UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SOPHIA CALLIHAM,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23-cv-638-TJK-MJS

PREVENTIVE MEASURES OF WASHINGTON, DC, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Sophia Calliham (“Calliham”) was terminated from her employment with

Amazing Love Health Services, LLC (“Amazing Love”) after she reportedly raised concerns to

management about fraudulent billing practices and kickbacks. She then filed this case alleging

retaliatory discharge under the False Claims Act (“FCA”),

(h), against Amazing

Love, its principal owner Georges Ntemi (“Ntemi”), and others. Neither Amazing Love nor Ntemi

appeared to defend against the suit, so the Clerk entered default against both. Calliham now moves

for default judgment. The motion is referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation.

For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT the motion in

substantial part and enter default judgment in favor of Calliham and against Amazing Love.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1

Calliham joined Amazing Love as a Quality Improvement Specialist in April 2019. (See

ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 10.) Her duties included, among other things, “randomly reviewing

1 These facts are drawn from the Complaint’s allegations, which the Court accepts as true by virtue of the defendants being in default. See Crabtree v. Buffalo Grand Hotel Inc.,

, at *3 (D.D.C. June 6, 2024) (citing Fanning v. AMF Mechanical Corp.,

, 14 (D.D.C. 2018)). consumer charts to ensure Amazing Love complied with D.C. law and regulations.” (Id. ¶ 11.)

Through her work, Calliham “realized that Amazing Love was billing Medicaid for Community

Support Worker (CSW) visits that had not occurred” and “using billing codes that reflected more

expensive services than those actually provided.” (Id. ¶¶ 12–14.) She separately discovered that it

was paying customers to sign up for services, which she calls a “kickback scheme.” (Id. ¶ 16.)

Calliham raised these concerns internally with her first-line supervisor at Amazing Love,

who in turn conveyed them to the company’s former CEO. (See

¶¶ 17–19, 21.) According to

Calliham, her supervisor likewise communicated Calliham’s concerns to Ntemi after he became

CEO, as well as to Amazing Love’s COO. (Id. ¶ 20.) Neither took any steps to address the

problems, however. (Id.) In fact, Calliham says Ntemi and the COO continued to impose standards

that “were nearly impossible” to meet, which necessitated the “fraud.” (Id. ¶¶ 20, 23.) Calliham

also reported her concerns about these issues to her program director, who reportedly responded

by acknowledging the importance of avoiding fraudulent practices. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22.)

On March 13, 2020, Calliham was called to a meeting with an Amazing Love manager,

“Ms. Tembunde,” and a human resources representative. (Id. ¶ 25.) During this meeting,

Tembunde asked Calliham, “What do you have against the company?” (Id. ¶ 26.) Tembunde

likewise told Calliham, “Every time I come to the office, I hear your name in something causing

trouble for the agency.” (Id.) Tembunde accused Calliham of “encourag[ing] staff members and

consumers to file grievances.” (Id. ¶ 27.) At the end of the meeting, Tembunde fired Calliham,

ostensibly on the basis that she was “creating discord in the workplace.” (Id. ¶ 28.) 2

2 When Amazing Love later fought Calliham’s claim for unemployment benefits, it defended its decision on different grounds by claiming she was “terminated for a conflict of interest.” (Compl. ¶ 29.)

2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Calliham filed her one-count complaint on March 8, 2023. Along with Amazing Love and

Ntemi, she originally named two other defendants: Preventive Measures of Washington, DC, LLC

and Dwayne Jones. The complaint alleged, on information and belief, that “Amazing Love was

acquired by Preventative Measures” and that Jones was the “principal owner and operator of

Preventative Measures.” (Compl. ¶¶ 8–9.) Not long after filing, though, Calliham voluntarily

dismissed Preventative Measures and Jones from the case (see ECF No. 5; May 1, 2023 Min.

Order), leaving only Amazing Love and Ntemi as defendants from that point forward.

Following service, neither Amazing Love nor Ntemi answered or otherwise appeared to

defend against the case. So Calliham attempted to move for default judgment. That request was

denied without prejudice because Calliham had not completed the predicate step of securing entry

of default against the defendants in keeping with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). (See ECF

No. 8; Aug. 1, 2023 Min. Order.) Calliham then requested—and the Clerk of Court processed—

entry of default against Amazing Love and Ntemi. (ECF Nos. 10, 12–14.) At that point, Calliham

renewed her motion for default judgment, but it was again denied without prejudice, this time

because she “provided no evidentiary support for the damages requested in the motion.” (ECF No.

15; Oct. 6, 2023 Min. Order.) Proving the adage that the third time is a charm, Calliham tried once

more, filing the motion for default judgment presently before the Court. (ECF No. 17.)

As indicated, the motion is referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation.

The Court held an evidentiary hearing on December 16, 2024, during which Calliham testified and

presented other evidentiary submissions, and the Court also received several supplemental filings

from Calliham, both before and after the hearing. (ECF Nos. 23, 24, 28.)

3 DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

Default judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, which prescribes a

two-step process to secure “a judgment for affirmative relief” against a party that “has failed to

plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). First, the plaintiff must request that the clerk

“enter the party’s default.”

Second, and only after default is entered, the plaintiff must seek a

default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). “By providing for a two-step process, Rule 55 allows the

defendant the opportunity to move the court to set aside the default before the court enters default

judgment.” Fanning v. AMF Mechanical Corp.,

, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

Entry of default, at the first step, “‘establishes the defaulting party’s liability for the well-

pleaded allegations of the complaint.’”

(quoting Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2011)). But the court must still determine, at the second step, whether

the unchallenged factual allegations—accepted as true—establish liability. CapitalKeys, LLC v.

Democratic Republic of Congo,

(D.D.C. 2017).

Assuming liability is found as a general matter, that still “does not automatically establish

liability in the amount claimed by the plaintiff.” Carazani v. Zegarra,

(D.D.C.

2013). The court must instead “‘make an independent determination of the sum to be awarded.’”

Fanning, 326 F.R.D. at 13–14 (quoting Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. R.W.

Amrine Drywall Co.,

(D.D.C. 2002)). The court exercises “considerable

latitude” in making that determination, and the plaintiff retains the burden of proving damages “to

a reasonable certainty.” Elite Terrazo Flooring, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 67–68. To that end, the plaintiff

may rely on “affidavits or documentary evidence” and is “entitled to all reasonable inferences from

4 the evidence” offered. Fanning, 326 F.R.D. at 14. The court may also elect to hold an evidentiary

hearing to determine damages, Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), but it is not required to do so.

II. Default Judgment Is Improper Against Georges Ntemi

The Court begins by dispensing with Calliham’s request for default judgment against

Ntemi. During the hearing, the Court asked counsel about D.C. Circuit precedent that seems to

preclude liability on an FCA retaliation claim against Ntemi as an individual defendant. U.S. ex

rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.,

, 740–41 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that

Section 3730(h) retaliation claims are only proper against an “employer,” but not an individual

owner or director); see also Saunders v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2011)

(relying on Siewick for proposition that “there is no individual liability” under Section 3730(h)).

In response—and without any real pushback—Calliham’s counsel conceded the point and

withdrew the request for default judgment against Ntemi. The undersigned therefore recommends

that the Court DENY AS WITHDRAWN this aspect of Calliham’s motion. 3

III. Default Judgment Should Be Granted Against Amazing Love

Turning to Calliham’s request for default judgment against Amazing Love, the undersigned

believes Calliham’s motion should be granted, albeit in a lesser amount than Calliham seeks. The

Court walks through the necessary analysis in the sections that follow.

A. Plaintiff Properly Served Amazing Love

The Court starts by evaluating whether Calliham has demonstrated proper service of

process on Amazing Love. After all, “a default judgment cannot be issued where the requirements

of proper service have not been satisfied.” Portillo v. Smith Commons DC, LLC,

Given this development, it is somewhat surprising that Ntemi even remains a named defendant at this point. Given Calliham’s counsel’s apparent agreement that Ntemi cannot be found individually liable under Section 3730(h)—which is the only claim Calliham asserts—the undersigned encourages counsel to effectuate his dismissal. If not, the Court should consider an order to show cause on the subject.

5 3287741, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2021); SNH Med. Off. Properties Tr. v. A Bloomin’ Sandwich

Cafe, Inc.,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2020) (similar).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally allow for service of process on a business

entity by delivery of “a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or

general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of

process[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Alternatively, District law authorizes service of process

through the Mayor or her designee “[i]f an entity fails to designate or maintain a registered agent

in the District,” or if the entity’s registered agent “cannot with reasonable diligence be found.”

; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A) (authorizing service “in the manner

prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (authorizing

service by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general

jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made”); Robinson v.

Ergo Solutions, LLC,

, 161–62 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding proper service under this

alternative method); SNH Med. Off. Properties Tr.,

, at *5 (same).

In serving Amazing Love, Calliham relied on the alternative methodology authorized by

(d). On initial review, the Court did not believe the original affidavit of

service (ECF No. 6) satisfied the statute’s requirements because it was silent as to whether

Amazing Love failed to maintain a registered agent in D.C., or whether Calliham had been unable

to serve its registered agent despite “reasonable diligence.” The Court requested supplemental

briefing on that issue, which Calliham recently filed. (Jan. 10, 2025 Min. Order; ECF No. 28.)

Therein, Calliham demonstrated that Amazing Love’s registered agent was Georges Ntemi;

Calliham likewise established—through process-server affidavits—that she was unable to

personally serve Ntemi despite diligent efforts. (ECF Nos. 28-1, 28-3, 28-5.) Those efforts

6 included four separate attempts on four different days at the 15th Street SE address for Amazing

Love reflected in the District’s records, plus three additional attempts on three different days at

another address in Bowie, Maryland associated with Ntemi. This showing falls well within the

range of efforts that other cases in this District have deemed sufficient to reflect “reasonable

diligence” for these purposes. D&E Sec. & Logistics, LLC v. 650 Lamont BL LLC,

, at *1 (D.D.C. July 28, 2023) (describing “five unsuccessful attempts to effect service”

on a registered agent before serving the Mayor’s designee); SNH Med. Off. Properties Tr.,

, at *5 (similar); Robinson,

(similar). 4

Finally, Calliham offers another sworn process-server affidavit that establishes personal

delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint for Amazing Love to the D.C. Superintendent

of Corporations on April 28, 2023. (ECF Nos. 6, 28-6.) The Superintendent is designated to accept

service on the Mayor’s behalf for these purposes. See, e.g., D&E Sec. & Logistics,

, at *1; SNH Med. Off. Properties Tr.,

, at *5 (same) (citing

). As other cases have recognized, once Calliham served the Superintendent of

Corporations as demonstrated in the affidavit, “‘service was complete,’ notwithstanding [the

agency’s] independent statutory duty to attempt service on” Amazing Love from there. SNH Med.

Off. Properties Tr.,

, at *5 (quoting Robinson, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 163–64). 5

4 At first blush, the record seems to reflect an inconsistency regarding Calliham’s ability to serve Ntemi because she claims to have accomplished service on Ntemi with respect to the claim against him. (ECF No. 7.) But the affidavit as to Ntemi reflects substitute service—i.e., by “leaving a copy of [the summons and complaint] at the individual’s dwelling or unusual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B)—which cannot be used to accomplish service on a registered agent of a business entity. In other words, Calliham was never able to personally serve Ntemi, whether in his individual capacity or his capacity as the registered agent of Amazing Love. 5 The undersigned observes that at least one case in this District has demanded that plaintiffs satisfy an additional step to establish proper service under

(d), by requiring that they request and file a “certificate of service” from the Superintendent of Corporations following the agency’s mailing. See, e.g., Moreland v. 1010 V LLC,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2025) (denying default judgment on this basis). But in the undersigned’s view, this additional step—while perhaps a good idea as

7 The undersigned finds that Calliham has demonstrated proper service of process on

Amazing Love in keeping with D.C. law, allowing for the potential entry of default judgment.

B. The Complaint’s Well-Pled Allegations Demonstrate Liability

To prevail on a claim of FCA retaliation,

(h), Calliham needs to establish

that: (1) “she engaged in protected activity” and (2) Amazing Love “retaliated against her because

of that activity.” Singletary v. Howard Univ.,

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing United

States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ.,

(D.C. Cir. 1998)). On the first element,

“protected activity” in this context encompasses “lawful measures to stop or avert what [an

employee] reasonably believed would be a violation of the False Claims Act.” Id. at 297. On the

second element, Calliham needs to show that: (a) Amazing Love “knew she was engaged in

protected activity” and (b) “the retaliation was motivated at least in part by her protected

activity.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); Pitts v. Howard Univ.,

(D.D.C. 2015) (“[B]oiled down to its essentials, an FCA retaliation claim requires: (1) protected

activity; (2) notice; and (3) adverse action taken in response to such protected activity.”).

Calliham’s allegations—which, again, are accepted as true by virtue of Amazing Love’s

default, Crabtree,

, at *3—satisfy these elements. First, she raised internal

complaints that “Amazing Love was billing to the government for services that it was not

providing.” (Compl. ¶ 1.) “In her review of case documentation, [she] realized that Amazing Love

was billing Medicaid for … visits that had not occurred.” (Id. ¶ 12.) She also reported concerns

that “Amazing Love was upcoding,” i.e., “using billing codes that reflected more expensive

services than those actually provided” to her supervisor and a program director, who in turn

a matter of practice—finds no grounding in the statute itself. Instead, as Judge Bates has explained, the work required after delivery to the Superintendent “is the Mayor’s duty—the plaintiff’s obligations are complete upon serving the Mayor’s designee with a copy of the summons and complaint.” Robinson, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 163–64; see also SNH Med. Off. Properties Tr.,

, at *5 (similar).

8 reported them up the leadership chain. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 17–22.) Because her reports were aimed at

stopping “fraud in connection with the submission of a claim for federal government funds,”

Singletary,

, Calliham’s actions qualify as “protected activity” under the statute,

Yesudian,

n.9 (“[I]nternal reporting of false claims is itself an example of a

protected activity[.]”). Second, because Calliham complained internally with management—who,

in turn, escalated those reports up the leadership ladder—the very nature of her reports suffices to

establish Amazing Love’s notice of her activity. And third, Calliham’s allegations show, in a non-

conclusory fashion, that her termination was “motivated at least in part” by those reports. Indeed,

during the termination meeting itself, an Amazing Love manager asked what Calliham “ha[s]

against the company,” reproached her for “causing trouble for the agency,” and said she was being

terminated for “creating discord in the workplace.” (Compl. ¶¶ 25–28.) Those allegations suffice

to show a causal link between Calliham’s protected activity and her termination.

Because the well-pled allegations of the Complaint allow for a finding of liability against

Amazing Love, the Court proceeds to evaluate the damages and other relief sought by Calliham.

C. Calliham’s Requested Relief

The FCA allows for “all relief necessary to make [the] employee … whole,”

(h)(1), and specifically provides for recovery in the form of “2 times the amount of back pay,

interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the

discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees,”

§ 3730(h)(2).

Calliham seeks recovery across all these categories of relief. The Court addresses each in turn.

1. Backpay

Calliham asks the Court to award a total of $258,944.32 in backpay—which she calculates

as “2 times the amount of backpay” under Section 3730(h)(2). (ECF No. 24.) Calliham arrives at

this amount using two overall inputs: her lost earnings and her replacement earnings.

9 Starting with her lost earnings, Calliham measures from March 13, 2020 (her last day with

Amazing Love) through October 8, 2023 (the date she started working full-time in her current

position). This timeframe encompasses 93.1 biweekly periods, which Calliham multiplies by

$2,192.31—her biweekly pay at Amazing Love based on her $57,000 annual salary ($57,000 ÷ 26

biweekly periods = $2,192.31 per period). As such, Calliham calculates her total baseline lost

earnings at $204,104.06 ($2,192.31 x 93.1), before accounting for any replacement earnings.

As for replacement earnings, Calliham’s evidence and hearing testimony confirm she

received earnings from four sources during the period captured above: (1) $9,250 from OneCare

DC, Inc. between September and November 2020, plus another $32,686 between February and

July 2021 (ECF Nos. 23-3, 23-4); (2) $15,244.50 from New Living Health Service, LLC between

September and December 2021 (ECF No. 23-5); (3) $27,083.30 from Life Care, Inc. between

February and July 2022 (ECF No. 23-6); and (4) $65,000 working for Prince George’s County,

Maryland in a temporary, one-year contractor position between July 2022 and June 2023 (ECF

No. 23-7). 6 Combined, these amounts total $149,263.80 across that period. 7

So those are the relevant inputs, and the undersigned is satisfied that Calliham provided a

sufficient evidentiary basis for both. The next question becomes how to properly sequence those

inputs when doubling a backpay award under the FCA. Specifically, should the Court double the

lost earnings before deducting replacement earnings (which would yield the $258,944.32 total

6 Along with the written exhibits substantiating these earnings, Calliham testified about these facts during the December 2024 hearing. A copy of the hearing transcript is on file with the undersigned’s chambers. 7 Calliham’s original backpay calculations also deducted amounts she received as unemployment benefits: around $16,000 in 2020, plus another $6,300 or so in 2023. (See ECF No. 17.) But during the hearing, the Court asked whether those amounts should be excluded from any offset under the collateral-source doctrine, and Calliham now argues for that approach. (See ECF No. 24.) The undersigned agrees and recommends that Calliham’s unemployment benefits not be offset against any backpay award. See, e.g., Conn v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross,

, 154–55 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[U]nemployment benefits should not be subtracted from back-pay in employment discrimination cases[.]”) (collecting cases).

10 Calliham seeks), or should it deduct replacement earnings first and double only the remainder

(which would yield a lesser total of $109,680.52)? Double then deduct, or deduct then double?

Calliham argues that United States v. Bornstein,

(1976), compels the first

approach—what she calls a “simple rule” of “multiply first, subtract second.” (See ECF No. 24 at

3.) The undersigned disagrees. Bornstein involved a different (and now-superseded) provision of

the FCA that provided for “doubl[ing] the amount of damages” the United States sustained as a

result of fraud against the government. Bornstein,

. Construing that statute, the

Court held that “in computing the double damages … the Government’s actual damages are to be

doubled before any subtractions are made for compensatory payments previously received by the

Government from any source.”

. The Court, in so reasoning, flagged that the statute spoke

of “doubling ‘damages’ and not doubling ‘net damages.’”

at 314 n.10. The text’s use of the

term “damages,” in other words, was key to the Court’s analysis.

Here, by contrast, the statute allows for recovery of “2 times the amount of back pay.”

(h) (emphasis added). Backpay is generally viewed as an “equitable” remedy,

Barbour v. Merrill,

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (addressing backpay in Title VII context),

that incorporates the concept of net loss by accounting for replacement earnings in the very

definition of backpay, see, e.g., Kapche v. Holder,

, 469–70 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

(affirming denial of backpay award because plaintiff earned more in a new job than he would have

earned in the lost job); Schroer v. Billington,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2009)

(outlining two approaches to calculate backpay—the “periodic mitigation method” and the

“aggregate mitigation” method—both of which account for actual earnings during the relevant

11 period). In this way, by providing for doubling of backpay, not damages, the statute effectively

speaks in terms of “net damages”—the very situation Bornstein said it was not addressing. 8

At least one other district court has squarely distinguished Bornstein on these same

grounds, going on to hold that Section 3730(h) is best construed by doubling lost earnings only

after reducing for replacement earnings. Miniex v. Houston Housing Auth.,

, at

*2–3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2019). The undersigned finds that analysis persuasive. And several other

federal courts have construed this aspect of Section 3730(h)(2) in the same way, albeit without

grappling with Bornstein as comprehensively. Hammond v. Northland Counseling Ctr., Inc.,

, 891–92 (8th Cir. 2000); Wilkins v. St. Louis Housing Auth.,

(8th Cir.

2002); Harris v. Blue Ridge Health Servs.,

, 643–44 (M.D.N.C. June 21, 2019).

As those courts reasoned, account for replacement earnings before doubling any backpay award

more faithfully adheres to the statute’s goal of providing “all relief necessary to make [an]

employee … whole,”

(h)(1), while avoiding “a windfall,” Hammond,

; Harris,

. The undersigned is aware of two district court cases—both

of which Calliham cites (ECF No. 24 at 4)—that endorse the other approach. Neither persuades.

Neal v. Honeywell, Inc. assumed without analysis that it should double lost earnings before

deducting mitigation amounts.

(N.D. Ill. 1998). And United States ex rel.

Mooney v. Americare, Inc. simply applied Bornstein to reach its conclusion,

(E.D.N.Y. 2016), which the undersigned finds unavailing for the reasons explained.

8 The cases Calliham cites from this District as “following Bornstein” for her preferred approach (ECF No. 24 at 3) are distinguishable for the same reason. They all construed the modern-day version of the statute at issue in Bornstein, now codified at

(a), which speaks of multiplying “the amount of damages” sustained by the government as a result of fraudulent claims. United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2007); United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2007) (same); United States ex rel. Fago v. M & T Mortg. Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2007) (same). None applied Bornstein to the distinct concept of “back pay” in Section 3730(h). The same holds true for Calliham’s other footnoted cases to this effect. (ECF No. 24 at 3 n.3.)

12 As a final point to wrap up this part of the discussion, consider a practical exercise. Assume

for the moment there was no basis to double backpay. In that scenario, based on the two inputs

summarized above, Calliham’s evidence would support a total backpay award of $54,842.26 (i.e.,

$204,106.06 in lost earnings less $149,263.80 in replacement earnings). None of that should be in

dispute. Now return to the world of doubling. Under Calliham’s proposed double-then-deduct

approach, the resulting backpay award would amount to nearly five times the baseline backpay just

identified (approximately $259,000), whereas a deduct-then-double approach would yield an

award that is exactly two times the baseline backpay (approximately $110,000). This exercise

speaks volumes. Calliham’s proposed approach would transform a statutory doubling provision

into a statutory quintupling provision, and the Court simply cannot endorse that result. 9

The undersigned thus recommends that the Court award Calliham backpay in the total

amount of $109,680.52, which represents “2 times the amount of back pay” proven. § 3730(h)(2).

2. Prejudgment Interest on the Backpay

Calliham asks the Court to award prejudgment interest “on her backpay damages.” (ECF

No. 23 at 6.) The statute provides for “interest on the backpay,”

(h)(2), and the

undersigned concludes that prejudgment interest would be appropriate here. 10 But Calliham

requests prejudgment interest on the doubled backpay award. For the reasons just explained (supra

§ III.C.1), this approach is equally inconsistent with the statute and would produce an improper

windfall. The courts to have squarely addressed this issue have held that “interest should be

9 While certainly not dispositive, the Court observes that Calliham originally calculated backpay damages by doubling the amount of lost wage after accounting for mitigation earnings, and in a lesser amount, seeking a total backpay award of $63,434.66—after doubling. (See ECF No. 17.) 10 Calliham originally requested prejudgment interest “on the total amount of the award.” (ECF No. 17.) Because the statute’s express terms allow for “interest on the back pay,” rather than interest on all the categories of relief described in Section 3730(h)(2), Calliham appropriately narrowed her request.

13 calculated on the undoubled back pay less the other income.” Wilkins v. St. Louis Hous. Auth.,

(E.D. Mo. 2001) (emphasis added), aff’d,

(8th Cir. 2002);

Miniex,

, at *2 (similar); Neal,

(similar); United States ex

rel. Howard v. Urban Inv. Trust, Inc.,

, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2013) (similar).

Calliham does not cite any cases to the contrary. The undersigned thus finds it appropriate to award

prejudgment interest only on the baseline backpay amount of $54,842.26. 11

Turning to the appropriate interest rate, Calliham says the Court should use the rate

provided by

(a). (ECF No. 23 at 7.) Other district courts have used that rate for

purposes of calculating interest on backpay under Section 3730(h)(2). Stewart v. Golden Victory

Med. LLC,

, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2024) (“The appropriate general standard

for the rate of prejudgment interest on an FCA plaintiff’s back pay is the rate provided by

(a).”) (cleaned up) (citing Wilkins,

); see also Thompson v. Quorum

Health Resources, LLC,

, at *9 (W.D. Ky. May 21, 2010) (using Treasury rates

in keeping with Section 1961(a)). This same approach would seem appropriate here.

But beyond generalities, Calliham fails to provide the Court with any calculations to

substantiate the amount of any prejudgment interest she seeks, let alone based on the proper

backpay amount that would be generating that interest ($54,842.26). And that analysis does not

strike the Court as obviously straightforward, especially given Calliham’s request for

compounding interest and the apparent need to account for Calliham’s various replacement

earnings at different steps of the overall calculations. Accordingly, at this juncture, the undersigned

recommends that the Court deny without prejudice Calliham’s request for prejudgment interest,

11 For what it’s worth, this is also consistent with the legislative history. H.R. Rep. No. 99–660, at 23 (1986) (“It should be noted that the interest payable is to be calculated before the back pay is doubled.”);

(reiterating that “interest” is “to be paid on the singular amount of back pay due.”).)

14 with leave to renew the request in a supplemental filing supported by specific calculations to

substantiate the amount of any prejudgment interest Calliham may seek. 12

3. Compensatory Damages

Calliham next asks the Court to award compensatory damages associated with her

emotional pain and suffering. The statute allows for relief in the form of “compensation for any

special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination,”

(h)(2), and courts

have held that this includes “recovery for emotional distress,” Gale v. Mission Hospice of San

Antonio, LLC,

, at *8 (W.D. Tex. July 11, 2023) (collecting cases).

Calliham’s initial filing requested $2 million in compensatory damages (ECF No. 17)

without any supporting legal authority and with relatively sparse evidentiary support. None of

Calliham’s supplemental filings filled in those gaps—they did not address Calliham’s request for

compensatory damages for emotional distress at all. (See ECF Nos. 23, 24.) The Court held a

hearing in December 2024, however, during which it received testimony from Calliham about her

emotional-distress damages, and, based on that evidence, the undersigned finds that some award

of compensatory damages is appropriate. But there is simply no evidentiary or legal support in the

record for an award anywhere close to the $2 million in damages originally requested.

The valuation of compensatory damages is not susceptible to fixed rules or formulas. As a

starting point, though, “a plaintiff’s own testimony is sufficient to establish emotional-distress

damages.” Hudson v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps.,

, at *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021),

12 Other courts have taken a similar approach in past cases. Trustees of Empire State Carpenters Annuity, Apprenticeship, Labor-Mgmt. Cooperation, Pension & Welfare Funds v. Oneidaview Pile Driving Inc.,

, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2016) (recommending denial of prejudgment interest subject to renewal supported by “appropriately detailed interest information and calculation”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Trustees of Empire State Carpenters Annuity v. Oneidaview Pile Driving Inc.,

(E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2016).

15 aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. Oct. 28, 2022). And “the factfinder may measure [the]

plaintiff’s testimony in light of the surrounding circumstances,” considering “elements of

compensable injury” that include “humiliation and personal indignity, emotional pain,

embarrassment, fear, anxiety and anguish.” Hobson v. Wilson,

(D.C. Cir. 1984),

overruled in part on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination

Unit,

(1993). At the hearing, Calliham testified about the emotional suffering she

experienced following her employment termination and based on her overall experiences with

Amazing Love more broadly. She described suffering from pronounced symptoms of anxiety,

migraine headaches, and vertigo—all of which began near the time of her termination from

Amazing Love. According to Calliham, she was prescribed medication to manage these conditions

and symptoms, and she treated with a psychiatrist and a therapist for support. She also described

the personal humiliation and sense of defeat associated she felt at being unable to financially and

emotionally support herself and her family for the first time in her life. 13

Based on firsthand and up-close observations of Calliham during the hearing, the

undersigned found her testimony on these points to be credible and compelling. The evidence thus

supports a nontrivial award of compensatory damages. But at the time same, the evidence likewise

reflects that Calliham has made meaningful strides at improvement over the last few years,

especially since returning to full-time work in late 2023. She is no longer taking medication to

manage her anxiety, and her migraines have improved (but not resolved completely). And steady

employment in a position she enjoys has improved her outlook overall. These latter points are all

to Calliham’s credit, but they counsel against a massive monetary award.

13 As noted above, the hearing transcript is on file with chambers. And many of these same facts are captured in Calliham’s November 2023 affidavit submitted with the default-judgment motion. (ECF No. 17.)

16 On balance, the undersigned recommends that the Court award Calliham compensatory

damages in the amount of $100,000. This would be in keeping with damages awarded by other

courts in cases involving reasonably similar facts. See, e.g., Dumpson v. Ade,

,

at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2019) (awarding $100,000 “for pain and suffering” where plaintiff

“require[d] regular therapy and ha[d] been diagnosed with PTSD” and described other symptoms

of “flashbacks, nightmares, depression, anxiety,” and other symptoms); Garcia v. Unit Dose

Servs., LLC,

, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2023) (awarding $100,000 based on

testimony that plaintiff “began to feel hopeless” and “anxious” after her employment termination,

among other points), report and recommendation adopted,

(S.D. Fla. Oct. 20,

2023); Joseph v. W. Linn Paper Co.,

, at *6 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2020) (awarding

$100,000 for emotional distress where plaintiff “could not pay his mortgage, could not support his

family, and had to move in with his daughter” and testified about “sleeplessness, anxiety, and

depression”), report and recommendation adopted,

(D. Or. May 12, 2020);

Reczek v. JHA Wilmington, Inc.,

(D. Del. Oct. 27, 2008) (awarding $100,000

where plaintiff was prescribed medication to manage stress and anxiety and testified to broader

feelings of embarrassment and depression). Admittedly, none of these cases is a perfect analogue

to this one, but they nevertheless offer a reasonable—and reasonably recent—survey of how other

courts have approached the valuation of emotional-distress damages in similar scenarios. Again,

Calliham did not point to any caselaw or other authority that would justify the large seven-figure

award of compensatory damages that she seeks here, or even anything close to it.

To borrow Judge Walton’s words, the Court recognizes that “awarding noneconomic

damages for pain, suffering, and mental anguish is necessarily an arbitrary endeavor to some

degree.” Robinson v. Ergo Sols., LLC,

, 178–80 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying

17 $200,000 emotional-distress award on default judgment and awarding $20,000 instead). But in

exercising its discretion to make that determination, the Court strived to carefully weigh the

relevant considerations based on the facts and the law. The undersigned recommends an award of

$100,000 in compensatory damages for Calliham’s emotional pain and suffering.

4. Litigation Costs and Attorneys’ Fees

Calliham finally seeks litigation costs and attorneys’ fees, which are likewise allowed by

the statute.

(h)(2). The undersigned largely finds these requests to be proper.

On costs, Calliham seeks only $402 for her court-filing fees. This is a recoverable cost,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1);

(1), and Calliham substantiates it with evidence (ECF

No. 27-13), so the undersigned recommends awarding it.

Turning to fees, “[t]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorney’s fee is properly calculated

by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable

hourly rate.” Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co.,

(D.D.C. 2015) (quoting

Blum v. Stenson,

(1984)). The applicant “bears the burden of establishing

entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the reasonableness of

the rates[.]” Covington v. Dist. of Columbia,

, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995). This requires

providing “sufficiently detailed information about the hours logged and the work done ... based on

contemporaneous time records,” Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def.,

(D.C. Cir. 1982), and demonstrating that the requested hourly rates are “in line with

those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,

experience, and reputation,” Ventura,

(citing Kattan by Thomas v. Dist. of

Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1993)). Ultimately, courts evaluating the reasonableness

of fees must make “a judgment call,” SNH Med. Off. Properties Tr.,

, at *9, and

18 are “obliged to exercise discretion in awarding attorney’s fees when cases are resolved by default

judgments,” Boland v. Yoccabel Const. Co.,

(D.D.C. 2013).

Starting with the requested hourly rates, Calliham’s counsel seeks reimbursement at the

rates prescribed by the Fitzpatrick Matrix, which counsel attests to be the firm’s “regular hourly

rates.” (ECF No. 23-11, A. Wilkenfeld Decl. ¶¶ 10–11.) The Fitzpatrick Matrix was developed by

the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia to model “prevailing market rates

for complex federal litigation in the District of Columbia.” J.T. v. Dist. of Columbia,

, 16 (D.D.C. 2023). Since its debut a few years back, courts in this District have increasingly

looked to the Fitzpatrick Matrix as an appropriate market barometer for fee requests in complex

federal litigation. Brackett v. Mayorkas,

, at *4–5 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2023)

(collecting cases). Here, the requested hourly rates—which range from $500 to $838 per hour

depending on the lawyer, as well as $236 per hour for paralegals—are right in line with the

Fitzpatrick Matrix. And the rates are further substantiated by sworn declarations from Calliham’s

counsel. (ECF Nos. 23-11 through 23-16.) On this record, the requested rates are reasonable.

As for the hours expended, the Court has carefully reviewed the latest version of the billing

entries submitted by Calliham’s counsel (ECF Nos. 24-1, 24-2), which are broken out by both

timekeeper and category of work. Those entries reflect the following: (1) approximately $12,000

incurred on pre-filing research and preparing the complaint; (2) approximately $7,000 incurred on

service of process; (3) approximately $1,300 incurred on miscellaneous filings, including

regarding the dismissal of certain defendants, notices of appearances, and pro hac vice filings; (4)

approximately $20,000 incurred on motion-for-default filings between September 2023 and March

2024; (5) approximately $4,000 incurred to request, prepare for, and attend a status conference in

September 2024; (6) approximately $21,000 incurred to prepare for the December 2024

19 evidentiary hearing, which includes preparing supplemental written submissions; (7) and

approximately $25,000 incurred in preparing submissions after the evidentiary hearing. (See ECF

No. 24-2.) All told, this amounts to approximately $90,000 in total fees across 143 hours. 14

At a surface level, these totals seem somewhat out of step with the amount of time and

expense one would expect to see for a case in which no defendant ever appeared. But the Court is

mindful that its role is not to become some “‘green-eyeshade accountant,’ sequentially weighing

the propriety of each entry listed in the movant’s request,” but rather to focus on the goal of “‘rough

justice.’” Brackett,

, at *7 (quoting Fox v. Vice,

(2011)).

Except for one category of entries discussed next, the balance of counsel’s entries reflect

reasonable work, especially since the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing involving witness

testimony and requested supplemental written submissions as part of the default-judgment process.

But the undersigned does recommend denying fees for counsel’s work on the first two

procedurally infirm motions for default judgment (ECF Nos. 8, 15), which the Court rejected for

(i) failure to first seek entry of default and then (ii) failure to provide evidentiary support for the

requested damages. (Min. Orders dated Aug. 1, 2023, Oct. 6, 2023.) Courts may reject fee claims

for “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary charges,” Okla. Aerotronics, Inc. v. United

States,

(D.C. Cir. 1991), and Calliham’s first two attempts at moving for

default judgment fit that description, see, e.g., West v. Potter,

, at *6 (D.D.C.

Dec. 1, 2011) (denying fees associated with unnecessary motions). To that end, in endeavoring to

capture that component of time, the Court reviewed billing category captioned “Motion for

Default” (ECF No. 24-2) and tabulated all entries that predate October 6, 2023—when the second

14 Calliham’s counsel did not separately seek an award of fees for time spent preparing the latest supplemental response addressing proper service of process on Amazing Love.

20 unsuccessful motion was denied—which total $10,535.60. 15 Subtracting that amount from

Calliham’s total requested fees of $89,199.90 (ECF No. 24 at 6), that leaves $78.664.30.

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court award Calliham $402 in

recoverable costs and $78,644.30 in attorneys’ fees.

RECOMMENDATION

To sum up, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT Calliham’s motion for

default judgment (ECF No. 17) in substantial part and enter judgment in favor of Calliham and

against Amazing Love as follows:

1. $109,680.52 in backpay (which includes doubling per Section 3730(h)(2));

2. $100,000.00 in compensatory damages; and

3. $402 in litigation costs and $78,644.30 in attorneys’ fees.

Otherwise, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE

prejudgment interest on the backpay award against Amazing Love, with leave to renew the request

supported by specific calculations. And the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY AS

WITHDRAWN Calliham’s motion for default judgment against Ntemi altogether.

* * *

The Court hereby advises that, pursuant to

(b)(1)(C) and LCvR 72.3(b),

any party who objects to a report and recommendation must file a written objection within fourteen

(14) days of the party’s receipt of the report and recommendation. The written objections must

specifically identify the portion of the report or recommendation to which objection is made and

the basis for such objections. Failure to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations

15 More specifically, this amount encompasses the following subtotals broken out by timekeeper: $4,508.20 for Bilkis, $236 for Chhabra, $344.40 for Greer, and $5,447 for Wilkenfeld.

21 set forth in this report may waive that party’s right of appeal from an order of the District Court

that adopts such findings and recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn,

(1985).

Dated: March 14, 2025 MATTHEW J. SHARBAUGH United States Magistrate Judge

22