UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RIYAN WILLIAMS, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 24-2032 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 5 : CAPITAL ONE BANK, N.A., : : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Capital One Bank, N.A. closed Plaintiff Riyan Williams’s credit card account.

Williams then filed this action pro se against Capital One, claiming that the account closure

represented a breach of contract and that Capital One failed to provide a reason for the adverse

action in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”),

et seq.

Capital One moves to dismiss Williams’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) on the grounds that Williams failed to state actionable claims because Capital One acted

in accordance with the Account Agreement and satisfied ECOA. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court grants Capital One’s motion to dismiss.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court constructs these facts based on Williams’s Complaint and subsequent briefing.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

, 677–78 (2009); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC,

(D.C. Cir. 2011). The Court must construe a pro se complaint together with all of the pro

se party’s filings and must read pro se filings liberally. See Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp.,

Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015); Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007). Williams opened the credit card account at issue with Capital One in May 2023 for

personal and family use. See Compl. at 17, ECF No. 1-1; id. at 54. 1 The Capital One Account

Agreement—the contract in dispute in this case—details Williams’s obligations regarding the

account, including Williams’s “promise to pay [Capital One] all amounts due.” Id. at 40. The

Account Agreement also articulates Capital One’s rights regarding the account, including the

right to “close or suspend” the account with or without notice to Williams and the right to report

account information to credit bureaus. Id. at 42–43. A few months later, on August 20, 2023,

Williams received a letter dated August 18, 2023, stating that Capital One was closing

Williams’s credit card account “because activity on [the] account [was] not consistent with

[Capital One’s] expectations for account usage and violate[d] the Capital One Customer

Agreement.” Id. at 20, 48. Williams’s credit report dated March 2024 shows a final balance of

approximately $569 on the closed account, exceeding the credit limit of $500 by $69. See id. at

54. The account status on the report reflects that Williams’s $569 balance was “written off.” Id.

A comment on the report additionally shows that Williams’s account was “closed at credit

grantor’s request” without requiring him to pay the remaining balance. Id.

After receiving Capital One’s letter of account closure, Williams sent a letter to Capital

One’s P.O. Box on August 22, 2023. See id. at 20, 43. In the letter, Williams inquired as to the

reasons for account closure and for documentation supporting Capital One’s claim that

Williams’s account activity violated the Account Agreement. See id. at 20. The letter appears to

have been received by Capital One, as it was sent through certified mail and a Capital One agent

signed for the certified mail package on August 31, 2023. See id. at 51. Williams alleges that he

sent numerous requests for information and clarification to Capital One, but all requests

1 The Court refers here to the page numbers generated by CM/ECF.

2 including the August 31, 2023, letter went unanswered. See id. at 20. Due to Capital One’s

reports to credit reporting companies regarding Williams’s closed account, Williams experienced

a significant decrease in credit score on October 15, 2023. See id. In an effort to learn the

reasons for account closure and restore his creditworthiness, Williams proceeded to dispute

Capital One’s report to Experian, a credit reporting company. See id. at 21–22. Williams was

unable to gather further answers through these disputes. See id.

Williams initially filed a complaint against Capital One in the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia on December 5, 2023, disputing the company’s closure of his account. See

Compl., Williams v. Capital One Bank, N.A., No. 2023-CAB-007360 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 5,

2023). Capital One removed that action to this Court. See Notice of Removal, Williams v.

Capital One Bank, N.A., No. 23-cv-3898 (Dec. 29, 2023), ECF No. 1. After the parties fully

briefed a motion to remand and a motion to dismiss, Williams moved to voluntarily dismiss his

case without prejudice because of deficiencies in the complaint and discovery of new

information. See Pl.’s Mot. to Dismiss Without Prejudice, Williams v. Capital One Bank, N.A.,

No. 23-cv-03898 (May 3, 2024), ECF No. 12. The Court granted Williams’s motion over

Capital One’s objection. See Order Dismissing Case, Williams v. Capital One Bank, N.A., No.

23-cv-3898 (May 19, 2024), ECF No. 14.

Williams filed a new Complaint in District of Columbia Superior Court on June 14, 2024,

asserting various contractual claims, including breach of contract (Count One), bad faith and

breach of fiduciary duty (Count Two), unconscionability (Count Three), and an ECOA claim

(Count Four). See Compl. at 14–33. Williams sought compensatory and punitive damages,

injunctive relief, attorney’s fees as permitted under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, removal of

adverse information on his credit report, and the reopening of his account with Capital One. See

3 id. at 32. Capital One subsequently filed a Notice of Removal on July 12, 2024, and the action

was removed from the Superior Court to this Court on July 15, 2024. See generally Notice of

Removal, ECF No. 1. Capital One then moved to dismiss the action for failure to adequately

state actionable contractual and ECOA claims. See generally Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 5;

Def.’s Mem. Support Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 5-1. Williams opposed the motion

to dismiss, see generally Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 7, and Capital One

replied, see generally Def.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 8.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint” by

asking whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim on which relief can be granted. Browning

v. Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), a court must consider the whole complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007); see also Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,

(D.C. Cir.

1994). However, a court may disregard “inferences drawn by [a] plaintiff[] if such inferences

are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Nurriddin v. Bolden,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Kowal,

).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must provide “a short and plain statement of

the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S at 570). A facially plausible claim is one that “allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are

4 therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

In determining a 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss, the Court may consider “only the facts alleged in the complaint [and] any documents

either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the Court] may take

judicial notice.” Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch.,

(D.C. Cir. 1997).

The Court, however, will construe a pro se complaint liberally and hold it “to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson,

(2007)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976)). The Court may thus “examine other

pleadings to understand the nature and basis of . . . pro se claims” as alleged in the complaint.

Gray v. Poole,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff is not

excused from adhering to the applicable procedural rules and must “plead ‘factual matter’ that

permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton v. D.C. Off.

of the Mayor,

, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79).

Despite the liberality afforded pro se complaints, the Court “need not accept inferences

unsupported by the facts alleged in the complaint or ‘legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations.’” Kaemmerling v. Lappin,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Henthorn v.

Dep’t of Navy,

(D.D.C. 1994)).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court first reviews Williams’s breach of contract, bad faith and breach of fiduciary

duty, and unconscionability claims, concluding that none of them can succeed based on the facts

alleged. See Compl. at 24–30 (Counts One, Two, and Three). The Court then reviews

Williams’s ECOA claim, determining that it, too, must fail. See Compl. at 31–32 (Count Four).

5 Lastly, the Court will address Williams’s citation of nonexistent authority. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–

5.

A. Breach of Contract

Williams asserts three breach of contract claims in his complaint. See Compl. at 24–30.

Count One alleges that Capital One breached the Account Agreement because it “failed to

address [Williams’s] dispute in a timely and effective manner, and the account closure process

was initiated without [Williams’s] consent or prior notification.” Id. at 26. Count Two alleges

that Capital One acted in bad faith by engaging in deceptive practices, thereby committing a

breach of fiduciary duty, because Capital One closed Williams’s account “without providing a

specific statement of reasons.” Id. at 27. Count Three similarly alleges that Capital One

“deceiv[ed] consumers” because “the contract incorporate[d] substantively unconscionable and

commercially unreasonable terms.” Id. at 29–30. In response, Capital One argues that

Williams’s contractual claims must be dismissed with prejudice. See generally Def.’s Mot.

Specifically, Capital One argues that Williams’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law

because the actions that Williams complains of were properly within the terms of the Account

Agreement. See id. at 7–8. Capital One further argues that Williams’s bad faith and

unconscionability claims are not cognizable causes of action. See id. at 8–10.

To prevail on a breach of contract claim under District of Columbia law, “a party must

establish (1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the

contract; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.” Howard Town Ctr.

Developer, LLC v. Howard Univ.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Francis v.

Rehman,

(D.C. 2015)). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals does not

strictly require a plaintiff to demonstrate damages, however, as a party that establishes a contract,

6 duty, and breach can be “entitled to an award of nominal damages,” declaratory relief, or specific

performance. Wright v. Howard Univ.,

, 753 & n.3 (D.C. 2013). A valid contract

exists between parties where there are “both (1) agreement as to all material terms, and (2)

intention of the parties to be bound.” Carter v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

, 144–45

(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Kramer Assocs., Inc. v. Ikam, Ltd.,

(D.C. 2005))

(finding that there was no valid contract because the lack of defendants’ signatures, an element

required by contract to form the contract, demonstrated a lack of agreement and intent to be

bound).

Once a valid contract is established, the plaintiff must sufficiently allege that the

opposing party “owed . . . a contractual obligation” that may be breached. Chambers v. NASA

Fed. Credit Union,

(D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim because plaintiff argued that defendant had the contractual obligation to base overdraft

fees on plaintiff’s actual balance, but no such obligation existed within the agreed upon

contract); see also Logan v. Lasalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n,

, 1023–24 (D.C. 2013)

(concluding that the borrower’s breach of contract claim was meritless because he did not

identify any provisions, actions, or omissions within the bounds of the loan agreement that the

lender affirmatively breached). If no contractual obligation is adequately alleged, the breach of

contract claim will fail. See Chambers,

. Whether a contractual obligation

exists is determined by the “plain language” of the governing contract.

.

Here, Williams fails to allege breach of a contractual obligation that Capital One owed to

Williams within the governing Account Agreement. 2 Neither party disputes the validity of the

2 The terms of the Account Agreement indicate the Virginia law applies, but neither party addresses this. See Compl. at 43; see also Def.’s Mot. at 7–10 (relying on District of Columbia law). Because the parties do not seek to enforce the provision, the Court does not either.

7 Account Agreement, which is the contract at issue. See generally Compl.; Def.’s Mot. By

opening and utilizing the credit card account with Capital One, both Williams and Capital One

agreed on all material terms of the Account Agreement and demonstrated intent to be bound to

the Account Agreement. See Compl. at 17; Def.’s Mot. at 8. Nonetheless, to prevail on his

breach of contract claim, Williams must adequately allege that any breach arose from a

contractual obligation due to him by Capital One. See Chambers,

.

Williams argues that Capital One was obligated to give Williams proper notice of account

closure, obtain his prior consent to the account closure, and address his disputes or inquiries into

the account closure, thereby providing him with specific reasons for the account closure. See

Compl. at 24–27.

The Account Agreement, however, articulates that if an account owner is in default,

Capital One may, “without notifying” the account owner unless the law requires otherwise,

“close or suspend [the] Account.” Compl. at 42 (emphasis omitted). The Account Agreement

further elaborates that Capital One “may close or suspend [an] Account at any time and for any

reason permitted by law, even if [the account owner] is not in default.”

(emphasis

omitted). The governing provisions in the Account Agreement thus expressly authorized Capital

One to close Williams’s account for any appropriate and legal reason. As in Chambers, where

the language of the contract governed permissible actions of the parties, here too, the language of

the Account Agreement determines permissible acts. Here, the Account Agreement explicitly

permitted Capital One to close Williams’s account “at any time for any reason.”

.

Additionally, there are no provisions in the Account Agreement that require Capital One to give

sufficient notice to Williams in the event of account closure, obtain his consent prior to account

8 closure, provide him with specific reasons for account closure, or respond to his communications

and disputes relating to the account. See Def.’s Mot. at 8; see generally Compl.

Williams also claims that Capital One’s failure to respond to his disputes violated “the

billing summary of rights provided by Capital One.” Compl. at 26. This Billing Rights

Summary does not appear to form part of the parties’ contract, but rather represents a separate

notice summarizing a consumer’s rights under federal law. Compare Compl. at 47, with

and

(requiring creditors to investigate and correct billing

errors). Looking to both the Billing Rights Summary and federal law, the Court again finds no

obligation that might require Capital One to respond to Williams’s dispute over closure of his

credit card account. The obligation to investigate and correct errors applies when a consumer

finds a mistake on a credit card statement and requires the consumer to notify the creditor in

writing “within 60 days after the error appeared on [the consumer’s] statement.” Compl. at 47;

see also

(a) (describing when a creditor must investigate a billing error).

Capital One must then either respond in writing within 30 days of receipt or simply correct the

error.

Williams does not allege that he contacted Capital One in writing regarding an error

on his credit card statement. See

(b);

(a) (defining billing

errors to include, for instance, inaccurate balances, substantiation of balances, and computation

errors). Rather, Williams contacted Capital One by mail to “question[] why the account was

closed” and ask for “documentation” regarding his violation of the Account Agreement. Compl.

at 20; see also Compl. at 21 (stating that “Plaintiff’s letters request[ed] the nature of why

Defendant closed the account”); Compl. at 26 (asserting that Capital One breached its obligations

because it failed to address “the account closure process . . . initiated without [Williams’s]

consent or prior notification”). Neither the Billing Rights Summary nor federal law thus created

9 an obligation for Capital One to respond to Williams. Accordingly, Williams does not identify

any provisions within the Account Agreement or another contract that give rise to the obligations

he alleges Capital One was required to perform. Williams’s breach of contract claim therefore

fails. 3

Williams next claims that Capital One acted in bad faith and breached a fiduciary duty by

closing his account without notifying him of the specific reasons for account closure and by

failing to respond to his requests for information. See Compl. at 27–29 (Count Two). Inherently

underlying all contracts is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Weatherly v.

Second Nw. Coop. Homes Ass’n, Inc.,

, 596 (D.C. 2023) (“[I]n every contract there

is an implied covenant that neither party shall . . . destroy[] or injur[e] the right of the other party

to receive the fruits of the contract.”). Successfully stating a claim for a breach of implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires alleging bad faith or alleging “conduct that is

arbitrary and capricious.” See Whole Foods Mkt. Grp. v. Wical L.P.,

(D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Kumar v. George Washington Univ.,

, 189–90

(D.D.C. 2016)). In Weatherly, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant breached the implied

covenant by filing a landlord-tenant action, seeking to evict plaintiff, and failing to discuss

feasible alternatives to eviction. See Weatherly, 304 A.3d at 596. The court, however, held that

the defendant did not act in bad faith as such conduct was “entirely consistent with [defendant’s]

rights under the contracts” at issue. Id. Conforming to the terms of the contract cannot be held

to “frustrate . . . enjoyment of the benefits of the contract, nor could it fairly be characterized as

3 The Court need not address the last required element of a breach of contract claim— breach—because Williams’s claim fails at the second element.

10 arbitrary or capricious or made in bad faith.” Abdelrhman v. Ackerman,

(D.C.

2013).

Likewise, Capital One did not act in bad faith here because the Account Agreement

explicitly authorized Capital One’s closure of Williams’s account. See Compl. at 42–43. The

Account Agreement authorized Capital One to close Williams’s account “for any reason,” and

Capital One nonetheless gave a reason, although it may not have been to the detail and

specificity that Williams desired. Id. at 43. Nor did Capital One act in bad faith by failing to

respond to Williams’s subsequent information requests. Not only did the Account Agreement

not require such action, see Compl. at 38–44, but Capital One had already provided Williams

with at least some information it was not contractually required to provide. In both Capital

One’s affirmative conduct and omissions of conduct, Capital One conformed to the terms of the

Account Agreement. Relatedly, Capital One did not breach any fiduciary duty as Williams

claims, see Compl. at 27–29, because “commercial entities,” like Capital One, “do not owe

fiduciary duties to ordinary customers.” Krukas v. AARP, Inc.

, 11 (D.D.C.

2020); see also Findlay v. CitiMortgage, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2011) (“The

relationship between a debtor and creditor is ordinarily a contractual one, lacking any fiduciary

duties.”). Williams points to nothing supporting a fiduciary duty in this case.

Williams additionally alleges that the contract is unconscionable. See Compl. at 29–30

(Count Three). Yet Williams now concedes that “unconscionability is not typically recognized

as an independent cause of action.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8–9. Count Three is a contractual claim that

11 essentially restates and supplements Williams’s breach of contract and bad faith claims, and can

therefore be viewed largely in light of Counts One and Two. See Compl. at 24–30. 4

For these reasons, Williams fails to state actionable contractual claims, and the Court

grants the motion to dismiss as to Counts One through Three.

B. ECOA

Williams next claims that Capital One violated ECOA by “refus[ing] to provide the

specific reasons for the adverse action of revoking . . . credit” and by failing to respond to

Williams’s requests for explanation of the account closure. Compl. at 31. Capital One argues in

response that Williams’s ECOA claim must be dismissed because Capital One complied with

ECOA by providing Williams with written notice of the reason for closure of his account. See

Def.’s Mot. at 3–6. The Court concludes that Capital One’s explanation was sufficient.

ECOA provides that “[e]ach applicant against whom adverse action is taken shall be

entitled to a statement of reasons for such action from the creditor,” and that the statement of

reasons must contain “specific reasons for the adverse action taken.”

(d)(2)–

(3). 5 ECOA’s requirement to provide a statement of reasons “discourages discrimination and . . .

4 Furthermore, Williams included various provisions of Title 28 of the D.C. Code in his breach of contract claim. See Compl. at 16–19, 23–25. Williams primarily refers to

, which prevents sellers from requiring consumers to sign certain negotiable instruments as evidence of credit obligation in consumer credit sales. See Compl. at 17–19, 24– 25;

;

§ 28-3802(2)(A). This provision is unrelated to Williams’s contractual claims, which primarily allege that Capital One—a creditor—breached the Account Agreement by closing Williams’s credit card account without notice, consent, or explanation. See generally Compl. The Court thus declines to address Williams’s references to the D.C. Code. 5 Both parties address

(d)(1) of ECOA, but that provision is about notice regarding action on a completed credit application, not on an existing account. See

(d)(1). The provision is, therefore, not relevant to the present case. Other provisions, § 1691(d)(2)–(3), cover the adverse action here. See Presidential Bank, FSB v. 1733 27th Street SE LLC,

(D.D.C. 2017).

12 educates consumers as to the deficiencies in their credit status.” Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet

Oldsmobile, Inc.,

(7th Cir. 2004). Nonetheless, the statement of reasons need

not be personally detailed or lengthy. See O’Dowd v. South Cent. Bell.,

(5th

Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant telephone company’s request to plaintiff consumer for a $100

deposit “due to [plaintiff’s] past payment record” satisfied ECOA because plaintiff was

sufficiently informed of the specific reason for the deposit request). A short statement may

suffice “so long as it reasonably indicates the reasons for adverse action.” Id.; see also Barat v.

Navy Fed. Credit Union,

(11th Cir.) (finding that defendant credit union’s

boilerplate language, “[p]oor credit performance with Navy Federal” in explaining its denial of

plaintiff’s loan application did not violate ECOA because the statement provided an adequate

reason for the denial of loans); Wigod v. PNC Bank, N.A.,

, 766–67 (N.D. Ill.

2018) (finding “[i]ncome insufficient to support credit obligations” sufficient); Higgins v. J.C.

Penney, Inc.,

, 724–25 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (finding “credit bureau

report/delinquent history” sufficient); King v. Police & Fire Fed. Credit Union, No. 16-6414,

, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2019) (finding “limited credit history,” and the

“[l]ength of [t]ime [a]ccounts [h]ave [b]een [e]stablished” sufficient); Aikens v. Nw. Dodge, Inc.,

No. 03 C 7956,

, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2006) (finding “excessive credit

obligations and credit file” sufficient).

Capital One, in written communication, explained that it closed Williams’s account

“because activity on this . . . account [was] not consistent with [Capital One’s] expectations for

account usage and violate[d] the Capital One Customer Agreement.” Compl. at 48. Like the

statement of reasons in O’Dowd and Barat, Capital One’s statement concisely identified the

reasons for closing Williams’s account. O’Dowd,

; Barat,

. In

13 fact, Capital One’s statement is more elaborate than the statements in O’Dowd and Barat and

specifically directed Williams to the Account Agreement for further basis of his violation that led

to the account closure. See

Capital One’s letter to Williams satisfies ECOA’s specific

statement of reasons requirement, and Williams accordingly fails to state a claim under ECOA.

Having determined that Williams’s Complaint fails to state a claim on either his contract

or ECOA theories, the next question is whether the Court must dismiss the Complaint with

prejudice, or whether Williams should be permitted the opportunity to amend. Williams filed a

previous complaint regarding this dispute, and the parties fully briefed a motion to dismiss

before the Court granted Williams’s motion for voluntary dismissal. See Order Dismissing Case,

Williams v. Capital One Bank, N.A., No. 23-cv-3898 (May 19, 2024), ECF No. 14. Williams

therefore had the opportunity to amend his complaint and replead, and Capital One has moved to

dismiss twice. The Circuit has previously framed dismissal with or without prejudice as the

question of whether a Rule 15(a) amendment would be available. See Wilcox v. Georgetown

Univ.,

(D.C. Cir. 2021). “Leave to amend a complaint under Rule 15(a) ‘shall

be freely given when justice so requires.’” Firestone v. Firestone,

(D.C. Cir.

1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). It may be denied, however, where there has been a

“repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,” there would be

“undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,” or amendment

would be “futil[e].” Atchinson v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1996). The

Court finds that the filing of any further amended complaints would unduly prejudice Capital

One because of the action Williams previously filed, and that Williams is unable to cure the

factual deficiencies present in the operative Complaint. The Court thus dismisses the Complaint

and the action with prejudice.

14 C. Citations to Nonexistent Legal Authority

Courts have recently seen increasing reliance on artificial intelligence in legal

proceedings, leading to the use of nonexistent citations in court documents. See Park v. Kim,

, 613–16 (2d Cir. 2024); Ruggierlo, Velardo, Burke, Reizen & Fox, P.C. v. Lancaster,

No. 22-12010,

, at n.5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2023); Anonymous v. New York

City Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:24-cv-4232,

, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2024). It

appears here that Williams too may have relied on an artificial intelligence tool to draft his brief.

See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–3 (referring to legal generative AI program CoCounsel); Def.’s Reply at 3

(explaining that Capital One “can find no such cases with the listed case captions that stand for

the position Plaintiff claims they do”). Williams cites to cases that do not exist and may either

be from his imagination or represent hallucinations of artificial intelligence. See Pl.’s Opp’n at

4–5. For example, “Pettway v. American Savings & Loan Association,

(N.D.

Ala. 1961)” is not a case that exists. Id. at 4. While Williams v. Equifax Information Services,

LLC is a case that exists, “560 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Va. 2008)” is the incorrect citation, and

“560 F. Supp. 2d 903” cites to a completely different case from the Northern District of

California. Id. at 5. There are multiple cases named Williams v. Equifax Information Services,

LLC and it is unclear which specific case Williams seeks to cite or whether the cases lend

support for Williams’s claims. Other cases cited in Williams’s brief present similar issues. The

use of these nonexistent citations dramatically weakens Williams’s opposition to Capital One’s

motion to dismiss because he fails to cite to supporting authority.

It is not acceptable for parties to submit filings to the Court containing citations to legal

authority that does not exist, whether drafted with the assistance of artificial intelligence or not.

See Park,

(referring attorney for investigation for drafting her brief by relying on

15 ChatGPT, an artificial intelligence tool); Ruggierlo,

, at n.5 (warning a pro se

defendant that using generative artificial intelligence to create citations may result in court-

imposed sanctions and wasted the court’s, the opposing party’s, and defendant’s own resources);

Anonymous,

, at *7 (warning a pro se plaintiff that citations generated by

artificial intelligence are unreliable, and that citation to nonexistent legal authority is

unacceptable). The Court strongly warns Williams against filing briefs with fabricated case

citations in this Court or any other. 6

V. CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the action

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is

separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: March 18, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

6 The Court notes that Williams has other cases pending before other judges of this Court. If Williams has followed the same practices in those courts to generate pleadings that remain pending, he must notify such courts and correct citations to erroneous or non-existent cases.

16