UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EON BROWN,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 2538 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case involves a federal employee seeking relief from an alleged hostile workplace and

supervisor. Eon Brown, proceeding pro se, sued the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

(FERC) and his supervisor, Ahlam Kaissani, on September 24, 2024, citing seven expansive

federal statutes, including the Violence Against Women Act, the Indian Civil Rights Act, the

Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Victim and Witness Protection Act. The Defendants have

moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons

explained below, the Court grants the motion.1

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and

attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023). As

1 Mr. Brown filed scores of documents in response to the Defendants’ pleadings, including seventeen notices of exhibits (ECF Nos. 8-12, 14, 17, 19-24, 26, 29-31), a Motion for Temporary Injunction (ECF No. 13), a Supplemental Memorandum (ECF No. 18), and a Surreply (ECF No. 25). The Court notes the lengths that Mr. Brown has gone to prove his case. But after thoroughly reviewing the record, the Court concludes that his claims must be dismissed. Mr. Brown is proceeding pro se, the Court will consider his complaint “in light of all filings,

including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.” Moini v. LeBlanc,

, 40

(D.D.C. 2020) (citations omitted).

Mr. Brown fills his complaint with sweeping claims. See Compl. at 4–5, ECF No. 1.

He alleges a range of intangible injuries under a seemingly random selection of federal

statutes, most of which narrowly prohibit wrongdoing in situations far removed from this one. See,

e.g.,

(governing harassment on Federal Indian land); see also

(permitting a government attorney to file a civil action to restrain harassment of a victim in a

federal criminal case). Without connecting these statutes to his case, Mr. Brown shares generalized

injuries, writing that he has “been subjected to relentless harassment, bullying/intimidation,

cyberbullying, cyberstalking, defamation, retaliation” and other “violation[s]” of his rights

between March 2024 and August 2024, which are “still present.” See Compl. at 4. He writes that

this behavior occurred at FERC, and that the “level of severe hostile work environment and

misconduct” has been “very detrimental” to his “mental health.”

Under the “Relief” section, he

asks the Court to “rectif[y] . . . all unjust, discriminatory, retaliatory, [and] improper actions,”

which includes “rescind[ing]” his “performance improvement plan”2 and awarding him “court

fees, attorney fees, legal fees, phone costs, [and] postage fees.”

at 4–5. He also asks to be

“removed from the management of Ahlam [Kaissani] altogether.”

More details— although, many ambiguous—emerge in Mr. Brown’s additional filings.

Spanning more than 700 pages, they include over a dozen exhibits, a Motion for a Temporary

Injunction and Restraining Order, ECF No. 13, a Supplemental Memorandum, ECF No. 18, and a

2 In his Complaint, Mr. Brown mentions just one performance review. But the exhibits he filed include multiple negative performance reviews. See, e.g., ECF No 13-1 at 123.

2 Surreply, ECF No. 25. In a mix of screenshots, web pages, his own words, and emails with other

FERC employees, he attempts to paint a picture of the harassment he has been experiencing. One

exhibit depicts an EEO complaint Mr. Brown filed on May 13, 2024, where he alleged that the

harassment began on March 4, 2024, after a “Performance Discussion Meeting” with his

supervisor, Ms. Kaissani. See ECF No. 13-1 at 127–128; ECF No. 13-2 at 1–2. During the meeting,

Ms. Kaissani became “aggressive, abrasive, ill-mannered, unprofessional, [and] hostile[.]” ECF

No. 13-1 at 128. She “painted multiple false narratives” regarding his work performance, implied

that he is “ineffective,” and “didn’t say anything positive,” ECF No. 13-1 at 128. On May 17,

2024, Raquel Snowden, an EEO Counselor, interviewed Mr. Brown as a part of the “initial EEO

information fact gathering process.” See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Kadia R. Myles Declaration,

ECF No. 4-1 at 3. On June 5, 2024, Ms. Snowden concluded her investigation by emailing

Mr. Brown to tell him that she was issuing a “Notice of Right to File.” See Notice of Internal

Exhibits, ECF No. 9 at 2. Mr. Brown’s exhibits do not include the notice itself, but regulatory

guidance explains that this notice gave him 15 days to file a formal complaint with the EEO. See

(“The notice shall inform the complainant of the right to file a discrimination

complaint within 15 days of receipt of the notice[.]”). The record contains no evidence that

Mr. Brown took this step.

On June 24, 2024, Mr. Brown filed an official grievance with the FERC employees’ union,

AFGE Local 421, where a representative wrote: “Mr. Brown has been subject to repeated, regular,

and incessant micro-aggressions and inequity stemming from disparate treatment from

Ms. Kaissouni [sic], due to his race and color.” See ECF No. 13-1 at 92. The grievance further

alleged that Ms. Kaissani not only “became aggressive, unprofessional, and hostile,” during the

March 2024 meeting, but “threaten[ed] Mr. Brown’s job and grade promotional level

3 authority.”

On August 12, 2024, Mr. Brown filed an “Unfair Labor Practices” charge with the

Federal Labor Relations Authority where he claimed that Ms. Kaissani was retaliating against him

by refusing to allow a union representative to attend a meeting. See ECF No. 13-2 at 5–9. On

August 24, 2024, he filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel where he wrote that he

had had been subjected to “a severe hostile environment, put downs, mockery, excessive

micro- aggressions, and antagonistic acts[.]” See ECF No. 13-2 at 18.

The remainder of the record contains a mix of doctors’ notes stating that Mr. Brown is

suffering from anxiety, see, e.g., ECF No. 13-1 at 7, printed webpages about the standards of

harassment under various statutes, see, e.g., ECF No. 13-2 at 109, as well as screenshots of emails

and calendar invites, see, e.g., ECF No. 13-3 at 30. Under a header that reads “Evidence of

Inappropriate Work Feedback,” Mr. Brown shares a screenshot of an email from Ms. Kaissani

where she wrote: “Going forward, it’s essential that you adhere to the deadlines provided for

completing tasks, as this particular one was not turned in on time.” ECF No. 13-1 at 104. In

another, he provides an email that he sent to Ms. Kaissani telling her that it made him

“uncomfortable” that she emailed after 7 p.m. See ECF No. 13-2 at 63.

Medical assessments peppered into the record show that Mr. Brown repeatedly sought

attention for extreme stress. See ECF 13-1 at 1–41. On September 9, 2024, Doctor Peter Jan Jr.

from the Mid-Atlantic Permanent Medical Group wrote: “Eon Brown is a 31-year-old diagnosed

with anxiety, depression, stress, chronic headaches, and PTSD,” and he reports “a recent

exacerbation of his mental health conditions due to a distressing work environment.” Id. at 26.

On November 14, 2024, a union representative emailed FERC’s workplace relations team

demanding they look at “additional evidence” in his case. ECF No. 13-3 at 35. The evidence

appears to be an August 2024 email from an employee at FERC to Ms. Kaissani in which the

4 employee said that she planned to nominate Mr. Brown for an award. See ECF No. 13-3 at 33.

On November 14, 2024, Mr. Brown forwarded the newly surfaced email chain to another

colleague. Id. at 32. He wrote that he was “holding back tears,” because Ms. Kaissani “deliberately

and maliciously” did not share the nomination, which he viewed as part of her plan to “perpetually

antagonize, devalue, [and] alienate” him. Id.

B. Procedural Background

Mr. Brown filed this Complaint on September 4, 2024, bringing seven claims against his

employer, FERC, and his supervisor, Ms. Kaissani. See Compl. The Defendants moved to Dismiss

his Complaint on November 8, 2024. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Defs.’ Mot.), ECF No. 4. Mr. Brown

filed a brief response on December 2, 2024, ECF No. 6, and the Defendants replied on December

9, 2024, Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 7. Mr. Brown filed many more documents, including a combined

Motion for a Temporary Injunction and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, which contains

hundreds of pages of exhibits, see Pls.’ Combined Mot. for Temp. Inj. & Temp. Restraining Order,

ECF No. 13. The Defendants filed a Response to Mr. Brown’s Motion on January 15, 2024. Defs.’

Response, ECF No. 16. The Motions are fully briefed.

LEGAL STANDARD

A deep dive into the record is typically not appropriate at the motion to dismiss stage. But

the Court is mindful that “where the non-movant is proceeding pro se and has filed multiple

submissions in opposition to the motion to dismiss, the district court should endeavor to read the

party’s filings together and as a whole.” Fennell v. AARP,

(D.D.C. 2011).

In other words, no matter how “inartfully pleaded” a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, a Court must

grant him the benefit of all inferences that can flow from the facts he alleges. Haines v. Kerner,

(1972). Courts must hold pro se pleadings to a “less stringent standard than

5 formal pleadings” drafted by lawyers, but “need not assume the role of [their] advocate.”

Mehrbach v. Citibank, N.A.,

(D.D.C. 2018).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(1955)). A pro se plaintiff

need not submit intricately detailed factual allegations, but he must “furnish ‘more than labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Montgomery v.

Mayorkas, No. 23- cv-3931,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2024) (citing Twombly,

).

DISCUSSION

The Defendants identify numerous fatal errors in Mr. Brown’s case. For most of his claims,

they argue that he lacks a private right of action. Defs.’ Mot. at 3. As to the two remaining claims,

defamation under the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) and hostile workplace under Title VII, they

argue that dismissal is proper because Mr. Brown failed to exhaust administrative remedies or

plead sufficient facts.

After weighing all the filings at issue, including the trove of documents

that Mr. Brown produced, the Court grants the Defendants’ Motion and dismisses the case.

A. Private Right of Action

Mr. Brown advances a scattershot array of claims that this Court has done its best to

unscramble. Most fail out of the gate for a simple reason: the fact that a person is harmed, or a

federal statute is violated, “does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of

that person.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago,

(1979). While some federal statutes

contain explicit language authorizing individuals to bring a lawsuit, see, e.g., the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),

et seq., (“[a] civil action may be

brought…under

(e)”) (emphasis added), many federal statutes do not. A “private

6 right of action, which courts use to describe the right to bring a lawsuit, “must be created by

Congress.” Alexander v. Sandoval,

(2001). A private right of action can be

identified either through “rights-creating language” or factors like legislative intent. Sandoval,

(internal quotation marks omitted). Courts analyzing whether a statute creates

a private right of action pay close attention to whether the plaintiff is “one of the class[es] for

whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.” Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby,

(1916). Mr. Brown’s claims severely miss the mark. After combing through his submissions, the

Court finds that five of the seven statutes or regulations that he cites lack a private right of action.

First, Mr. Brown cites a chapter of the Victim and Witness Protection Act, which allows a

government attorney to stop the harassment of a victim or witness in a federal criminal case.

See Compl. at 3; see also

. As the Defendants note, Mr. Brown “pleads no facts

to support a plausible inference either that he is a victim or witness in a criminal case or that

Defendants harassed him.” Defs.’ Mot. at 10; see also Dickson v. Barnes, No. 22-cv-2698,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2022) (finding that a pro se plaintiff’s reliance on

failed because “no government attorney filed an application for a temporary

restraining order in this case”).

Second, Mr. Brown raises

, a regulation that governs the administration

of justice within tribal courts regarding harassment. See Compl. at 3; see also

.

But Mr. Brown fails to show that he was harassed in any protected area of Indian country. See

Defs. Mot. at 10. Even if he had, federal courts have rejected private claims under

, reasoning that “private citizens may not enforce federal criminal laws.” Lopez v. Pec,

No. 23-cv-23012,

, at *15 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2025).

Third, Mr. Brown raises a provision of the Violence Against Women Act that criminalizes

7 stalking. See Compl. at 3; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. Again, this “accords no private right of

action.” See LaRue v. Johnson, No. 16-504,

, at *11 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2018)

(collecting cases).

Fourth, Mr. Brown raises a portion of the Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and

Established Constitutional Heritage Act governing the recognition of foreign defamation

judgments. See Compl. at 3; see also

. As the Defendants note, Mr. Brown

“does not plausibly allege that there is a foreign judgment for defamation.” Defs.’ Mot. at 11.

Finally, Mr. Brown cites

, a regulation from the Family and Medical

Leave Act that prohibits employers from interfering with or retaliating against whistleblowers.

See Compl. at 3;

(a)(2). Mr. Brown’s exhibits show that he filed many

complaints about his supervisor, but he has presented no evidence that “he engaged in protected

activity under the statute[,] or that [the] Defendants retaliated against him for doing so.”

Defs.’ Mot. at 11.

Because none of these statutes or regulations provide a private cause of action, the Court

dismisses the claims that rely on them.

B. Defamation

Turning to the defamation claim, although Mr. Brown does not explicitly mention the

Federal Torts Claims Act as grounds for his claim, the Court will treat it as such given his pro se

status. See Hoai v. Superior Ct. of D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2008) (“pro se plaintiffs

are not required to use specific legal terms or phrases”) (emphasis in original). The FTCA provides

“the exclusive remedy for most claims against Government employees arising out of their official

conduct.” Hui v. Castaneda,

(2010). It “effected a limited waiver of the

government’s traditional immunity from suit by authorizing federal district courts to exercise

8 exclusive original jurisdiction over certain tort actions against the United States.” Lombard v.

United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part). But the FTCA

only waived the government’s immunity for negligent acts by federal employees. See Kugel v.

United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[Congress] has not waived immunity for

every type of tort.”). The statute includes an “intentional tort exception,” which states that liability

is not waived for “any claim arising out of . . . libel [or] slander[.]”

(h). “In other

words, both the United States and federal employees acting within the scope of their duties are

immune from common law actions for libel and slander.” Simpkins v. Dist. of Columbia Gov’t,

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Mr. Brown’s defamation claim is thus barred under the FTCA.

See, e.g., Chatman v. Perdue, No. 17-cv-1826,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2020)

(dismissing defamation claim against United States as barred by sovereign immunity).3

C. Title VII

Finally, Mr. Brown’s Title VII claim fails. The Defendants first argue that Mr. Brown did

not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the complaint. This is true, and not

insignificant. While filing complaints with the Equal Employment Office is cumbersome, the

“gauntlet of agency procedures and deadlines” required to “administratively exhaust” these claims

serve an important purpose. Crawford v. Duke,

(D.C. Cir. 2017). These

“‘rigorous exhaustion requirements’” work to “preserve[,] for the employing agency[,] a ‘crucial

administrative role’ in addressing alleged violations.” Webster v. Del Toro,

(D.C.

Cir. 2022) (quoting Brown v. GSA,

(1976)).

3 The Defendants also argue that Mr. Brown failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA. Defs.’ Mot. at 4. Not so. While plaintiffs must first exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an FTCA claim, defamation is not a viable FTCA claim. Mr. Brown had no duty to exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA because he had no viable claim. See Simpkins,

.

9 As failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under Title VII, it is the Defendants’ burden

to prove that Mr. Brown failed to complete this prerequisite. See Koch v. Walter,

(D.D.C. 2013). Courts faced with this inquiry may consider EEO administrative records

“without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment” because “such

records are public documents of which a court may take judicial notice.” Johnson v. Loc. Lodge

1759, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, No. 18-cv-1150,

, at *3 n.5 (D.D.C. June 17, 2019) (cleaned up). The Defendants have met their

burden. Mr. Brown received a “Notice to File” on June 5, giving him fifteen calendar days to file

a formal administrative EEO complaint with the agency. See Myles Decl. at 3. Mr. Brown did not

do so and instead filed suit in this Court. He thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

The Court again acknowledges that Mr. Brown went to great lengths to bring his claims in this

Court, but a failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be overcome.

In any event, the Defendants argue that Mr. Brown fails to state a plausible claim for relief

under Title VII. The Court agrees. To plead a Title VII claim, a plaintiff may use either direct or

circumstantial evidence which “permits an inference of discrimination.” Jenkins v. D.C.,

, 83 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Holcomb v. Powell,

(D.C. Cir. 2006)). When a plaintiff provides only “circumstantial support,” courts must turn to the

framework set out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See Battle v. D.C.

Dep’t of Transp., No. 19-cv-682,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2020). Under this

framework, a plaintiff must prove, “by a preponderance of evidence,” that “(1) she is a member of

a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action

gives rise to an inference of discrimination.’” Montgomery,

, at *3. While

“detailed factual allegations are not necessary,” a plaintiff must advance “sufficient factual matter,

10 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft,

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The information must be sufficiently detailed

enough to “nudge” a plaintiff’s claims over the line from “conceivable” to “plausible.”

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Mr. Brown fails to meet this burden. He employs colorful language to capture the alleged

harassment he has faced, but he provides almost no concrete details. He makes vague conclusory

statements, calling Ms. Kaissani’s behavior “antagonistic” and “intolerable.” See ECF 13-2 at 18.

He points to arbitrary actions, such as Ms. Kaissani making “inappropriate head gestures” during

a meeting on his performance, shooting him “unfavorable faces” and delivering “inappropriate and

crude remarks,” while subjecting him to “excessive micro-managing.” ECF No. 13-1 at 128. These

allegations are not sufficiently detailed to withstand dismissal.

But even assuming Mr. Brown had pleaded sufficiently detailed facts, he lacks another

critical element: evidence linking this action to a protected trait or activity. See Bryant v. Brownlee,

(D.D.C. 2003). Mr. Brown’s allegations do not support an inference that

the events he describes “have any racial . . . overtones.” Bryant,

. Instead,

they appear “completely neutral with regard to these protected classifications” and reflect “instead

strained relations with [his] coworker[] result[ing] from job-related tensions or personality

conflicts.”

One of the few times Mr. Brown mentions race is regarding a failing grade that

Ms. Kaissani gave him on a performance review, which suggested to Mr. Brown that Ms. Kaissani

wanted him “to be submissive to her as an African American male by flexing her authority.” ECF

No. 13-1 at 128. This conclusory statement alone does not support a racial discrimination claim .

As to Mr. Brown’s multiple poor performance reviews, see, e.g., ECF No. 13-1 at 128,

even if he had proven a causal connection between his reviews and a protected characteristic such

11 as race, this type of workplace action fails to meet the high threshold for harassment under Title

VII, see Sims v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., No. 17-cv-2519,

, at *22 (D.D.C. Nov.

20, 2020) (“Many of the challenged actions here—including [the] Plaintiff’s performance review

and placement on a [Performance Improvement Plan]—are the type of work-related actions by

supervisors that provide insufficient grounds for a hostile work environment claim.”) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Lowe v. Jackson,

(D.D.C.

2014) (“[T]here is no basis for the Court to find that [the Performance Improvement Plan’s]

implementation was tantamount to discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.”) Mr. Brown

insists that his performance reviews are actionable as they contain some falsehoods. But this, too,

fails. See Hutchinson v. Holder,

(D.D.C. 2011) (“negative performance

reviews—even if inaccurate, as [the] Plaintiff claims—are not strong indicia of a hostile work

environment”). In sum, while the Court is sympathetic to Mr. Brown’s plight, his surface

allegations under Title VII collapse under the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court grants the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4, and

denies the Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order,

ECF No. 13.

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: March 24, 2025

12