UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PATRICK EDDINGTON, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 19-2794 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 46, 49 : U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, : : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Patrick Eddington submitted a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to

the United States Department of State for any documents mentioning Amir Meshal, a U.S.

citizen who was detained by Kenyan and Ethiopian authorities for more than four months during

2007. Eddington filed this lawsuit after the Department of State denied his request for expedited

processing and failed to timely produce the requested records. The Department of State then

made approximately two dozen productions of responsive documents over the ensuing two years.

The scope of the parties’ dispute has now narrowed to the Department of State’s decision to

withhold two unclassified cables recounting information Meshal shared with U.S. officials

during consular visits while he was detained. The Department of State withheld the records

under FOIA Exemption 6 because it determined that their release would represent an

unwarranted invasion of Meshal’s personal privacy. After reviewing the records in camera, the

Court finds that Meshal has a privacy interest in their contents, but that the public interest would be served by the release of some information in one of the cables. The Court does not find this

limited intrusion into Meshal’s privacy to be unwarranted. The Court therefore instructs the

Department of State to release specific portions of the cable in unredacted form.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Amir Meshal, a U.S. citizen, filed a Bivens action in 2009 alleging that he was detained

by a joint U.S.-Kenyan-Ethiopian operation along the Somali border while fleeing unrest in

Mogadishu. See Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Meshal Compl.”), ECF No. 49-2; see also

Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Pl.’s SUMF”) ¶ 10, ECF No. 49-3. In his

detailed federal complaint, Meshal alleged that he was arrested by Kenyan security forces in late

January 2007 while in possession of his U.S. passport, transported to Nairobi, and held in poor

conditions without access to counsel or communications. Meshal Compl. ¶¶ 47–55, 80–81. He

alleged that when U.S. officials learned of his presence, agents from the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (“FBI”) interrogated him several times. Id. ¶¶ 56–76, 82–88. Meshal additionally

alleged that Kenyan authorities continued to hold him solely at the behest of the FBI, and that the

FBI threatened him and denied him access to legal counsel. See id. ¶¶ 76–80, 83, 86–91, 96, 99,

102. After Kenyan courts began hearing detainees’ habeas petitions, Meshal recounted, he was

transferred to Somalia on February 9, 2007, and later sent to Ethiopia on or about February 16,

2007, where he was again kept in poor conditions. See id. ¶¶ 108–19, 130–31. Meshal alleged

that U.S. officials orchestrated his continued detention by foreign security forces so that they

could continue to interrogate him without access to counsel. Id. ¶ 122–29A, 132–33, 136–53,

160, 163–65A. On or about May 24, 2007, Meshal was released and flew back to the United

States. Id. ¶ 166. Meshal asserted that he informed Department of State officials of his

2 treatment and interrogation by FBI agents during consular visits in Kenya on February 7, 2007,

and in Ethiopia on March 21, March 29, and April 3, 2007. Id. ¶¶ 103, 157, 159. 1

On April 26, 2019, Eddington filed a FOIA request with the Department of State, seeking

“any Department of State documents that mention Amir Mohamed Meshal, a U.S. citizen . . .

who was held by both Kenyan and Ethiopian government entities in 2006-2007.” Pl.’s Resp. to

Def.’s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 2, ECF No. 49-4. On September 18, 2019, Eddington filed

this lawsuit after the Department of State denied his request for expedited processing and failed

to timely respond to the FOIA request. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Between December 12, 2019,

and February 7, 2022, the Department of State made approximately two dozen productions of

responsive documents. See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 5, ECF No. 49-4.

The Department of State withheld about 600 pages of records, including classified information

exempted from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 1. See id. ¶ 8. At this stage, Eddington

challenges the Department of State’s decision to redact information in two unclassified cables

under Exemption 6 that it determined would represent a clearly unwarranted invasion of

Meshal’s personal privacy. The parties cross-move for summary judgment on that issue. See

Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 46; Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 49. Because the parties

debate the contents of the cables and their public interest value, the Court instructed the

Department of State to submit the records for in camera review. See Min. Order dated Mar. 12,

2025; Notice of In Camera Submission, ECF No. 55.

According to the Vaughn Index, the first record is a three-page cable sent from American

Embassy Nairobi on March 26, 2007. See Ex. C to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Vaughn Index”),

1 The district court dismissed Meshal’s case because his claims were not cognizable under Bivens, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed. See Meshal v. Higgenbotham,

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

3 ECF No. 46-5. The cable “regard[s] detention of Amir Meshal in Kenya” and “contains private

details of Mr. Meshal’s ordeal relayed to consular officers during an interview.”

This

includes “personally identifiable information and information about the travel, detention, and

repatriation experience of an American citizen in Somalia and Kenya as provided in an interview

to Consular personnel and law enforcement.”

The Department of State redacted the Nairobi

cable in full, other than a paragraph summarizing the U.S. Ambassador’s public remarks on

Kenya’s deportation of U.S. citizens. See Redacted Nairobi Cable, ECF No. 56-2. The Court’s

in camera review of the Nairobi cable confirms that it contains this information. However, the

cable also contains several paragraphs recounting U.S. officials’ actions in response to Meshal’s

detention, including the involvement of FBI officials, consular officials’ efforts to access

Meshal, and opposition to his transfer to Ethiopia.

The second record is a two-page cable sent from American Embassy Addis Ababa on

April 2, 2007, which “detail[s] the detention of an American citizen” and “contains intimate

details of the citizen’s detention, physical and mental condition, communications with family,

and potential mistreatment.” Vaughn Index. The cable also “contains statements regarding the

health, conditions of detention, financial information, and familial status of the American

citizen.”

The Department of State redacted most of this personal information before

releasing the record, although unredacted information reveals that the cable concerns Meshal and

his detention in Ethiopia. See Redacted Addis Ababa Cable, ECF No. 56-1. The Court’s in

camera review confirms the accuracy of this description, and that the cable does not describe

U.S. officials’ activities. 2

2 Eddington initially disputed application of Exemption 6 to another cable from American Embassy Addis Ababa that was withheld in full. See Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. at 8–9, 14 n.5, ECF No. 49-1. The Department clarified that the entire record was subject to

4 III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Freedom of Information Act is meant “to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy

and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray,

(1991) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose,

(1976)). It “directs that

‘each agency, upon any request for records . . . shall make the records promptly available to any

person’ unless the requested records fall within one of the statute’s nine exemptions.” Loving v.

Dep’t of Def.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting

(a)(3)(a)). “Consistent

with the Act’s goal of broad disclosure,” those exemptions should be “given a narrow compass.”

U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Tax Analysts,

(1989). “The agency bears the burden of

establishing that a claimed exemption applies.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2014).

Because FOIA cases do not ordinarily involve disputed facts, they “are typically and

appropriately decided on motions for summary judgment.” Moore v. Bush,

(D.D.C. 2009) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In assessing whether the movant has met that burden, a

court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all

reasonable inferences in his favor, and eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the

evidence.” Montgomery v. Chao,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “This

burden does not shift even when the requester files a cross-motion for summary judgment

because ‘the Government ultimately has the onus of proving that the documents are exempt from

FOIA Exemption 1 as classified material, and Eddington withdrew his challenge to the cable. See Pl.’s Reply at 8 n.1, ECF No. 54.

5 disclosure.’” Hardy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives,

(D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. Food & Drug

Admin.,

, 904–05 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

Even if a FOIA exemption applies, an agency cannot withhold information unless it also

“reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by” the exemption.

(a)(8)(A)(i)(I); see Leopold v. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2024)

(“Even if an exemption covers an entire agency record, the agency still must release any

reasonably segregable information within the record that could be disclosed without causing

reasonably foreseeable harm to an interest that the exemption protects.”); Reps. Comm. for

Freedom of the Press v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,

(D.C. Cir. 2021)

(explaining the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016’s “foreseeable harm” requirement).

IV. ANALYSIS

Exemption 6 permits a federal agency to withhold certain records based on personal

privacy concerns. The parties here dispute the Department of State’s application of this

exemption to the two cables from the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. The

Department of State argues that Meshal and others have privacy interests in the information

contained within the cables, and that there is no public interest in the information because it does

not reveal government functions. Eddington responds that Meshal lacks a privacy interest

because he revealed the information in a lengthy federal complaint, and that the cables would

demonstrate when the Department of State knew about Meshal’s detention, as well as its failure

to bring Meshal back to the United States. After reviewing the cables in camera, the Court

concludes that Meshal does have a privacy interest in the information contained within the

records, but that at least some of the information sheds light on government activities. The Court

6 finds that release of six paragraphs within the Nairobi Cable would not represent a clearly

unwarranted invasion of Meshal’s personal privacy and directs the Department of State to release

that information.

A. Legal Standard for Exemption 6

Exemption 6 applies to “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

(b)(6). There are three stages to analyzing whether Exemption 6 properly applies. See

Perioperative Servs. & Logistics, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,

(D.C.

Cir. 2023). First, the analysis “requires . . . a determination of whether the document in question

qualifies as a ‘personnel, medical, or similar file.’” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Navy,

(D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008)). The term “similar files” is “construed broadly and is ‘intended to

cover detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that

individual.’” Gov’t Accountability Project v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

, 105–06

(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co.,

(1982)).

Because Eddington does not contest the Department of State’s characterization of the

information withheld as “similar files,” see Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. and in

Supp. of Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mot.”) at 10 n.2, ECF No. 49-1, the Court will not

analyze this issue further.

Second, the Court must “determine whether there is a ‘substantial’ privacy interest in

preventing the document[s’] disclosure.” Jud. Watch,

(quoting Nat’l Ass’n

of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner,

(D.C. Cir. 1989)). “[U]se of the word

7 substantial in this [FOIA] context means less than it might seem. A substantial privacy interest

is anything greater than a de minimis privacy interest.” Multi Ag Media, 515 F.3d at 1229–30.

Third, if a substantial privacy interest has been identified, then the Court must “determine

whether [the records’] disclosure ‘would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy’” within the meaning of the statute.

at 1228 (quoting

(b)(6)). To do

this, the Court “balance[s] the privacy interest that would be compromised . . . against any public

interest in the requested information.” Id.; see also Sullivan v. Veterans Admin.,

(D.D.C. 1985) (describing two steps to the balancing analysis: first, “identify[ing] the

nature and magnitude of the various interests involved” and second, “balancing these competing

interests”). To establish a public interest, a plaintiff must show “that the public interest sought to

be advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its

own sake,” and that “the information is likely to advance that interest.” Nat’l Archives & Recs.

Admin. v. Favish,

(2004). FOIA “tilt[s] the balance (of disclosure interests

against privacy interests) in favor of disclosure.” Wash. Post. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &

Hum. Servs.,

(D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing Ditlow v. Shultz,

(D.C. Cir. 1975)).

B. Application to Department of State Cables

1. Privacy Interest

The Department of State argues that it has carried its burden to demonstrate that Meshal

has a privacy interest in the information contained within the records, as they relate to his

familial relations, health, finances, and conditions of detention. See Mem. in Supp. Def.’s Mot.

Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 10–11, ECF No. 46-1. Eddington responds that this information

“would ordinarily implicate a person’s privacy,” but that Meshal has no privacy interest because

8 he “has disclosed all that information in a highly publicized court action.” Pl.’s Mot. at 11. The

Court finds that Meshal and others have an enduring privacy interest in the information

contained in the cables.

The Supreme Court has counseled that “[a]n individual’s interest in controlling the

dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that

information may be available to the public in some form.” U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Lab. Rels.

Auth.,

(1994). There is a “privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of

certain information even where the information may have been at one time public.” U.S. Dep’t

of Just. v. Reps. Comm. For Freedom of Press,

(1989). “[B]oth the common

law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information

concerning his or her person.”

. The Court reads these cases to mean that Meshal has a

privacy interest in information even though he previously placed some of the relevant facts into

the public sphere.

Eddington cites several cases holding that individuals forfeit privacy interests when they

choose to make certain information public. See Pl.’s Mot. at 11–12 (citing, among others,

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. DOJ (“CREW”),

, 1091–92

(D.C. Cir. 2014)). In CREW, the D.C. Circuit considered whether an individual had a privacy

interest in an FBI investigation into his activities after he announced publicly that the

Department of Justice had declined to bring charges against him. CREW,

. The

court reasoned that the FBI could disclose that it had records related to an investigation into the

individual, as his “public statements confirmed he had been under investigation.”

(discussing propriety of Glomar response). The court concluded that although his “action

lessened his interest in keeping secret the fact that he was under investigation, he retained a

9 second, distinct privacy interest in the contents of the investigative files.”

. The court

analogized the case to Kimberlin v. Department of Justice, in which “a prosecutor . . . publicly

acknowledged he was the subject of a disciplinary investigation,” but did not thereby “waive all

his interest in keeping the contents of the [disciplinary] file confidential.”

(quoting Kimberlin

v. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 1998)). In Kimberlin, the Circuit explained that

the official “still ha[d] a privacy interest . . . in avoiding disclosure of the details of the

investigation, of his misconduct, and of his punishment—and perhaps, too, an interest in

preventing hitherto speculative press reports of his misconduct from receiving authoritative

confirmation from an official source.” Kimberlin,

.

The Court does not interpret this caselaw to mean that government agencies must release

records containing sensitive personal information whenever an individual has revealed related

information in a public forum. Kimberlin and CREW stand at most for the proposition that the

Department of State correctly acknowledged that the cables exist and relate to Meshal’s ordeal.

See Vaughn Index (discussing the general topic of the cables); see also Redacted Nairobi Cable;

Redacted Addis Ababa Cable. The Circuit counseled, however, that an individual’s public

discussion of the subject matter does not undermine his interest in avoiding release of the

records’ detailed contents. See CREW,

; Kimberlin,

. It is true,

as Eddington argues, that Meshal’s federal complaint sharing his experience in foreign detention

is readily available. See Pl.’s Reply at 2–3 (explaining that the complaint is available through

PACER and on the internet). Yet the Court’s in camera review confirms the Department of

State’s assertion that “the information redacted and the information in Meshal’s complaint are

not one and the same.” Def.’s Reply at 6, ECF No. 52. Meshal’s choice to reveal some

10 information during litigation does not vitiate his right to privacy regarding the remaining

information.

In addition, Eddington is incorrect that Meshal wholly “lacks a privacy interest” in

information he has shared elsewhere. Pl.’s Mot. at 14. Eddington points to Nation Magazine,

Washington Bureau v. U.S. Customs Service,

(D.C. Cir. 1995), where the Circuit

considered whether billionaire presidential candidate Ross Perot had a privacy interest in

redaction of his name from records after he publicly offered private assistance to federal

authorities in the interdiction of drugs. See

at 888 & n.1. The court concluded there that

“Perot’s decision to bring information connecting himself with such efforts into the public

domain differentiates his privacy interest from” others “who did not voluntarily divulge their

identities” in relation to the requested records.

. The Circuit reasoned in Nation

Magazine, however, that “[Ross] Perot ha[d] some interest in nondisclosure of any records

regarding his offers of assistance,” but that it may be “less substantial” than an interest in records

associating him with a criminal investigation, for example.

. Perot retained an interest

in nondisclosure even though he—like Meshal—made statements that received significant

publicity. In Kimberlin, too, the court observed that the prosecutor’s public statements about his

disciplinary proceedings “diminish[ed]” his privacy interest, but did not destroy it entirely.

; see also CREW,

(explaining that the individual’s public statements

“lessened” his privacy interest, rather than eliminated it). 3 Thus, Meshal’s privacy interest is

3 The Court further observes that both cables contain information related to Meshal’s family members. See Vaughn Index. The Circuit has instructed that one person’s waiver of a privacy interest “has no effect on the privacy interests of others.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,

(D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Milton v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2011) (explaining that “a protected privacy interest can be waived only by the person whose interest is affected”). To the extent that Meshal could have fully waived his

11 potentially reduced regarding information he made public in his federal complaint, while his

privacy interest in non-public information within the records remains fully intact. Meshal thus

has “greater than a de minimis privacy interest” in the two records at issue here. Multi Ag Media,

515 F.3d at 1229–30.

2. Public Interest

The next step is to identify any public interest in the information within the requested

records and then balance that with the privacy interests. See Multi Ag Media,

.

The Department of State argues that the redacted information has “no relevancy or nexus” to a

public interest. Def.’s Mot. at 11. Eddington responds that “the records would expand the

public’s understanding of State’s failure to help Meshal despite his claims” of mistreatment, Pl.’s

Mot. at 15, and that “the cables would likely illuminate whether and when State was aware of

possible FBI involvement in Meshal’s detention and how it reacted to learning those

allegations,” id. at 16. He additionally suggests that “the public has a strong interest in

understanding how State investigates U.S. citizens’ allegations of mistreatment while they are

detained abroad.” Id. at 17. The Court finds a public interest in six redacted paragraphs of the

Nairobi Cable, and that release of those paragraphs would not constitute a clearly unwarranted

invasion of Meshal’s personal privacy.

“Where a legitimate privacy interest is implicated, the requester must ‘(1) show that the

public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having

the information for its own sake, and (2) show the information is likely to advance that interest.’”

Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Boyd v. Crim.

privacy interests by filing a lawsuit about the subject matter of the cables, he could not waive the privacy interests of family members discussed in the cables.

12 Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2007)). Exemption 6 applies only when

disclosure of private information “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy.”

(b)(6). Whether disclosure of private information is warranted turns on

whether it furthers “the citizens’ right to be informed about ‘what their government is up to,’”

including when “[o]fficial information . . . sheds light on an agency’s performance of its

statutory duties.” Reps. Comm.,

. Therefore, “[t]he only relevant public interest

in disclosure ‘is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the FOIA, which

is contribut[ing] significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the

government.’” Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &

Hum. Servs.,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. FLRA,

(1994)); see also Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin.

v. Favish,

(2004) (noting public interest in knowing whether “responsible

officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties”). “That

purpose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is

accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency’s

own conduct.” Reps. Comm.,

.

Following its own in camera review, the Court agrees with the Department of State that

most of the information in the cables lacks a relevant nexus to the public interest. As explained

in the Vaughn index, the cables largely detail Meshal’s experience during foreign detention, his

familial status, and his financial information. See Vaughn Index. This information does not

reveal the “operations or activities of the government.” Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr.,

(emphasis removed). Nor does it shed light on the Department of State’s “performance of

its statutory duties.” Reps. Comm.,

. As Meshal retains a privacy interest in this

13 information, and there is no public interest in its disclosure, the Department of State properly

applied Exemption 6 to most of the paragraphs in the records. See Milton v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2011) (“[E]ven a modest privacy interest outweighs nothing

every time.”).

The Court identifies six paragraphs of the Nairobi Cable, however, that do further the

public’s understanding of the “operations or activities of the government.’” Consumers’

Checkbook Ctr.,

(emphasis removed). Paragraph 1 provides a summary

discussing FBI and other officials’ contact with Meshal, while paragraphs 2 and 7 describe

consular officials’ efforts to locate him. 4 Paragraphs 6, 8, and 9 recount the embassy officials’

protest to Kenyan authorities regarding deportation of U.S. citizens to Somalia, Meshal’s later

transfer to Ethiopia, and the officials’ protest regarding lack of notification about Meshal’s

arrest. These paragraphs demonstrate the Department of State’s “performance of its statutory

duties.” Reps. Comm.,

. In particular, federal officials are empowered to seek

information about, assist, and potentially demand the release of American citizens imprisoned

abroad. See

;

(j);

; 7 Foreign Affairs Manual

§§ 411–17.5, 421–26.5. The Court thus finds that the “public interest sought to be advanced is a

significant one,” and that “the information is likely to advance th[is] interest” in the

government’s performance of these duties. Sussman,

.

These paragraphs do contain at least some information regarding Meshal’s detention, but

the details can also be found in Meshal’s publicly available complaint. See Meshal Compl. ¶¶ 2,

4 One parenthetical in paragraph 2 contains information about Meshal’s place and date of birth that lacks a nexus to the public interest and may remain redacted. The last sentence of paragraph 7 discusses confidential family information that lacks a nexus to a public interest and may remain redacted.

14 108–15, 119. He thus has a reduced privacy interest in those facts. In contrast, the Court finds a

substantial public interest in the Department of State’s actions responding to his detention. The

Court therefore finds that this invasion of Meshal’s personal privacy is not “unwarranted,” much

less clearly so. See Reps. Comm.,

(explaining that “whereas Exemption 6

requires that the invasion of privacy be ‘clearly unwarranted,’ the adverb ‘clearly’ is omitted

from Exemption 7(C),” creating a comparatively higher bar for withholding under Exemption 6).

3. Foreseeable Harm

Although some information within the records must be released, the Court must

nonetheless consider whether releasing the paragraphs the Department of State has otherwise

properly redacted would foreseeably harm the privacy interests at issue here. See Leopold,

(quoting

(a)(8)(A)(i)). “[W]hether a requested record falls within an

exemption and whether the disclosure of that record would foreseeably harm an interest

protected by the exemption are distinct, consecutive inquiries.”

“Agencies, therefore, must

provide ‘a focused and concrete demonstration of why disclosure of the particular type of

material at issue will . . . actually impede’ the interests protected by a FOIA exemption.”

(quoting Reps. Comm.,

). The Court established above that Meshal has a privacy

interest in the records at issue in this litigation, which has not been forfeited by his decision to

publicly reveal some information in his Bivens lawsuit. As the Department of State described in

its Vaughn Index and declaration, and as the Court has confirmed, the redacted information is

personal in nature and relates to a particular individual’s travel, detention, and repatriation

experience. See Vaughn Index; Second Weetman Decl. ¶¶ 15–20, ECF No. 47-2. Disclosure of

those paragraphs within the records would inevitably harm Meshal’s privacy interest, as well as

those of his family members mentioned within the documents, by making the information public.

15 The Court thus finds that the Department of State has shown that disclosure of the remaining

paragraphs would foreseeably harm an interest protected by Exemption 6.

C. Segregability

The Department of State argues that it “carefully reviewed all three cables and released

all segregable, non-exempt information to Plaintiff.” Def.’s Mot. at 12. The agency also

explains that it “conducted a line-by-line review” of each record and found “no additional

meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.” Vaughn

Index. Eddington’s segregability argument relies largely on the notion that the records contain

information in which Meshal lacks a privacy interest, and that some of that information must be

segregable. See Pl.’s Mot. at 14. The Court has found that Meshal does have a privacy interest

in the redacted information, but it must nonetheless make a finding as to segregability. See

Sussman,

.

Even when FOIA exemptions apply, “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record

shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are

exempt.”

(b). This rule of segregation applies to all FOIA exemptions. See Ctr.

for Auto Safety v. EPA,

(D.C. Cir. 1984). “It has long been a rule in this Circuit

that non-exempt portions of a document must be disclosed unless they are inextricably

intertwined with exempt portions.” Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force,

(D.C. Cir. 1977).

The Court has identified six paragraphs in the Nairobi Cable that may be reasonably

segregated from Meshal’s exempted personal information. The Department of State may

additionally redact the parenthetical in paragraph 2 relaying Meshal’s place and date of birth, as

well as the last sentence of paragraph 7 discussing Meshal’s family members. The remaining

16 parts of the two records relay Meshal’s personal information, and based on its in camera review

the Court finds no “non-exempt portions” to disclose.

. The agency has thus carried

out its segregability obligations regarding the material that may remain redacted within the

records.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Department of State’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and Eddington’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Department of State shall release paragraphs 1, 2 (other

than place and date of birth information), 6, 7 (other than the last sentence of the paragraph), 8,

and 9 of the Nairobi Cable, Doc. No. C06842040. The Department of State has carried its

burden to demonstrate proper application of FOIA Exemption 6 to the remaining information in

the records. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and

contemporaneously issued.

Dated: March 27, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

17