UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BARON JAMAL BELL, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 23-2036 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 22 : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, : : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Baron Jamal Bell sued the District of Columbia pro se following his termination

from the Department of Health. This Court previously granted the District’s motion to dismiss

Bell’s original complaint as unclear and overly long in violation of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8. Bell then filed a 15-count Amended Complaint alleging various violations of

, the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act (“DCWPA”), the D.C. Human Rights Act

(“DCHRA”), and the D.C. Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”), as well as five

theories under D.C. tort law. The District moves to dismiss once more, arguing that the

Amended Complaint also violates Rule 8 and that Bell fails to state a claim under any of his

theories. The Court agrees that Bell fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983 and declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining D.C. law claims.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Bell is a Black man who worked for the District of Columbia Department of Health’s

HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis, STD and TB Administration (“HAHSTA”) for four years prior to his

termination. Am. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 17. In January 2021, while participating in an Anti- Racism Group organized by a HAHSTA administrator, he believed that he witnessed a

coworker, who was a Black woman, being bullied over email by another coworker, Ivan Eaton.

Id. ¶ 12. Bell alleges that during this incident, Eaton “accused” the coworker of “making no

sense.” Id. Bell later emailed the Anti-Racism Group “demanding the incident be addressed,”

and after no action was taken Bell filed a report with the Department of Health’s Employee and

Labor Relations Manager. Id. ¶ 13. He states that this report was not investigated. Id. ¶ 14.

Bell alleges that Eaton launched a retaliation plot in response to these reports, which

resulted in the Employee and Labor Relations Manager requesting to meet with Bell about “a

communication” he wrote to Eaton in December 2020. Id. ¶ 15. During that meeting, the

manager “informed” Bell “that as a condition of his continued employment, he must submit an

affidavit denouncing any intent on killing, maiming, murdering, or injuring any DC government

officials or employees.” Id. ¶ 16. Bell’s supervisor later shared his understanding that Bell had

“threatened to kill” Eaton. Id. ¶ 18. Bell was then summoned to four mediation meetings

between April 28, 2021, and June 24, 2021, to address allegations that he created a hostile work

environment for a coworker, Sherita Grant. Id. ¶¶ 22–29.

On July 9, 2021, Bell filed a 17-page complaint with the District of Columbia

Department of Human Resources, and he alleges that he received no response. Id. ¶¶ 30–33. On

the same day, Bell “inform[ed] his supervisor that he [could not] perform in such a hostile

work environment” and requested unpaid extended leave. Id. ¶ 34. On July 27, 2021, that

request was denied, and Bell was placed on “absent without leave (AWOL)” status the following

day because he had not been reporting to work. Id. ¶¶ 35, 37. On December 14, 2021, the

District sent him a proposed separation letter for job abandonment, to which he responded by

“notifying the Defendant of his hostile and dangerous work environment.” Id. ¶¶ 45–46.

2 On June 2, 2022, the District informed Bell that due to a procedural error, his proposed

separation was being rescinded. Id. ¶ 53. On that same day, Grant sent Department of Health

Director LaQuandra Nesbitt a 19-page email Bell had sent to her personal email address. See id.

¶ 56; Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 22-1. 1 In that email sent on June 1, 2022, Bell

accused Grant of lying, chastised her at length, and discussed “those whores in the hood from

[her] childhood,” among numerous other topics. Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 7. The email

also referenced violence. One exclamation included, “[y]ou are the mother of a son who has

been convicted of murder and you want to play with violence Sherita?” Id. at 9. After Grant

responded that Bell should “[g]et [h]elp,” Bell replied that he hoped Grant would “be confident

in [her] TRUTH,” “[f]or when we have no fear of TRUTH then we are prepared to meet our

Lord on the Day of Reckoning.” Id. at 3. Some time after Director Nesbitt received this email,

Bell was instructed not to report to work. Am. Compl. ¶ 60.

1 A court considering a motion to dismiss is generally precluded from considering “matters outside the pleadings” unless the motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, “[a] district court may consider a document that a complaint specifically references without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). The document must be “referred to in the complaint and . . . integral to [the plaintiff’s] claim.”

(quoting Kaempe v. Myers,

(D.C. Cir. 2004)); see also Hinton v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that courts may consider “documents ‘upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies’ even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss”). The Amended Complaint quotes from the June 1, 2022, email to Grant and explains that the message led to recission of the instruction to return to work and ultimately Bell’s termination. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55–59. Bell’s Fourth Amendment and whistleblower claims additionally rely on the document. See

¶¶ 167–74, 107–15. Furthermore, Bell does not dispute that the email is authentic in his opposition to the District’s motion to dismiss. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11–12. As such, the Court concludes that the Amended Complaint specifically references the email and that it is integral to Bell’s claim. The Court may thus consider the contents of the email in resolving the motion to dismiss.

3 On July 20, 2022, Bell received a final summary removal notice from Director Nesbitt.

¶¶ 70–74. That notice indicated that the Department of Health’s summary removal action

issued on June 6, 2022, “is the appropriate resolution of this matter.” Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot.

Dismiss at 2. 2 “Accordingly, your last official day with the District of Columbia government

will remain June 6, 2022.”

Director Nesbitt reasoned that Bell’s conduct constituted an

“immediate hazard to the agency” and its staff and that his actions were “detrimental to the

public health safety, or welfare.”

She also cited Bell’s off-duty conduct and use of abusive

or otherwise unacceptable language.

That letter informed Bell that he had “the right to

challenge” his summary removal through the Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”). Id. at 4.

The record contains no indication that Bell appealed his termination to the OEA.

Bell initiated this lawsuit on July 14, 2023, filing a 136-page, 14-count complaint against

the District of Columbia. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 1. On June 5, 2024, this Court granted the

District’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Bell’s complaint was unclear and overly long,

affording him the opportunity to amend. See Mem. Op. at 14, ECF No. 16. Bell filed that

Amended Complaint on July 5, 2024, listing 15 counts against the District. See generally Am.

Compl.

The Amended Complaint includes claims under

alleging violations of

the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, including procedural and

substantive due process violations. See

¶¶ 91–166 (Counts One, Two, and Three). Bell

alleges a violation of the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act for his report that a coworker was

2 The Notice of Final Decision of Summary Removal is quoted at length in Bell’s Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70–84. As the Amended Complaint necessarily relies on the notice, and Bell does not contest its validity, the Court may consider the full document at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Banneker Ventures,

; Hinton,

.

4 being bullied and for his subsequent complaints. See

¶¶ 167–74 (Count Four). He alleges

that he experienced discrimination under the D.C. Human Rights Act based on sex, sexual

orientation, and religion. See

¶¶ 175–92 (Counts Five, Six, and Seven). Relatedly, he also

alleges constructive discharge and a hostile work environment. See

¶¶ 205–15 (Counts Nine

and Ten). Bell claims that the District violated the CMPA by placing him on absent without

leave status and then terminating him. See

¶¶ 193–204 (Count Eight). Finally, Bell claims

injury under five tort theories, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation,

invasion of privacy and false light, negligence, and wrongful termination. See

¶¶ 216–51

(Counts Eleven through Fifteen). The District filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the

Amended Complaint remains too long and convoluted, and that Bell fails to state a claim on the

merits. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 22. Bell opposes the motion to dismiss. See Pl.’s

Opp’n, ECF No. 25. 3

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal

sufficiency of a complaint” by asking whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim for which

relief can be granted. Browning v. Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). In considering such a motion, the complaint must be construed “liberally in

3 Bell moves to file a surreply. See Mot. for Leave to File Surreply, ECF No. 27. The decision to grant or deny leave to file a surreply “is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.” Banner Health v. Sebelius,

(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Akers v. Beal Bank,

(D.D.C. 2011)). “A court determining whether to allow a surreply considers whether the reply raises new arguments, whether the proposed surreply would be helpful to the resolution of the pending motion, and whether the other party would be unduly prejudiced.” Jackson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 19-cv-1487,

, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2022) (citing Glass v. Lahood,

, 230–31 (D.D.C. 2011)). Here, the District does not oppose the motion, the surreply purports to address new arguments raised in the District’s reply, and the District would not be prejudiced were leave to file granted. The Court therefore grants Bell’s motion to file the surreply.

5 the plaintiff’s favor with the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.”

Stewart v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Kowal v. MCI

Commc’ns Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1994)). But a court may disregard “inferences

drawn by a plaintiff if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.”

Nurriddin v. Bolden,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting Kowal,

).

Thus, although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007), “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, [if] accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (internal quotation omitted). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are

insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

(citing Twombly,

). Similarly,

there is no obligation to accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, nor to presume the truth of

legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly,

. The

Court may consider “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and

matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial

Sch.,

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc.,

, 1017–18 (5th Cir. 1996)).

Finally, because Bell is proceeding pro se, the Court will construe the Amended

Complaint liberally and hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976)). Thus, the Court may “examine other pleadings to understand the nature and basis

of [the plaintiff’s] pro se claims” as alleged in his complaint. Gray v. Poole,

,

6 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, even a pro se plaintiff is not excused from adhering to the

applicable procedural rules and must “plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more

than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor,

, 681–82

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal,

). Therefore, despite the liberality afforded pro

se complaints, the Court “need not accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged in the

complaint or ‘legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.’” Kaemmerling v. Lappin,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy,

(D.C.

Cir. 1994)).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court first considers Bell’s civil rights claims brought under

,

concluding that he fails to plausibly plead municipal liability. Having dealt with these federal

law claims, the Court considers whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bell’s twelve

remaining state law causes of action under the DCWPA, DCHRA, CMPA, and D.C. tort law.

The Court determines that these claims are appropriate for resolution by the D.C. Superior Court

in the first instance.

The District encourages the Court to dismiss Bell’s Amended Complaint as inconsistent

with Rule 8. See Def.’s Mot. at 7–9. As the Court observed in its prior memorandum opinion, a

lengthy and confusing complaint can frustrate the defendant’s and the Court’s abilities to discern

the essential facts underlying a plaintiff’s legal claims. See Mem. Op. at 10. The Court

continues to experience some difficulty determining exactly which facts underly which counts of

the Amended Complaint. The Court can sufficiently determine the nature of Bell’s claims,

however, with respect to his allegations of municipal liability against the District. The Court

thus declines to dismiss the Amended Complaint as inconsistent with Rule 8.

7 A. Section 1983 Claims

Bell claims that the D.C. Department of Health violated his First Amendment rights by

penalizing him for speaking on a matter of public concern and engaging in religious expression,

see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91–106, that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights by initiating an

investigation based on the email Grant forwarded, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 107–15, and that it

violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by failing to comply with the

CMPA at various times, see ¶¶ 116–66. The District moves to dismiss these claims because Bell

fails to plead municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

(1978), and the claims fail on their merits. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 1–19. Bell

asserts that he pleads municipal liability because Director Nesbitt is a final policymaker and the

Department of Health acted with deliberate indifference. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 18–20. The Court

concludes that Bell does not state facts sufficient to plead Monell liability.

To establish that a municipal entity is liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983, a

plaintiff must show that the local government’s official policy or custom was “the moving force

of the constitutional violation.” Monell,

. The D.C. Circuit has recognized four

pathways to Monell liability, under which a plaintiff must point to: (1) “the explicit setting of a

policy by the government that violates the Constitution,” (2) “the action of a policy maker within

the government,” (3) “the adoption through a knowing failure to act by a policy maker of actions

by his subordinates that are so consistent that they have become ‘custom,’” or (4) “the failure of

the government to respond to a need (for example, training of employees) in such a manner as to

show ‘deliberate indifference’ to the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional

violations.” Baker v. District of Columbia,

, 1306–07 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “Proof of

a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell,

8 unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional

municipal policy.” Parker v. District of Columbia,

, 711–12 (D.C. Cir. 1988)

(quoting City of Okla. City v. Tuttle,

, 823–24 (1985)).

Bell suggests that the District of Columbia is liable for constitutional violations because

Director Nesbitt fired him, and she has “final policymaking authority” under D.C. law. Triplett,

108 F.3d at 1453; see also id. (“The issue of final policymaking authority is one of state law.”);

Pl.’s Opp’n at 18–20. Bell conflates a final decision-maker with a final policy-maker. He points

to provisions of D.C. law that empower Director Nesbitt to, for instance, supervise the

Department of Public Health and remove employees. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 19–20 (citing D.C.

Mun. Regs. tit. 6-B § 1616.3;

;

;

).

Yet these are not “specific provisions in the D.C. Code granting the director authority to

promulgate rules for the administration of [her] respective department with regard to” personnel

matters. Byrd v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2011); see also Ryan v.

District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2018) (finding that fire chief was not

final policymaker because “Chapter 4 of Title 5 of the D.C. Code . . . does not delegate to the

Fire Chief the kind of broad employment, personnel, and discipline-related policymaking

authority”). Although Director Nesbitt may decide to terminate an employee, she lacks the

power to make final D.C. government policy that can deprive an employee of his constitutional

rights under Monell. See Triplett, 108 F.3d at 1453 (observing that the “authority to exercise

discretion” is insufficient).

, for instance, places the Department “under the

supervision and direction of a Director who shall be appointed by the Mayor” but does not grant

her the authority to make policy with regard to personnel issues. In addition, Bell points to D.C.

municipal regulations regarding summary suspension or removal of personnel. See Pl.’s Opp’n

9 at 19. There is no indication that Director Nesbitt promulgated these regulations, which are the

same ones she referred to when upholding Bell’s summary removal. See Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot.

Dismiss. She was therefore “constrained by policies not of [her own] making” in the isolated

decision of whether or not to terminate Bell. Byrd,

. Bell thus pleads

insufficient facts to show that his alleged constitutional injuries arose from the actions of a final

policymaker in the D.C. government.

Bell also contends that the District acted with deliberate indifference by failing to

respond to his “18-months of pleading for substantive and procedural due process.” Pl.’s Opp’n

at 20. “[A] city’s inaction, including its failure to train or supervise its employees adequately,

constitutes a ‘policy or custom’ under Monell when it can be said that the failure amounts to

‘deliberate indifference towards the constitutional rights of persons in its domain.’” Daskalea v.

District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris,

, 388–89 & n.7 (1989)). Deliberate indifference “is an objective standard, ‘determined

by analyzing whether the municipality knew or should have known of the risk of constitutional

violations, but did not act.’” Harvey v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir.

2015) (quoting Jones v. Horne,

(D.C. Cir. 2011)). “A municipality’s

culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to

train.” Connick v. Thompson,

(2011). To prevail, a plaintiff must show more

than simple or even heightened negligence; the District’s indifference must be conscious, or at

least reckless. See Canton,

.

Even assuming that the District of Columbia’s actions in this case were unconstitutional,

Bell pleads no facts showing that they arose from the city’s failure to train, properly supervise, or

correct any pervasive unconstitutional actions of its employees. Nor does he demonstrate that

10 officials were conscious of any shortcomings in a manner that might render those failures to be

official policy or custom within the District. See Connick,

(requiring city officials

to be on “notice” that training is deficient). Instead, he points to his own case—a “single

incident of” alleged “unconstitutional activity”—as evidence of a broader policy. Parker, 850

F.2d at 711–12; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 20. This is insufficient, as “[a] pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate

deliberate indifference.” Connick,

; see also Harvey, 798 F.3d at 331–33 (finding

deliberate indifference after the District “disregard[ed] the medical needs of involuntarily

committed mental patients” for decades); Watson v. District of Columbia, No. 23-cv-1670,

, at *5–6 (D.D.C. July 19, 2024) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint stated

facts justifying allegation of improper training); Bah v. District of Columbia, No. 23-cv-1248,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2024) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint

stated that reports and memoranda made D.C. jail aware of inadequate staffing and supervision

leading to violation of plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights). Bell alleges no such widespread

risks of constitutional harm within the D.C. government of which policymakers were made

aware. As such, he cannot rest Monell liability on a deliberate indifference theory.

The Court concludes that Bell fails to plead municipal liability under Monell, as he does

not show that the District was “the moving force of” any “constitutional violation.” Monell,

. The District therefore cannot be held liable for any constitutional violations that its

employees may have committed. The Court thus grants the District’s motion to dismiss as to

Counts One through Three. Because Bell does not establish Monell liability, the Court does not

determine whether any underlying constitutional violations in fact occurred.

11 B. Remaining State Law Claims

Bell asserts that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining claims

brought under D.C. law. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 13; Am. Compl. at 2. 4 “When a federal court has an

independent basis for exercising federal jurisdiction, it may, in certain circumstances, also

exercise pendent, or supplemental, jurisdiction over related claims under state law.” Women

Prisoners of District of Columbia Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia,

(D.C.

Cir. 1996); see also

. There is a two-part test for determining when it is

appropriate for a federal district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. First, the Court

determines “whether the state and the federal claims ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative

fact’; if they do, the court has the power, under Article III of the Constitution, to hear the state

claim.” Women Prisoners,

(quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,

(1966)). Second, “even if it concludes that it has that power, the district court

must then decide whether to exercise its discretion to assert jurisdiction over the state issue.”

(citing United Mine Workers of America,

). “State and federal claims share a

common nucleus of operative facts if the claims are such that the plaintiff would ordinarily be

expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.” Chelsea Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n v. 1815

A St., Condo. Group, LLC,

(D.D.C. 2007) (citing United Mine Workers

of America,

). “A common nucleus of operative facts exists when there is a link

or overlap between the facts of the state and federal claims.”

(citing Women Prisoners,

).

4 The Court observes that “the District is not subject to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Long v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1987).

12 Courts determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after federal claims

have been dismissed must consider “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”

Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l,

(D.C. Cir. 2005). While the decision is left to each

court’s discretion, see United Mine Workers,

, when all federal claims are

eliminated before trial, the “balance of the[] factors” weighs toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

(1988). As such, the D.C. Circuit has identified a clear preference for courts to exercise

their discretion to remand state claims back to District of Columbia courts once all federal

questions have “left the building.” Kyle v. Bedlion,

(D.D.C. 2016)

(quoting Araya v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

(D.C. Cir. 2014)).

In Bell’s case, these factors weigh against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over

his remaining state law claims. The three federal § 1983 claims over which the Court exercised

federal question jurisdiction are dismissed, and the remaining twelve claims are based entirely in

District of Columbia law. The D.C. Superior Court is better positioned to resolve these issues

regarding the DCWPA, DCHRA, and CMPA in the first instance. This also includes the

CMPA’s potential preclusion of Bell’s common law tort claims. See Def.’s Mot. at 21.

Furthermore, discovery in this case has not yet begun, and the case has not progressed in federal

court past the District’s motions to dismiss. The Court thus “decline[s] to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction” because it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

(c). The Court additionally determines that the D.C. law claims at issue here

“substantially predominate[]” over the federal claims it has dismissed.

§ 1367(c)(2).

13 V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the District of Columbia’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: March 25, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

14