UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MAY CHEN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00472 (UNA) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court

grants plaintiff’s IFP application and, for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses the complaint,

and this matter, without prejudice.

Plaintiff, who resides in the District of Columbia, sues “District of Columbia (Black

People),” “State of Maryland (Black People),” “State of Texas (Black People),” and “State of

California (Hispanic, Black People).” See Compl. at 1–3. The complaint is rambling and difficult

to follow. It begins with a hodgepodge of vague grievances, provided without any supporting

details or context, regarding defendants’ alleged “housing demolition and wrongful tax sale,”

“repeated bullying,” deprivation of rights related to “shower, housing, parking, entering building,

economic losses; employment etc.[,] [and] [her] DMV vehicle registration.” See id. at 3. Plaintiff

continues to haphazardly inventory a laundry list of other assorted alleged wrongdoing, spanning

two or three decades, which, while unclear, appears to arise from litigation filed in some, or all, of

the state defendants’ respective court systems. See id. at 4–5. As best understood, plaintiff focuses

predominantly on the Los Angeles County court system, alleging that she faced “intentional harm,

false police report, wrongful judgment, discrimination, unfairness, failure to implement the law, misapply law, negligence, grievances, etc.” See id. at 4. She closes by more generally alleging

that that “the defendants, especially Black people” have intentionally caused her to suffer myriad

harms, and she demands 59 quintillion dollars in damages, “criminal prosecution,” a “barring

notice, [and] injunctive relief forever.” See id. at 5.

Federal Rule 8(a) requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009); Ciralsky v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that

defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive

answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown

v. Califano,

(D.D.C. 1977). Notably, “[a] confused and rambling narrative of

charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort

Myer Constr. Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). And when a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly

nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and

personal comments [,]” it also fails to fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. See Jiggetts v. D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021,

(D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017).

The instant complaint falls squarely within this category. Plaintiff presents mere

conclusory statements within a mess of tangled assertions, failing to provide defendants or the

court with notice of any cognizable claim. Furthermore, the complaint paragraphs are conflated

and are not limited “to a single set of circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order accompanies

this memorandum opinion.

Date: April 8, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge