UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOL HUNGARIAN OIL AND GAS PLC,

Petitioner,

v. Civil Action No. 23-218 (AHA) REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,

Respondent.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas PLC (“MOL”) prevailed in arbitration against the Republic

of Croatia and now petitions this Court to enforce the arbitration award. Croatia moves to dismiss

the petition based on sovereign immunity, personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and failure

to state a claim on the merits. Having stayed proceedings pending resolution of Croatia’s sovereign

immunity argument, the Court now concludes immunity is foreclosed by the D.C. Circuit’s recent

decision in NextEra Energy Glob. Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain,

(D.C. Cir.

2024). Because each of Croatia’s remaining bases for dismissal are without merit, the Court denies

the motion to dismiss.

I. Background

The Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”) is an investment treaty that the EU, most of its member

states, including Croatia and Hungary, and some other countries signed “to promote international

cooperation in the energy sector.”

; see ECT art. 2, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95.

Under the treaty, contracting states agree to afford “fair and equitable treatment” to investments

made by investors from the other contracting states and agree to not “impair by unreasonable or

discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal.” ECT art. 10(1). The ECT also provides that each contracting state “gives its unconditional consent to the

submission of a dispute to international arbitration” in certain tribunals, including the International

Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). ECT art. 26(3)(a) & 4(a)(i).

MOL, a Hungarian oil and gas company with investments in Croatia, brought arbitration

against Croatia in ICSID, alleging Croatia “violated [its] obligations under the ECT.” ECF No. 1

¶¶ 7, 28. Croatia contested ICSID’s jurisdiction, but the tribunal rejected its arguments and the

parties arbitrated MOL’s claims to completion.

¶¶ 28–35. The tribunal ultimately found Croatia

breached its ECT obligations and awarded MOL $183.94 million in damages, plus costs, fees, and

interest.

¶¶ 35–38.

MOL then filed the present petition to enforce the award. After Croatia moved to dismiss

the petition based in part on sovereign immunity, the Court granted the parties’ joint request to stay

proceedings pending the D.C. Circuit’s resolution of NextEra, which appeared likely to resolve

whether an EU signatory to the ECT is entitled to sovereign immunity against enforcement of an

arbitration award in an intra-EU dispute. See NextEra,

. The Circuit later issued

its decision, holding that the ECT operates as an agreement to arbitrate that withdraws sovereign

immunity.

. Following that decision, Croatia nonetheless renewed its motion to dismiss

“both to preserve its arguments in the event the D.C. Circuit, en banc, or the Supreme Court,

reverses or otherwise modifies NextEra and to distinguish certain aspects of the NextEra holding.”

ECF No. 31-1 at 1. 1 This Court stayed merits briefing to consider Croatia’s renewed motion to

dismiss. See Process & Indus. Devs. Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria,

(D.C. Cir.

2020) (recognizing sovereign immunity should generally be resolved as early as possible).

1 The D.C. Circuit has since denied rehearing en banc. NextEra Energy Glob. Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 23-7031,

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 2, 2024). 2 II. Discussion

A. Sovereign Immunity

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) “codifies a baseline principle of

immunity for foreign states,” and “then sets out exceptions to that principle.” Turkiye Halk Bankasi

A.S. v. United States,

(2023) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604–1607). Relevant here,

the FSIA withdraws sovereign immunity:

in any case . . . in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if . . . the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.

(a)(6). The D.C. Circuit has held that this “arbitration exception” to immunity

applies when three jurisdictional facts are present: “(1) an arbitration agreement, (2) an arbitration

award, and (3) a treaty potentially governing award enforcement.” NextEra,

(citing Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador,

, 204 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Croatia does not

contest that the third fact exists here—the United States is a signatory to the ICSID Convention

and federal law requires courts to enforce an ICSID award “as if the award were a final judgment

of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.” 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a). The first and

second jurisdictional facts exist here, too.

In NextEra, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the FSIA’s arbitration exception allowed

enforcement of an arbitration award against Spain because it signed the ECT. The court explained

that what matters for the purposes of the arbitration exception, and therefore for jurisdiction, is

“the existence of an arbitration agreement.” NextEra,

(quoting Chevron Corp.,

). The court rejected Spain’s argument that the ECT was not an arbitration

3 agreement within the meaning of the exception, reasoning that “[t]he clear terms of the ECT’s

arbitration provision cover ‘[d]isputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another

Contracting Party.’”

at 1102 (quoting ECT art. 26(1)). The court’s holding compels the same

conclusion here. Croatia, like Spain, “is undeniably a ‘Contracting Party’” to the ECT.

(quoting

ECT art. 1(2)); see ECF No. 1 ¶ 8 n.2. And MOL is, like the plaintiff companies in NextEra,

“undeniably ‘[an Investor] of another Contracting Party’” because MOL is “organized in

accordance with the law applicable in” Hungary. NextEra,

(quoting ECT arts.

1(7), 26(1)); see ECF No. 1 ¶ 7 & n.1. MOL accordingly satisfied the first jurisdictional fact

because it “showed [Croatia’s] agreement to arbitrate, for purposes of the FSIA, by producing

copies of the ECT.” NextEra,

(cleaned up) (quoting LLC SPC Stileks v. Republic

of Moldova,

(D.C. Cir. 2021)); ECF No. 1-9.

MOL has likewise shown the second jurisdictional fact, “an arbitration award.” NextEra,

. As with an arbitration agreement, what matters for jurisdiction is “the existence

of an award.” Chevron Corp.,

; see also NextEra,

(“For

jurisdictional purposes, the FSIA’s arbitration exception requires that the arbitral tribunal

‘purported to make an award pursuant to the ECT, not that it in fact did so.’” (quoting Stileks,

)). Here, MOL has provided documentation of its arbitration award, including a certified

copy of the ICSID award. See ECF No. 1-2; Stileks,

(recognizing that such

documentation “demonstrated that the arbitration exception applied” (citing Chevron Corp.,

)).

Croatia acknowledges that NextEra forecloses the main argument it would otherwise make,

preserving that argument for future en banc or Supreme Court review. ECF No. 31-1 at 30 & n.19.

Croatia also asks this Court to distinguish NextEra on two grounds, but each is essentially an end-

4 run around the D.C. Circuit’s decision. First, Croatia argues there is no arbitration agreement by

pointing to two opinions by the Court of Justice of the European Union, Slovak Republic v. Achmea

B.V., ECLI:EU:C:2018:158 (Mar. 6, 2018), and Republic of Moldova v. Komstroy LLC,

ECLI:EU:C:2021:655 (Sept. 2, 2021). According to Croatia, these decisions show that EU law

would “negate the existence of any arbitration agreement under the ECT.” ECF No. 31-1 at 23.

The problem for Croatia is that Spain tried to make the same argument, relying on the same cases,

in NextEra and the D.C. Circuit rejected it. The court acknowledged Achmea and Komstroy and it

held, notwithstanding those decisions, that the ECT is an arbitration agreement within the meaning

of the FSIA’s arbitration exception. See NextEra,

. The court explained that this

argument—that the ECT’s arbitration provision “does not extend to EU nationals”—goes to “the

scope of the Energy Charter Treaty, not its existence.”

. And “disputes about the scope

of an arbitration agreement, such as whether a binding arbitration agreement covers a particular

dispute, are not jurisdictional questions under the FSIA.”

at 1101 (quoting Stileks,

). 2

2 Croatia argues this Court can overlook the D.C. Circuit’s awareness of Achmea and Komstroy, saying the court analyzed those cases “only in connection” with part of its analysis and overlooked them in later analysis which begins on the very same page. ECF No. 31-1 at 23; see NextEra, 112 F.4th at 1102–03. The Court declines to read the Circuit’s opinion that way. Croatia also tries to repackage this argument under the “act of state” doctrine, which “precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,

(1964). But the relevant “act of state”—a determination that the ECT’s arbitration provision “does not extend to EU nationals”—runs headfirst into the D.C. Circuit’s holding that such questions go to “the scope of the Energy Charter Treaty, not its existence.” NextEra,

. This argument goes to the merits, not jurisdiction—indeed, Croatia itself appears to acknowledge as much. See ECF No. 31-1 at 27 (observing that the act of state doctrine “ordinarily is a defense on the merits” and asserting, without citation, that here it “presents a threshold FSIA issue”). As described below, Croatia’s act of state argument fails as to the merits as well. 5 Second, and relatedly, Croatia says the second jurisdictional fact, an arbitration award, does

not exist because the ICSID tribunal “knew of Komstroy before issuing its Award” and therefore

“could not have even ‘purported to make an award pursuant to the ECT.’” ECF No. 31-1 at 33

(quoting Stileks,

). But, again, the relevant question for the purposes of jurisdiction

is “the existence of an award,” and MOL has made that showing. Chevron Corp.,

.

Binding circuit precedent forecloses Croatia’s challenges to jurisdiction based on the scope

of the ECT and the ICSID award. Arguments about “[w]hether the ECT applies to the dispute” and

“why the ECT may not apply to the dispute” are not jurisdictional under the FSIA. NextEra,

(quoting Stileks, 985 F.3d at 878–79). 3

B. Merits

Croatia’s renewed motion to dismiss also argues that MOL’s petition fails to state a claim

upon which this Court can grant relief, for three reasons: the arbitration award is not entitled to

full faith and credit; the act of state defense bars enforcement of the ICSID award; and the foreign

sovereign compulsion doctrine bars enforcement. None of these arguments is persuasive.

The Court must accept the petition’s well-pled factual allegations as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in MOL’s favor. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). The Court

may also consider “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters

of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Francis

Xavier Parochial Sch.,

(D.C. Cir. 1997). A respondent may argue for dismissal

3 Croatia separately raises arguments about personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens, but acknowledges they are foreclosed by binding precedent. See ECF No. 31-1 at 37–38. The Court accordingly rejects those bases for dismissal as well. 6 based on an affirmative defense only “when the facts that give rise to the defense are clear from

the face of the” petition. Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1998). 4

1. The ICSID award is entitled to full faith and credit.

Croatia first argues that MOL’s petition should be dismissed because the ICSID award is

not entitled to full faith and credit. According to Croatia, European law would not recognize the

arbitration agreement and this Court should thus find that ICSID “lacked adjudicative authority”

to arbitrate MOL’s claims and that the resulting award is unenforceable. ECF No. 31-1 at 41. This

argument is unsound.

The ICSID Convention, to which the United States is a party, provides that the courts of

member states act as “courts of enforcement, not review” of ICSID awards. Valores Mundiales,

S.L. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones

Exteriores,

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (citing ICSID Convention art. 54(1)). By signing

the Convention, member states agree to recognize an award “as binding,” to “enforce the pecuniary

obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in

that State,” and to “treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent

state.” ICSID Convention art. 54(1). Congress’s implementing legislation accordingly instructs

that the “pecuniary obligations imposed by” an ICSID award “shall be enforced and shall be given

the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction

4 In their briefing, the parties agree that the ordinary standards and civil rules of procedure apply in evaluating MOL’s petition to enforce. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”). The Court thus applies the ordinary rules and standards, consistent with the practice of other courts. See Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. CV 23-2701,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2024); Micula v. Gov’t of Romania,

(D.D.C. 2015); Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

(2d Cir. 2017). 7 of one of the several states.” 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a). MOL’s ICSID award is accordingly binding

and entitled to full faith and credit, as though it were a final judgment from another state.

To be sure, as Croatia points out, a “judgment of a court in one State is conclusive upon

the merits in another State only if the court in the first State had power to pass on the merits—had

jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment.” ECF No. 31-1 at 40 (quoting Underwriters Nat’l

Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n,

(1982)).

Accordingly, courts “may inquire into the jurisdictional basis of [a] foreign court’s decree” and

“need not” give full faith and credit if “that court did not have jurisdiction.” Underwriters,

. But this exception is limited and “must yield to the prohibition against relitigation.”

Valores,

. In Underwriters, the Supreme Court made clear “a judgment is entitled

to full faith and credit—even as to questions of jurisdiction—when the second court’s inquiry

discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court

which rendered the original judgment.” Underwriters,

(quoting Durfee v. Duke,

(1963)).

Here, Croatia explicitly pressed its jurisdictional arguments, and they were fully and fairly

litigated, during the ICSID arbitration. ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 454–89. The tribunal rejected Croatia’s

arguments and concluded it had jurisdiction over MOL’s claims. Id. ¶ 488. Because “the matter

was fully considered and finally determined,” the ICSID award is “entitled to full faith and credit.”

Underwriters,

. 5

5 In addition to this circumscribed inquiry into whether there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit has said it is appropriate for courts to consider disputes as to the authenticity of an ICSID award and whether ICSID itself “would treat the award as binding.” Valores,

. Croatia does not dispute either here. 8 2. The act of state defense does not apply.

Croatia next argues that the act of state doctrine bars enforcement of the award. The act of

state doctrine “precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public

acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.” Sabbatino,

. It applies as a defense when the relief sought “would require a court in the United

States to declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory.”

McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (alteration

omitted) (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,

(1990)). The doctrine applies only “when a court must decide—that is, when the outcome of

the case turns upon—the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign.” W.S. Kirkpatrick,

.

Croatia argues that enforcement of the arbitration award would require the Court “to deny

the validity of multiple sovereign acts,” including the European Union Court of Justice’s opinions

in Achmea and Komstroy and declarations of the EU and its Member States. ECF No. 31-1 at 28.

But that is not accurate. To enforce the arbitration award, this Court need not opine on the validity

of any foreign opinion or declaration. The ICSID Convention and its implementing legislation

provide that the award is to be treated as a final judgment and that disputes of the nature Croatia

raises are to be resolved by ICSID, not by this Court. The Convention states that an “award shall

be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those

provided for in th[e] Convention.” ICSID Convention art. 53(1). And those remedies allow parties,

by application to ICSID’s Secretary-General, to bring disputes about the “meaning or scope of an

award”; “request revision of the award” based on discovery of new decisive facts; and seek

“annulment of the award” if the tribunal was not properly constituted, exceeded its powers, was

infected with corruption, departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or failed to state its 9 reasons.

arts. 50-52. None of these allow Croatia to bring this act of state challenge to the award

in this Court, and none contemplates this Court passing on the validity of foreign acts of state as

an additional layer of review of the award. Congress’s implementing statute similarly commands

that ICSID awards “shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the

award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several states.” 22

U.S.C. § 1650a(a). 6

Under the governing authorities, this Court is called upon to “do no more than examine the

judgment’s authenticity and enforce the obligations imposed by the award.” Mobil Cerro Negro,

. And accordingly, “[n]othing in the present suit requires the Court to declare

invalid, and thus ineffective as a rule of decision for the courts of this country, the official act of a

foreign sovereign.” W.S. Kirkpatrick,

(citation omitted); see also Blasket,

, at *12 (rejecting act of state defense to ICSID award because court’s role “is cabined

to examining ICSID’s jurisdiction over the dispute, the authenticity of the award, and whether

ICSID would treat the award as binding” (citing Valores,

)). 7

6 As the D.C. Circuit has noted, Congress did not even afford ICSID awards the limited judicial review available under the Federal Arbitration Act, into whether the award was “procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means” or rendered in excess of the arbitrator’s powers.

; 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a); see Valores,

(observing that Congress reduced the scope of review of ICSID awards “below even the extremely limited review available under the FAA” (citation omitted)). 7 The Court’s conclusion is reinforced by the fact that when a respondent asserts the act of state doctrine, it is an affirmative defense. See Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

(D.D.C. 2013) (citing Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger,

(D.C. Cir. 1984)); Konowaloff v. Metro. Museum of Art,

(2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Sum of $70,990,605,

(D.D.C. 2017) (“The act of state doctrine is an affirmative defense.”). Accordingly, at the motion to dismiss stage, the defense applies only “when the facts that give rise to the defense are clear from the face of the” petition. Smith-Haynie,

. 10 3. The foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine does not bar enforcement of the award.

Lastly, Croatia argues that principles of international comity prevent enforcement of the

award, according to the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine. This doctrine has been applied in

certain contexts “where a Court compels compliance with U.S. law in a manner that may put a

litigant at odds with its obligations under foreign law.” Blasket,

, at *13 (citing

examples); see also Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 cmt. 10 (2018). Croatia

argues that requiring it “to pay a judgment resulting from the Award would force Croatia to make

unlawful payments in violation of EU State-aid law” and “recognize and validate an award that

contravenes EU law.” ECF No. 31-1 at 43, 44.

The Court is not persuaded that international comity counsels against enforcement of an

ICSID award. “International comity ‘is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory

to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation.’” Usoyan v. Republic of Turkey,

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot,

(1895)). And it is “the

central precept of comity” that “the decisions of foreign tribunals should be given effect in

domestic courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation and encourages reciprocity,

thereby promoting predictability and stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations.” Laker

Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,

(D.C. Cir. 1984). It would be

contrary to that precept to set aside an ICSID award that resulted from several years of arbitration

before a tribunal convened under a multilateral agreement between nations. To the contrary, as one

court in this District put it, “comity concerns are essentially ‘baked in’ to the ICSID convention

and its implementing statute.” Blasket,

, at *13. Indeed, Croatia itself recognized

the finality of ICSID awards by signing the ICSID Convention, which provides that awards are

binding and not subject to appeal or any other remedy. ICSID Convention art. 53(1); ECF No. 1

11 ¶ 8 n.2. And this Court is bound by Congress’s determination that courts “shall” enforce ICSID

awards. 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a). 8

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Croatia’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 31, is denied.

AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge

Date: April 16, 2025

8 Relying on a declaration, Croatia argues that following an order to enforce the award could put it in violation of EU law, creating a conflict between U.S. law and its foreign obligations. ECF No. 31-1 at 44. Even setting aside the propriety of relying on a declaration outside the pleadings at this stage, this is insufficient to trigger the compulsion doctrine in this context. To begin with, Croatia does not provide any evidence to indicate that the consequences it mentions, such as sanctions, are certain or even likely. See Blasket,

, at *14 (“[W]hen considering whether comity considerations should stay the judiciary’s hand, many U.S. courts have considered the certainty to which the party will face consequences abroad.”). Moreover, as a court in this District aptly noted in response to a similar argument, Croatia’s proposed solution—declining to enforce the ICSID award—would just create its own conflict, placing the United States in violation of its obligations to recognize the award under the ICSID Convention. See

at *13 (citing ICSID Convention art. 54(1)). 12