UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GINA LATTURE,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 23-1364 (TJK)

PRIORITY LIFE CARE, LLC,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In January 2021, Gina Latture began working as the director of marketing for Priority Life

Care, LLC while the company prepared to open a new assisted-living facility in her native South-

east D.C. Her eight-month tenure in that role, though, was rocky. She did not always comply with

Priority Life’s “marketing non-negotiables”—core practices that the company had distilled into

requirements for its marketing team. In July of that year, Priority Life placed her on a performance

improvement plan that underscored heeding those rules. But things did not get better, and Priority

Life fired her about a month later for insubordination and other conduct problems.

Suing under Title VII, Latture alleges that the real reasons for her firing were racial dis-

crimination and retaliation, and that she endured a hostile work environment. She insists that

several Priority Life employees made racist remarks during her time there. And her objection to

one of those comments, in her view, caused Priority Life to place her on the improvement plan and

then fire her. But Latture has not created a genuine dispute on the key issue for her discrimination

claim: whether Priority Life’s nondiscriminatory reason for firing her because of subordination

was pretextual. Nor has she shown that her limited opposition to one racist remark caused Priority

Life to take an adverse action against her three months later. And finally, the isolated remarks that she points to were not severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment, so

her hostile-work-environment claim falters too. Thus, the Court will grant Priority Life’s motion

for summary judgment and enter judgment on its behalf.

I. Background

Founded in 2009, Priority Life Care, LLC aims to provide affordable housing to senior

citizens. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 1. The company is headquartered in Fort Wayne, Indiana, but it even-

tually began managing Livingston Place in Southeast Washington, D.C. Id. ¶¶ 2, 5. This “brand

new assisted living facility” had “over 150 units” and was meant to serve low-income residents of

the District, especially those in Ward 8. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.

Gina Latture grew up in this part of D.C. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 6. She applied to work for

Priority Life as the Director of Sales and Marketing at Livingston Place. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. In December

2020, Tammy Gerardot—Priority Life’s Regional Director of Operations with “oversight respon-

sibility for Livingston Place”—and her colleague interviewed Latture for that role. ECF No. 29-5

(“Gerardot Dec.”) ¶ 5; see also ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 7. Gerardot “approved making” Latture “an offer

of employment,” see Gerardot Dec. ¶ 5, and Latture began working for Priority Life in early Jan-

uary 2021, see ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 8. 1

Latture’s “primary duty” as Livingston’s head of sales and marketing was to “[m]anage

and create strategic initiatives” that would “maximize admissions” to the facility. ECF No. 29-3

at 88. In other words, her main job was “build[ing], grow[ing], and maintain[ing] an acceptable”

1 Latture insists that she received the offer “from Defendant” Priority Life, not from Gerar- dot. For support, she cites Exhibit 1 of her deposition testimony—a letter from “Tammy Gerardot” describing the “offer of employment.” ECF No. 29-3 at 84–85. Latture does not dispute that Gerardot interviewed her, and Gerardot explained in her declaration that she “approved making” the “offer.” Gerardot Dec. ¶ 5. In short, there is no genuine dispute that Gerardot was personally involved in the hiring decision for Latture and sent her the offer letter.

2 number of residents in Livingston as the facility opened its doors. 2 ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 8; see also

ECF No. 29-3 at 11–12. But Priority Life also has “marketing non-negotiables” that, as the name

suggests, represent a “core set of processes and tools” that marketers are “train[ed]” on and “ex-

pected to use.” ECF No. 29-6 ¶ 6; ECF No. 29-3 at 155–57. For example, “callbacks” must

happen the “same day” as an inquiry, and the same is true for entering sales leads into Priority

Life’s database for managing customer relationships. ECF No. 29-3 at 156; see also ECF No. 29-

6 ¶ 6. The marketing plan must also use MailChimp—an email-marketing platform—to create

monthly email communications to referral contacts. ECF No. 29-3 at 156. Latture received mar-

keting materials describing these non-negotiables and, in late January 2021, participated in mar-

keting training. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 10.

Because construction was still underway when Latture joined the team, she worked in a

satellite office until early April 2021. ECF No. 33-1 ¶¶ 12–13. She shared that office with two

people: Gail Jernigan, the Executive Director at Livingston, and Ashley Lawrence, who worked

on low-income housing credits. Id. ¶ 13. Jernigan and Latture moved into the offices within Liv-

ingston in early April, as did Michelle Pierson, the Business Office Manager. Id. ¶ 14. Other than

Jernigan and Pierson, everyone working at Livingston—including Latture—was black. Id. ¶ 19.

But members of Priority Life’s “corporate leadership team” periodically traveled to Livingston to

prepare for its opening, which Priority Life had to postpone from April 1 to June 4, 2021. Id.

¶¶ 20–21. Gerardot visited Livingston several times “before and after th[at] opening,” and Clayton

2 Latture partially disputes this statement of material fact, but she never denies that her job included these duties. Instead, she claims only that Priority Life’s “sales and marketing plan was ineffective.” ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 8. And although Latture often raises that point when “disputing” Priority Life’s asserted facts, it is often non-responsive and thus not a proper way to controvert the fact. See, e.g., id. ¶ 10 (repeating this dispute in response to a factual statement that Latture re- ceived certain marketing materials and training).

3 Brightwell—the Director of Corporate Training and Finance Liaison—was on site at least once.

Id. ¶ 21.

Between her deposition testimony and declaration, Latture says that she heard several re-

marks that she considered discriminatory while working for Priority Life. The company claims

that some comments never happened, but of course Latture gets the benefit of the doubt as the non-

movant. The first remark occurred while Latture, Jernigan, and Lawrence were working in the

satellite office before moving in early April 2021. There, Jernigan called Lawrence an “ignorant

‘black’ bitch.” ECF No. 33-2 (“Latture Dec.”) ¶ 26; ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 27. Latture was nearby and

objected to this remark, prompting Jernigan to say that she “at least . . . did not use the ‘N’ word.”

Latture Dec. ¶ 26. After moving to the Livingston offices, Jernigan apparently “consistently

ma[d]e fun of and mimicked black coworkers” but never used a “racial slur in front of” Latture.

Id. ¶¶ 27–28. Latture also overheard Brightwell mention on a phone call with an “unknown per-

son” that Livingston was in “the straight up hood with nothing but ghetto blacks and hood rats.”

ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 25; ECF No. 29-3 at 24. She did not think that “Brightwell was aware that she

could hear what he was saying,” and she said nothing about Brightwell’s comments to anyone.

ECF No. 33-1 ¶¶ 25–26. Pierson, for her part, once told Jernigan that a homeless woman

“smell[ed] like cooch” but never “mention[ed] the race of the” woman in that conversation. Id.

¶ 30; ECF No. 29-3 at 38. Finally, Latture recounts several comments that Gerardot made during

her visits. When Gerardot became frustrated after an approved potential resident decided not to

move into Livingston, she commented that “these people” “live in the ghetto” and asked why they

don’t “want to live better.” ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 31; Latture Dec. ¶ 30. Gerardot also once asked

“investors” to “guess how many bodies had been found at the gas station next store.” ECF No. 33-

1 ¶ 32; Latture Dec. ¶ 32. And while talking with Jernigan in Jernigan’s office, Gerardot said that

4 a group of men hanging around the gas station looked like a “pack of animals” or “monkeys.”

ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 33; Latture Dec. ¶ 31.

With one exception, Latture never reported any of these comments. See ECF No. 33-1

¶ 34. She did not lodge an internal complaint with Priority Life’s human resources team, see id.,

even though the employee handbook that she received described the company’s “harassment pol-

icy” barring racial discrimination and “direct[ing]” employees to “report instances of harassment”

so that they could “be investigated,” id. ¶ 9. Nor did she tell Brightwell, Pierson, or Gerardot that

she heard their comments or found them offensive. Id. ¶¶ 26, 30, 34. Latture did, however, object

to Jernigan when Jernigan called Lawrence an “ignorant black bitch.” Id. ¶ 27.

Meanwhile, Livingston was struggling. The facility had only one resident when it opened

on June 4, 2021. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 37. Gerardot emailed Latture during this “stressful period,” id.,

explaining that “[n]umbers are low” and that “the outreach, events, and marketing efforts” must

be “beefed up,” ECF No. 29-5 at 24–25. Priority Life’s leadership identified several things it

wanted Latture to do differently to align with the marketing non-negotiables. For example, Latture

had “problems” with Priority Life’s database that was supposed to log “report[s] on the status of”

resident “leads and referrals.” Gerardot Dec. ¶ 11; Latture Dec. ¶ 36. Latture explains that she

created a spreadsheet to track this information instead. Latture Dec. ¶ 35. But problems persisted

even after Latture told Gerardot and others that her difficulties accessing the database were re-

solved by June 25. See ECF No. 29-5 at 12. Jernigan reported that Latture had not consistently

made her entries, see id. at 42–43; Gerardot Dec. ¶¶ 20, 22, and Gerardot told Latture that the

database was not “current . . . the last time [she] looked,” ECF No. 29-5 at 35. In early July,

moreover, an approved candidate sent an “e-mail complaint” to Livingston because the “qualified

5 candidate had not heard from [Latture] since being approved” in June. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 38. 3 That

prompted a member of Priority Life’s leadership team to remind Latture that she must “call back

[the] same day” that the inquiry comes in. ECF No. 29-5 at 19.

Given these issues, Priority Life placed Latture on a performance improvement plan in

early July. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 41. That plan identified several “areas of concern.” ECF No. 29-5 at

27. First, Latture was “[n]ot utilizing [the database] to manage inquiries” despite having received

the necessary training. Id. Second, she was not adequately using the “MailChimp email blasting

platform as outreach for referral partners and prospective residents.” Id. Although Latture was

“required” to send 40 such emails between February and May, she had sent only 6. Id. Third,

Latture was also inadequately using “OneDay Video as a Marketing Platform” for referral partners

and potential residents. Id. at 28. So the improvement plan outlined a three-step corrective path

with specific directives: Latture had to make entries into the database “[e]very day”; use Mail-

Chimp to “[c]reate at least two communications per month”; and use the “One Day app” in the

circumstances detailed in the “[m]arketing non-negotiables.” Id.

Latture had a different view of why things weren’t going well at Livingston. Certain “re-

quirements for Medicaid” impeded the facility’s ability to get residents, so she claims that she

focused her marketing efforts on individuals who had “the Medicaid Waiver” and would thus “be

eligible to Livingston Place [sic].” Latture Dec. ¶¶ 3–8. Priority Life, Latture believed, just did

not understand how to successfully market Livingston in Southeast D.C. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Instead,

Priority Life was sticking to its ineffective marketing non-negotiables, which she thought “should

have been considered void and later renegotiated.” Id. ¶¶ 4–7. Latture also believed that an

3 Latture “denie[s] in part” this fact, but her belief that “it was not possible to return all calls on the same day” does not dispute that she failed to respond to this candidate. ECF No. 33- 1 ¶ 38.

6 “assistant” should “complete data entry” and “return calls,” but Priority Life—despite hiring an

assistant for her—still wanted Latture to enter the data. Id. ¶¶ 44–45.

All of this came to a head on August 11, 2021, when Gerardot decided to fire Latture. ECF

No. 29-5 at 41–42; ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 55. The day before, Jernigan had emailed Gerardot about an

“angry response” that “she received from” Latture after asking whether Latture “had contacted a

specific referral they were pursuing.” Gerardot Dec. ¶ 20. Jernigan also said that Latture had not

been “entering information in” the database “daily” and “continued to disagree with being required

to enter every call she makes into the system.” Id. And on August 11, Jernigan sent Gerardot

another email detailing Latture’s failures to enter data and apologizing to a Priority Life employee

for “how confrontational” Latture had been. Id. ¶ 22. That email “also alerted” Gerardot of “a

pattern of insubordinate conduct and ‘temper control’ issues that” Latture had shown. Id. ¶ 23.

Based on all that information and “the information” Gerardot “already had about” Latture’s “per-

formance and behavior,” Gerardot decided that her “employment should be terminated.” Id. Jer-

nigan told Latture about the decision on August 12 and gave her the “termination letter from Ms.

Gerardot.” ECF No. 33-1 ¶¶ 58–59. That letter “confirm[ed]” the discussion, explaining that

Priority Life had fired Latture for “discourteous or inappropriate behavior” that included “insub-

ordination and unprofessionalism.” ECF No. 29-3 at 196. About three weeks later, Priority Life

hired Brandon Webb, a black man, to replace Latture as Livingston’s Director of Sales and Mar-

keting. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 63. 4 Gerardot “was involved in interviewing” Webb and “approv[ing]”

that “hiring” decision. Id.

Latture filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

4 Latture did not respond to this asserted fact. That non-answer “fail[s] to properly address [the] fact,” so the Court finds that it “is undisputed for purposes of the summary-judgment motion.” Lawrence v. Lew,

(D.D.C. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

7 Commission in May 2022. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 76. About nine months later, she sued Priority Life

in D.C. Superior Court, bringing claims under Title VII (disparate treatment, retaliation, and hos-

tile work environment) and for wrongful termination and tortious interference with business rela-

tions. ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 31–67. Priority Life removed the case to this Court, see ECF No. 1, and

moved to dismiss the latter two counts, see ECF No. 4. The Court granted that motion. After

completing discovery, Priority Life moved for summary judgment on the Latture’s Title VII

claims. ECF No. 29.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a

verdict for the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris,

(2007). A fact is “material”

if it could affect the outcome of the litigation under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

the Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]”—here, Lat-

ture—“draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, and avoid weighing the evidence or

making credibility determinations.” Thompson v. District of Columbia,

, 812–13

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). But in opposing summary judgment, the nonmovant “must do

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

(1986). So if the evidence that the

nonmovant relies on is “‘merely colorable’ or ‘not significantly probative’” such that no reasona-

ble factfinder could rule in that party’s favor based on that evidence, then “summary judgment

may be granted.” Bradley v. D.C. Pub. Sch.,

(D.D.C. 2016) (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50). Thus, although at summary judgment the Court does not weigh

8 the evidence or find the facts, the Court must decide whether the nonmovant’s evidence is proba-

tive enough that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson,

; Johnson v. Perez,

(D.C. Cir. 2016).

III. Analysis

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “is central to the federal policy of prohibiting

wrongful discrimination in the Nation’s workplaces.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,

(2013). One provision targets status-based discrimination by making it “unlawful”

for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race” or other protected

characteristic. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Another protects against retaliation by prohibiting em-

ployers from “discriminat[ing] against” employees for “oppos[ing] any practice” that Title VII

makes unlawful or for participating in a Title VII proceeding. Id. § 2000e-3(a); see also Steele v.

Schafer,

(D.C. Cir. 2008).

Plaintiffs suing under either provision may prove their claims “by direct or circumstantial

evidence.” Oviedo v. WMATA,

, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The latter implicates the

framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

(1973). See Oviedo, 948

F.3d at 395. To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under that framework, a plain-

tiff must show that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employ-

ment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Vickers

v. Powell,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Retaliation cases resting on

indirect evidence similarly require proof that “(1) [the plaintiff] engaged in protected activity; (2)

she suffered from a materially adverse act; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected

activity and the employer’s act.” Gonda v. Donahoe,

(D.D.C. 2015).

These inquiries streamline when the defendant “proffers legitimate, nondiscriminatory or

9 nonretaliatory reasons for the challenged actions.” Morales v. Gotbaum,

, 187–

88 (D.D.C. 2014). In that context, the question boils down to “whether the defendant intentionally

discriminated” or retaliated “against the plaintiff.” Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Jones v. Bernanke,

(D.C.

Cir. 2009). For a discrimination claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that “the defend-

ant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination” or (in mixed-motive

cases) that the “employment action was motivated by discrimination in addition to the proffered

legitimate reason.” Morales,

. Similarly, for a retaliation claim, the plaintiff

must show that the defendant’s “asserted non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason” for the

employment action and that the defendant “intentionally retaliated against the employee.” Holmes

v. WMATA,

, 19 (D.D.C. 2024) (cleaned up).

Finally, a hostile-work-environment claim under Title VII recognizes that “discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult” can sometimes become “severe or pervasive” enough “to alter

the conditions of the victim’s employment” by “creat[ing] an abusive working environment.”

Johnson v. Perez,

(D.D.C. 2014) (Jackson, J.) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Still, the “conduct at issue” must “actually constitute[] discrimination because

of the employee’s protected status.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And

because Title VII is not a “general civility code,” the “[c]onduct must be extreme.” Brooks v.

Grundmann,

(D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted). Courts consider the “totality

of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory [or retaliatory] conduct, its

severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work performance.”

(alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Latture presses three claims under Title VII: race-based disparate treatment, race-based

10 hostile work environment, and retaliation. See ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 31–52. In moving for summary

judgment, Priority Life contends that each falters for several reasons. The Court agrees that each

claim has at least one insurmountable flaw entitling Priority Life to summary judgment. First,

Priority Life’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for firing Latture defeat her disparate-treat-

ment claim. Second, her retaliation claim fails for lack of causation. And third, Latture has not

cleared the high bar for showing that the remarks she heard created a hostile work environment.

A. Latture Fails to Show that a Reasonable Jury Could Find that Priority Life Discriminated Against Her Because of Her Race

Priority Life begins by arguing that Latture has not established that discriminatory racial

animus motivated its decision to fire her. ECF No. 29-1 at 7–8. In response, Latture does not

suggest that another employment action could support this claim. See ECF No. 33 at 27–31 (ac-

knowledging Priority Life’s contention that Latture’s “disparate treatment claim is limited to her

termination” and addressing only the reasons for termination). Instead, she argues two points: she

has (1) offered “direct evidence of discrimination,”

, and (2) shown that Priority Life’s

reasons for firing her are “completely false,”

. Neither holds water.

Begin with Latture’s purported “direct evidence” of racial discrimination. “To qualify” as

such, “a statement or remark must itself show[] . . . bias in the employment decision.” Conn v.

Am. Nat’l Red Cross,

(D.D.C. 2016) (citation omitted). Seeking to meet

that standard, Latture marshals several comments that she overheard: Gerardot’s remarks about

potential clients “liv[ing] in the ghetto” and not “want[ing] to live better”; Jernigan’s “ignorant

black bitch” comment to Lawrence; Pierson’s remark about a woman smelling bad; Brightwell’s

phone conversation mentioning “ghetto blacks and hood rats”; and other references to “these peo-

ple” and “those people.” ECF No. 33 at 26–27. The problem for all these “statement[s],” though,

is that they do not on their own show “bias against a protected class in the employment decision.”

11 Oviedo, 948 F.3d at 394 (emphasis added) (citation and brackets omitted). Put another way, Lat-

ture identifies no comment “by a decision maker involved in the employment decision . . . that

explicitly mentions race as a factor in the decision making process.” Markowicz v. Nielsen,

(D.D.C. 2018). Instead, all the statements—to the extent they explicitly

involve race at all—“arose in . . . entirely different context[s].” Conn,

.

Because Latture offers no “evident connection between [any] remark and the adverse employment

[action]”—that is, her firing—she has not presented “direct evidence of discrimination.”

Latture’s lone case supporting her direct-evidence argument shows what she is missing. In

Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, the plaintiff claimed that his employer “explicitly denied him a raise

because of his race.”

(D.C. Cir. 2013). So what would count as direct evidence

that racial discrimination caused that adverse action? A statement by the employer that race fac-

tored into the decision to deny the raise, such as: “For a young black man smart like you, we are

happy to have your expertise; I think I’m already paying you a lot of money.”

But that kind

of evidence—a statement causally linking the employee’s race to the challenged employment ac-

tion—is lacking here. So Latture has not presented “direct evidence” that would “entitle[]” her

“to a jury trial.”

at 576–77.

As for indirect evidence of discrimination, the first step is pinning down Priority Life’s

nondiscriminatory reason for firing Latture. Priority Life argues that Latture’s “termination was

prompted by documented, reported, and observed evidence of” her “repeated behavior that vio-

lated [its] standards of conduct.” ECF No. 29-1 at 9. More specifically, Latture demonstrated

“insubordinate” behavior by “continued noncompliance with the marketing non-negotiables”—

even “after being put on the [performance improvement plan]”—and by reacting negatively to

conversations about compliance. ECF No. 34 at 13–15. Such “insubordination” and

12 “unsatisfactory performance” are “commonly asserted legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

taking an adverse employment action.” Richardson v. Petasis,

(D.D.C.

2015) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Akonji v. Unity Healthcare, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2007) (“Insubordination and violation of company rules are widely accepted non-discrim-

inatory reasons for termination.”).

Latture tries to show that this explanation is pretextual in a few roundabout ways. She

starts by arguing that Priority Life cannot “hide behind the same actor defense.” ECF No. 33 at

29. But that theory is not so much a “defense” as an “inference” that the employer may benefit

from. Indeed, the “same-actor inference” holds that “when the person who made the decision to

fire [is] the same person who made the decision to hire, it is difficult to impute . . . an invidious

motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire, especially when the firing has

occurred only a short time after the hiring.” Hicklin v. McDonald,

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Vatel v. All. of Auto. Mfrs.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011)). That

inference seems to present “a significant . . . hurdle” for Latture. Vatel,

. Gerar-

dot signed off on hiring Latture “less than a year”—in fact, only eight months—“before her dis-

missal.”

And “it would be odd” to hire Latture “and then immediately start ginning up reasons

to dismiss her.”

But even if Latture is right that the inference packs less of a punch here for

one reason or another, see ECF No. 33 at 29–30, that at most removes extra support for Priority

Life’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her. So mitigating (or even eliminating) the

same-actor inference does not help Latture carry her burden of “produc[ing] sufficient evidence

that” Priority Life’s explanation “is pretextual and that [it] intentionally discriminated against her.”

Vatel,

.

13 Latture’s focus on the race of her replacement falls in the same bucket. Within three weeks

of firing Latture, Gerardot approved hiring Brandon Webb, a black man, to replace her. See ECF

No. 33-1 ¶ 63. Hiring someone “within the same protected class” as the fired individual “cuts

strongly against any inference of discrimination.” Murray v. Gilmore,

(D.C.

Cir. 2005). Latture argues that “Southeast D.C. is majority African American,” so a “high per-

centage of African Americans would apply” to work at Livingston. ECF No. 33 at 9. That rea-

soning is questionable; if Gerardot harbored racist views that caused her to fire Latture for being

black, presumably she could have taken the time to find some non-black applicants and favor them

in the hiring process. But again, even if Latture has undermined this inference to some extent, that

is all she has done—mitigated (to some degree) an inference that might otherwise help Priority

Life but does not move her closer to carrying her burden of establishing pretext and discrimination.

Latture also contends that Priority Life did not produce any “contemporary records detail-

ing any deficiencies” in her job performance. ECF No. 33 at 28. She adds that the company’s

“business model did not take into consideration” key aspects of Southeast, D.C. demographics,

suggesting that she was performing adequately despite the challenging parts of her job.

But

“the perception of the decisionmaker” is what matters, and Latture “cannot establish pretext simply

based on [her] own subjective assessment of [her] own performance.” Beyah v. Dodaro,

(D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted). The same holds true for Latture’s beliefs about

the effectiveness and wisdom of Priority Life’s marketing strategy, which she admits that she did

“not always” satisfy “at the level that” Priority Life “wanted.” ECF No. 29-3 at 14. Title VII does

not permit the Court to second guess a company’s decisions about how to run its marketing oper-

ations.

14 The record also shows that Gerardot had “a reasonable basis” for “conclud[ing] that” Lat-

ture’s “conduct justified [her] termination” because she did not comply with Priority Life’s mar-

keting rules. Hicklin,

. An email thread from early July reveals that Gerar-

dot and others learned about a potential resident whose inquiry Latture failed to respond to, vio-

lating Priority Life’s rule about same-day responses. ECF No. 29-5 at 19–22. In another July

email, Gerardot noted that Latture had seemingly failed to keep the database “current” despite

resolving her access problems weeks earlier. Id. at 35. And the performance improvement plan

from early July—perhaps the most direct evidence of performance deficiencies—describes several

ways in which Latture had fallen short. Id. at 27–28. All this evidence lines up with Gerardot’s

explanation that in “the June-July 2021 timeframe,” she became “concern[ed] about Ms. Latture’s

performance.” Gerardot Dec. ¶ 13. In other words, “a wealth of evidence indicate[s]” that Priority

Life had concerns about Latture’s “deficiencies,” and her “view[]” of those concerns—or the non-

compliance that prompted them—“is irrelevant.” St. John v. Napolitano,

, 99–

100 (D.D.C. 2013).

Latture takes one last stab at showing pretext by arguing that Jernigan “submitted false

accusations” that prompted her firing. ECF No. 33 at 30–31. She leaves it at that, declining to

explain what the false reports said or how they influenced the firing decision. See id. at 31. That

is not enough to carry her burden of showing pretext; “judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles

buried in the record.” Murthy v. Missouri,

, 67 n.7 (2024) (cleaned up) (citation omit-

ted). In any event, the Court’s review of the record suggests that Latture may be referring to

communications between Jernigan and Gerardot in the days surrounding her firing. On August

10, Jernigan emailed Gerardot and described how Latture was not “entering anything daily” into

the database. ECF No. 29-5 at 37. Early the next morning, Jernigan followed up by documenting

15 the database entries—including “0 entries” for many days.

at 42–43. That email also apolo-

gized to a different employee for how “confrontational” Latture became.

And finally, Jernigan

drafted a written statement dated August 11 that described problems with Latture’s behavior, but

only after Gerardot had decided to fire Latture and requested the statement. Id. at 42, 47; see also

Gerardot Dec. ¶¶ 23–24.

But Latture fails to offer a non-speculative basis for finding that discriminatory animus

rather than honestly held concerns about her insubordination motivated Jernigan’s emails. One

problem is that Latture does not say which allegations she thinks are “false,” so the Court cannot

untangle whether a particular part of Jernigan’s communications suggests pretext and discrimina-

tion. See ECF No. 33 at 31. Beyond that deficiency, “there is simply no probative evidence to

support” her theory that Jernigan was trying “to paper the record for the ultimate firing and thereby

hide an improper racist . . . motivation.” Vatel,

. Jernigan’s emails did not raise

concerns from out of left field. Rather, she said that Latture was not making daily entries into the

database, disagreed with having to enter every call, and became confrontational—and not for the

first time. ECF No. 29-5 at 37, 42–43. Gerardot already knew about the database-entry problems

because the performance improvement plan had flagged that deficiency and Gerardot had observed

it in another email.

at 27–28, 35. The improvement plan also described how Latture had

repeatedly breached Priority Life’s rules for marketing.

at 27–28. In this way, one of Jernigan’s

emails just documents what the database “says” about Latture’s database entries: for several

weeks, she had not been complying with Priority Life’s rules and the directives of her improvement

plan. Id. at 43. Again, Latture might have disagreed with Jernigan’s view of her compliance and

insubordination, but she offers no reason to think that Jernigan did not “honestly believe[]” that

Latture had shown these deficiencies. Hicklin,

(citation omitted). Her

16 vague allegation that Jernigan submitted false accusations “point[s] to” no “specific facts in the

record that reveal a genuine issue” about whether Jernigan lied. Campbell v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2015); see also ECF No. 33 at 30–31 (asserting that Jernigan

“submitted false accusations” without citing any part of the record).

All told, Latture has not offered a non-speculative basis to find that Jernigan—motivated

by “racial animus toward” Latture—lied about insubordination problems to get her fired and that

the ultimate firing decision followed from a racially motivated false report. Bradshaw v. Vilsack,

, 143 (D.D.C. 2021). That is true even if Latture has created a disputed factual

issue about whether Jernigan had “a general bias against [black] employees.” Morris v. McCarthy,

(D.C. Cir. 2016). She needs “more than” that—specifically, “enough evidence

for a reasonable jury to find that her [firing] was motivated by that bias.”

And on that front

she falls short.

In sum, a reasonable jury could not find “both that the reason” Priority Life gave for firing

Latture “was false, and that discrimination . . . was the real reason.” Weber v. Battista,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

(1993)). So

Priority Life is entitled to summary judgment on her disparate-treatment claim.

B. Latture Fails to Show that a Reasonable Jury Could Find that Priority Life Retaliated Against Her Because of Her Protected Activity

As mentioned, Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees for

engaging in protected activity under the statute. Priority Life does not argue that it had a legitimate,

non-retaliatory reason for firing Latture. Her retaliation claim fails instead, the company says, for

two reasons: she did not engage in “protected activity” when she objected to Jernigan’s comments,

and she fails to show a causal connection between that objection (assuming it is protected activity)

17 and any adverse action. ECF No. 29-1 at 10–11. Because the Court agrees with the second point,

it need not address the first.

A plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under Title VII must show that “her protected ac-

tivity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Nassar,

.

That standard requires evidence “that no adverse action would have been taken if” the plaintiff

“had not” engaged in the protected activity. Gonda,

. Latture “points to no

direct evidence of retaliation,” so she must rely on circumstantial evidence, which is “generally

limited to conduct occurring shortly after the employee’s protected activity.” Ruppe v. Blinken,

, 25 (D.D.C. 2024) (citation omitted). In Latture’s view, she offers enough

causation evidence because the temporal gap between her purported protected activity—objecting

to Jernigan calling Lawrence an “ignorant black bitch”—and the alleged adverse action—being

placed on the performance improvement plan in early July—is not that large. 5 ECF No. 33 at 31–

32.

But Latture has a more fundamental problem. To show causation through temporal prox-

imity, a plaintiff must also establish “that the official responsible for the alleged retaliatory act was

aware of the protected activity.” Gonda,

. That makes sense. If the “alleged

discriminating official[]” did not know about “prior protected activity” before “contemplating ad-

verse action,” then the employment action can hardly stem from retaliation for such activity. McIn-

tyre v. Peters,

(D.D.C. 2006). And recall that Latture opposed Jernigan’s

comments to only one person: Jernigan. Gerardot, for her part, “had no knowledge of Ms. Jernigan

5 Priority Life appears to concede that placing Latture on the performance improvement plan could be an adverse action—an argument that Latture makes only for her retaliation claim. See ECF No. 34 at 21–23. But whether the adverse action is the improvement plan, the termina- tion, or both makes no difference to the Court’s analysis.

18 referring to Ashley Lawrence as a ‘black bitch,’” or of Latture “object[ing] to or complain[ing]

about” that comment. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 61. 6 So even if the performance improvement plan counts

as an adverse action, the record shows that Gerardot—who “was involved in putting Ms. Latture

on” that plan, see Gerardot Dec. ¶ 16—did not know about Latture’s opposition before Gerardot

“contemplat[ed] [the] adverse action.” McIntyre,

. 7

Latture’s retaliation claim would falter on causation even without that defect, though. To

start, she overstates the value of the temporal proximity here. The smallest timing gap that a rea-

sonable jury could find between the purported protected activity and adverse action is about three

months: Jernigan made the comment sometime between January and early April, so the end of that

window is roughly three months before the early July decision to place Latture on the improvement

plan. ECF No. 33-1 ¶¶ 13, 27, 41; see also ECF No. 29-5 at 27–28. And although there is no

“bright-line three-month rule,” this “Circuit has generally found that such gaps negate the temporal

proximity needed to help a plaintiff prove causation.” Holmes, 723 F. Supp. 3d at 23. The D.C.

Circuit has, for example, cited with approval cases holding that a “two-month period between

6 Latture “[d]enie[s] in part” this statement of fact, but her denial is limited. ECF No. 33- 1 ¶ 61. She says that she “told Jernigan that her racist comments were offensive and” that “Gerar- dot herself made racist comments.” Id. That denial says nothing about the key point here: whether Gerardot was “aware of any allegation” that “Latture objected to or complained about” Jernigan’s comment to Lawrence. Id. Because Latture offered only “additional facts” and did “not actually dispute [Priority Life’s] asserted fact,” the Court finds this “assertion of fact” about Gerardot’s lack of knowledge “undisputed.” Toomer v. Mattis,

(D.D.C. 2017). 7 Latture does not argue that Jernigan—who did know about Latture’s opposition—decided (or participated in the decision) to place her on the performance improvement plan. That is waiver. As the “non-moving party,” Latture “is responsible for demonstrating a[] genuine dispute of ma- terial fact that would preclude summary judgment.” Mosleh v. Howard Univ., No. 19-cv-339 (CJN),

, at *15 n.6 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2022). So her “failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment” on the ground that Jernigan took part in the improvement-plan decision “con- stitutes waiver of that argument.”

(citation omitted). The Court will not construct an argument for her from whole cloth, particularly because Latture is represented by counsel.

19 protected activity and” the “employee’s discharge” does not “establish[] a ‘causal connection’ be-

tween the two events.” Taylor v. Solis,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (brackets omitted)

(quoting Bilow v. Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C.,

(7th Cir. 2001), and citing Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n,

(8th Cir.

2002)). And the Supreme Court has done the same for a case holding that a three-month gap was

“insufficient.” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden,

(2001) (citing Richmond v.

ONEOK, Inc.,

(10th Cir. 1997)).

So Latture’s reliance on (at best) a period of three months is shaky, even putting aside

Gerardot’s lack of knowledge. Compounding that problem is the evidence of Latture’s “unsatis-

factory work performance”—the common and straightforward reason for placing an employee on

a performance improvement plan. Gonda,

. Again, she admits that she

thought Priority Life’s marketing non-negotiables were mistaken and that she did “not always”

complete them “at the level that [Priority Life] wanted.” ECF No. 29-3 at 14; see also ECF No. 33-

1 ¶ 35.

Given all these causation defects, a reasonable jury could not find “that no adverse action

would have been taken if [Latture] had not complained about” Jernigan’s comment to Lawrence.

Gonda,

. So Priority Life is entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation

claim.

C. Latture Fails to Show that a Reasonable Jury Could Find that Priority Life Subjected Her to a Hostile Work Environment

“When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult

that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create

an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.” George v. Leavitt,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Priority Life argues that no such violation happened here for

20 three reasons: no “contributory act of harassment” occurred within the limitations period, so the

claim is time-barred; the conduct that Latture relies on is not “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to

satisfy the demanding standard; and Priority Life cannot be liable given Latture’s unreasonable

failure to report the harassing acts under the company’s anti-harassment policy. ECF No. 29-1 at

13. The second argument is dispositive, so the Court begins and ends there.

Latture’s claim suffers from one general problem and two more specific ones. Typically,

“offhand comments[] and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discrim-

inatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” Akonji,

(quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton,

(1998)). Even when those “isolated inci-

dents” involve “offensive language”—or “even ethnic or racial slurs”—they seldom clear the high

bar for hostile-work-environment liability.8 Nagi v. Chao, No. 16-cv-2152 (KBJ),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2018) (Jackson, J.). This limitation on Title VII’s reach “has

long been clear.”

And it explains, for example, the result in Harris v. Wackenhut Services,

Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2008), supplemented by

(D.D.C. 2009). There,

the plaintiff argued that his exposure to several racist comments—a racist “riddle,” a “black bitch”

remark, and a reference to a black person “liv[ing] in the ghetto”—was enough for his hostile-

work-environment claim.

at 61–62, 75. The court disagreed, however, because the “incidents

of harassment must be”—but were not—“sufficiently continuous and concerted” such that they

were “pervasive.”

. The D.C. Circuit affirmed on that point, reasoning that the plaintiff’s

8 The possible exception is the “n-word”—an “unambiguously” and “deeply offensive ra- cial epithet.” Toomer v. Esper,

, 169 (D.D.C. 2020) (citations and emphasis omitted). Indeed, the “D.C. Circuit [has] recognized that” a “single incident” of using that word “might” be “sufficient to establish a hostile work environment.”

(quoting Ayissi-Etoh,

). That is not this case. Jernigan’s statement that “at least I didn’t call [Lawrence] the N word” is (to say the least) distasteful, but it does not implicate the potential exception for times when a supervisor actually uses the racial slur itself. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 27.

21 evidence of “only three racially motivated comments directed at him during a one-year period”

was “not sufficiently extreme for” him “to prevail.” Harris v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc.,

, 1–2 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

The remarks that Latture highlights are no doubt offensive, but they are not “severe or

pervasive” enough to “alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Johnson,

(citation omitted). As in Harris, the comments are

“episodic” rather than “continuous and concerted.”

(citation omitted). And

two features of Latture’s evidence further diminish the severity of the remarks. First, several com-

ments are “not related to” Latture’s “race,” so they “cannot be used to support [her] hostile work

environment claim.” Kelley v. Billington,

(D.D.C. 2005). Pierson, for

example, “did not mention the race of the homeless person” whom she said smelled “like cooch.”

ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 30; see also ECF No. 29-3 at 37–39. Because a race-based hostile-work-environ-

ment claim requires proof “that the conduct at issue . . . actually constituted discrimination because

of the employee’s” race, the Court must “exclude from consideration” remarks “lack[ing] a linkage

of correlation to the claimed ground of discrimination.” Johnson,

(emphasis

added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Second, Latture focuses on “racial statements” and other comments that “were not directed

to” her, which “generally” means that a plaintiff “cannot . . . establish[]” a “hostile environment.”

Nurriddin v. Goldin,

(D.D.C. 2005). For instance, Brightwell was talking

to an “unknown person” on the phone when Latture purportedly heard him mention “ghetto blacks

and hood rats.” ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 25. And Jernigan told Lawrence that she was an “ignorant black

bitch.” Id. ¶ 27. Gerardot’s comments were also directed “to third parties” and are thus “less

indicative of a hostile work environment.” Kelley,

. Even if her comments

22 about the dead bodies at the gas station had a racial connotation, they were not “directed specifi-

cally at” Latture but were parts of conversations with investors and Jernigan. Id.; see also ECF

No. 33-1 ¶¶ 32–33. So too for her alleged offensive comment that a group of men near the gas

station “looked like a pack of animals or monkeys.” ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 33 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). She said that “in a separate conversation in Ms. Jernigan’s office” while

Latture “was in her own office.”

In short, although these “purported use[s] of” of racialized

“comments” might have “cause[d]” Latture “discomfort,” the record shows that most remarks were

not “even directed at” her. Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao,

(D.D.C. 2004)

(holding that “ethnic slurs, sexist comments, and inappropriate age statements” did not rise “to the

level of creating a hostile work environment,” in part for that reason). And this feature of the

evidence further undermines Latture’s theory that these comments created a hostile work environ-

ment.

Because Latture fails to show that a reasonable jury could find that she endured a hostile

work environment, Priority Life is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

IV. Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

and enter judgment on its behalf. A separate order will issue.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: March 28, 2025

23