counts IV through VII.

B.

Turn now to negligent training and supervision. The Government opposes Count VIII on

three grounds, the first two of which are jurisdictional. It contends that Yarullina did not

administratively exhaust the claim and, even if she did, the FTCA’s discretionary function

exception bars the claim. Mot. to Dismiss at 8–15. It rounds these positions out by arguing that

even if the Court has jurisdiction, Count VIII fails to state a claim. Id. at 15. The Court is

unpersuaded by the jurisdictional arguments but will dismiss Count VIII because it fails to state a

claim.

1.

The Government says Yarullina’s administrative claim with the Secret Service did not

encompass her negligent training and supervision allegation. Mot. to Dismiss at 8–10. So it

6 reasons that Yarullina did not administratively exhaust her claim, which divests this Court of

jurisdiction over it. Id. The Court disagrees.

The FTCA requires a plaintiff to work through an agency’s administrative claims process

before suing in federal court.

(a). If the agency denies the claim or takes no

action after six months, the plaintiff can sue.

The claims in federal court are limited to those

of which the agency was on notice from the plaintiff’s administrative claim.

This notice

requirement is “minimal.” Tsaknis v. United States,

, 298–99 (D.D.C. 2007)

(quoting GAF Corp. v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1987)). To satisfy it, the

claimant must “file (1) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency

to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum-certain damages claim.” GAF Corp.,

. The notice of injury “enable[s] the agency to investigate and ascertain the strength of a

claim” while the sum-certain “enable[s] it to determine whether settlement . . . [is] desirable.”

.

But claimants need not identify the precise theories of liability behind their claims. An

agency is constructively on notice of any “theories of recovery that its reasonable investigation

of the specific allegations of the claim should reveal.” Burchfield v. United States,

(11th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, an agency is generally on notice of missteps that

“were part of the chain of events that culminated in” the harm described in the administrative

complaint. Tsaknis,

(quoting Rise v. United States,

(5th Cir. 1980)).

To be sure, Yarullina did not directly identify negligent training and supervision in her

administrative claim. See Mot. to Dismiss at 9. And the Government is also correct that

Yarullina’s more detailed follow-up letter a year later did not widen the aperture on notice

7 because neither party treats it as an amendment to the original claim. See Reply at 7–8. But

none of this gets the Government where it wants to go.

Yarullina “sufficiently describe[ed] the injury to enable the agency to begin its own

investigation,” GAF Corp.,

. The core of her claims both with the agency and

with this Court are that officers used excessive force when they shot Casey. Her agency letter

broadly alleges that this shooting came about as the result of negligence and that the conduct of

the three officers was “objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.” Admin. Claim Letter

at PDF p. 2. An agency investigation into possible negligence surrounding Casey’s shooting

would necessarily have unearthed questions on whether the officers followed agency protocol.

And those questions would have naturally prompted scrutiny of the officers’ training and

supervision vis-à-vis those protocols. Any “reasonable investigation” would thus have identified

deficient training and supervision as possible sources of liability because they are part and parcel

with Yarullina’s negligence claim. Burchfield,

. So Yarullina can pursue her

claim in federal court because the Secret Service had constructive notice of it.

2.

In the Government’s second jurisdictional argument, it says Count VIII is barred by the

FTCA’s discretionary function exception. This exception preserves the Government’s sovereign

immunity for claims premised on discretionary actions by federal employees.

(a). Two considerations guide the applicability of the exception: (1) the action must

involve “an element of judgment or choice” rather than rigidly adhering to “a federal statute,

regulation, or policy [that] specifically prescribes a course of action”; and (2) the judgment

exercised in the action must be “of the kind that the discretionary function exception was

8 designed to shield,” meaning it was a decision “grounded in social, economic, and political

policy.” United States v. Gaubert,

, 322–23 (1991) (cleaned up).

On the basic requirements, the parties agree. See Mot. to Dismiss at 11, Opp’n at 11.

But they diverge on how the test caches out in its application because they conceptualize the

issue differently. The Government frames this as a dispute over “the adequacy of the training

offered by the Secret Service, not whether a specific required training occurred.” Mot. to

Dismiss at 13. It says Yarullina has identified no regulation or policy “that specifically

prescribes how the Secret Service should supervise or train its officers in the use of force.” Mot.

to Dismiss at 11–12. Instead, it acknowledges that some applicable policies touch on training

and supervision, but it says those policies leave the finer details to the boots-on-the-ground

employees tasked with implementing the programs.

Yarullina says otherwise. She contends that the agency “failed to train” the three officers

on “use of force.” Am. Compl. ¶ 159 (emphasis added); see also Opp’n at 13 (“Plaintiff alleges

that the United States failed to ensure that the Doe Defendants adhered to already set policies and

rules.” (cleaned up)). And she identifies a specific policy that she says mandates training: the

Secret Service’s “Use of Force Policy.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 159; see also Dep’t Policy on the

Use of Force, ECF No. 19-4.

The Government is right insofar as the relevant policies imbue employees with discretion

on the content of training programs. See, e.g., On-the-Job-Training (OJT) Program, ECF No. 9-

4, at 1 (requiring training coordinators to “identify training activities necessary” for employees).

But though the training curriculum may be discretionary, the frequency of certain types of

training is not. See Dep’t Policy on the Use of Force at 5 (the agency “shall conduct less-lethal

use of force training no less than every two years” (emphasis added)). Yarullina’s pleading is

9 not a model of clarity, but the Court can fairly infer that she is alleging the Secret Service “failed

to train” the three officers as required by the Department Policy on the Use of Force. So the

discretionary function exception does not foreclose jurisdiction because Yarullina is alleging the

Secret Service breached mandatory policies by not providing required training at the mandated

frequency. Gaubert,

(“If [an] employee violates [a] mandatory regulation, there

will be no shelter from liability because there is no room for choice and the action will be

contrary to policy.”).

3.

Having hashed out the Government’s jurisdictional objections, the Court next considers

whether Count VIII states a plausible claim. It does not.

The FTCA is not itself a cause of action, so a motion to dismiss turns on applicable local

law. See Art Metal,

. Under D.C. law the elements of negligent training and

supervision are: (1) “that the employer knew or should have known its employee behaved in a

dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner,” and (2) “that the employer, armed with that actual

or constructive knowledge failed to adequately supervise [or train] the employee.” Blair v. Dist.

of Columbia,

(D.C. 2018)); Lin v. Dist. of Columbia,

, 846 (D.C.

Cir. 2022) (applying the same standard for negligent training).

Actual knowledge exists when supervisors are contemporaneously aware of misconduct

and either fail to stop it or affirmatively authorize it. See Dist. of Columbia v. Tulin,

, 796–97 (D.C. 2010) (concluding a jury could find negligent supervision when supervising

officers improperly authorized the plaintiff’s arrest without determining whether it was justified);

Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc.,

(D.C. 2001) (implying that negligent

supervision occurs when a supervisor sees employee misconduct but fails to intercede).

10 In contrast, constructive knowledge arises from a recurring pattern of similar misconduct,

though there is no brightline rule on the number of incidents or temporal proximity required. Cf.

McComb v. Ross,

(D.D.C. 2016) (sufficient notice when the same police

officers were named in “eleven previous complaints for similar unlawful conduct” over two

years); Singh v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2012) (sufficient notice

when a plaintiff reported harassment by the same officers “on five separate occasions” in the

same year). 2

At the outset, Yarullina does not allege that the officers’ supervisors were present at the

scene or directly authorized their use of force against Casey. And the Government says

Yarullina has not put forth enough facts to infer that prior misconduct by the officers placed the

Secret Service “on notice of any dangerous or incompetent behavior.” Mot. to Dismiss at 15.

Yarullina maintains her Amended Complaint is sufficient because it “describes numerous

incidents” in which different Secret Service officers used “excessive and lethal” force. Opp’n at

17. Taken together, she argues, these incidents should have put the Secret Service on notice of a

general “pattern and practice of using excessive force against citizens and violating their

constitutional rights.”

But Yarullina reads too much into her facts. The Amended Complaint lists four

unconnected incidents spread across nearly two decades. See Am. Compl. at 8–9. One of the

2 McComb and Singh involved § 1983 municipal liability claims under Monell v. Department of Social Services,

(1978) rather than D.C. law. But Monell claims premised on insufficient training and supervision have an analogous knowledge requirement. See McComb,

(requiring “actual or constructive knowledge” that officers would engage in misconduct); see also Odom v. Dist. of Columbia,

, 270–71 (D.D.C. 2017) (dismissing a negligent training and supervision claim under D.C. law “for the same reasons as the Monell claim” because both lacked “facts demonstrating a pattern or practice of excessive force . . . [and] actual or constructive notice of inadequate training or supervision”).

11 incidents Yarullina references happened after Casey’s death, so it cannot have put the Secret

Service on notice beforehand. See Am. Compl. ¶ 55 n.2; Spiller v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2018) (“[F]ailures to supervise or train after the incident in question

do not give rise to a reasonable inference that [the defendants] were on constructive notice of

dangerous or incompetent behavior.”).

Two other situations arose from dubious arrests, but Yarullina makes no mention of

excessive force. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 57; see also

¶ 57 n.4. Count VIII sounds in use of

excessive force, not wrongful arrest. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 151–52 (alleging “a pattern and practice of

using excessive force” and insufficient “training and supervising [of] employees in accordance

with the use of force policies and procedures”). Prior wrongful arrests—without improper use of

force—do not demonstrate deficiencies in use-of-force training and supervision. See, e.g.,

Kenley v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2015) (finding no constructive

knowledge when a plaintiff alleged only misconduct that was not “related in any way to the

behavior challenged”). At best, the wrongful arrests might have put the Secret Service on notice

that different employees in the past violated different agency policies. That is insufficient.

The remaining incident listed in the Amended Complaint involves lethal use of force by

different Secret Service officers in 2013. Am. Compl. ¶ 54. Yet Yarullina does not contend the

lethal use of force was improper under the circumstances, and the Amended Complaint offers no

facts from which to draw that inference. See

Standing alone, this “single [incident] that does

not even establish that an improper [use of force] actually occurred hardly gives . . . notice of a

shortfall in [the defendant’s] training processes.” Lin, 47 F.4th at 846.

Even if the Court were to ignore these deficiencies, Yarullina has also “failed to present

any evidence connecting [these] prior allegations of unrelated misconduct to the incident

12 involving” Casey. Xingru Lin v. Dist. of Columbia,

, at *18 (D.D.C. June 30,

2020), aff’d in relevant part, Lin v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2022). She does

not claim that Casey was the repeated target of officer misconduct. See, e.g., Singh,

. Nor does she identify a string of complaints alleging similar misconduct in recent

years. See, e.g., McComb,

. Simply put, the Amended Complaint does not

allege sufficient facts to plausibly infer the Secret Service was on notice of any dangerous or

incompetent behavior from the three officers. So Count VIII fails to state a claim.

IV.

Yarullina’s case is far from over. The Court leaves for another day the merits of her

remaining claims. But as for Counts IV through VII, the FTCA does not permit Yarullina to

name the individual officers as defendants. And Count VIII fails to state a claim, so it must be

dismissed. For these reasons, it is

ORDERED that the Government’s [16] Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint in Part

is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Counts VIII, IX, and X are dismissed, and United States Secret Service

Officers Doe 1–3 are dismissed as defendants for Counts IV through VII; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s [14] Motion for Early Discovery is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

2025.03.14 15:40:31 -04'00' Dated: March 14, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN United States District Judge

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