UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MIKE WEBB,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 23-cv-00816 (DLF) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiff, Mike Webb, proceeding pro se, brings this action against the Office of

Management and Budget (“OMB”) and the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) under the

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (“FACE”) Act,

the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),

, 1985, and 1986, and the

common law of torts. Second Am. Compl., Dkt. 52. Before the Court are the defendants’

partial motion to dismiss, Dkt. 72, and the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, Dkts. 78,

86. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss and

motion for summary judgment and deny the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Under any definition, the plaintiff qualifies as a highly vexatious litigant. In the past few

years alone, he has filed nearly 50 cases in this and other federal courts. See OMB Mot. to Dismiss,

at 1–5, Dkt. 43 (citing the plaintiff’s numerous unsuccessful and largely COVID-related cases).

The plaintiff routinely alleges “confused and rambling narrative[s] of charges and conclusions” as

“an untidy assortment of claims” that cannot be “meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments.” Webb v. Dep’t of Army, No. 22-cv-02236,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2022) (cleaned up). Indeed, over the course of this

litigation, he has ceaselessly filed frivolous, prolix, “rambling,” and “disorganized” motions.

Minute Order of February 27, 2024. As a sample, he has filed nine motions for summary judgment

(excluding the one before the Court today), Dkts. 5, 8, 11, 23, 36, 47, 53, 67, 68; three motions for

a temporary restraining order, Dkts. 5, 8, 11; two motions for leave to file in forma pauperis after

already being denied such status, Dkts. 20, 61; and four motions for sanctions, Dkts. 37, 73, 83,

95.

The plaintiff also has repeatedly and willfully disregarded this Court’s orders. For instance,

on March 7, 2024, the Court denied one of his motions for summary judgment as premature and

stated that it would not entertain any such motions until the defendants had answered his amended

complaint. See Minute Order of March 7, 2024. Nonetheless, before the defendants answered the

complaint, he filed two additional motions for summary judgment, Dkts. 67, 68. After the Court

denied those motions, Minute Order of May 14, 2024, he filed a 35-page “supplemental”

memorandum in support of summary judgment, Dkt. 70. Ultimately, the Court prohibited the

plaintiff from making any further filings without prior leave pending a ruling on the instant

motions. See Minute Order of September 27, 2024. The Court also warned him of the possibility

of sanctions for his litigating behavior.

Despite the Court’s warnings, the plaintiff was

undeterred. Since the Court’s September 27, 2024 Minute Order, the Court denied the plaintiff

leave to file on six separate occasions. See Dkts. 103, 104, 106, 107, 108; Minute Order of October

9, 2024. And today, the Court denies leave to file an additional twelve motions, affidavits, and

other filings.

2 This case, like many of the plaintiff’s recently filed cases, recycles arguments and

allegations related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This particular action stems from a March 23,

2021 FOIA request that the plaintiff submitted to OMB for “[a]ny and all documents pertaining to

the infectious dose for COVID-19, or it’s [sic] causative agent, SARS-CoV-2 . . . being determined

to represent, at least a topic, ‘unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to

cause damage to the national security,’ warranting a personnel security classification of

‘confidential’” and for “[a]ny and all documents pertaining to the secondary attack rate for

COVID-19, or it’s [sic] causative agent, SARS-CoV-2 . . . being determined to represent, at least

a topic, ‘unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the

national security,’ warranting a personnel security classification of ‘confidential.’” Ex. 1 to Decl.

of Heather V. Walsh, at 4–5, Dkt. 86-4; see Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 248, Dkt. 52-1. OMB responded on the

same day, acknowledging receipt of the FOIA request. Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 248. The agency commenced

its search for records responsive to the plaintiff’s request in January 2022, almost one year after it

received the request, see Walsh Decl. at 3, but was unable to locate any responsive records or

identify any custodians who may have responsive records, see

. OMB informed the

plaintiff of the same by way of a written final response on January 26, 2024. See

at 2–3.

When OMB failed to respond to the plaintiff’s FOIA request within the statutory

timeframe, the plaintiff commenced two actions in the Eastern District of Virginia seeking the

release of the requested documents and raising various unrelated claims. See Webb v. Fauci, No.

3:21-cv-432 (E.D. Va.); Webb v. OMB, No. 3:22-cv-418 (E.D. Va.). At some point during the

proceedings in the Eastern District of Virginia, his Facebook account was “permanently

disable[ed].” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 16. He alleges that OMB, in retaliation for his litigation

efforts, conspired with Meta Platforms, Inc., to have his account shut down.

3 After the actions in the Eastern District of Virginia were dismissed, the plaintiff filed the

instant action. This Court dismissed his first complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 14. The Court also dismissed his amended complaint for

failure to comply with Rules 8 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, among other

reasons. Dkt. 46. That dismissal was with prejudice as to defendant Meta, but without prejudice

as to OMB.

The plaintiff then filed his second amended complaint on February 28, 2024. Dkt. 52. This

time, he added EOP as a defendant, as well as the undersigned judge and the District Court for the

District of Columbia.

Because "a party may not engage in judge-shopping by seeking leave

to add the assigned judge whenever dissatisfied with the Court's rulings," Bozgoz v. Haynes, No.

19-cv-2790 (RDM),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2020), the Court dismissed the

claims against the undersigned and against the District Court with prejudice. See Minute Order of

May 14, 2024. The remaining defendants moved to partially dismiss, Dkt. 72, and the parties

cross-moved for summary judgment, Dkts. 78, 86.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss an action

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). When reviewing a motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations

in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally.” Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. FDIC,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). At the same time, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

subject-matter jurisdiction, see Arpaio v. Obama,

(D.C. Cir. 2015), and courts

must raise obstacles to their jurisdiction sua sponte, see Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis,

(2019). “[W]hile complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than

4 those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, even a pro se plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Newby v. Obama,

(D.D.C. 2010) (cleaned up).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A facially plausible claim is one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to

[an] assumption of truth,”

, and the court construes the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff,

who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,”

Hettinga v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). But the Court need

not accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” nor an inference unsupported by

the facts alleged in the pleadings. Trudeau v. FTC,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting

Papasan v. Allain,

(1986)). Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,

.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When a federal agency

moves for summary judgment in a FOIA case, “the court views all facts and inferences in the light

most favorable to the requester, and the agency bears the burden of showing that it complied with

5 FOIA.” Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,

, 332 (D.D.C.

2020). The agency “must show beyond material doubt . . . that it has conducted a search

reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Weisberg v. DOJ,

(D.C. Cir. 1983).

“The peculiarities inherent in FOIA litigation, with the responding agencies often in sole

possession of requested records and with information searches conducted only by agency

personnel, have led federal courts to rely on government affidavits to determine whether the

statutory obligations of the FOIA have been met.” Perry v. Block,

(D.C. Cir.

1982). Agency affidavits are entitled to a presumption of good faith, see SafeCard Servs., Inc. v.

SEC,

(D.C. Cir. 1991), and a court may grant summary judgment based on

an affidavit if it contains reasonably specific detail and neither contradictory record evidence nor

evidence of bad faith calls it into question, see Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv.,

(D.C. Cir. 2013). “[T]he vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment.”

Brayton v. Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative,

(D.C. Cir. 2011).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss

The defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 72. They argue that sovereign immunity bars the

plaintiff’s claims under the FACE Act (Count 3),

, 1985, and 1986 (Counts 4

and 5), and the common law of torts (Counts 6 and 7). They also argue that he fails to state a claim

with respect to his RFRA claim (Count 3) and his standalone claims for declaratory and injunctive

relief (Counts 8 and 9). The Court will address the defendants’ jurisdictional challenges before

addressing the adequacy of the complaint.

6 1. Rule 12(b)(1)

Sovereign immunity shields the federal government and its agencies from suit and is

“jurisdictional in nature.” FDIC v. Meyer,

(1994). “To bring a claim against

the United States, a plaintiff must identify an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.” See

Franklin-Mason v. Mabus,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing FAA v. Cooper,

(2012)). Such a waiver must be “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”

Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz,

, 49 (2024) (cleaned up). The

Supreme Court has “found a clear waiver of sovereign immunity in only two situations”—"when

a statute says in so many words that it is stripping immunity from a sovereign entity” and “when

a statute creates a cause of action and explicitly authorizes suit against a government on that

claim.” Id. (cleaned up). “If sovereign immunity has not been waived, a claim is subject to

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Clayton v. District of

Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2013).

Count Two of the Second Amended Complaint alleges that OMB violated the FACE Act,

, by coordinating with Meta, Inc. to ban the plaintiff’s Facebook account and

thereby interfere with his First Amendment right of religious freedom. See Second Am. Compl.

¶¶ 13–22. The FACE Act permits aggrieved parties to bring a private action against “[w]however

. . . by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or

interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person lawfully exercising or

seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship.”

(a)(2) & (c)(1)(A).

The Court cannot discern, and the plaintiff does not identify, any language in the FACE

Act resembling a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The statute does not state that it is “stripping

7 immunity” from any entity. Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 49; see

. Nor does it “explicitly

authorize” suits against any sovereign entity. See

(e); Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 50–51

(finding a waiver of sovereign immunity when a statute authorized suit against “any person” who

failed to comply with its directive and defined “person” to include “any . . . governmental . . .

agency”). Accordingly, sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff’s FACE Act claim.

Likewise, Counts Four and Five, which raise claims under

, 1985(3),

and 1986, are barred by sovereign immunity. It is well-settled that the federal government cannot

be sued under these provisions. Columbia v. Carter,

, 424–25 (1973) (no waiver of

sovereign immunity under § 1983); Dye v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2007)

(same under § 1985(3)).; Ramirez v. U.S. Park Police, No. 22-cv-187 (CRC),

,

at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2023) (same under § 1986). Thus, the plaintiff’s

, 1985(3),

and 1986 claims also will be dismissed.

Count Seven raises a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). The

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) waives the United States’ sovereign immunity with respect to

claims for money damages arising out of certain torts.

(b)(1). The FTCA is the

exclusive remedy “[w]here a plaintiff seeks monetary damages against a federal agency for torts

committed by federal employees.” Lempert v. Rice,

(D.D.C. 2013). But

the FTCA does not waive immunity for “any claim arising out of assault, battery, false

imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,

misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contract rights[.]”

(h). This is

commonly known as the “intentional tort exception” to the FTCA. See, e.g., Jerome Stevens

Pharms., Inc. v. FDA,

(D.C. Cir. 2005).

8 The D.C. Circuit has held that the intentional tort exception applies only to claims arising

out of the torts listed in

(h). See

(noting that applicability of the

intentional tort exception does not depend on whether conduct underlying the tort was negligent

or intentional). And while the D.C. Circuit has not decided whether § 2680(h) applies to IIED

claims, other circuits have held that a claim for IIED is not per se barred because it is not among

the torts listed in § 2680(h). See, e.g., Limone v. United States,

(1st Cir. 2009)

(collecting cases). Indeed, courts in this district routinely permit IIED claims to proceed under the

FTCA. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Gooding, Civ. A. No. 08-743 (RWR),

, at *1

(D.D.C. May 14, 2010); Lewis v. Werfel, Civ. A. No. 23-359 (RBW),

, at *6

(D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2024). But see, e.g., Charles v. United States, Civ. A. No. 21-0864 (CKK), at *6

(D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2022).

Nonetheless, the plaintiff’s IIED claim is jurisdictionally barred for different reasons. First,

while the FTCA waives the United States’ immunity for certain tort claims,

(b)(1), it does not waive sovereign immunity for suits against specific agencies, see

Coulibaly v. Kerry,

(D.D.C. 2016). Because the plaintiff names EOP and

OMB, rather than the United States, as the defendants, he cannot establish a waiver of sovereign

immunity under the FTCA. See

But even if he had named the United States as the defendant,

the Court would still lack jurisdiction because an FTCA suit may not be brought in federal court

until the claimant has exhausted his administrative remedies. See Randhawa v. DHS, No. 20-cv-

3200-DLF,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2022) (citing McNeil v. United States,

(1993)). That includes filing a “written statement sufficiently describing the injury

to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and . . . a sum-certain damages claim” to the

relevant agency and having that claim denied by the agency in writing. Hoffman v. District of

9 Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2009) (omission in original); see

(a).

While the plaintiff alleges that he filed a FOIA request with OMB, Second Am. Compl. ¶ 3, he

does not allege that he gave the United States or any agency written notice of his tort claims. Thus,

his IIED claim is jurisdictionally barred.

Count Six raises a civil conspiracy claim. As with the plaintiff’s IIED claim, a civil

conspiracy claim may only be brought against the United States under the FTCA. See Coulibaly

v. Pompeo,

(D.D.C. 2019). The same reasons that require dismissal of

the plaintiff’s IIED claim—his failure to name the United States as a defendant and his failure to

exhaust administrative remedies—also require dismissal of his conspiracy claim. See id.

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

Count Three alleges a RFRA violation. To state a claim under RFRA, a plaintiff bears the

initial burden of proving that the government has “substantially burden[ed] [his] exercise of

religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a);

see Holt v. Hobbs,

, 358, 360 (2015). “A substantial burden exists when government

action puts ‘substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’”

Kaemmerling v. Lappin,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd.,

(1981)). If the plaintiff proves the existence of a substantial burden, the government

must show that its “application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling

government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government

interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b); cf. Holt, 574 U.S. at 362.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired with Meta to “permanently disabl[e] his

Facebook account, and block[] his access to a designated safe place of worship.” Second Am.

Compl. ¶ 16. He appears to allege that Facebook was a designated safe place of worship because

10 of certain comments made by the Governor of Virginia in defense of restrictions on public

gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. ¶ 21. Thus, according to the plaintiff, his

“religious freedom on social media have [sic] been infringed upon through direct government

action, in violation of [RFRA].” Id. ¶ 24.

The plaintiff falls far short of stating a claim under RFRA. To begin, he does not identify

his religion, nor does he identify a religious practice that has allegedly been burdened. See

Kaemmerling,

(“A litigant’s claimed beliefs must be sincere and the practice at

issue must be of a religious nature.” (cleaned up)). And even if suspension of a Facebook account

could constitute a burden on the exercise of religion, he offers nothing to support the cursory

assertion that he was suspended at the behest of OMB, and the Court must “disregard . . .

unsupported factual allegations within the complaint.” Gulf Cost Mar. Supply, Inc. v. United

States,

(D.C. Cir. 2017); see also Order, Dkt. 46 (dismissing the plaintiff’s first

amended complaint for failure to state a RFRA claim because, among other things, he did not

plausibly allege a conspiracy to shut down his Facebook account). Accordingly, the Court will

dismiss Count Three for failure to state a claim.

Counts Eight and Nine of the Second Amended Complaint, respectively, bring claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief. However, “a count for a declaratory judgment is not cognizable

as a separate cause of action but is more properly included in the prayer for relief.” Malek v.

Flagstar Bank,

(D.D.C. 2014). The same is true for a stand-alone claim for

injunctive relief. See Miriyeva v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,

, 945 (D.C. Cir.

2021). The Court therefore will dismiss Counts Eight and Nine for failure to state a claim.

11 B. Motion for Summary Judgment

The cross-motions for summary judgment dispute the adequacy of OMB’s search. The

plaintiff argues that (1) the defendants characterized his FOIA request as implicating classified

records; (2) if records relating to the risk assessment of COVID-19 were classified, then the virus

must necessarily have originated in a laboratory; and (3) because the defendants did not produce

records indicating that COVID-19 originated in a laboratory, their search must have been

inadequate. Pl.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment at 29–31. Webb also argues that OMB failed to

clarify his search request, Pl.’s Reply, at 25–26, Dkt. 91, and that the agency failed to use certain

search terms like “code words or pseudonyms,”

.

The adequacy of a search “is judged by a standard of reasonableness and depends, not

surprisingly, upon the facts of each case.” Weisberg v. DOJ,

(D.C. Cir. 1984).

To survive a motion for summary judgment, an agency “must show that it made a good faith effort

to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to

produce the information requested.” Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press v. FBI,

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army,

(D.C. Cir. 1990)). “[T]he

issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to

the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate.” Meeropol v. Meese,

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (cleaned up) (emphasis in original); see also SafeCard,

. “The agency has the initial burden to demonstrate the adequacy of its search, which

it may meet by providing declarations or affidavits that are ‘relatively detailed[,] . . .

nonconclusory and submitted in good faith.’” Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA,

(D.D.C. 2013) (cleaned up). A detailed affidavit “set[s] forth the search terms and the

type of search performed, and aver[s] that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such

12 records exist) were searched[.]” Oglesby,

. “Once the agency has provided a

reasonably detailed affidavit describing its search, the burden shifts to the FOIA requester to

produce ‘countervailing evidence’ suggesting that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to

the adequacy of the search.” Hunton & Williams LLP v. EPA,

(D.D.C.

2017) (citing Morley v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 2007)).

OMB construed the plaintiff’s request “as seeking all OMB records pertaining to any

determination that either the infectious dose or secondary attack rate of COVID-19 (or its

corresponding virus, SARS-CoV-2) warranted classification at the Confidential level.” Walsh

Decl. ¶ 7. It determined that the only OMB offices likely to have responsive records were the

Health Division within the Health Programs Resource Management Office or the National Security

Division within the National Security Programs Resource Management Office. Id. ¶ 8. It relayed

Webb’s request to those offices on January 10, 2022. Id. ¶ 9. Both offices reported that they did

not have responsive records. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.

Then, on January 13, 2022, OMB initiated a series of email searches within the OMB

unclassified and classified email systems. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. These searches were not limited to the

Health and Security Divisions, but instead included emails sent to and from all OMB employees.

Id. ¶¶ 23–24. They also encompassed emails that users deleted or which originated with persons

no longer employed at OMB. Id. ¶ 17. Using a date range of December 21, 2019, through January

13, 2022, OMB searched for records including the terms “secondary attack rate” or “infectious

dose,” as well as “confidential,” “classified,” or “COVID-19.” Id. ¶ 14. Thereafter, an OMB

attorney reviewed each potentially responsive email record and identified neither responsive

records nor any other custodian who might have records responsive to the request. Id. ¶ 42. On

13 January 26, 2024, OMB responded to the plaintiff’s FOIA request, stating that it was unable to

locate any responsive records. Id. ¶ 5; Ex. 3 to Walsh Decl.

Webb presents no countervailing evidence to show a genuine dispute of material fact with

regards to the adequacy of the search. His unsubstantiated assertion that there must be records

indicating that COVID-19 originated in a laboratory is the kind of “purely speculative claim[]

about the existence and discoverability of other documents” that cannot rebut the presumption of

good faith accorded to detailed agency affidavits describing a search. SafeCard,

.

Webb argues that OMB could have used unspecified other search terms, such as “code words or

pseudonyms,” see Pl.’s Reply at 26, but an agency retains “discretion in crafting a list of search

terms that they believe[] to be reasonably tailored to uncover documents responsive to the FOIA

request,” Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency,

(D.D.C. 2015) (cleaned up). “Where the agency’s search terms are reasonable, the Court will not

second guess the agency regarding whether other search terms might have been superior.”

Liberation Newspaper v. Dep’t of State,

, 146–47 (D.D.C. 2015). The bare

assertion that “other” search terms could have been used—without specifying those search terms—

does not suffice to cast doubt on the reasonability of the agency’s search. Finally, OMB’s failure

to clarify Webb’s request does not indicate bad faith on the part of OMB. An agency is not

obligated to clarify a request for records—the statutory burden is on the requester to “reasonably

describe[] the records sought.” Inst. for Just. v. IRS,

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (cleaned

up); see

(a)(3)(A).

OMB is entitled to summary judgment on Count One because the agency “conduct[ed] a

search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents,” In re Clinton,

, 116

14 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up), and the plaintiff has offered no evidence to rebut the adequacy of

OMB’s search.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 72, is granted:

Counts 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1); Counts 3, 8,

and 9 are dismissed with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In addition,

the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 86, is granted; the Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, Dkt. 78, is denied; and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

Count 1. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge March 31, 2025

15