UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) JESSE MICHAEL WALL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-3342 (ABJ) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on defendant District of Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss

plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12) and plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

No. 25). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the District’s motion and

DISMISS the amended complaint in its entirety. The termination of the case will render plaintiff’s

summary judgment motion to be moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff describes himself as a “United States, and US Treaty Holder.” Am. Compl. (ECF

No. 6) ¶ 4. As such, he considers himself beyond the reach of the Superior Court of the District

of Columbia. See id.; see also id. ¶¶ 18, 28, 33-36, 42-43, 45. Nevertheless, it appears that the

Superior Court issued a Civil Protection Order (“CPO”) against him, held criminal contempt

proceedings following his violation of the CPO, accepted his guilty plea, and ordered his detention.

[1] See id. ¶¶ 14-15, 20, 24, 38-39.1

Plaintiff has sued the District of Columbia, the Attorney General of the District of

Columbia, St. Elizabeth’s Hospital and one of its employees, the Chief Judge, two Associate

Judges and one Magistrate Judge of the Superior Court, the United States Marshal for the Superior

Court, and the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency. According to plaintiff,

defendants retaliated against him for having “reported sex crimes, libel, slander, and defamation,

on January 24th, 2023.” Id. ¶ 13.

One alleged form of retaliation was the CPO issued by a Magistrate Judge on May 4, 2023,

see id. ¶¶ 14-15, 20 (referring to 2023 CPO 0001500), and extended by an Associate Judge on

May 8, 2023. See id. ¶ 16. Another alleged retaliation event was the entry of a default judgment

against plaintiff on May 23, 2023. See id. ¶ 18. These acts also amounted to “judicial misconduct”

in plaintiff’s view, see id. ¶¶ 13, 18, as were the acts of a second Magistrate Judge who “did not

give bail amount,” id. ¶ 32, and the Associate Judge who presided over the criminal contempt

proceedings. See id. ¶¶ 24-25, 28.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants defamed him, apparently by way of court documents

submitted to the Superior Court by the Office of the Attorney General in support of a petition for

the CPO, see, e.g., id. ¶ 23, a witness’s testimony, and information included in Superior Court

orders, see id. ¶ 20, claiming plaintiff had committed criminal offenses. See id. ¶¶ 20-21. As a

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the Superior Court’s public docket of the criminal contempt proceedings. See In re Wall, No. 2023 CCC 000027 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed June 23, 2023). It appears that, over the course of criminal contempt proceedings, the Superior Court ordered a mental competency examination, found plaintiff incompetent to stand trial, ordered plaintiff’s transfer to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital for competency restoration and subsequent transfer to the D.C. Jail, accepted plaintiff’s guilty plea and waiver of trial, entered a judgment and commitment order, and sentenced plaintiff to a term of imprisonment. [2] result, plaintiff allegedly lost “possible contract opportunities [worth] billions of dollars” with the

federal government. Id. ¶ 24.

In addition, plaintiff faults other individuals and agencies involved in his arrest,

supervision, conviction and detention. For example, plaintiff alleges that United States Marshals

arrested him without a warrant, see id. ¶ 29, that a doctor with the District’s Department of

Behavioral Health “made erroneous conclusions,” id. ¶ 35, presumably about plaintiff’s

competence to stand trial, and that the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency “coerced

Plaintiff by threats.” Id. ¶ 41.

In this action, plaintiff plainly challenges the authority of the Superior Court. See, e.g., id.

¶¶ 18, 28, 42-43. He demands an order to “vacate . . . sentence and dismiss the charges with full

prejudice . . . and stay . . . prosecution to sovereign from [the Superior Court].” Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiff

demands a judgment in his favor and an award of $60 million, among other relief. See id. ¶ 1; see

also id. at 9 (page number designated by CM/ECF).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

The District of Columbia (“District” or “defendant”) moves to dismiss the amended

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that it fails to state a claim

for which relief may be granted. See generally Def. District of Columbia’s Mem. of P. & A. in

Support of its Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl. (ECF No. 12, “Def.’s Mem.”) at 5-9 (page

numbers designated by CM/ECF).

A plaintiff need only provide a “short and plain statement of [his] claim showing that [he

is] entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . .

. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (per

[3] curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009); see also Wood v. Moss,

, 757–58 (2014).

A facially plausible claim pleads facts that are not ‘“merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability”

but that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

(quoting Twombly,

); see Banneker

Ventures, LLC v. Graham,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Plausibility requires more than

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully[.]”).

The Court must consider the entire complaint, with all factual allegations accepted as true,

“even if doubtful in fact.” Twombly,

; see also Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v.

Google, LLC,

(D.C. Cir. 2019). The Court cannot, however, “assume the

truth of legal conclusions, nor [does it] ‘accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out

in the complaint.’” Arpaio v. Obama,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original)

(internal citation omitted) (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales,

(D.C. Cir. 2007)); see Iqbal,

(stating that conclusory allegations are “not entitled

to be assumed true”).

In applying these standards to pleadings filed by pro se litigants, the Court must consider

the complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.” Johnson

v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt.

Grp., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In addition, a pro se complaint must “‘be liberally construed’ and ‘held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Bowman v. Iddon,

(D.C. Cir.

[4] 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted)). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from complying with

applicable procedural rules and “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more

than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal,

); see also Jones v. Horne,

(D.C. Cir. 2011).

B. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am.,

(1994). Because federal courts are “forbidden . . . from acting beyond

[their] authority,” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC,

(D.C. Cir. 2008), judges have “an

affirmative obligation ‘to consider whether the constitutional and statutory authority exist for [the

Court] to hear each dispute.’” James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig,

(D.C.

Cir. 1996) (quoting Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Sciences,

(D.C. Cir. 1992)).

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

(1992); Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2002). While the Court must “assume the truth of all material factual

allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the

benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi,

(D.C. Cir.

2005)), it need not limit itself to considering the allegations of a complaint, and instead “may

consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question of

whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections &

[5] Ethics,

(D.D.C. 2000) (citing Herbert,

); see also Jerome

Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA,

(D.C. Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant District of Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss2

The amended complaint consists of eight counts, and the District of Columbia moves to

dismiss Counts I, II, IV, VII and VIII. See Def.’s Mem. at 3.

1. Retaliation Claim and

(Count I)

Count I invokes anti-retaliation and anti-coercion sections of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which provide:

(a) Retaliation

No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.

(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation

It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.

. The ADA defines the term “disability” as follows:

The term ‘‘disability’’ means, with respect to an individual—

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment[.]

2 Plaintiff refers to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), see

, in his complaint and opposition to the District’s motion. See Am. Compl. ¶ 1; Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. Because the Court construes the complaint, as amended, as one bringing claims against District of Columbia defendants, the FTCA does not apply in this case.

[6]

(1).

The District moves to dismiss Count I for two reasons: plaintiff “has not alleged that he

suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA,” and he “fails to plead facts showing he

was engaged in protected activity or opposed practices made unlawful by the ADA, that the District

took an adverse activity against him, or that there as a causal connection between the two.” Def.’s

Mem. at 6.

Plaintiff identifies “GAD,” which he does not describe further or indicate that it is part of

any formal diagnosis he has received, as “an ADA recognized set of symptoms for his disorder.”

Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 24, “Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1. He also asserts that

“retaliation can occur before any ‘protected activity’ occurs.

He appears to identify “filing a

claim of libel and slander” a form of protected activity,

and issuance of the CPO an act of

retaliation.

. This response, to the extent it is intelligible, falls far short of a plausible ADA

claim. While plaintiff may have a disability, he fails to allege facts showing, for example, he has

a mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, or that any Superior Court

proceeding occurred because plaintiff has that disability, or that any defendant interfered in any

way with plaintiff’s exercise of any right under the ADA.

2. Defamation Claim and

(1) (Count VII)

The District argues that “[d]efamation is a matter of state law that does not implicate any

federal question.” Def.’s Mem. at 6, and that the complaint alleges no facts showing that

(1) applies. See

. The Court concurs.

The statute on which plaintiff relies defines the term “defamation” with respect to the

recognition of foreign defamation judgments in domestic courts. See

. Plaintiff

fails to allege facts showing that these federal statutes are applicable here.

[7] There is no defamation claim under federal law. See Jean-Baptiste v. Booz Allen Hamilton,

Inc.,

, 94 (D.D.C. 2022) (concluding that

“does not create a

federal cause of action for domestic defamation suits”), aff’d in part, No. 22-7128,

(D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2023), and rev’d and remanded on other grounds, No. 22-7128,

(D.C. Cir. June 2, 2023) (per curiam). Rather, defamation is a common law claim

arising under District of Columbia law, and absent factual allegations demonstrating the existence

of diversity jurisdiction, see

(a)(1), the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction

over it. See Shafi v. McFadden, No. 1:05-cv-1268 (RWR),

, at *1 (D.D.C. June

21, 2006); Mays v. Meeks, No. 1:05-cv-2116 (CKK),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 5,

2006).

3. Claims under

, 1513, 2241, and 2381 (Counts IV, II, III and VIII)

The District correctly argues that plaintiff’s claims under

, 1513, and 2381

must be dismissed because “[c]riminal codes do not provide a basis for a private civil action.”

Def.’s Mm. at 7.

None of the statutes on which plaintiff relies establishes a private cause of action. See

Eslick v. Washington, No. 2:21-cv-0282-TOR,

, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8,

2022) (“Section 2 is a general criminal statute establishing criminal liability for those who act as

principals in the commission of a federal crime,” and absent “legislative intent indicating

could be used to assert a private cause of action . . . Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on this claim as a matter of law.”); Barrett v. Biden, No. 1:22-cv-02823 (UNA),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2022) (“[P]laintiff attempts to bring a claim for treason

pursuant to

, but that is a criminal statute which does not create a private right of

action and, therefore, cannot be relied upon by a civil plaintiff to state a claim for relief.”) (citing

[8] cases); Abou-Hussein v. Mabus,

, 262 n.5 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[T]o the extent that

the plaintiff intends to raise a claim pursuant to [18 U.S.C.] § 1513, such a claim cannot be

maintained.”); Ghost Bear v. South Dakota Dep’t of Corr., No. 11-cv-5051,

,

at *2 (D.S.D. 2011) (stating there is no private right of redress or private suit for a violation of

); Shahin v. Darling,

, 538–39 (D. Del.) (recognizing no private

right of action under

, 1513), aff’d,

(3d Cir. 2009) (per

curiam).

In the absence of a statute creating a private cause of action, the Supreme Court is “quite

reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone,” and it “ha[s] not

suggested that a private right of action exists for all injuries caused by violations of criminal

prohibitions.” Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,

(1994).

The amended complaint relies on two additional criminal statutes. Plaintiff cites

as a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction, see Am. Compl. ¶ 2, and in Count III, plaintiff purports

to bring a claim under

. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-61. Although the District does

not mention these statutes in its motion, its rationale for dismissal of civil claims based on criminal

statutes applies to them as well. See Saleh v. Titan Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2009)

(“Congress has also adopted criminal statutes that would apply . . . had [defendants] committed

acts of torture, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340A, 2241, 3261, but Congress has not created a corresponding

tort cause of action.”); Jordan v. Cicchi, No. 08-cv-6088 AET,

, at *12 (D.N.J.

Mar. 9, 2010) (noting that the “White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. 2421, . . . and the related sexual

abuse statutes at

, 2242, 2244, are criminal statutes and do not give rise to any

private right of action”), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds,

(3d Cir.

[9] 2011) (per curiam); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton,

, 5 n.3 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding

that

(acts affecting personal financial interest) provides no private right of acon),

aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 1996).

B. Claims Against Superior Court Judges

1. Claim Under

(Count V)

In Count V, plaintiff faults the Chief Judge of the Superior Court for her failure to force

the recusal of the judge presiding over the criminal contempt proceedings. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67-

68. He purports to bring a claim under

, which authorizes complaints against

federal circuit, district, bankruptcy, and magistrate judges “alleging that a judge has engaged in

conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or

alleging that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or

physical disability.”

(a). This statute pertains to federal judges, not Superior Court

judges, and even if it applied to defendants in this case, the statute does not create a private right

of action. See Walker v. Walker, No. 1:23-cv-488,

, at *2 (W.D. Mich. May 22,

2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-cv-488,

(W.D. Mich.

June 12, 2023); Hueter v. Kruse, No. 1:20-cv-3686,

, at *2 (D.D.C. July 2021)

(noting that Section 351 “provides a procedure by which persons ‘may file with the clerk of the

court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint’ about a federal judge’s conduct” and “does not

create a private cause of action”).

[10] 2. Claim Under

(Count VI)

The Court construes Count VI as a claim that defendant judges violated their oath of office,

see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 71-72, set forth in

There is no private right of action under

either. See Butler v. City of Tampa Fla., No. 8:22-cv-606-MSS-SPF,

, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 2022) (“Plaintiff lists

, which merely states the

oath of U.S. justices and judges. This does not create a private right of action against federal

judges.”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Butler v. City of Tampa, No. 8:22-cv-

606-MSS-SPF,

(M.D. Fla. May 31, 2022), adhered to on recons., No. 8:22-cv-

606-MSS-SPF,

(M.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 22-13373-J,

(11th Cir. Dec. 15, 2022), and appeal dismissed, No. 23-10379-H,

(11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2023); Lloyd v. Pokorny, No. 2:20-cv-2928,

, at *8

(S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2020) (dismissing claim under

“for there is no private right of

action allowing suit under th[is] la[w]”); Simon v. Hollis, No. 97-cv-1164-JTM,

,

at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 1997) (“Statutes which require state or federal officials to take oaths of

office do not create a private cause of action for acting contrary to the Constitution.”), aff’d sub

nom. Simon v. N. Farms, Inc.,

(10th Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Green,

,

554 n.14 (D.D.C. 1986) (“Neither Article VI, clause 3, which mandates that federal judges swear

3 “Each judge of the Superior Court, when appointed shall take the oath prescribed for judges of courts of the United States.”

. The oath states:

I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.

. [11] an oath of allegiance to the Constitution, nor

, which sets forth that oath, creates a

substantive cause of action against federal judges for violating that oath by acting contrary to the

Constitution.”).

3. Federal District Court Jurisdiction and Judicial Immunity

At bottom, plaintiff essentially is attacking Associate and Magistrate Judges of the Superior

Court for positions taken, rulings made, and conduct occurring in the course of performing their

judicial duties, granting or extending protection orders, conducting criminal contempt

proceedings, and effecting plaintiff’s detention. “This federal district court lacks jurisdiction to

review another court’s decisions and order it to take any action.” Phillips v. Office of Attorney

General for the District of Columbia, No. 1:22-cv-3810 (UNA),

, at *1 (D.D.C.

Jan. 26, 2023) (citing Gray v. Poole,

(D.C. Cir. 2002)) (“The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine prevents lower federal courts from hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent

of an appeal from a state court.”); United States v. Choi,

(D.D.C. 2011)

(district courts “generally lack[ ] appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot

exercise appellate mandamus over other courts.”) (citing Lewis,

).

Consequently, this Court cannot review or overrule any ruling of the Superior Court.

In addition, the defendant judges “are entitled to absolute immunity from suits predicated

on actions taken in their official capacities, unless such actions ‘are taken in the complete absence

of all jurisdiction.’” Miller v. Marriott Int’l LLC,

(D.D.C. 2019) (quoting

Sindram v. Suda,

(D.C. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, No. 19-7053,

(D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 2019); Jenkins v. Kerry,

, 134–35 (D.D.C. 2013). “Like

other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from

ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco,

(1991) (per curiam).

[12] IV. CONCLUSION

The amended complaint fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted, and the

District’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Court, therefore, DISMISSES the complaint and

this civil action, and DENIES plaintiff’s summary judgment motion as moot. An Order is issued

separately.

DATE: March 31, 2025 /s/ AMY BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge

[13]